

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AND COLLEAGUES IN ALLIED DEPARTMENTS

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THE EDITORS OF THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
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GEORGE BURMAN FOSTER

PROFESSOR OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

AND FROM ITS FOUNDATION ONE OF THE

EDITORS OF THE "JOURNAL"

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

Volume XXIII

JANUARY 1919

Number I

THE PRESENT PROBLEM OF THE SUPPLY AND THE TRAINING OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY IN ENGLAND

ALFRED E. GARVIE

New College, University of London, England

The problem of the ministry in England is at present very serious and urgent: It is twofold. Not only is the supply of candidates inadequate for the needs of the churches, but the need of change in the methods of training is being widely felt and freely discussed. Even before the war the problem existed, but the war has made it very much more acute. For nearly four years no students, with a few insignificant exceptions, have been admitted to the theological colleges, and the courses of most of those already in college have been interrupted by military service or other forms of national work. The churches have not made any endeavor to secure exemption for their students and are already being confronted with and will still more have to face an alarming shortage in the numbers of thoroughly trained men to carry on the work of the ministry. The knowledge which it has been possible to gain of religion and morals in the army has brought home to the churches a fact that might have been known before, that the majority of men are, if not hostile, at least indifferent to the churches and to their testimony and influence. And there has been much searching of heart. If the churches are not reaching the masses of the nation, what is wrong in their methods of work? How far is the

ministry to be blamed? And what defects have there been in training men for the ministry? It is felt that the close of the war will offer an opportunity, unexampled in its extent and importance, for the churches to do all they can in the work of reconstruction. It may interest readers of this *Journal* in America, where the same problem essentially will arise, to know what is being thought and done about it in England.

I

It is hoped, and there are good grounds for the hope, that there will be a considerable number of men offering themselves to the colleges for training, especially for foreign mission work. While the experience of warfare has turned a few from their purpose to be Christian ministers, in a far larger number the influence has been to awaken or to quicken the desire to do work for the Kingdom of God which will in the future forbid the repetition of the horrors and calamities which have lately been experienced. The heads of the theological colleges are receiving letters of inquiry from the camps which give proof of such a movement. The men who have passed through the ordeal, moral and religious, of the war and emerge enriched in Christian experience and strengthened in Christian character will have the quality that will be needed in the coming days of stress and strain. There has been a great deal of discussion as to the special kind of training to be given to these men, but this subject will more fittingly be discussed in the second part of this essay. We need not then fear a permanent shortage of men for the ministry, although for three or four years after the war is over it may continue to be a serious question for the churches.

There is a danger in the present situation against which the churches may be forearmed by being forewarned. There is always a considerable number of men who desire to do the work of the ministry but are either unprepared or unqualified to undergo the training that is required. While there are exceptional cases of even extraordinary success on the part of untrained men, yet the majority of these men are not so gifted that they can do without training; and one may even venture to say that gifted men lose nothing but gain much by training. There has been even in the denominations

that allowed greater liberty, some would say even laxity, in the admission of such untrained men to the ministry, a tightening up of the rules for admission and a raising of the standard required, and it would be a serious injury to the churches if this progress were arrested, and if, under the pressure of a temporary emergency, the door of admission were again opened as widely as it once was. Yet if the colleges do not provide the churches with a sufficient number of men for their needs, it will be difficult to resist the demand that, at least temporarily, rules may be relaxed. The men admitted to meet the need of the moment would not be ready to withdraw when the need was met but would remain a permanent hindrance, in some cases at least, to the more efficient discharge of the duties of the ministry. As will be shown in the second part the need of the time is a more and not less efficient and consequently trained ministry.

It has been suggested that the shortage might be met without any real loss to the permanent interests of the Kingdom of God by a smaller number of churches. It must be admitted that in many villages and small towns there is a serious overlapping and consequent waste of effort, with even here and there the evils of jealousy, rivalry, and competition. In one town there may be two or even three Congregational or Baptist churches, where one building would be quite large enough to hold all who attend. In the villages different denominations have chapels, when there is need and room only for one. The relations of the free churches to one another are becoming so cordial and intimate that we have reason for believing that a serious effort will be made to remedy this defect; but the fact just mentioned, that there is overlapping in the same denomination, shows how difficult it is to avoid it with regard to different denominations. The widespread and deep-rooted movement toward Christian unity will, it may be hoped, more and more lessen this evil in the time to come. The present emergency has forced the pace, and denominations are now combining for common worship which would never have been induced to take such a step before. But the problem cannot be solved completely in this way. The greatest cities are not over-churched, and the world as a whole needs not less but more, and more earnest and competent

ministry from the churches. It is the hope and desire of the best men in all churches that they will be called and fitted to do a far greater work in the land than it has hitherto ever entered into their minds to conceive or expect. Very much of that work will be done by men and women not in the ordained ministry, and the peril of a one-man ministry in each church must certainly be avoided; but teachers and leaders for the workers will be needed, who give their whole time, strength, and gifts to their calling, and who have had the most thorough preparation for it that can be secured by them.

There are some who are looking, if not for a solution of the problem, yet for some relief in the present distress to the recognition of the ministry of women. The "woman" movement has been greatly advanced by the war, owing to the indispensable and invaluable service rendered by women in spheres hitherto closed to them. With this growing economic and political independence there has been awakened in not a few women the desire for greater moral and religious independence. It would be impossible adequately to estimate the value of the services rendered by women in the Christian churches; but with few exceptions the more responsible offices of the churches have been reserved for men. But highly educated and spiritually minded young women are feeling that the church does not offer them full opportunity for the free use of their talents and are turning to other forms of public service to give them what the church denies. Does not the shortage of men for the work of the churches supply the instant occasion for a serious consideration of their demand, which in any circumstances deserves the most respectful treatment?

Most churches do make and will continue to make a distinction between the ordained and the unordained ministry. There are churches in which there is no present prospect of the admission of women to the ordained ministry; but others are ready to consider the question. It has been decided that there is nothing in the Constitution of the Congregational Union of England and Wales to debar a woman from ordination; and one woman has been ordained after completing the regular course of training at a theological college. A conference of representatives of the theological colleges (Congregational) resolved to recommend to the colleges

"that provision be made by the colleges for the training of women for the Christian ministry on the same terms as men." Ancient trust deeds may, however, stand in the way of granting scholarships to women, and it may be necessary to try to secure new scholarships without any restrictive conditions as regards sex. What is to be insisted on, however, is that women shall be expected to reach as high a standard as men in their training. That does not mean that some subjects taught to men may not be omitted and some specially suitable for women be added, but it does mean that the way into the ministry must not be made easier for women than for men. Not only would this put women in the odious position of "blacklegs," but it would in the long run be injurious to the women themselves, who for efficiency need the training at least as much as men. It is not probable, however, that the number of women seeking to enter the ordained ministry, even when it is open to them, will be large. Only a few will be ready to submit to the training from five to seven years. Most women happily still look to the home as their sphere. Not less but more than ever after the war will there be need of Christian wifehood and motherhood. Nature has appointed that thus woman can render the highest service to the race. Perhaps there may be found a few women capable of combining the Christian ministry with the full responsibilities of the home. In many of the churches there is a strong feeling, especially among the women, against a woman ministry; and in any case women will not replace men in sufficient numbers to meet the whole need of the hour, and, fully trained, they will not be ready for the present emergency.

It is being recognized, however, that outside of the ordained ministry there is a great need of and much room for a varied service of women in the churches. In Sunday-school work, in social service, in pastoral visitation, the labors of the ordained ministry can be supplemented and supported by the efforts of women. For such work it is being recognized that training is no less necessary; and steps are being taken in several of the churches to provide training for women who might be willing to devote themselves to such tasks of Christian love. It will not duplicate the regular theological training but be adapted to the kind of service intended.

II

If the number of men available will be fewer, it is all the more necessary that they should be well trained and trained especially in two new directions: (1) leadership in the manifold forms of service which must in increasing measure fall on the membership of the churches if they are to fulfil their part in the community; and (2) personal competence to do the kind of work—educational, social, and moral—which the new conditions will demand, but which has so far either not been done at all or been done without adequate preparation to do it efficiently. There has been a gradual and yet certain development of opinion that the curriculum of the theological colleges which has come down to this generation needs modification. Progressive colleges here and there have been trying to face the present position with such resources as they can command. But it is being realized that more needs to be done than has as yet seemed at all practicable, and by mutual counsel and help the theological colleges are endeavoring to accomplish what it hitherto seemed even rash to attempt.

We must distinguish between measures which it may be necessary to take to meet the immediate emergency, the measures which must be taken in the new conditions, and the fresh realization which has come to many of what these new conditions mean for the permanent improvement of the training of the ministry. It is recognized that it will be impossible to ask men whose course at college has been interrupted for three or four years to resume it and complete it as if there had been no such break in its continuity. Very much ground in the way of knowledge will have been lost, and it will take a long time to recover slowly, as, for instance, in linguistic proficiency. Interests will have been awakened which will make most of the regular course appear a wearisome drudgery. An experience will have been gained and character formed amid the trying conditions of warfare which will to some extent at least compensate for a shorter than the usual period of training. This consideration will apply also to those who had not begun their course when called to military or other forms of service, and the delay in the commencement of their course must also be allowed for. Two conditions, however, must be observed: (1) that none shall be allowed the

modified course who have not had some kind of personal discipline which might be taken as in some sense an equivalent of the additional time spent in training; (2) that as regards practical efficiency in the ministry the modified course shall provide an adequate training. It is in the more distinctively academic side of the education that for a time at least some changes must, however reluctantly, be made, and for only such time as appears imperative.

I can from personal knowledge testify what a difference in Christian experience and character and consequent competence for the work of this ministry the painful discipline of warfare can make. Students who left as boys in outlook and ways return either from military service itself, or from Y.M.C.A. work, mature men with an insight, moral and religious, and a capacity for service which an academic training alone could never have given them. While it does seem imperative that a knowledge of Greek sufficient to allow an intelligent, scholarly study of the New Testament must, as far as is at all practicable, be insisted upon for all students for the Christian ministry, yet, where the acquisition of languages is difficult, Hebrew must be surrendered; but this must be compensated for by a more thorough instruction in the history, theology, and ethics of the Old Testament. Latin too must go, but some knowledge of classical literature, if only in translations, ought to take its place. A knowledge of the contents of the Bible, the great truths and duties of the Christian gospel, and the main features of the history of the church must be imparted. As it is not improbable that this class of man will not be attracted by scholarship so much as by the practical work of the ministry, training for that must be given in so scientific a way that it will serve as the mental discipline which a man must undergo if he is to have any pretensions to education. For instance, Sunday-school work must be based on psychology and pedagogy, and social reform on economics as well as ethics. Some of the colleges are already preparing curricula which will fulfil these requirements.

Turning now from the emergency to the regular curriculum, teachers of progressive outlook see at the present moment an opportunity for effecting reforms which it might have taken years to bring about, for conservatism finds a refuge even in theological

colleges; and it is not easy to get the churches so interested in the education of the ministry as to make adequately articulate, as is being done under the present pressure, the demand for the kind of ministers that they need. Several general considerations must be offered rather than details discussed.

1. While common sense would lead any teacher to recognize differences in interest, taste, and capacity in his scholars, the surer insight that psychology gives is leading to more accurate discrimination. It is being recognized that it is now impossible to force all the students into the same mold of preparation. There are men who come to college and very speedily show that they are qualified for scholarly pursuits. The capacity of some is specially linguistic, of others philosophical or scientific. Few there are who desire to make "all knowledge their province." The curricula in theological colleges hitherto have leaned unduly to the linguistic side. Science especially has a claim for further recognition as at least a preparation for the theological course. But any change in this direction is confronted with two difficulties: First, it seems to me that a man has not been properly trained for the Christian ministry who does not know enough Greek to read his New Testament in the original with interest and intelligence. Secondly, I have learned from experience with some of my students how difficult it is for any man who has had a predominantly scientific training to turn to the study of even one language. That a man who knows both Latin and Greek will use English words of classical origin with a finer appreciation of their exact meaning must be admitted, and to give up one of them is educationally a loss. But no less is it a loss for a man to be shut out altogether from the realm of science. The study of even one science is an invaluable discipline of the mind as well as an added interest for the life. Undue specialization in the arts course which should lead up to the theological is to be deprecated. While special aptitude must be recognized, a one-sided development must, if possible, be avoided. The Christian minister must be not merely a specialist in theology but a cultured man, and the wider the culture that is the setting of his specialism the better even for his theology. While there are theological teachers who regard a preparation in philosophy as rather a disadvantage to

their students, and while it must be recognized that there are philosophies that engender a bias against theology, yet it does seem to me that a theology which is not second-hand but first-hand can only be won by a man for himself, and not borrowed from others, when he has learned how to think things together as philosophy will teach him. Greater variety, however, is an insistent demand in the theological curriculum even on its more academic side.

2. The Christian minister of today is required to render far more varied services in his church and through his church to the community than the minister of a former generation. Sunday-school work, social reform, and moral guidance of society claim his instructed and intelligent support. Pastoral theology and homiletics do not exhaust the subjects which must be included in his practical training. He cannot be an expert in all these subjects, but he can at least know enough about them not to be either the foe or the slave of the experts. His preaching will gain from the knowledge of psychology and pedagogy which will enable him to lead competently the workers in his Sunday school. A study of economics will save him from making in the pulpit rash and foolish utterances into which his social sympathies, unregulated by knowledge, might betray him; and he will be the better able to guide the social service of the members of his church into the more profitable channels. Modern society needs moral leadership, the application of Christian principles to the complex conditions in which we find ourselves. No man's individual conscience is competent of itself to solve the many difficult problems. There must be a study of the science of ethics and the history of man's moral development, combined with a scholarly study and not merely a literalist interpretation of the New Testament. For students preparing for the mission field the practical training must be specialized. I have dealt with this topic in the *International Review of Missions* and cannot now discuss it further. There are several subjects which this class of students *must* know, and which men being trained for the home ministry would also be the better for knowing, that must be mentioned—the psychology of religion, the comparative study of religions, and the history of Christian missions. Some teachers fear that if a larger place is given to these subjects of

practical training the education will be less scholarly. We must enlarge our view of scholarship, and we must recognize that all these subjects are beginning to be dealt with in a less empirical and a more scientific way than formerly, although there is still room for progress. We must learn how to combine the practical and the academic so that "the man of God may be thoroughly furnished unto every good work." A greater variety of subjects must be included in the curriculum than hitherto.

3. There are students whose tastes are scholarly and students whose bent is practical, and the ministry has room and need for both. It is much to be desired that there be opened to scholars more posts in which they can use their talents for the enrichment of the knowledge and thought of the world. The churches should aspire to provide intelligent leadership as well as moral guidance, religious influence, and social service; and the theological colleges will not fulfil their part unless they give the scholarly student every help and encouragement. It is waste of effort, however, to try to make scholars out of the majority of students who offer themselves for the ministry. The experience of conversion, on the one hand, and the passion for souls, which are with many the desire and motive in the purpose to preach the gospel which bring them there, do not usually include any special aptitude for scholarship. The fact should be frankly recognized. Time that is now spent on Hebrew which is forgotten almost as soon as the college is left behind could be much more profitably employed in making them proficient for the particular tasks that await them. There are limits to human capacity and endurance, and we must give up the attempt to teach all the students all the subjects which should properly be included in a theological curriculum, or to carry them all on to the same stage of proficiency even in the subjects that each is taught. There must be no slackness allowed, and thoroughness must be required; but this demand, necessary even for the moral character of the students, can be made justly only when due account has been taken of a man's tastes and capacities.

4. Such a varied and adapted curriculum will make large demands on the scanty resources of the colleges. We in Great Britain look with envy to some of the theological colleges in America

with their large staffs of professors and lecturers. Four or five teachers is the maximum our colleges possess. There is a movement to relieve, if not altogether to remove, this defect which is of interest in itself. Many of the theological colleges have some kind of connection with the universities and so can take advantage of their teachers for the arts training and even, although this is not common, for some theological subjects. The colleges connected with a university, although of different denominations, are, as far as is practicable, co-operating, so that the combined staff may be able to provide a greater variety of subjects and preserve the necessary specialization by individual teachers. A proposal of this kind is being put into shape just now by three London colleges, Hackney, New (Congregationalist), and Regent's (Baptist); and it is hoped not only that provision will be made for greater variety in the ordinary curriculum, but that instruction will be afforded in post-graduate, advanced studies which may attract students from elsewhere. The horizon is widening, and we are now thinking of closer co-operation in future between the colleges throughout the British Commonwealth and the colleges of the United States of America. It were well if the bond that is so closely drawing together all the English-speaking peoples were made even closer, not only by common moral and religious interests, but also by their rational interpretation in a Christian theology which could offer leadership in the things of God to the world.

THE WAR AND THE DILEMMA OF THE CHRISTIAN ETHIC

JOHN M. MECKLIN
University of Pittsburgh

I

One of the striking characteristics of the present time is its uncertainty as to the nature of ultimate religious loyalties. Science, higher criticism, the disconcerting effect of evolution upon authoritarianism, the rise of a secularized social conscience, the unfortunate alliance of Protestantism with the discredited pecuniary individualism of business, the sudden and radical transition from the provincial estate of a "nation of villagers" to a tense, highly mutualized, industrial civilization, dominated by the chaotic and irresponsible life of the city, and finally the cataclysm of a world-war—these are some of the things that have bewildered our spiritual leaders and made them lose their bearings. The conscience of the church, together with that of the community, is little more today than "a heterogeneous collection of provincial moralities."

This prevailing uncertainty as to the bearing of religion upon life appears in the feverish attempts that are being made to reconcile the ethic of Jesus with the Christian patriot's duty in the present world-war. There is, in spite of individual utterances of Jesus to the contrary, a very general conviction that the essential spirit and intent of his teachings are opposed to war. This general conviction has given rise to an uncomfortable dilemma, which we may state as follows. If we accept the spirit of Jesus' utterances as final, as orthodox Christianity has always professed to do, then the ethical sanctions for war that have been built up within historical Christianity are false and should be repudiated. On the other hand, if it be granted that institutionalized Christianity's moral sanctions for war are valid and meet the approval of the best men of every age, including the hosts of Christian men who are enlisting

in the present great crusade to make the world safe for democracy, then we must be honest with ourselves and say that the moral ideal cherished by Jesus and his immediate followers, an ideal in which, as we shall see, war had no place, cannot be considered binding upon the consciences of men under all conditions and in every age. We cannot consistently accept the deliverances of the consciences of Jesus, John, Origen, Tertullian, and Lactantius as to war while in actual reality we are ordering our lives in this matter of an appeal to force according to the ethical teachings of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and the great body of Christians of today.

It is not a question as to the patriotic Christian's duty under existing circumstances. The conscience of the great body of institutionalized Christianity is entirely clear as to its duty to obey the call to arms. Never was that call issued in a more righteous cause. It is not a question as to the attitude of historical Christianity toward war. The church from the days of Ambrose and Augustine has sought and found ethical sanction for the use of force. The problem is one of intellectual consistency or, if you please, of intellectual honesty. Stated in its broadest terms, the question is as to whether we can accept the moral sentiments of one age or group, even though it be the group that surrounded Jesus, as final for all succeeding ages in which new and unforeseen contingencies arise and where the moral sentiments of men are organized in terms of totally different social, political, and economic environments. Must we say that the attitude of Jesus toward war and all forms of brutality and violence was final only for himself and his immediate group, as giving expression to their interpretation of the ethical ideal, or must we claim with an authoritarian ethic that the deliverances of the moral consciousness of Jesus are final for all succeeding ages? This is the dilemma of the Christian ethic offered by the present international situation.

It is of course quite common for the apologist for the finality and authoritativeness of the Christian ethic to escape from the present dilemma by asserting that did Jesus live today and were he faced with the same problems that face the moral and spiritually minded men of this nation he would undoubtedly act as the Christian patriots are acting when they enlist for the purpose of killing their

fellow-men. Stated in this broad fashion, this purely hypothetical formulation of the problem appeals to the uncritical moral sense of the average man and seems to secure the sanction of Jesus' example for war. In reality this hypothetical statement involves vicious and unpardonable jugglings with the facts of psychology and of social evolution. In the first place the Jesus developed from childhood to maturity within the present social order would be an entirely different personality, with a different measure of moral values, from that of the historical Jesus whose moral sentiments were shaped by the simple, peace-loving village life of the Palestine of the first century. On the other hand, speculations as to what the moral reactions of the historical Jesus would be were he suddenly placed in the midst of this war-torn world can hardly give us a satisfactory solution of the problem.

II

The various attempts that have been made to avoid this dilemma reveal the chaos prevalent in contemporary religious thought. On the whole the Roman Catholic moralist has succeeded better than the orthodox Protestant in maintaining intellectual consistency, for the authoritarian ethic of the Catholic church is not confined to the ethical teachings of the Bible. Side by side with the utterances of Jesus stands the vast body of ethical traditions gradually accumulated in the effort to rationalize the developing moral experience of the church. This organized body of ethical traditions dealing with war was a slow growth.¹ Its earliest lineaments appear in Ambrose. These were further elaborated by Augustine. In the thirteenth century Aquinas embodied the theses of Augustine in the ethical portions of his great *summa*. The theologians of the sixteenth century, Vitoria and Suarez, gave final formulation to the Roman Catholic ethic of war. The sanity of this body of ethical tradition is evinced by the fact that Grotius, the formulator of the law of nations as to war, made large use of it in his work *de jure belli et pace*, published in 1625.²

¹ A. C. McGiffert, "Christianity and War: A Historical Sketch," *American Journal of Theology*, XIX, 323 ff.

² Mgr. Batifol, "The Catholic Church and War," *Constructive Quarterly*, III, 199.

Fundamental for the Catholic ethic of war is the contention, which differentiates it perhaps more than anything else from Protestantism, of an essential unity underlying all those values that have emerged and secured a more or less permanent place in Christian civilization. To be sure the gap between the world of absolute values represented by the Kingdom of God and the immediate social order, bequeathed by early Christian ethic, remained for centuries, though Ambrose and other patristic thinkers sought to bridge it by means of the social philosophy of the Stoa. The dualism appears in its most uncompromising form in Augustine's *City of God*. In the course of time, however, the lust of a secularized church for power, the rise of a feudal society in which class distinctions were based upon status, the growing emphasis of social values due to the development of trade, and the emergence of an intensive and self-conscious civilization made imperative the formulation of a social and ethical philosophy that would assure to the church the continued loyalty of men by showing that only in the church could all the values represented by different social activities find fitting recognition. The brain of the "angelic doctor" provided the alembic for the subtle process of distilling these values from the "spotted actuality" of society and building them into a permanent and thought-satisfying scheme.

Into the philosophical retort, from which finally emerged the finished product of Thomas Aquinas' great *summa*, many elements entered. Among them we find the *jus naturale* of the Stoics, the Decalogue and militant Old Testament ethics, the pacifism of the Sermon on the Mount, the mystical idealism of neo-Platonism now permanently institutionalized in the *vita contemplativa* of the monastery, the traditions of the Fathers, and last, but not least, the architectonic elements of the thought of Aristotle. The significant thing for the problem of war was that, by thus taking over the Aristotelian conception of an evolving moral order regulated by an ascending scale of forms or values, it became possible for Aquinas to ascribe to all the various activities of the different social groups a definite function and a unique moral dignity. To be sure he introduced the principle of relativity into the moral order, but without it he would hardly have been able to include the radical

pacifism of Jesus and the profession of arms in the same general ethical scheme. The church, in blessing the sword of the knight, recognized the moral value of the profession of arms; but by excluding the clergy from military service, as was done at the council of Chalcedon in 451, the church also recognized the higher ethic of nonresistance. This was not intended to be a condemnation of militarism, for the monk was permitted, nay enjoined, to pray for the success of the arms he was not allowed to wield. The rights and duties of knight and saint were measured in terms of their peculiar status and function in a comprehensive moral order.

It is of course entirely obvious that this artificial segmentation of ethics into a series of ends determined by status, while offering an apparent solution of the problem of war, destroyed the essential unity of the moral life and abridged the notion of individuality; for the moral unity of Aquinas' system had slight basis in the facts of life; it was merely the logical and metaphysical justification for the church's claim of complete control of the life of the mediaeval man. The contention that all the moral capacities of the individual could find full and adequate expression in the limited group life to which he was confined by the principle of status is psychologically and ethically false. The modern conception of the individual insists that the attainment of the moral ideal is only possible where each shares as far as possible in the larger life of the whole. The Catholic ethic of war has, however, always appealed to the moral common sense of Christianity. It seems to solve the problem by superinducing upon the social order an unreal and arbitrary scheme of values. But if we accept the early Christian ideal and seek to incorporate it in any real sense in the existing social order, it may be seriously doubted whether this can be done without adopting some such scheme of ethical relativism as we find in the philosophy of Aquinas. The appeal of the Catholic ethic of war is due to the fact that it is after all a moral compromise growing out of the practical exigencies of institutionalized Christianity. The Catholic Christian, therefore, who follows the ethical traditions of the Fathers as to war finds it much easier to answer the call to arms with a

clear conscience than the orthodox Protestant who accepts as supreme the authority of the pacifist ethic of Jesus.¹

III

Of all the solutions offered from the Protestant point of view, the Quaker's ethic of war, perhaps, has most in common with the attitude of Jesus. For the Quaker, war is a "hideous denial" of the Christian faith. Hodgkin, secretary of the London Friends Foreign Missionary Association, quotes with approval the suggestion of George Bernard Shaw, that the best course for the church to pursue would be "to close our professedly Christian churches the moment war is declared by us, and reopen them only on the signing of peace. . . . This would act as a powerful reminder that, though the glory of war is a famous and ancient glory, it is not the final glory of God."² The Quaker claims that Tertullian's famous dictum, "the Lord in disarming Peter unbelted every soldier" (*De Idol.* 19), describes the attitude of the masses of early Christians toward war.³

The classical expression of the Quaker's attitude toward war is found in the address delivered to Charles II in 1660:

We utterly deny all outward wars and strife, and fighting with outward weapons, for any end or under any pretense whatever; this is our testimony to the whole world. The spirit of Christ by which we are guided is not changeable, so as once to command us from a thing as evil, and again to move into it; and we certainly know and testify to the world that the spirit of Christ, which leads us into all truth, will never move us to fight and war against any man with outward weapons, neither for the Kingdom of Christ, nor for the kingdom of this world.⁴

¹ Wright, "A Sixteenth Century Theologian and the Present War," *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, July, 1917, pp. 397 ff.

² Hodgkin, "The Church and War," *Constructive Quarterly*, III, 215.

³ It is interesting to quote in this connection the language of a great scholar of militaristic Germany: "Es bedarf nicht weiterer Worte, um festzustellen, dass das Evangelium alle Gewalt ausschliesst und nichts Kriegerisches an sich hat oder auch nur dulden will. Wie zum Überfluss—aber es war nicht überflüssig—ist Matth. 26, 52 noch gesagt: 'Steck dein Schwert ein; denn wer zum Schwert greift, wird durchs Schwert umkommen,' und daran schliesst sich die Mitteilung, dass der Vater im Himmel sein Werk auf Erden nicht durch Legionen kriegerischer Engel ausführen wolle (s. auch Joh. 18, 36) (Adolf Harnack, *Militia Christi*, p. 2).

⁴ Quoted by Hodgkin, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

The foregoing language indicates by its constant repudiation of "outward" wars and "outward" weapons that we can only predicate moral character of spiritual struggles. Hence the Quaker insists that if we would rightly interpret the mind of Jesus we must eliminate the use of force from the sphere of the moral. "The kingdom of God is within you." The Quaker contends that to drop to the lower level of force is to stultify the essential spirit of him who said, "My kingdom is not of this world else would my soldiers fight." To take the sword does not further moral and spiritual values; it can only be used under conditions where those values are purposely violated and ignored. Institutionalized Christianity is committed, in name at least, to a struggle the terms of which are spiritual, while in point of fact she denies her lofty traditions. She appeals to God for help against her enemies and then repudiates the spiritual and moral order that is presupposed in such an appeal when she arms her members and sends them forth to battle. The proof of the truth of Jesus' attitude, for the Quaker, is found in the fact that by being true to it even unto death he won for the cause of righteousness and truth a victory that no earthly conqueror has ever been able to equal.

The Quaker finds the root of Jesus' opposition to war in his great doctrine of love. The Kingdom of God is to be a dispensation of love, and perfect love casts out war and strife and fear. The logic of the ethic of war when carried to its conclusion means the utter destruction of all those things which make life desirable, and finally the elimination of life itself. The logic of love is life and that evermore abundant. The sheer necessity for self-preservation and the continued existence of all those values which enter into civilization and the higher life of man makes it imperative that he should cultivate the ethic of love. War is a cruel and expensive luxury. It is only possible on a large scale where the problems of government, of economics, and of science have been mastered and where medical skill has so far conquered disease as to insure an abundant population, so that man can indulge in his ancient pastime of human butchery. War is a royal luxury, the sport of kings who have skillfully cajoled their loyal subjects into breeding and training *Kanonenfuller* wherewith to make a Roman holiday. And when war,

with its frightfulness, its wastefulness, its unspeakable folly, its cruelty and lust, has left society exhausted, bleeding from a thousand wounds, and poisoned by hate, its temples in ruins, its homes in ashes, its women the spoil of the ravisher, love takes up her eternal task of healing and of life and reconstructs the fair fabric of civilization.

The principle of love, so fundamental in the ethic of Jesus, can never be neglected in any sane and comprehensive philosophy of civilization. It matters little what dress we give it—psychological, sociological, biological, or theological—the principle itself is too fundamental, too thoroughly human, to be ignored.

The fundamental law that Christ enunciated, as true and necessary for man's well-being as the laws of physics and hygiene, is that there is an underlying kinship between man and man and that trust and co-operation between men lead to life more abundant, just as their opposites lead to death. He put it that we *ought* to love one another. Another way of stating it is that we *must* or we shall be punished for it, just as certainly and just as automatically as if we disobey the law of gravity. This principle may appear silly or unmanly or unfair; the point is that it is *true*. To forgive one's enemies may seem an unreasonable thing to do, but no one can call it impractical—it works, whilst its opposite does not.¹

IV

The pacifist ethic of the Quaker, however, has called out, especially in England, vigorous protests on the part of those passionately enamored of justice and indignant at the impotent cry, "Forgive, forgive, love, love."² This group, while recognizing the moral pre-eminence of Jesus, refuses to believe that he can reject force as an instrument for insuring justice. "His conduct and character are unhesitatingly founded upon perfect justice, wise, discriminating justice, and such an idea includes a background of force, even though patient explanation and gentle entreaty stand full in the foreground" (p. 489).

These writers start from the very real and terrible facts of the present struggle. They see solemn covenants treated as mere

¹ Bolton, "The Fulfilment of the Law," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXVII, 202, 203.

² Maynard, "The Love Which Is Not the Fulfilling of the Law," *Hibbert Journal*, XV, 479 ff.

"scraps of paper"; they see neutral countries devastated as with a very besom of destruction; they see the deepest instincts of men violated by brutes in human form. Filled with this passionate desire for justice they come to the ethic of Jesus, demanding something more than a sentimental and passivist ethic of love; they want a sanction for the use of force. In direct opposition to the Quaker's point of view these thinkers insist that the social and political order, with the rights and human values concerned, must take precedence over the impotent ethic of non-resistance of the pacifist. "The war is, thank Heaven, not one of religion but of ethics" (p. 487).

Religion and ethics are not only differentiated, but the latter is preferred as giving the most effective basis for action. It is even insisted that the ethic of love and forgiveness can only be exercised because brave hearts are willing to fight for the sterner ethic of justice. It is this sterner ethic of justice that makes possible the ethic of love by assuring to it a stable social order. The ethic of love, therefore, is something of a spiritual luxury made possible by the law and order achieved in the eternal *Kampf um das Recht*. This militant ethic agrees with the note struck by secular moralists from the days of Aristotle to the present, to wit, that simple justice is the most fundamental element in the entire moral order. The ethic of love and forgiveness may supplement the ethic of simple justice, but can never supplant it.

This group pours out its scorn, furthermore, upon the lack of finer ethical discrimination and the atmosphere of sentimentalism so often associated with the ethic of love and nonresistance. To love all alike, saint and sinner, enemy and friend, the stranger as well as those of your own household, is to introduce confusion into our scheme of moral values and to make of love an essentially immoral thing. Such an indiscriminating love can only be predicated of a fool or of a god.

There is, indeed, inherent in the nature and constitution of every powerful sentiment something that is incompatible with strict justice, for powerful systems of feeling are prejudiced and self-centered. They arbitrarily select their own objects; they create their own measures of values. What furthers the mother's

love for her child is good, what antagonizes it is bad. Curiously enough this essential partiality of strong sentiments, especially that of love, has been capitalized in Christian theology of the predestinarian type. The supreme charm of divine goodness is found in the fact that, following the promptings of his own love, God has selected some, though undeserving, for the enjoyment of eternal bliss, while neglecting others whose claims are quite as strong. This sovereign love scorns even-handed justice and transforms what would be a hideous injustice from the human standpoint into a token of transcendent goodness. This very inequity of the divine grace elicits in the hearts of the redeemed a gratitude and passionate devotion for the adequate expression of which the infinite lapses of eternity are all too short.

It is doubtless a fundamental distrust of our ability to base an ethical system or a sound social philosophy upon a sentiment or an emotional attitude, even though that sentiment be love, the noblest of all, that has evoked the criticisms of the Christian ethic of love by the sober students of morals. Hobhouse writes:

The conception of a brotherhood of love based on the negation of self is demonstrably inadequate to the problem of reorganizing society and intelligently directing human efforts. Even on the personal side it is deficient, for human progress depends on the growth and perfecting of faculty, and therefore requires that provision be made for a self-development which is not selfishness but builds up a better personality on a basis of self-repression. Equally on the social side the ideal of loving self-surrender is beautiful, but not always right. Utter self-sacrifice is magnificent, but it is not justice, and justice and reciprocity are even more essential elements in any commonwealth that can survive and include average humanity within it than the readiness to resign all for the sake of others—a willingness which can hardly be made a universal rule without bringing action to a standstill.¹

V

A word must be devoted in this connection to a group which for lack of a better name we may call militant ecclesiastics. They represent for the most part staunch churchmen who are more interested in demonstrating the patriotism and loyalty of the church at this crucial moment than in the critical interpretation

¹ *Morals in Evolution* (3d ed.), p. 524.

of the mind of Jesus. They are from the very nature of the situation then special pleaders. Hence it is not at all surprising that in their zeal to discover something in the records more warlike than the passivist mandates of an ethic of nonresistance they are led to read into the language of the gospels meanings which in many cases are more than doubtful. For example, a writer who selects for his theme "The Warlike Context of the Gospels" begins by asking, "What would Jesus teach if he were in our midst today?" Throughout a dozen pages or more the evidence is piled up to show how the fighting instinct must have been encouraged in Jesus. From infancy he was familiar with the Old Testament, "a book of war"; naturally the warlike traditions of his family, the exploits of Gideon, Barak, David, and the rest, who "subdued kingdoms, waxed valiant in fight, turned to flight the armies of aliens," would be familiar to his ear from childhood; his most intimate associates were the pugnacious "sons of thunder"; he was born among the Galileans, whom Josephus describes as "men inured to war."

Thus is the way paved for the triumphant reply to the question raised at the start:

And this Christ did he stand forth out of the dim and distant past and appear in England today . . . would he not bid us call to mind the exhortation of Jehovah to another Jesus, on the borders of the promised land, "Have not I commanded thee?" Resolve on war: came it not from noblest motives? "Be strong therefore and of good courage; be not afraid, neither be thou dismayed; for the Lord thy God is with thee" [Josh. 1:9].

Such language may have a certain apologetic and hortatory value; it is hardly satisfying to the serious student because it ignores many of the acts and utterances of Jesus.

Another writer finds that Jesus sanctions war in the parable of the Wolf and the Shepherd.

Aggressive war is one of the expressions of the wolf-spirit, at present dominant in man. The antithesis of the wolf-spirit is the shepherd-spirit, at present nascent, weak, but growing in man. Its ideal is freedom; freedom for all; freedom for life and spirit; freedom from the wolf; and it does not bar violence in combating the wolf.²

¹ Rev. Charles Hargrove, *Hibbert Journal*, XIV, 366 f.

² Rev. J. M. Wilson, canon of Worcester, "Christ's Sanction as Well as Condemnation of War," *Hibbert Journal*, XIII, 840.

Into the simple framework of Jesus' thought with its otherworldly tinge is then read all the accumulated wisdom of modern science as reconstructed by Darwinism.

I take it to mean that the wolf-spirit, which grasps power and dominance for itself, which runs through all history, tribal and national, which has been inherited by us from countless generations of prehistoric ancestors, shall gradually give way in human nature, as the shepherd-spirit—which desires abundant life for all, and will fight, if need be, for freedom, if freedom cannot be secured otherwise—grows in strength [p. 844].

One may sympathize with the immediate and pressing obligation of the spiritual leader to find moral sanctions for his hearers during a great crisis such as now faces the Christian world. It is unfortunate, however, that the performance of this task seems to be inseparable from a certain laxity of thought and a disregard for the intellectual consistency which demands in the interest of truth that we discriminate between the necessary limitations of Jesus' thought when this parable was spoken and the modern moral or scientific values which the preacher finds it necessary to read into the parable to make his message effective. It is doubtless entirely legitimate to make use of great classical religious utterances, such as the parables of Jesus, as symbols around which we can drape our own moral and spiritual enthusiasms and through which we can give effective expression to the human values which appear supreme in our lives at the present moment. But there must inevitably be confusion of thought where all these varying symbolic usages of Jesus' words and parables are identified with the actual emotions and ideas that accompanied these words in his own mind. It is of course entirely obvious that the thought of Jesus cannot be made to stand sponsor for the Quaker ethic of nonresistance as well as the militant ethic of the patriotic churchman.

VI

Perhaps the most numerous group of apologists for the Christian ethic is composed of those who take middle ground between the pacifist ethic of the Quaker and the militant groups we have just discussed. They insist, as a rule, upon the essential moral supremacy of the Christian ethic but frankly acknowledge its impracticability in the present militaristic stage of social evolution. "The

ethics of the Sermon on the Mount were promulgated for those who became, or were to become, citizens of a very real kingdom, but one not of this world."¹ There are, to be sure, real moral values in the kingdoms of earth as well as in the Kingdom of Heaven, but the two spheres are not the same; each has its own ethic. The ideal is to be attained when the ethic of the world with its fighting spirit is absorbed into the higher ethic of Jesus with its "resist not evil."

The responsibility for this rather awkward dualism between the sphere of the perfect ideal of Jesus' pacifist ethic and the militant ethic of actual society is sought, not in the inherent difficulties growing out of any attempt at a faithful reproduction of the original spirit and intent of the ethic of Jesus as to force, but in the weakness of human nature and the imperfections of society.

It is altogether beside the mark, then, to rave about the violation of the Christian ethic in modern warfare of nations, seeing that the ethic only applies where it is voluntarily accepted, and its judgment only where there has been light in which it might have been accepted. As a matter of fact, those nations, which are merely Christian by courtesy of speech, act naturally in fighting, just as the true servant of Christ in abstaining from fighting acts naturally also [p. 221].

Taking for granted the finality and the feasibility of the early Christian ethic as to war, a very cheap and easy way out of the difficulty is thus achieved by asserting that the apparent failure of the Christian ethic is due to the fact that it has never really been tried—"it is idle for us to talk about the Christian ethic until we seek to understand it by living it" (p. 224). Here the tacit but dubious assumption is made that it is not only psychologically possible but that it is the height of ethical wisdom to strive to reproduce, as far as possible, in exact detail the organizations of emotions and sentiments that found expression in Jesus' ethic of nonresistance. It is assumed that this ethic, beautiful and attractive as it has always been to the hearts of men, offers for all ages and types the sanest and the most valuable instrument for the socialization of those powerful instincts and impulses that form the "cosmic roots" of character, fundamental among which is the fighting instinct.

¹ Rev. P. Gavan Duffy, "War and the Christian Ethic," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXVII, 219.

There are many and interesting variations upon this general attitude, which insists that we have in the Christian ethic the best solution of the problem of war, while acknowledging that such a solution is impossible in human society as at present constituted. Donald W. Fisher, in a stimulating essay, which, however, is not free from the prevailing confusion of thought, insists that "whatever connection may exist between war and the Christian religion holds only with regard to the Christian religion of history. No connection is discoverable between the concrete phenomena of war and the ideal and absolute essence of the Christian religion,"¹ for "in its ideal aspect the Christian religion maintains an unqualified opposition to war. It condemns the human impulses and motives without which war would be impossible" (p. 94). Yet Fisher's conclusion is that the peace aimed at in the ideal of primitive Christianity "is the only peace which the world would find sufferable, the only peace in which the human spirit could escape extinction; and it is the only peace which the world would find lastingly possible" (p. 108). If, however, the Christian ideal condemns the "human impulses and motives" from which war springs, and if, as psychology indicates, these impulses and motives are ineradicable and necessary elements in human nature, being merely perverted in war, we may well ask how the attainment of the Christian ideal will ever be possible so long as human nature remains as it is.

The real interest of Fisher, however, seems to lie in another direction. He is concerned mainly to indicate the very real and intimate connection between war and institutionalized Christianity. In an imperfect, though it must be confessed the only real, world with which we are acquainted, war and Christianity have many common enemies, many related interests; never have they declared themselves to be fundamentally at enmity with each other. Their agreements exceed their differences.

War and historical Christianity agree in that they tend to disrupt materialistic and sensualistic tendencies. To be sure "the war spirit is not identical with the spirit of God; it is not entirely

¹ "War and the Christian Religion," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXVIII, 107.

spiritual," but the church at the level of "grace" and war at the level of "nature" are striving for the same ends (pp. 95, 99). War and historical Christianity also are akin in that they are both irrational. The pacifist is always a rationalist; the great anti-militarists, Buckle, Spencer, Bentham, Hume, Comte, Voltaire, Holbach, Diderot, Kant, were rationalists. But "in general where we find opinion which acknowledges in war any considerable element of worth we also find, not a materialist or rationalist philosophy, but a religious and essentially Christian philosophy" (p. 101). The rationalist lives an artificial life, remote from reality; war and historical Christianity are close to life, nay are parts of life and partake of its colossal stupidities, its spiritual triumphs, its heroic sacrifices, its depths of folly, its hates and hopes, its blood and tears.

This writer's conclusions are in many ways typical of a general attitude toward the Christian ethic among a large class of thinking people. We recognize here a half-hearted and academic homage paid to the purity and loftiness of the early Christian ideal of peace, accompanied by the conviction that it is impractical and undesired—"it may seriously be doubted if there exists in the world anywhere any very sincere or single-minded desire to see it realized" (p. 108). There is no suggestion as to the way in which we are to make the transition from this imperfect world in which war and institutionalized Christianity find so much in common to the ideal world of primitive Christian pacifism. On the other hand, we get a very decided impression that for Fisher the only real world is the immediate and tragic one of "blood and iron," in comparison with which the world of the Christian ideal is a pale and ghostly unreality. In fine we seem to have here a typical illustration of the growing tendency, even among those who cling in more or less sentimental fashion to the time-honored doctrine of the finality and feasibility of Christian pacifism, to seek the real solution of the problem in the reasoned deliverances of the consciousness of historical Christianity rather than in the moral attitudes peculiar to the early Christian group.

It will hardly be denied that there is a menace to the integrity and efficiency of the moral life in any such tacit acknowledg-

ment of a permanent dualism between the ideal and the actual. Nowhere are the disastrous effects upon the religious and moral life of such a dualism more in evidence than in modern Germany. Luthardt was true to the traditions of Lutheranism when he wrote:

The Gospel has nothing to do primarily with the temporal but is concerned with the eternal life. It does not deal with external arrangements and institutions which may come into conflict with earthly affairs but with the heart and its relations to God, with divine grace, the forgiveness of sins and the like, in short with the heavenly life. The characteristic trait of the kingdom of heaven is the rule of grace while that of the kingdom of earth and the earthly life is the rule of justice. They are different entirely in kind, do not occupy the same plane and belong to two different worlds.¹

To try to interpret the Christian ethic in a temporal sense would "upset entirely the earthly life" (p. 85).

These words, written by a distinguished Leipzig theologian, now some years dead, are a striking commentary upon the land that has given birth to Prussian militarism. They enable us to understand why Germany, the very cradle of Protestantism itself, the land of Luther and Schleiermacher, could assume the rôle of the Frankenstein among the nations and foist upon the world the most hideous moral monstrosity of all time. The burning questions of German Protestantism have never been moral and social but theological and scientific. The implications of religious liberalism never affected political and economic conditions in Germany as they did in lands influenced by Calvinism. Luther's theological ideas shaped themselves so that the democratic implications of the spirit of Jesus, Paul, Wyclif, and Huss did not molest the privileged status of the landed aristocracy. Hence for generations the tramp of the human *Kanonensfuller* and the raucous cry of the Prussian drill-sergeant have never disturbed the pastor in his study or distracted the attention of the theological pedant intent upon the mysteries of the messianic consciousness of Jesus, the documents of the Pentateuch, or the influence of Gnosticism upon Christian theology. Today Germany and a bleeding world are made to pay a fearful penalty for the moral impotence of German Protestantism.

¹ Luthardt, *Luther's Ethik*, p. 81.

The world which Luther thought to have emancipated from the priest with his crucifix has been crucified upon the iron cross of Prussia.

VII

During these days that try men's souls it is natural, in the harrowing struggle for the conservation of those things that make life worth while, for some to find consolation in the belief in an eternal and indefectible world of values. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of the central ideas of Calvinism, the theology of an "agonized conscience,"¹ should again appeal to the hearts of men. Furthermore, when the passions of men are running high, and the finer moral sensibilities are blunted, it is easy to fall back upon the cruder ethical ideas of other days, such as human depravity, the blood atonement, and the idea of an absolutely sovereign God who has impounded the moral values in the universe and deals in an arbitrary and vindictive fashion with the evildoer. All these ideas are to be found in more or less modified form in the most ambitious apology for the Christian ethic that has yet appeared.²

The central idea around which the two hundred pages of Forsyth's earnest and at times eloquent book are centered is the doctrine of the atonement:

I am bound to admit that all I have just been saying falls to the ground as a piece of speculative fantasy except on one condition. It all goes down at a breath unless it is founded on a rock. And that rock is the historic Cross as a real atonement, a real bearing of God's judgment on sin. Apart from that Christianity abjures moral history and sinks into the sand as a benevolent and ineffectual pacifism [p. 57].

This statement is exceedingly significant. It acknowledges that any interpretation of the Christian ethic based directly upon the simple teachings of the gospels is utterly incompatible with war and all forms of force. These teachings must be evaluated in the light of the eternal cosmic moral significance of the cross. "What one misses in certain lovable types of religion is the historic sense, and an ethic upon that scale, ethic in the grand style . . . the sense of cosmic righteousness and a historic continuity of public

¹ Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 189.

² P. T. Forsyth, *The Christian Ethic of War* (London, 1916).

regeneration, with duty accordingly" (p. 92). The Sermon on the Mount

is but a series of illustrations of the power and principle of the Cross occasioned by certain circumstances. To substitute the teachings of Jesus for his Cross as the ethical source instead of using it as illustration is a very wide and anti-evangelical error. It displaces our center of gravity, and therefore causes Christianity to falter where it should firmly tread [p. 86].

It is of course obvious that the logically consistent but thoroughly unreal world in which the writer's thought moves prevents him from perceiving that he has done violence to the facts of the life and person of the historical Jesus. He has subordinated the simple idealistic ethic of the Kingdom to the later psychological reactions to the life and person of Jesus registered in the writings of Paul. The Pauline dramatization of the tragic death of Jesus was in the interest of a propaganda that would make the new religion attractive to a pagan world familiar with oriental and Greek passion cults of the type of Osiris and Dionysus. The exigencies of the Pauline missionary evangel had much to do with the subordination of the eternal beauty and simplicity of the story of the Prodigal Son and the Sermon on the Mount to the ethical monstrosity of the blood atonement.¹

In the cross, however, as the militant assault upon the forces of evil in the universe, Forsyth finds justification for the use of force. The soldier's quarrel now ceases to be an individual matter. It is part and parcel of the eternal moral process. The present war is no "mere matter of a local conflict of quarrelling nations, but of an Armageddon in the Lord's controversy with the world." The Christian soldier is the chosen instrument of a just and angry God; the soldier's high duty is to maintain truth and justice and holiness on the earth. "We are now more than soldiers. We are the international police. We are there neither for conquest, nor merely for self-defense, but for the world-order, liberty, justice and humanity for which Christ died" (p. 144).

Into this stern and inexorable ethical scheme Forsyth even seeks to fit the Golden Rule. The saint goes into battle with one desire uppermost, namely, to further this supreme world of moral values.

¹ Bacon, *Christianity Old and New*, pp. 75 f., 120 f.

If he is mistaken in his efforts, he asks that in the interest of those values he be eliminated. He is so passionately enamored of the eternal righteousness of God's will that he subordinates all other issues, all other loves and loyalties, to the furthering of this one great end.

If such a man is to do to others as he would that others do to him, is he wrong by Christian ethic, when he perceives a deadly sin in his fallen brother, in treating him as he desires to be treated himself, and at least risking(?) his brother's life in the process of averting his sin and its effects? [Pp. 14, 15.]

In this wise, according to Forsyth, we have the rather paradoxical situation in which it is possible to kill the Germans out of love for the Germans!

The pragmatic value of Forsyth's justification of war will hardly be denied. It fired the Christian soldiers of Constantine in the struggle against a decadent paganism; it animated the Crusaders in their repeated efforts to rescue the Holy City from the rule of the infidel; to it the pious Ferdinand made effective appeal in driving the Moors from Spain; it provided the sanctions for Alva's fearful treatment of the Netherlands just as it inspired the sturdy "Beggars of the Sea" to defy him and his legions; Cromwell and his Ironsides voiced similar sentiments in their battle hymns; it is still recognizable in the guise of the crude and half-pagan gospel of German *Kultur*.

But Forsyth's philosophy of war will hardly satisfy the modern thinker either from the standpoint of theology or of ethics. The statement of his argument in theological form does not add to its value; it might have been presented even more forcibly in purely philosophical terms. In fact we have a similar ethic of war in current German philosophy stripped of all theological trappings. We cannot escape the feeling that Forsyth has made illegitimate use of the authoritarian atmosphere always associated in the mind of the average man with the doctrines of traditional theology in order to secure a more ready acceptance of his ethic of war. The liberal theologian is apt to repudiate the argument together with its outworn theological dress.

It may very well be objected that Forsyth has not indicated in any clear and satisfying fashion the points of contact between

this indefectible moral order of the cross and the lurid and murderous atmosphere of the battlefields of Europe. By what marvelous insight into the nature of things can the American, French, or English soldier be assured that he is a scourge of an angry God wherewith to cudgel the wicked and recalcitrant German and the unspeakable Turk into a frame of mind more in accord with this eternal and indefectible moral order? Exactly the same philosophy has enabled both German and Turk to provide ethical sanctions for conduct that outrages humanity. There is not the slightest doubt that thousands of patriotic and intelligent Germans believe that, under God, they are the chosen instruments for the consummation of a divine plan looking toward the material, moral, and spiritual betterment of the entire world.

The outcome of the present colossal appeal to force, whatever it may chance to be, will hardly enable us to pronounce final judgment as to the relative merits of the civilizations concerned. Poison gas and machine guns throw no light for us upon the correctness of the ethical sanctions that inspire the conduct of the contestants. The only thing that the present immediate struggle can decide finally for us is the purely material and physical question as to which of the two groups of contestants is able to utilize most skilfully and effectively the material forces at their command for killing men. So far as human intelligence goes we have not the slightest indication that the flight of a German bullet or the explosive power of an English shell are affected by the eternal moral issues involved. The only possible merit the cause of the Allies can claim, as contrasted with that of the Germans, is that they are fighting for a return to conditions of civilized society which in their judgment will make for the richest and most successful cultivation of human values, while the Germans are fighting for the maintenance of a social order in which they can ignore these values whenever it suits their selfish national interests.

Finally Forsyth does not perceive apparently the somewhat dubious rôle God is forced to play in his philosophy. God, we are told, is vitally interested in the outcome of the present titanic struggle. He directs in masterful fashion every factor in the drama, physical as well as moral. Yet the shot and shell that fly daily

from trench to trench follow exactly the same physical laws in the case of each contestant. The aim of the Turk is just as deadly as that of the Englishman. The shell of the German gunner finds its mark just as unerringly as that of the Frenchman. If God directs this eternal moral order, if he manipulates every toothache, "every headache after a debauch" (p. 73), as a means of moral discipline, why does he not influence the laws of nature so that the bullets of his servants may fly true and those of his enemies may fly false? Or must we say that God has ordained the unchangeable laws of the struggle, "the rules of the game," and then leaves it to the contestants as to which shall be most skilful and intelligent in conforming to those laws? If this be true, wherein lies the moral worth of God's character and the reality of that indefectible moral order over which he presides? Is the goodness of God to be identified with the pitiless and inexorable laws of nature seen in the storm that drives one ship on the rocks and another safely into harbor? If so, God's goodness is little more than the unmoral, impersonal, inexorable uniformity of the mechanical order of nature.

Such a conception of the deity hardly satisfies the demands of the unsophisticated moral sense. It makes God remote, impersonal, immaculately aloof, unpardonably neutral where the fundamental issues of his Kingdom are at stake. To preserve his moral worth, even his very existence, he must become implicated in some very real fashion in the present struggle. We are forced to assert that his attitude toward the issues involved must be in some measure at least similar to our own. Contingency, the unforeseen and uncontrollable factors always present where we have the spontaneous activity of moral wills, must be as real to him as to us or else his interest in the final outcome will be nominal, artificial, cruelly and sardonically remote. A God who can keep the loyalties or even the passing interest of thinking men and women during these troublous days must feel with us the trembling of the moral balance of the universe, must agonize with us, bleed and die with us, or else hope to have no part in the paean of victory.

VIII

The foregoing discussion indicates great contrariety of opinion as to the bearing of the ethic of Jesus upon the problem of war.

To anyone at all interested in intellectual consistency this condition must appear intolerable. It is of course perfectly obvious that we cannot make Jesus responsible for the pacifist ethic of the Quaker as well as the militant ethic of the churchman, for the traditional and legalistic ethic of the Roman Catholic as well as for the evolutionary ethic of the progressive who sees in war but an evil made necessary by imperfect social development, for the hard-headed protagonist of social justice who subordinates love to righteousness as well as for the predestinarian ethic of the theologian who interprets the Sermon on the Mount in terms of the metaphysical implications of the cross. To attribute to Jesus all these various interpretations of the Christian ethic would be to convict him of a welter of contradictions only to be found in the brain of a madman. Apparently there is no phase of modern religious thought in which there is a larger need for plain, straightforward thinking than in the field of Christian ethics.

It would certainly seem that any trustworthy solution of the problem of war and the Christian ethic must be based upon some understanding of the way in which moral ideas take shape and are modified from age to age. It has already been suggested that the general type of ethical ideals of an age is the result of the organizations of emotions and sentiments by social, economic, and political forces. The need of the group or social order for self-preservation and social equilibrium tends to place a premium upon certain types of personality, certain attitudes of mind, certain virtues. Lecky has called attention to the fact that each period in the evolution of morals tends to accentuate some fundamental virtue that provides the measure of values for the other virtues.¹ One needs only to recall the emphasis of wisdom by the Greeks, courage by the Romans, love by the early Christians, poverty and chastity by the man of the Middle Ages, thrift and fidelity to obligations after the rise of a commercial civilization. It follows, therefore, that, owing to the constant shifting of the stresses and strains of the social order and the creation of new moral values, no community or group or age can ever hope to exhaust the whole of the moral experience. For the same reason it is psychologically impossible for any one type of character, no matter how universal its traits, to anticipate all

¹ Lecky, *History of European Morals*, I, 163.

future modifications of moral values. A character may be perfect and even absolute in the sense that it is the complete expression of its group or age, but fixed and final moral perfection is from the very nature of the evolving social process unthinkable. There is no place for such a term in an ethic that accepts whole-heartedly the principle of evolution.

What then, we ask, was the peculiar type of character emphasized by the age of Jesus? The general tendency of the period in which Jesus lived was to throw men back upon themselves and their inner attitudes for orientation in the realm of moral and spiritual loyalties.¹ The Roman conquest tended to minimize ancient loyalties and to set men free from the "cake of custom." Emotional needs once satisfied through local cults and religious symbols were thus set adrift. Men became emotionally self-conscious to a painful degree; hence the emergence of the religious problem in philosophy as well as in other phases of life. For religion deals with the problem of defining and conserving ultimate values.

In so far as men succeeded in reorganizing their religious loyalties it was from the subjective point of view. Moral obligations became for the most part matters of inner attitudes, problems of the subjective formulation of feelings and emotions. Not external acts or ritualistic performances but the "pure heart" was the measure of values. The choicest product of ethical inwardness among the Greeks was Stoicism. For the Stoic moral values were in the last analysis psychological facts. The moral drama began and ended in the soul. Spontaneity of will was interpreted to mean moral sovereignty. Virtue was a matter of inner attitude, a quality of the heart.

The ethic of Jesus marks the culmination of a similar movement making for ethical inwardness among the Jews. The movement, to be sure, began with the prophets, was intensified by the captivity and the Diaspora, and reached spiritual maturity during the enlightenment period of late Judaism. The thesis of the utilitarian

¹ Max Wundt, *Geschichte der griechischen Ethik*, II, 265 ff.; I. King, "Influence of the Form of Social Change upon the Emotional Life of a People," *American Journal of Sociology*, IX, 124 ff.; A. O. Lovejoy, "The Origins of Ethical Inwardness in Jewish Thought," *American Journal of Theology*, XI, 228 ff.

and hedonistic ethic of the wisdom literature was that the good man who obeys the divine law and observes the traditions of the Fathers should receive richer returns of this world's goods than the evildoer. The discrepancies between this thesis and the facts of experience gave rise to the problem of Job, the problem, not of the origin and nature of evil, but of its relative distribution. In order to explain and justify the sufferings of the saint, the Hebrew moralist was forced to fall back upon the notion that his experiences were a form of discipline designed to reveal inner weaknesses and to purge the soul of "secret sins."

This habit of introspective analysis gave rise to a sharpened sense of moral values. The Kingdom of God, an inner subjective attitude, took precedence over everything else; it provided the ultimate measure of values. The unpardonable sin was pride, "the last infirmity of noble minds," because it militated against the cultivation of this world of inner attitudes; hence the constant emphasis of those virtues most opposed to pride and self-assertion, namely, meekness, humility, forbearance, compassion, and self-sacrificing love. Since the moral initiative is taken out of the hands of the saint he must be absolutely open and receptive to the will of God, the holy and righteous Ruler of the universe.

This accentuation of the essentially inward nature of the moral situation manifested itself in striking fashion in two ways. It tended to give to the emotions and the subjective attitudes a moral dignity and worth without a parallel in the history of ethics. The dictum of the wisdom ethic, "Keep thy heart with all diligence for out of it are the issues of life," was in thorough harmony with the few suggestions of Jesus as to a methodology for the moral life. In the second place this emphasis of inner attitudes resulted inevitably in discrediting the significance of social institutions for the moral life. The eschatological setting in which the thought of Jesus, together with that of his contemporaries, moved to a very large extent was a sort of transcendental substitute for the immediate social order in which men had lost their faith. It provided a sublimated *mise en scène* for the unfolding of moral values which were felt to be incompatible with the persistence and enduring worth of existing social institutions.

It will be seen that this background of ethical traditions, presupposed in the teachings of Jesus, did not lend itself to a moral evaluation of war. All use of force was contrary to the spirit of Jesus, and that for two reasons. In the first place the entire atmosphere of the thought of Jesus was subjective, spiritual, ideal. In such a world force had no part or lot. It was impossible to ascribe to it moral value; there was no provision for its use. The prerequisite of every moral act was love, the expression of the essence of God whose will was the law of the Kingdom. Where love has been completely banished by the brutal and murderous spirit of the will-to-power the conditions necessary to the existence of moral values are lacking. In so far as the principle of coercion appears in late Jewish ethics, it is formulated in terms of a transcendental ethic that had few or no points of contact with the immediate social situation. "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord."

In the second place it is difficult to see how Jesus could have associated moral worth with the calling of the soldier in view of his attitude toward social institutions. For Jesus was interested in the immediate facts of the moral life and not in the more or less remote social, political, or economic conditions that make possible the realization of moral excellence. But the soldier's calling is only moral in the sense that it utilizes force to assure to men the permanence and security of these social and material conditions. The present fight to make the world safe for democracy is an appeal to force to secure for present and future generations political institutions that will encourage the rich and free and full unfolding of human values. We have no evidence that Jesus was interested in reforming and perpetuating existing social institutions so as to secure for the ages to come the most congenial earthly setting for the attainment of the ideal. The famous dictum, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's," was little more than the recognition of the necessity of some sort of a *modus vivendi* if men were to live in the existing political order at all. It can hardly be twisted into an authoritative sanctioning of the permanence and moral value of the Roman Empire. Loisy is doubtless correct when he says:

The respect of Jesus for the political authorities was purely negative. In his reply to the question as to the tribute he did not intend to sanction the rule of Caesar as a principle of the future. It was not possible for Caesar to belong to the providential order. . . . His power would fail like that of Satan; Caesar was in fact in certain respects the representative of the order of Satan."¹

With such a mental attitude it would be impossible for Jesus to attribute moral worth to the profession of arms.

Those who seek in the ethic of Jesus a justification for war, therefore, are wasting their time and energies. Furthermore, they do gross injustice to that ethic itself. No artist would attempt to rival the matchless frieze of Phidias that still in part adorns the ruined Parthenon; to try to do so would result in a grotesque parody. No architect, however great his cunning, can ever hope to reproduce the spiritual *elan* of the spires of Chartres, the mysterious and colorful perspectives of the interior of Notre Dame, the glorious flamboyant façade of Rheims, now, alas! shattered by German shells. These artistic masterpieces are unique and inimitable because they sprang directly from the thought and aspiration of an age. But the Athens of Pericles and Phidias, with its brilliant and varicolored lights, is gone forever; the unquestioning faith of the twelfth century, which enabled men to carve their whole philosophy of life in the living stone of their cathedrals, is dead. Likewise, the peculiar stresses and strains of the social order, which wrung from the early Christian group their noble ethic of non-resistance, have disappeared with the flight of the centuries. The social order which is the prerequisite of the absolute finality of that ethical ideal is gone.

Yet that ideal lives on, like the frieze of Phidias or the Gothic cathedral, "a thing of beauty and a joy forever." To be sure, we realize that this unique moral experience can never be duplicated in all its details, for this very uniqueness has lent to the teachings of Jesus an indefectible character. At the same time these moral experiences will ever remain an inexhaustible source of inspiration to the late-born sons of men. We can never forget that in the person and spirit of Jesus we have the most unequivocal condemnation of the folly and wickedness of war the world has ever

¹ *Les evangiles synoptiques*, I, 231.

known. His ethic will always enable us to keep alive the hope, now faint and dim, but never entirely absent from the hearts of the best spirits of the race, that men may one day in very truth beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning-hooks.

Jesus' right to be called the world's Great Pacifist is not invalidated by the fact that he shared in the belief of his age that an era of perpetual peace could only be attained through a cataclysmic close of the present world-order and the supernatural initiation of a new heaven and a new earth wherein dwell only men of good-will. He will still remain our Prince of Peace, although he failed to catch a true glimpse of the slow and infinitely laborious process through which man must in time tame the ape and tiger and achieve a social order in which the fighting instinct is not eliminated but harnessed and made to serve the cause of justice, sweetness, and light. The great canvas of human destiny must be ample enough for all possible heavens and hells of experience—men are today passing through an inferno undreamed of by Michelangelo. Among the high lights of the world-scheme the ethic of Jesus will ever occupy a prominent place. But it has reality only as part of a process the end of which is not yet. It is but one act in a drama upon which the curtain has not yet descended for the last time. May it not be true that the difficulties we experience in trying to apply the priceless treasures of the Christian ethic to the problems of modern life would be to a very large extent removed by a frank acknowledgment that this ethic has its necessary limitations?

THE STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS IN THE ITALIAN UNIVERSITIES

LOUIS H. JORDAN
Eastbourne, England

The theme dealt with in this sketch is veritably an inspiring one. Much more has been achieved in the domain of the history of religions under Italian auspices, and achieved in a modest yet frankly aggressive spirit, than the majority of English-speaking scholars are wont to believe.

Recall what has happened during the last fifty years. One can discern without difficulty two well-defined movements, separated by a brief but significant interregnum. In truth, these movements are one. At the end of an intervening period of derangement forces which had existed for a time in a condition of unstable equilibrium suddenly gather strength and press forward (united and persistent) with an energy and dash which are positively exhilarating.

1. *The period lying between 1873 and 1910.*—The year 1873 will always be memorable in the academic annals of Italy. In that year Parliament put into force an act whereby the theological faculties of all the universities of the kingdom were summarily abolished.¹ The history of religions suffered no loss in consequence of this step, seeing that in Italy the scientific study of the faiths of mankind had not yet been begun. Up to that date very little investigation of this sort had been attempted in any of the countries of Europe. Professor Friedrich Max Müller, it is true, had just published a useful little book containing a course of four lectures which he had delivered three years earlier at the Royal Institution in London, and which he tells us were “intended as an introduction to a comparative study of the principal religions of the world.”²

¹ Cf. *Atti del Parlamento* (April, 1872) and *Atti del Senato* (January, 1873).

² Cf. *Introduction to the Science of Religion* (London, 1873), p. vii.

For a considerable period this courageous pioneer had slowly been feeling his way through researches in philology and mythology into a more intimate acquaintance with man's worship of multifarious deities. Already he had begun to publish a collection of essays, destined speedily to gain a wide and cordial welcome.¹ But his *Introduction* brought British and Continental thinking to a sudden halt, and then gave it a new impulse and bent. Many statements in this volume seem now to be vague, confusing, and immature. Nevertheless, it proved an epoch-making book, not so much on account of its actual contents as because it opened a door into a great field in which many inquirers have been busy ever since.

Italy however remained practically untouched; or, as some may prefer to describe it, Italian scholarship remained sound and unscathed. In 1870 the country was successfully unified under Vittorio Emanuele II. Three years later, as already stated, the theological faculties disappeared. But the statute which dissolved them decreed that the chairs it had emptied were not to be abolished along with the faculties to which they had belonged; they were in each instance to be transferred to the "facoltà di filosofia e lettere." It seemed possible, accordingly, that this decision, if Italy so desired it, might be utilized with excellent results in the interests of the history of religions. This opportunity was brought all the closer, and indeed was immensely strengthened, by sundry frank declarations made by influential members of Parliament. These deputies expressly maintained that the history of religions (in addition to the philosophy of religion, the history of Christianity, etc.) must in the future be assigned a place in the official courses of study provided by the universities.

The action taken by the Italian Parliament was faulty in two particulars. First, it deliberately allowed a body of teachers, indispensable to every thoroughly equipped university staff, to pass out of existence. Few will contend that any mistake was made in abolishing the theological faculties *as they were then constituted*. All who held chairs in them were priests, instructors who derived their authority to teach (ultimately) from the Vatican. In a word,

¹ Cf. *Chips from a German Workshop* (London, 1867-75), 4 vols.

the theological faculties of the Italian universities, prior to 1873, were simply Roman Catholic seminaries of a high grade, maintained at the public expense. Now, however much local religious communities may value the establishment and perpetuation of such schools, the state is under no obligation to facilitate theological teaching which is imparted in purely denominational institutions. No modern government is prepared to make itself responsible for any system of beliefs which a large proportion—and, quite possibly, the majority—of its supporters find themselves unable to accept and indorse. Those who wish to see such seminaries in active operation must themselves undertake to meet the outlay involved. Strictly speaking, the “faculties” intrusted with the teaching of theology in Italy were not really university faculties at all. What the government ought to have done was to have reconstructed thoroughly the existing machinery of theological education, thereby securing the preservation of the old faculties, endowing them with a higher prestige and widened capabilities, and encouraging them to apply (wherever possible) the methods of scientific research to a study which every academic corporation should accord the place of highest honor.

The other mistake which the Italian Parliament made lay in its handing over the teaching of this complex subject to a faculty constituted for an entirely different purpose, and one which was already overweighted by its supervision of a group of exacting studies. It was a good thing, to be sure, that the proposed courses of instruction in the history of religions were not committed to the oversight of the existing theological faculties. The Church of Rome, the oldest and the most uncompromising authority in Italy, has never shown itself friendly toward this special branch of inquiry. Individual members of that communion, and several groups of scholarly investigators which it has furnished, have honestly sought to further and defend the growing demands of this study. Nay, more; upon occasion, selected representatives of that church, officially designated and approved, have announced that they have taken this department under their care, and have then defined with much exactitude its range and its limitations. But the weight of influence, in the highest quarters, has invariably tended

to obstruct rather than to promote the progress of this particular kind of research. Whenever the Church of Rome has ostensibly lent it countenance and patronage, this course has seemingly been adopted, not so much because it has sought to widen contemporary knowledge as with a view of keeping the immediate situation under control. Dogmatic ends may be served through the medium of this study; it is not therefore to be abandoned to those who might make an inconvenient use of it. Ultimately considered—to state the case in the baldest and most general terms—there exists for the Church of Rome, in effect, only *one* religion; and of Roman Christianity that church is the *sole* authoritative interpreter. The history of religions, in so circumscribed and restraining an atmosphere, could not have survived very long. Moreover, the Church of Rome continues to be needlessly uneasy whenever laymen invade any theological domain. Theological preserves have long been jealously restricted to the activities of the clergy; the Italian government, on the other hand, was resolute in its determination to remove the teaching of theology beyond the reach of that clerical supervision by which it had previously been regulated.

A wiser course was followed in France when the faculties of theology were allowed to disappear in that country. In both cases reform and readjustment rather than complete abolition would best have met the needs of the occasion. France did not abruptly end these faculties, though unfortunately she did permit them to drift away from her universities and to become “*établissements extérieurs*.” Thus we have now the “*faculté libre de théologie de l’institut catholique de Paris*,” the “*faculté libre de théologie protestante de Paris*,” the “*faculté libre de théologie protestante de Montauban*,” the “*faculté libre de théologie catholique de Lille*,” etc. But if France consented to surrender a part of her full university equipment, she did not stop at that point. The teaching of the history of religions was not handed over to her “*facultés des lettres*,” nor yet allowed to become the monopoly of purely denominational colleges; on the contrary, it was intrusted to a large special staff of highly trained instructors—some of whom had formerly been “*in orders*”—who constituted the “*section des sciences religieuses*” of the famous *École des Hautes-Études* of

Paris. There the methods of historical and comparative research were applied (and are still being applied) with the necessary skill and without interference from any external authority operating in influential quarters. As the result has demonstrated, such studies, however penetrative their investigation into sources, traditions, contemporary authorities, etc., can not only be conducted without loss of reverence for really authentic religious beliefs, but with the positive advantage of placing these beliefs upon verifiable and satisfying foundations.

The new act "*per la soppressione della facoltà di teologia nelle Università del Regno*" was eventually passed. It was framed in an atmosphere of keen and often very embittered controversy. If it contains occasional vagueness and vacillation of statement, that fact is traceable to its endeavor to reconcile numerous political and ecclesiastical disagreements. The church, as was natural, was openly antagonistic; it has never disguised its hostility toward the practical working of this act. The government, however, exhibiting a commendable energy, brought the law into immediate operation. It will be interesting briefly to recall the names of the professors who were intrusted with the responsibility of incorporating the history of religions in the curricula of the Italian universities, the ways in which their undertaking was temporarily thwarted, and the gratifying measure of success which at last begins to crown their efforts.

Under the terms of the law of 1873, Professor Filippo Abignente was invited to occupy the chair allotted to "*storia della chiesa*" in the University of Naples. This nomination was made while Parliament was still in session, and thus Professor Abignente holds the premier place in the slowly lengthening line of a courageous and honorable succession. It will be noted that the government in naming Christianity as the first religion whose history was to be studied under the new conditions showed honor to the faith which was supremely revered in Italy. At the same time, this action undoubtedly implied a challenge which was viewed by the church with no very kindly feelings.

The first selection of a professor to fill one of the newly established group of university chairs involved no change of post

for Professor Abignente, seeing that, as it happened, the chair of church history had already been incorporated in the "facultà di filosofia e lettere" at Naples, and the professor was the occupant of that chair. The real significance of the situation lay in two facts. First, a revised scheme of university instruction having been decreed, and the government acting without delay, Naples was the first city in which the new law went into operation in Italy, and Professor Abignente was the first to respond to a not unwelcome summons. Secondly, inasmuch as this professor, in his place in Parliament, had shown great enthusiasm when advocating the proposal that the history of religions should be introduced into the curricula of the Italian universities—it being one of the subjects which, in his opinion, the government might usefully substitute for the dogmatic teaching which was then imparted in all the theological faculties—it was confidently expected that an entirely new régime was about to be inaugurated at the chief seats of learning throughout a unified Italy.

This forecast would probably have proved correct had circumstances not been so adverse. If temporary failure ensued, at least part of the blame must be laid at Professor Abignente's own door. Formerly a priest, he had ultimately attained the rank of canon. But the abandonment of his clerical calling, followed by his election to Parliament in 1860 and his appointment in the following year to the chair of church history in Naples, had been succeeded by evidences of extreme theological liberalism. The Church of Rome is too much given to affixing the label "rationalist" to men who call in question her alleged infallible authority in matters of faith; but some justification for this action was certainly furnished by the aberrations of the university teacher whose lectures are now under discussion. No doubt Professor Abignente's thinking suffered the effects of a serious reaction from earlier restraints and an overstrict religious upbringing. He became besides, in later life, an admirer of David Friedrich Strauss, and his intellectual attitude tended to assume a much too generous coloring from that quarter. Yet further, his teaching under his second appointment was never sufficiently concentrated and intensive; it is not surprising, therefore, that it often failed to be

satisfying. It did not possess—at least it did not exhibit—the skill and confidence of a master; probably it was as well that it covered only a period of about three years. The lectures offered were too negative, and they were often very radical in tone; students expected, and they certainly had a right to demand, guidance of a stronger and more competent character. As regards the non-Christian religions, Professor Abignente, although possessing no mandate to pursue this course, soon made it plain that these alien faiths were to be given no subordinate place. Accordingly, he expounded them with diligence and considerable ingenuity. Perhaps it is not too much to say that he bestowed more time and pains upon the interpretation of the tenets of Buddhism, Egyptian religion, Chinese religion, Mithraism, Parsism, etc., than he was accustomed to allot to the exposition of the doctrines of Judaism and Christianity.

The second selection made under the law of 1873 occurred when Professor Raffaele Mariano was invited to fill the chair which Professor Abignente vacated in 1876. This invitation, be it remarked, was postponed until 1885; the former holder of this post was still living, but nine years were allowed to elapse before the government took fresh action. Difficulties not wholly unexpected barred the way against a more rapid procedure. Renewed opposition on the part of the church and a feeling of disappointment (alike within Parliament and beyond it) among the friends of the new law put effectual brakes on the wheels of progress. But Dr. Mariano, upon assuming his official duties, showed himself to be a man of resource and energy. At the outset, at any rate, he entertained sanguine expectations concerning the success of a somewhat doubtful experiment. He was a student of wide learning, of a distinctly philosophic turn, and deeply read in law as well as in history and theology. He was aware that, for many years to come, the scientific study of religion in Italy would have to meet experiences inseparable from a difficult and checkered career. Yet he refused to be discouraged. With untiring voice and pen he sought to gird up the minds both of himself and others. Finally, however, in 1904, he insisted upon relinquishing his chair. For eight additional years he lived in retirement, busy among his books,

engaged chiefly in revising and issuing a definitive edition of his numerous publications.¹ Those who knew him intimately had often an opportunity of discussing with him the prospects of his exacting yet favorite study; and none could fail to mark how deep was his regret that many of his earlier hopes had withered and then utterly perished. "The conditions are too unfriendly," he frequently used to say. Or, again, "Italy must be content to wait; my vision of a great and welcome *sorgimento* has not yet been fulfilled." If this pioneer had only lived until today he would have rejoiced to find that many of his dreams have been realized.

In the year in which Professor Mariano delivered his inaugural lecture in Naples,² the University of Rome resolutely pressed *its* claim to enter this controversial arena. The advisability or inadvisability of such action had been discussed again and again, but a hue and cry of irreconcilable opposition had invariably arisen. Why was this chair to be created? it was asked in unmistakably resentful tones. Although Parliament had made express provision for it, it was alleged to be a post that was quite needless. Few desired to see the chair established; and even if it were set up there was no one within reach (so it was declared) who was reasonably competent to fill it.

The debate finally ended in Professor Baldassare Labanca being selected, and this call was with some hesitance accepted. The inaugurator of this unpromising undertaking was already "professore ordinario" of moral philosophy in the University of Pisa, and he continued to hold that chair for some time after he came to the capital. Why? Because, in view of the situation just described, it was not a full professorship that the University of Rome had originally to offer; in effect, it was merely a lectureship. It was not until seven years later, viz., in 1893, that a professorship was securely established. When Professor Labanca accepted the appointment to act as "incaricato per la storia del Cristianesimo nell' Università di Roma,"³ he had no thought of doing more than helping to give the experiment a good start. He proposed to return

¹ Cf. *Scritti vari* (Florence, 1900-1911), 12 vols.

² Cf. *Lo stato e l'insegnamento della religione* (Naples, 1886).

³ That is, a professor officially "placed in charge" of a particular subject.

before long to Pisa, where he was happy in his work. But, as he once expressed himself when recalling this incident in his career, he had put his hand to the plow and he refused to turn back; "*la imperiosa necessità moderna degli studi religiosi imponeva al governo ed al professore di perseverare nell' opera intrapresa.*"

Professor Labanca was the first university teacher in Italy who was appointed to give instruction in "*storia delle religioni.*" This fact marks a significant advance. However, less than three years later the professor himself approached the ministry of public instruction with a request that the title of the chair be changed to "*storia del Cristianesimo.*" This petition was acceded to; and, although onlookers still recall that concession with regret, the explanation of it is not far to seek. There was not the least desire on Professor Labanca's part to shirk any portion of his duty; on the contrary, his extreme conscientiousness—his resolve to perform his task in a thoroughgoing and competent manner—constrained him to secure the narrowing of his original commission. He was already well advanced in life; he was too old, indeed, to initiate researches in a very wide and perplexing field of inquiry. Besides, in earlier years, he had been received into the priesthood; and, intimately acquainted with the tenets and excellences of the Christian faith, he preferred to conduct his little band of students along ancient and familiar pathways. His reverence for Christianity and his conviction that it would ultimately win the universal acknowledgment of its unrivaled superiority never faltered or became dim; nevertheless, he was insistent that the narrow and dogmatic teaching of the church on this subject was not only unwarranted, but that it involved the throwing away of an immensely valuable apologetic opportunity. There were religions other than Christianity in active operation; and these faiths, sincerely and legitimately obeyed by millions of mankind, the Christian had never sufficiently esteemed. Hence, in his inaugural lecture he declared that "to inquire into, and to ascertain with impartiality, all religious facts pertaining to various peoples—ancient and modern, savage and civilized—is to pursue the only method whereby the history of religions can be dealt with aright in our universities. It is a problem needing solution; and it can

be solved only through the medium of profound research and persistent investigation."¹ And again: "Critical as opposed to dogmatic [study] . . . is practically neutral ground, a region where the facts of religion are permitted to live and move free of constraint from without."² Professor Labanca went farther; for he declared emphatically that it was only through the employment of the comparative method that the real significance of Christianity, standing in the forefront of the other religions of the world, could ever be made indubitably clear.

An impression which at first widely prevailed, viz., that other universities besides those of Naples and Rome would quickly avail themselves of the provisions embodied in the law of 1873, proved to be unfounded. The hindrances which were devised with the purpose of rendering any such action abortive proved only too successful. The antagonism of the church, the jealousy and strife of political factions, and (especially) the lack of sufficient appreciation of the high value of the projected new chairs resulted in a most disappointing stay of proceedings. In truth, no further step in advance, in so far at least as the universities were concerned, falls to be chronicled within the next succeeding quarter of a century. The modernist movement, always a friend and advocate of the scientific study of religion, developed indeed unexpected resources of strength, and presently a very able modernist *Review* was successfully launched.³ But this fact only incensed the church anew and made the outlook of the history of religions more precarious than ever. The year 1910 was one in which the promoters of this study in Italy felt extremely downhearted. It was the darkest hour of all. But it was also the hour that heralded the dawn.

2. *The period between 1910 and 1918.*—Professor Mariano died in December, 1912; and a few weeks later Professor Labanca (still in harness but visibly failing in strength) fell ill and passed away. Dr. Mariano's chair had already been vacant for over eight years,

¹ Cf. *La religione per le università è un problema, non un assioma* (Turin, 1886), pp. 15, 16.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 23.

³ Cf. *Il Rinascimento* (Milan, 1907-9). [*Vide infra.*]

and the post vacated by Professor Labanca's death was destined to remain in abeyance for two additional years. Thus, during a considerable interval, the law of 1873 ceased practically to be in effect; in all Italy, for the time being, there existed not a single university chair offering instruction in the history of religions. Attention was repeatedly called to this fact, and the friends of a study which was most seriously being neglected loyally reasserted its claims. But old antagonisms and suspicions, quickly revived, successfully barred the way. Then the present war, with all its anxieties and sufferings, was suddenly launched upon Europe. In the circumstances, a further pause seemed inevitable. Nevertheless, as events have proved, the seed so diligently sown was not really dead. On the contrary, it had secretly taken root; and a rich harvest, apparently, is now about to be reaped. The optimism and the splendid energy which are manifest today on every hand are abundantly warranted. The promoters of the scientific study of religion in the universities are more than ever confident; this time they will surely win. The results thus far achieved will be chronicled in the remainder of this paper.

Let us begin with the University of Rome. In March, 1913, Dr. Raffaele Pettazzoni was appointed lecturer ("libero docente") in "storia delle religioni." This post revived responsibility for the task which had originally been committed to Professor Labanca, twenty-seven years earlier; but it will be remarked that the undertaking was now intrusted to one of the junior teachers in the university. This step did not betoken a reduced estimate of the importance of the history of religions; it signified rather the conviction that the only prospect of dealing adequately with this subject lay in the selection of a scholar of moderate age, whose comparatively recent training would enable him to stand closely *en rapport* with the situation, and whose subsequent studies might be expected steadily to advance the widening interests of his department. Exactly two years later (in March, 1915), Dr. Ernesto Buonaiuti was selected as Professor Labanca's successor, his researches to be devoted mainly to an exposition of "storia del Cristianesimo." In the autumn of that year, the new professor delivered his inaugural lecture, in which he surveyed in a vivid and

most effective way a theme of undying fascination.¹ The university may well be congratulated upon its having secured a very promising addition to its staff, seeing that Professor Buonaiuti is a writer who is winning for himself a steadily growing circle of readers.² Moreover, it can confidently be affirmed that the range of his lectures, as it was true of the lectures of the late Professor Labanca, will not be confined within too rigidly circumscribed limits. And finally, inasmuch as Dr. Pettazzoni, successfully coaxed away by the University of Bologna, has found a worthy successor in Dr. Nicola Turchi, the interests of "storia delle religioni" are in no danger of being neglected. Dr. Turchi enjoys the honor of being the author of the first competent textbook on this subject which Italy has given to the world.³ During the winter session of 1916-17, he delivered a course of lectures dealing with "religioni dei Romani"; during the following session, he discussed "Le religioni misteriosofiche." He has also been very active in helping forward those arresting literary enterprises which have characterized the recent history of the university and to which express reference is made on a subsequent page. Altogether, when one takes a conjunct view of the situation, the University of Rome now occupies the premier place in Italy among the promoters of special research in the history of religions.

Turning next to Naples, the chair formerly held in that university by Professor Mariano has at last been filled. The post has been awarded, and very wisely so, to Dr. Luigi Salvatorelli, an accomplished scholar and a tireless investigator. His books are well known far beyond Italy, for he wields the pen of a ready and attractive writer. He has proved a welcome visitor at numerous theological and philosophical congresses, at which he has read papers of conspicuous merit. In particular, he has prepared the initial volume of a library known as "Collezione di scienza delle religioni," thereby rendering students in this field an appreciable

¹ Cf. *Il cristianesimo nell' Africa Romana* (Rome, 1915).

² Cf. *Lo gnosticismo. Storia di antiche lotte religiose* (Rome, 1907); *Il cristianesimo primitivo e la politica imperiale romana* (Rome, 1913); *Il cristianesimo medioevale* (Città di Castello, 1914); *La prima coppia umana nel sistema manichaeo* (Rome, 1917); *Sant' Agostino* (Rome, 1917), etc.

³ Cf. *Manuale di storia delle religioni* (Turin, 1912).

and very timely service.¹ He is not likely to commence his lecture courses until after the end of the war; but he is quite certain to cast his net, eventually, much wider than an exposition exclusively of "storia della chiesa."

In the University of Bologna, likewise, the new spirit of the times is already finding expression. After considerable discussion, a chair allotted to "storia delle religioni" was established in October, 1914, and Dr. Pettazzoni of Rome was invited to fill it. The occupant of this post has not yet acquired the status of a "professore ordinario." It should be remarked, however, that he enters upon his work holding the grade of a teacher who ranks considerably in advance of a "libero docente"; he is to serve, meanwhile, in a "professore incaricato" capacity. Attention need hardly be called to the zeal and success with which Professor Pettazzoni has already applied his hand to investigations which are henceforth to secure the full concentration of his powers.²

But, apart from what the Italian government is effecting through its Università Regie, note must also be taken of what has recently been accomplished by two of its best-known Istituti Universitari. At the Royal Academy (R. Accademia Scientifico-Letteraria) of Milan, Dr. Uberto Pestalozza has been invited to deliver in the future regular courses of lectures on "storia delle religioni." This departure was first made in 1912, and it has been rewarded from the outset by evidences which demonstrate its success. In like manner, at the Royal Institution of Advanced Studies in Florence, Dr. Umberto Fracassini was appointed instructor in "storia del Cristianesimo" in 1915. Thus far he has had to postpone arranging a definite program of lectures; but he expects to undertake full duty within the current year.

Recent progress in the scientific study of religion in the Italian universities can claim to be credited with still additional achievements. The world stands indebted in no small degree to various professors and lecturers who, at work in kindred fields of research,

¹ Cf. *Introduzione bibliografica alla scienza delle religioni* (Rome, 1914).

² Cf. *La religione primitiva in Sardegna* (Piacenza, 1912); *La scienza delle religioni e il suo metodo* (Bologna, 1913); *La storia del cristianesimo e la storia delle religioni* (Bologna, 1914), etc.

have lent opportune and most welcome assistance. In the University of Rome, for instance, who can fail to be grateful for the help so often furnished in the interpretation of Confucianism, Taoism, etc., by Dr. Giovanni Vacca, who in 1912 was appointed to the chair of Chinese language and literature; in the interpretation of Indian religions by Dr. Carlo Formichi, professor of Sanskrit, who has held his present post since 1913; and by several others of equal ardor—for example, Professor Rodolfo Lanciani—who have long been connected with this metropolitan center of learning. In the University of Naples, one cannot overlook the fruitful labors of Professor Alessandro Chiappelli and Professor Giuseppe de Lorenzo. In the Royal Institution of Florence, Dr. Carlo Puini (professor of oriental history) and Dr. Paolo E. Pavolini (professor of Sanskrit) continue to be loyal and capable co-workers with other international scholars in this field. It is in Florence, too, where Dr. Giulio Farina resides, the Egyptologist whose successful researches and whose connection with the Museo Egizio of that city have made him so widely known. Among the most active promoters of the new *Rivista di Scienza delle Religioni*, to which reference is made below, no one sought more diligently to insure its complete success than Dr. Farina. And then one remembers Dr. Leone Caetani (Principe Leone di Teono),¹ and all that he has accomplished in the interests of our closer acquaintance with Mohammedan scholarship.² Inasmuch as Italy is becoming more and more the protector of very numerous Moslem subjects, it needs no gift of prophecy to foresee the importance (for other lands not less than for Italy itself) of a thorough familiarity with this extensive domain. Indeed, if one were to specify in detail all the tributaries which now feed the waters of an ever-deepening stream, the record of the recent advances which the study of the history of religions has made in Italy would far exceed the limits prescribed for the present passing survey.

Take, for instance, the contributions successively rendered available in the proceedings of the various congresses, learned

¹ Now become the Duca di Sermoneta.

² Cf. *Annali dell' Islam* (Milan, 1905—), in progress; *Studi di storia orientale* (Milan, 1911—), in progress; *Cronografia islamica* (Paris, 1913—), in progress; etc.

societies, etc., which have met in Italy within the last five years. Quite apart from the assistance lent of late by its universities and other centers of learning, a marked feature of recent research in Italy has been the frequency with which scholars in all domains of inquiry have turned aside to investigate questions raised by the historical and critical study of religion. If one consult the series of volumes published by the International Congress of Historical Studies, he will find that, at the meeting held in Rome,¹ a considerable amount of time was allotted in section vii to the consideration of papers on "storia delle religioni." Again, the Circolo di Filosofia, when it met in Rome in the spring of 1913, inaugurated a scheme under which lectures on "storia delle religioni" are now systematically offered. The professors of the university lent their willing assistance, and the success of the undertaking became almost immediately assured. To cite but one more instance, at the meeting of the Italian Society for the Advancement of Science, called together in Siena in September of the same year, a new section—now devoting itself annually to the exposition of this subject—was enthusiastically and firmly established.

It must not be overlooked, yet further, that the publishers of Italy are contributing their full share toward strengthening this new crusade. No small apportionment of praise is due to leaders who, in spite of large financial risks, have shown themselves willing to face this responsibility. Within the last three years several "libraries" dealing with the science of religion have been projected, and at least one of these collections has already been begun. This *Biblioteca*, published by Signor Guglielmo Quadrotta, now serving at the front as an officer in the Italian army, has been designated *Collezione di Scienza delle Religioni*. The series when complete will present a very comprehensive survey of the field which it proposes to cover, the history, comparison, and philosophy of religion being dealt with in a really adequate manner. The first volume, as above stated, has been issued. As soon as the present war ends, this important project will be carried forward with energy and expedition.

¹ Cf. *Atti del congresso internazionale di scienze storiche, 1903* (Rome, 1904).

Another undertaking, of a similar though less inclusive character, has been announced by Messrs. V. Bartelli e C^o, a firm of publishers in Perugia. This enterprise, which is to be conducted under the supervision of Professor Bernardino Varisco of Rome, stands suspended until peace has been re-established in Europe. Popular rather than critical in its aim, this library should meet a real need in the contemporary literature of Italy.

There must be mentioned also the *Biblioteca di Studi Religiosi*, edited by the professors of an important Baptist theological school, the Scuola Teologica Battista di Roma. Begun in 1912, this series of publications is growing rapidly and is discharging a very competent service. As might be anticipated, these treatises (thus far) have been more apologetic than constructive. It will become clear, presently, whether these volumes are to assume a more aggressive and comprehensive rôle.

This sketch would be signally defective, especially as regards the growing use now being made of the press, if no reference were made to the recent founding of one or two critical Reviews. To this subject only one or two paragraphs can be devoted in this survey. Out of the many journals which Italy so industriously produces—often only to discard them before they have had time properly to effect their purpose—three at least must be given a place in this record. In no country in Europe is the life of a Review so precarious as when it happens to be born within the Italian kingdom. Influences of a very subtle and mischievous character frequently emerge, sometimes with startling suddenness; and in this way the labor of years may be ruthlessly and utterly sacrificed. Readers of a certain highly valued publication which, notwithstanding all obstacles, managed to hold on its way for a considerable period,¹ were filled with genuine regret when it ceased to make its appearance; but they were prepared from the outset to face this probable issue. The Review had not been in existence a twelvemonth before difficulties began to accumulate. It was no doubt true that “the tardy development of the critical study of religion” proved increasingly disappointing to its editors; but all are aware that that explanation accounted only to a very limited

¹ Cf. *Il Rinascimento* (Milan, 1907-9). 6 vols.

extent for its lamentable disappearance. It had secured a large circulation among Roman Catholic laymen, and its modernistic teaching was held in certain quarters to be disturbing.

At the commencement of last year a group of Italian scholars, including Professors Buonaiuti, Fracassini, Pestalozza, Pettazzoni, Salvatorelli, Dr. Farina, and Dr. Turchi, had the courage to launch a new scientific journal of a very high order.¹ Its projectors proposed to devote this Review to the promotion exclusively of the critical study of religion. It was the earliest publication of its type which Italy had ever known. France will always enjoy the distinction of having founded the journal which first ventured to enter this field, a journal which, from its very commencement, has been a credit to the country which stands sponsor for it.² Germany came second, providing us with a Review of a less intensive but highly valuable character.³ Great Britain and America, afraid to take this particular plunge, still hesitate before launching out into the deep. With increase of faith and the pressure of a steadily growing need, their day of action must come before very long. But Italy, even amid the distractions and crises of the present war, boldly initiated her adventurous project. And what happened? Just what might have been anticipated. *Il Rinascimento* was allowed three years of life; this new *Rivista* was permitted to appear but twice! The issues for January-February and March-April were duly distributed among numerous and expectant subscribers, but then the threatening bolt suddenly fell. By a decree of the Holy Office, further publication was suspended on the ground that the Review was "an organ of modernistic propaganda." Repression of this sort has not infrequently been resorted to in the history of mankind; but it has never permanently dammed any stream of wholesome and vitalizing influence. This Review has not really been destroyed. Like many a spring whose waters have been forced to make their way beneath the surface, the subject-matter hitherto found in the pages of this journal must now seek vent through less conspicuous and deeper channels.

¹ Cf. *Rivista di scienza delle religioni*. Bimonthly. Rome, 1916.

² Cf. *Revue de l'histoire des religions*. Bimonthly. 76 (half-yearly) vols. Paris, 1880— (in progress).

³ Cf. *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*. Quarterly. 17 vols. Leipzig, 1898—.

Another publication, more compact and less academic in type, has also already come to an untimely end.¹ All who possess its first volume will sincerely hope to see it revived when war exigencies shall have ceased. That such a journal should have been begun is of itself an encouraging and significant fact. For the period of a year it filled a vacant niche and showed itself fully competent to discharge an important task.

An older scientific journal, not so widely known in Great Britain and America as it ought to be, is "pubblicata a cura dei professori della Scuola Orientale nella R. Università di Roma."² Conducted in an excellent spirit and with an untiring industry, it has secured many valuable results in the extensive field of research to which it devotes itself. Yet it does not of course occupy the place which the recently suspended *Rivista* aspired to fill. It has other functions to discharge; it has responsibility for tasks which are more particularly its own. Its range is so wide that only occasionally does material relevant to the history of religions come within its purview. For the most part, it is constrained to deal with subjects which have no affiliation with the study just named.

There are several auxiliary topics to which, if they did not lie outside the scope of this survey, it would have been a genuine satisfaction to refer. And, concerning some of them, a great deal might usefully have been written. It must not be overlooked, for example, that modernism has always whole-heartedly favored the study of the history of religions. The reason of the serious opposition it has encountered in some quarters is indeed in this way partially explained. The coercion to which it has been persistently subjected in Italy has merely been hinted at; some readers of the *American Journal of Theology* might with advantage take a glance through one of Signor Murri's recent pamphlets.³ Did the occasion permit, attention might also have been directed to many incidental discussions of highly important and directly relevant

¹ Cf. *Bollettino di letteratura critico-religiosa* (Rome, 1914).

² Cf. *Rivista degli studi orientali*, Rome, 1907— (in progress).

³ Cf. Romolo Murri, *La religione nell' insegnamento pubblico in Italia* (Rome, 1915).

subjects.¹ But, for the purpose aimed at in a series of mere sketches, enough has already been said.

Summing up the gains of the last eight years, at least six notable achievements have been chronicled in the foregoing pages.

1. Two adequately established university chairs ("professori ordinari") having been secured—one for Rome and the other for Naples—these posts have once more been filled; and their occupants, though appointed to deal directly with other and more general themes, are unalterable friends and promoters of the study of the history of religions.

2. A professorship ("incaricato") has recently been founded in the University of Bologna and a lectureship ("libero docente") in the University of Rome for the express purpose of fostering the interests of this study.

3. A professorship devoted to the history of religions has recently been established under the auspices of the Royal Academy of Milan.

4. Members of the *facoltà di filosofia e lettere* in several universities—supported by many representative teachers in university institutes, etc.—are taking a steadily deepening interest in the fortunes of this department.

5. Scientific societies, congresses, etc., are beginning to exhibit a wholly unfamiliar inclination to explore this field diligently and with genuine devotion.

6. The printing press is now rendering fuller (and most welcome) service. In particular, a scientific journal of a most promising type having made its appearance in Rome, it is admitted that concrete expression has at last been given to a strong and very widely diffused demand. It is being affirmed, in truth, that a Review of this sort is today a *sine qua non* in Italy. Impediments, to be sure—impediments which were not wholly unforeseen—have led to the temporary suppression of this journal; but, among other liberalizing influences of the war, there is certain before long to be a reaction in its favor. A more generous reception of such enterprises in future is now practically assured. The tide of

¹ Cf., for example, Mario Puglisi, *Il problema morale nelle religioni primitive* (Rome, 1915).

enlightened sentiment is unmistakably rising, and that tide will yet submerge all ultra-conservative obstacles.

Many significant advances, concerning which Italy is content meanwhile to remain silent, are in confident prospect. While her brave soldiers are winning a wider political liberty amid the hardships and agonies of the battlefield, her scholars are on the eve of winning a no less decisive victory at home. Within the sphere of religious liberty, great changes are sure to come. And not least among these reforms will be the new scope accorded to the scientific study of the many faiths of mankind. In that metropolitan city and university wherein this study has had to fight so long and so hard for even the barest recognition, in a city and university wherein multiplied and hitherto insurmountable difficulties have effectually barred its progress, a new era in its evolution has been ushered in. Antiquated defenses and insecure citadels are being demolished one by one. Today an entirely new outlook greets the investigator who has entered into a once-forbidden domain. It has become indeed the widely diffused hope of many, both in Italy and beyond it, that Rome will yet possess in affiliation with its university a "scuola delle religioni" which will emulate the "section des sciences religieuses" of the famous École des Hautes-Études of Paris. Such an achievement may require more time than optimistic onlookers and local enthusiastic students are inclined to believe; but, though the vision tarry, it is now destined to take substantial and permanent form. When that day comes, none will applaud its advent more sincerely than Italy's countless well-wishers in America, in France, and in the British Isles.

FACT AND FANCY IN THEORIES CONCERNING ACTS

CHARLES C. TORREY
Yale University

The friendly treatment which my recent investigation of the Acts of the Apostles¹ has received at the hands of experts in New Testament science encourages me to add here a few observations, in part supplementary, in part replying to queries or objections raised by reviewers of my work. The main conclusions of my pamphlet, though doubted by some, have been accepted to an extent which has surprised me. Among the objections urged are some which appear formidable until they are examined closely; I hope to do justice to them in the following pages. As will presently appear, I have been led to change my opinion with regard to one matter which, though incidental, is not without importance. In general, it is not likely that any of the readers of the essay have realized how far-reaching will be the consequences of accepting the demonstration as to the original language of I Acts (i.e., Acts 1:1b—15:35). Thus my colleague Professor Bacon, in an article published in a recent number of this *Journal*,² speaks in very generous terms of my demonstration of an Aramaic original for I Acts, and of my previously attempted proof of a Hebrew original of the first two chapters of Luke's Gospel.³ He says (p. 3): "Torrey's earlier demonstration (the term is not too strong) is now supplemented by equally cogent proof that Acts 1:2—15:35 is a translation from the Aramaic. . . . The more careful the reader's verification of Torrey's evidences of translation, the more hearty will probably be his consent to the verdict." So also pages 11, 17, 18. Yet it seems

¹ *The Composition and Date of Acts*. "Harvard Theological Studies," No. 1. Cambridge, 1916.

² Benjamin W. Bacon, "More Philological Criticism of Acts," *American Journal of Theology*, XXII (1918), 1-23.

³ "The Translations Made from the Original Aramaic Gospels," contributed to *Studies in the History of Religions Presented to Crawford Howell Toy*, 1912.

plain that Bacon after all regards this demonstration as hardly more than a highly interesting *curiosum*, important chiefly to philologists, though of course valuable to all New Testament scholars as showing through what a history our documents have come. That it has any important bearing on what he would term "critical" theories of Acts he evidently would not admit for a moment. For him the book is the same old *corpus vile* now as before, still capable of dissection into the same half-dozen discordant sources, laboriously chopped and glued into their present conglomeration by an editor. He does not feel that the great problems of the book and its origin are brought any nearer to solution. I think that it will eventually become evident that when the proof of an Aramaic original for I Acts is once granted there is no escape from certain other conclusions which are much more comprehensive and important.

The material of this preliminary essay of mine was limited in its scope and very summarily presented; I was able to bring forward in it only a small part of the evidence on which I myself was relying. I realize that its full significance will remain obscure until I can undertake a more general discussion, taking in the wider field and establishing firmly some things which at present are half appreciated or flatly misunderstood. Thus in Bacon's article, especially pages 17 f., he recognizes, and assumes that I must also recognize, principles of literary criticism which I know to be quite unsound; I shall have occasion to speak of them in the sequel. There are also certain views long held—now perhaps universally held—by scholars with regard to the editorial and other literary activities of Luke which if correct would render some of the conclusions in this investigation of Acts less cogent. I know these views to be mistaken and believe that I can gain general credence for my own view, which, however, I have not yet even expressed, to say nothing of attempting to set forth the reasons for holding it.

Professor Foakes Jackson, in an interesting review of my *Composition and Date of Acts*,¹ puts his finger on one of these points. He says on page 352: "That Luke translated this [the Aramaic document of I Acts] with meticulous accuracy, adding nothing of

¹ "Professor C. C. Torrey on the Acts." *Harvard Theological Review*, X (October, 1917), 352-61.

importance of his own and adapting nothing to prove those points which he desired to establish, is, *judging by his use of Mark and Q*,¹ to me at least incredible." But when the evidence of translation in the Gospels has been mustered (and it has never yet been examined with sufficient care) it will be seen that the activities such as Professor Jackson has in mind nearly all pass out of Luke's hands into those of the author of an *Aramaic* Third Gospel. Luke's own work there is almost solely that of translator, and its characteristic features are precisely those which appear in his rendering of I Acts. Even before the proof of this is furnished, however, it seems to me that the evidence in I Acts alone, cumulative and consistent as it is, is quite sufficient of itself, without the added support from the Gospel, to justify the characterization given in my pamphlet (pp. 40 f.). I presume that Professor Jackson's use of the word "meticulous" is not intended to convey any disparagement, for all those who, like Professor Jackson himself, have studied carefully the ancient renderings from Semitic into Greek know that the method which I have tried to characterize in examining the Greek of the first half of Acts is in all its essential features the typical method of the translators of that day. As I attempted to show in my "Translations Made from the Original Aramaic Gospels," the workman then had a different conception of his task from that which now prevails. Better than most modern translators, he knew what he was about, and it is most fortunate for us that his aim was what it was, in spite of the glaring faults of his method. Even the careless, the slovenly, the stupid among the workers in this difficult field, habitually exhibit the same standard of *verbal* precision and even the same ingenuity (to us often perverse ingenuity) in attaining it which we can observe in I Acts.

Luke, like all the best translators of his day, is cautious and reliable—barring the inevitable slips, which are likely to be of the very greatest value to us.² His procedure in the Gospel and the Acts does not necessarily afford an index of the relative importance

¹ The italics are mine.

² In my pamphlet, p. 40, I spoke of Luke as "*singularly* faithful to his sources." The adverb is a misleading one, and I corrected it in the margin of my own copy almost as soon as it was issued. "Very" or "decidedly" would have been better.

to him of the documents he was rendering; he and his fellows would have pursued the same method if the texts in hand had been of minor interest. There is another phrase in the sentence quoted above with regard to which I have a query. Can Professor Jackson be perfectly sure that there were "points which Luke desired to establish"? I of course admit the possibility that he had his own pet theses which he was even willing to introduce into his translations, though I do not know where the evidence of this could be found; but it seems to me far more probable that he conceived his duty to be that of a collector of authentic Palestinian records, by translating which he could give Theophilus and his like a trustworthy account—the *best native Palestinian account*—of the Christian beginnings. And I believe that the narrative which he thus made available was in fact much truer in its essential features than anything which he could have produced by editing and composing according to his own ideas. He was not a "historian" according to our notions, and even if he had been he doubtless would have been at a loss to find the main thread and the true perspective in much of this strange material.

Professor Jackson also deals generously with the main feature of my essay, the demonstration of Aramaic underlying the Greek of I Acts. He accepts the proof as valid for most of the first fifteen chapters, but is inclined to doubt it for chapters 13-15, not because the evidence in the latter case is essentially weaker, but because of a long-standing and widely accepted theory of the composition of the book, according to which these chapters are made a part of the document which continues in chapters 16 ff. Bacon, in the above-mentioned article (p. 4, note 2, and pp. 13, 22 f.), shows himself under the influence of the same theory. He admits indeed that the Greek of these chapters is a rendering from Aramaic, but asks us to believe that this Aramaic was itself the translation of a Greek document. It is in fact not possible to hold that the demonstration of translation-Greek is valid for a part of I Acts but not for the remainder. The evidence of an underlying Aramaic original is fully as strong in all parts of chapters 13-15 as it is in the chapters preceding. The Aramaisms which I happened to mention are by no means the only ones that could be pointed out; the texture of

the Greek is Aramaic through and through. I feel quite sure that when the question has been adequately studied scholars will come to the conclusion that there is no tenable middle ground; it is necessary either to reject the theory of translation *in toto* or else to include the whole of I Acts in the hypothesis.

Professor Jackson, like many other New Testament scholars, takes it for granted that a friend and companion of Paul must be a disciple of his, that is, an adherent and exponent of his theology and a champion of his more extreme views in matters of controversy. The man who wrote the account of Paul's journey to Rome, it is said, must have occupied the point of view represented by the second chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians and must have disapproved the statements of the fifteenth chapter of Acts. This is pure assumption, however, and nothing more; it is not only unsupported by anything in Acts, but the evidence, if we admit that there is any, points in the opposite direction sufficiently to give trouble to the adherents of the theory. But is the assumption justified at all? I do not believe that Professors Jackson and Bacon would wish to insist even on this general statement: Everyone who becomes a friend of a great theologian and travels in his company understands and approves his theology. Neither in modern nor in ancient times could such a statement hold even approximately true. Nor is this any better: Every friend and companion of a man who has been engaged in a sharp controversy holds precisely his point of view and will suppress, if possible, any statements that might be interpreted in such a way as to make him appear in certain controversial utterances to be speaking with some personal bias.

Is it not from just this major premise, however, that Professors Jackson and Bacon and their fellows take their start? Professor Jackson is mistaken when he also attributes such a view to me. He says (p. 358): "Dr. Torrey points out . . . the impossibility of the Council of Jerusalem in Acts 15 having been so described by a companion of Paul's." But Professor William Jerome Wilson, in his essay entitled "The Unity of the Aramaic Acts,"¹ to which I shall refer later, is right in supposing (p. 328, note) that what I said of this import on pages 42 f. of my pamphlet was intended

¹ In the *Harvard Theological Review*, XI (July, 1918), 322-35.

simply as a concise statement of the prevailing "critical" views, not as an expression of my own opinions. I should, however, have expressed myself more clearly. Professor Jackson, it must be observed, not stopping with the statement quoted above, goes on to say: "But does not Dr. Torrey ignore the difficulty of accounting for a close friend of Paul's having incorporated into his narrative so damaging a statement as that relating to the proceedings of the Apostles and the promulgation of the letter to the churches of Syria and Cilicia?" That is, he would say, granting for the sake of argument the existence of an Aramaic document, including chapter 15 (which then would presumably *not* be the composition of a personal friend of Paul's), is it easily conceivable that Luke (or whoever compiled the book) should have permitted this chapter to remain in his translation or transcription of the document which lay before him? Now we know very little indeed about the compiler. We do not know whether he was Jew or Gentile,¹ Hellenist or proselyte, opinionated or diffident; to what extent he would be inclined to harmonize and to what extent to leave his sources as he found them. We have only very slight and partial knowledge of his point of view, and no knowledge whatever as to the immediate conditions and impulses under which he wrote, save the bare fact that he had an acquaintance named Theophilus, whom he hoped to instruct and not mislead.

We are therefore obviously not in a position to be dogmatic; and yet it seems to me that the question asked above can be answered with confidence: It *is* very easily conceivable that Luke should have incorporated Acts 15 in his book, and that too without the least hesitation or unwillingness. Even if we should grant that he held the views conjectured for him by Professor Jackson, we know nevertheless that he did, at least occasionally, allow his sources to say things contradicting each other or his own narrative—this is the case both at the beginning and at the end of the Aramaic

¹ This is true even when the compiler is supposed to be Luke. It is indeed customary to argue from Col. 4:10 f., 14, that Luke was a Gentile; but the wording of verse 11 is so ambiguous and difficult as to render the conclusion quite unsafe. See, for instance, the rendering of the English Revisers, who follow the Greek and take the consequences, and Schmiedel's desperate struggle with the text in *Encycl. Bibl.*, "Luke," cols. 2830 f. Is it not probable that the original reading here was *οἱ μεν οὖν* instead of *οἱ μοι οὖν*? This is just what we should expect Paul to write, and the accidental corruption of *ε* to *ο* is very common.

document, as well as in one or two other places—and that in translating he was notably cautious and exact. This all gives real ground for the belief that he wished to deal faithfully with his sources and not to refashion them according to his own ideas. This belief is not difficult in the least, especially as the mode of procedure—giving each source its own right—is the rule and not the exception in oriental historiography. Even an eager partisan of Paul might well have incorporated views belonging to the extreme opposition, if he found them in a document which he thought important.

I can, however, see no reason for believing that we have here before us partisans and party documents. What is there in either the Judean narrative or II Acts that is distinctly controversial or one-sided? I am well aware that this has long been the way of regarding the book in certain schools of New Testament interpretation; it is the postulate which lies at the basis of most of the analyses of Acts. In its extreme form it assumes—and also finds—a considerable cluster of discordant sources forced into an unhappy union by a man whose principal characteristic was zeal for the interests of his own small party. By way of partial illustration I quote a sentence or two occurring incidentally in Bacon's article. He speaks on page 19 of considerations showing "the systematic adaptation of the sense of II Acts away from what would agree with the Pauline Epistles, to conform it to the Petrine standard made central in the chapter on the Apostolic Council."

In other words, II Acts must have agreed with the Pauline Epistles; it does not, in fact, agree with them; ergo, it has been garbled. This is strikingly like the Mohammedan doctrine of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures: They definitely foretold and described Mohammed and his work; no such definite predictions and descriptions are to be found in the Bible as it now exists; ergo, the Jews and Christians have falsified their Scriptures.

Bacon goes on to say: "The main evidence is the misinterpretation of Paul's action in 16:3 and 21:26 and the suppression and perversion of the real object of the great delegation to Jerusalem." Again, on page 21: "Chapters 6-8, with their sequel in 11:19-26, contain a presentation of the same central idea, which is fundamentally at variance with the compiler's. The best efforts of the Autor ad Theophilum to harmonize and adjust remain powerless.

to suppress the testimony of this fundamentally Hellenistic account of Gentile mission work," etc.

This is similar reasoning turned in the other direction: The author of Acts and the author, i.e., compiler, of the Aramaic document were both partisans of the narrow view and aimed to trim all their sources into agreement with their own ideas; in point of fact I Acts contains much that is distinctly liberal; therefore we must conclude that they either overlooked these telltale wide-hearted elements or else did not know how to get rid of them.

A few lines farther down the page Bacon comes to the mention of *another* "source" which similarly baffled both the "Aramaic compiler" and the "Autor ad Theophilum": "In like manner the harmonizing transpositions, omissions, and corrections of the editor are of no avail against the irrepressible testimony of Acts 12:1-23; 9:32-11:18. Here we have another presentation of the same fundamental idea, and one which is equally free with that of the Hellenistic source." And on page 22 we read of "the Aramaic harmonist," "this forced harmonization," "the camouflage of chapter 15 with its compromising 'decrees of the Apostles and elders,'" and the way in which the author of the Book of Acts, in appending the Greek Acts of Paul to the Aramaic document, "was of course compelled to narrow down its representations to the same harmonizing standard his Aramaic predecessor had adopted."

To sum up: According to the theory of partisan sources we have before us in I Acts a collection of uninspiring little documents produced by insignificant little writers who without exception were possessed either of very limited information or of slight regard for the truth, or both; all combined by a mean and dishonest little editor. For this last-named author, as he is described, I, for one, could feel only contempt; and this appears to be the reaction which he and his activities produce upon Professor Bacon.¹ Now, far be it from me to say that these and similar conclusions are groundless, but I do know with certainty that they are quite unnecessary. I

¹ Let no one suppose that any such manipulation of documents as is here postulated was either usual or regarded as respectable in those days. Bacon speaks on page 13 of "the known phenomena of ancient book-making," but what he describes is the construction of ancient books as it is carried on chiefly in modern workshops and lecture-rooms. See further in the concluding instalment of this article.

think I am as determined as I know Professor Bacon to be to follow the evidence, according to my lights, wherever it leads. The evidence seems to me both plain and altogether consistent, and in this latter particular I have the advantage over Professors Jackson, Bacon, and their fellows, as can be seen from their own admissions in the preceding pages. I agree entirely with Bacon's conclusion that the author of I Acts and the author of the whole book were men of kindred spirit; I said this with some emphasis in my pamphlet, page 65. What is still more interesting and important, they were thoroughly *representative* men, speaking for the great body of the Christian church of that day. Each of the two was far from deserving the reproach laid by the great Apostle to the Gentiles at the door of certain Christians of the time, that they said: "I am of Paul's party," or, "I am a follower of Cephas." These two writers show everywhere a refreshing breadth of mind and a warm, catholic spirit; they are not adherents of any party but are trying to record truthfully, as far as they are able, the successive main steps in the wonderful transition from Jewish sect to world-religion.

Bacon and his fellows exclaim at the liberal elements in I Acts and wonder at their presence. The reason for it is that the author of I Acts, who wrote these chapters, was a liberal man. Wonder is also expressed that so much in II Acts should seem to show "conformity to the Petrine standard." The reason, I take it, is this, that events and opinions actually took the course described. Of course the great body of the church would have inclined toward "the Petrine standard" if it had been aware of any such thing. Paul could not possibly have rivaled in authority the great pioneers, the Twelve, *at that time*, and that he in fact did not is shown plainly enough by his own emphatic, almost indignant, protestations that he *is* an apostle and as good as any of them. Of course he had his own strong following, which grew steadily stronger; but it would have been strange indeed if either the author of the Third Gospel or the author of the Judean document had been of the number, however great a leader they may have seen in him, and however epoch-making they felt his work to be. They were under the still more potent spell of Galilee and Jerusalem, and could see the beginnings of the church in something like their true proportion.

Professor Jackson, in the sentence quoted above, speaks of Acts 15 as embodying a statement of the course of events that would be "damaging" to Paul's reputation. I confess that after a good deal of careful study of the chapter from my own point of view, and comparison of it with Paul's Epistles, I am quite unable to see in it anything "damaging" to Paul or to anyone else. Certainly neither Paul nor the Twelve Apostles had reason to fear the truth. I have no doubt that the story of the Council and its findings told in Acts 15 is substantially true, though of course we expect embellishment in details in such a narrative. I certainly have no question that every statement made by Paul regarding these and the related matters was believed by him to be strictly in accordance with fact.

As for Gal. 2, wherein lies the difficulty in pronouncing its agreement with Acts 15 perfectly satisfactory, when we take into account the totally different nature of the two documents and the totally different circumstances under which they were produced? We are familiar enough in our own day with the phenomenon of widely dissimilar accounts of the same happenings given in good faith and with good reason by men speaking and writing from diverse points of view; it is one of the interesting features of human testimony on which we comment daily. One reporter sees and presents one aspect, his fellow presents another, and each report is true as far as it goes. Why should we deny to these ancient records the freedom which we allow unhesitatingly and with full approval in any modern instance? What Paul gives in his Epistle is of course an *ex parte* account; it could not be otherwise. He is speaking as an advocate, and it would seem that the greater part of his immediate hearers felt him to be in a decided minority and perhaps even seriously mistaken. The events which he mentions when writing in this strain are as a matter of course only those which show that he was justified in his own view—as he certainly was. In his account of the Council he thinks of himself as the hero. He would have thought this in any case, since he was human, and it was in fact due mainly to the splendid labors accomplished by him and Barnabas that new action by the church was necessary. To the members of the Jerusalem church, however, and to all the great body of

believers who looked thither for inspiration, the foremost heroes of the occasion were of course Peter and James, even though the view which triumphed was that of which Paul had been the principal champion. It is possible, moreover, though perhaps not necessary, to suppose that Paul's recollection of the visit to Jerusalem and the scene there was somewhat colored by the events of the intervening years.

We know, in the first place, that there was some difference of opinion between Paul and the apostles, who were the leaders of the main body of the church. Just what the difference was *we do not know*, nor to what extent, if at all, it touched upon matters that were essential. Sounds of real *controversy* we have only in Paul's Epistles. In Acts we have merely incidental evidence of what sounds like an unimportant conflict of views (in 21:20-26). This certainly suggests the probability, rather than the mere possibility, that the question at issue was not one of grave concern. This probability is only strengthened by the crucial passage in Paul's writings, the second chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians. The tone of the chapter is distinctly that of a discussion of matters of limited, not universal, importance. Paul feels personally hurt, that is beyond all question (see especially vs. 6), and believes that his influence and the success of his great work are being impaired; more than this, he is persuaded that the leaders ("whatever they are!") are pursuing an unwise and harmful policy. He writes with some impatience, and the phrases which he uses, where we could wish for information, are not definite, but general, more or less rhetorical, and colored by his mood.

Bearing in mind the fact that what is really of great importance to the individual apostle and his work may not be vital to the interests of the whole church, we seem to see the probable reason why II Acts lays no stress on the matter. What we know of the subsequent history testifies to the same effect. Professor Ropes, in his *Apostolic Age*, states very clearly and cogently the fact that Paul's real *controversy* was not with the Twelve Apostles, nor with Peter, but with the "Judaizing" Christians, whose efforts very justly alarmed and exasperated him. The issue between him and them was *vital* for the whole church and the Christian gospel, for they insisted on the

Jewish law, or at least a part of it, as an essential part of the new faith. Ropes describes their activities (pp. 91-93), but shows that though they were at first comparatively numerous and sometimes influential, and always very active and bitter, in their opposition to Paul and Peter and James and the orthodox church generally, yet they were never anything more than a minor sect and were soon hopelessly left behind (see pp. 93-98). He remarks that their efforts became more and more a personal attack on Paul¹ and says (p. 94), what is especially important for our present inquiry: "In Paul's later writings this controversy with Judaizing emissaries from the church at Jerusalem disappears. It was by no means the controlling characteristic of the Apostolic age." It seems plain, in view of the preceding, that the reason why the note of controversy disappears from Paul's writings is that the occasion for it had become insignificant, not that the convictions of the apostle had been changed or weakened. If, as some suppose, the leaders of the church in Jerusalem, and the apostle Peter in particular, had held and taught that certain Jewish ordinances were *essential* for Jewish Christians, could Paul possibly have laid down his weapons in this way? *Was Christ divided?* Such teaching would have been a fatal blow at the very heart of the gospel, and no one knew this better than Paul. Is it conceivable that Peter and his colleagues should have been so blind as not to see this also?

What then does the apostle mean in Gal. 2:7 by his slightly impatient phrase, "the gospel of the circumcision"? We are bound at least to test the hypothesis that he has in mind a *policy* rather than a doctrinal requirement. This agrees very manifestly with the tone of the whole chapter, which does not in the least suggest the presence of such a fundamental principle of the faith as that just mentioned. It agrees also with his other utterances and with what he tells us of his co-operation with the Twelve. It is also

¹ The apprehension felt by Paul before his last visit to Jerusalem, expressed in Rom. 15:30-32, is sometimes interpreted, in an unwarranted way, as though he thought that the main body (!) of the church at Jerusalem was hostile to him. He knew very well what power even a small band of "Judaizers" could wield there, and what an opportunity would be given them, by his arrival, to stir up the mob of the city against him. This is just what happened. Of course the apostles and the Jerusalem church were absolutely powerless under such circumstances.

thoroughly consonant with what we are told in the Book of Acts. Peter in his speech in Acts 15 is represented as distinctly cutting loose from the standard of "Jewish law for the Jews" in verses 10 and 11: "Neither we nor our fathers could bear the yoke; we believe that *both we ourselves and the Gentiles are to be saved through the grace of our Lord Jesus.*" Yet Peter's attitude toward the Jewish law was different from that of Paul. This would seem to mean that he held that it was better for the Jewish Christians to be circumcised, *for the sake of preserving the continuity of the Jewish people.* There were plainly strong reasons for this, some of which we can appreciate even at this distance. Foremost among them was Old Testament prophecy, with its precious promises for the "eternal people," עַם עוֹלָם. The best-known and most cherished of these prophecies were precisely for the messianic age, in which Israel was to hold a favored place in the multitude of the saved; could it be that, with the advent of the Messiah, Israel should now disappear? The end of the present age, they all felt, was not far distant. Peter and his colleagues, we may then suppose, took the ground that Jewish Christians should continue in the observance of their inherited laws and customs and should even be "zealous" for them (Acts 21:20), *provided always* that all understood and admitted that these ordinances now had merely racial value and were quite destitute of any significance for Christianity. This might well have seemed to the great majority of Jewish Christians at that day a most desirable policy, since it was only the *requirement* of these rites that would have been false to the spirit of Christianity. It was a difficult teaching to maintain in its purity, however; and history eventually made short work of it.

Paul's attitude toward this policy would then seem to have been one of disapproving acquiescence. His own feeling, emphatically expressed, is that in Christ all distinctions of race have been done away; the Jews should not hold any peculiar position in the church. He saw clearly how the policy was sure to be made to appear the doctrine; and the way in which it actually was thus transformed proved the greatest single hindrance to his work. We should probably say, from our standpoint, that Paul's attitude here was wiser and more farseeing than that of the others, but it certainly

was less natural. On the other hand, he must have felt as strongly as anyone the necessity of conciliating the Jews, on whose ultimate attitude so much depended. It is evident, both from the record and from his own frequent utterances, that he *was* conciliatory, though he was not willing to go to the length of some others, including his colleague Barnabas. As for the Jews themselves, who had not yet become Christians, he of course would have desired them to continue in their own laws and customs.¹

The narrative of Acts and the statements in Paul's letters agree completely with what has been assumed here with regard to the attitude and mutual relations of Paul and the Twelve. There were doubtless many unrecorded instances of mild controversy, in which now the one, now the other view prevailed; also instances in which the one or the other disputant yielded either because of new light or for the sake of the greater good. When Peter was rebuked by Paul at Antioch he was presumably in the wrong, though it appears from Gal. 2:13 that even Barnabas did not think so. In that case we may take it for granted, since he was not a small man, but a great one, that he frankly acknowledged his error. He had meant well, and under other circumstances his action might have been justified. There was certainly no fundamental and lasting difference of opinion between him and Paul. The latter, in turn, showed himself ready to yield his general preference in specific cases as long as no principle was involved. "All things are *lawful* for me," he said, "but all things are not *expedient*." He would gladly be (he tells us) a Jew with the Jews if by any means he might gain them over. The incident narrated in Acts 16:3, the circumcision of Timothy, was a case in point. No principle whatever was involved, for it was simply a matter of conciliation; otherwise we can be perfectly certain that Paul would not have done as he did. Beyond what is told us in the single sentence in verse 3 we know nothing whatever about the circumstances under which the action was taken; and it is the circumstances that ordinarily bring about the decision in such matters. Another occurrence of the same sort is narrated in 21:23-26, an incident in which there is difficulty only for those who are inclined to find it there, or who misunder-

¹ Compare, e.g., Acts 24:14, 26:3, 28:17, and see also below.

stand Paul's attitude. Where is the evidence that he wished to forbid to Jewish converts the right of continuing in their customs, or that he refused to meet halfway the Jews themselves who were inquiring about the new sect? There is no such evidence, but there is plenty to the contrary.

We—all of us—need to keep in mind, what we very easily forget, that our reconstructions of ancient history from meager records are sure to be machine-made and arbitrary and possibly most mistaken where we feel surest of them. The actors in the few scenes which happen to pass before our eyes were human beings, not puppets, and their actions were not simple and reducible to the formulas which we constantly and of necessity apply to them, but complicated by their personalities, which we are far from understanding in any case, and by a great variety of circumstances about which we have only the slightest knowledge. When, for instance, Bacon asserts (p. 19) that the statement in Acts 24:17 shows either ignorance or dishonesty on the part of the narrator or else "prevarication" on the part of Paul, the natural reply is that there is indeed profound ignorance in the case; but it is our own, not that of the contemporary historian.

It may be remarked here that one principal reason why so much in the Book of Acts seems to Professors Jackson and Bacon artificial and improbable is because of the late date which they have assigned to it. If I myself supposed Acts 15 to have been written in the second century A.D., or late in the first century, I should find it much more difficult to understand and to accept as a substantially true account. There is not a whisper of sharp controversy in the chapter. This is not because the writer was ignorant or dishonest, but because the sharp controversy involving a considerable part of the church had not yet arisen. It was at a later day that the dispute became widespread and the situation really acute. Wilson in his "Unity of the Aramaic Acts"¹ (pp. 329 f.) has some excellent remarks on this point. He says very truly that the chapter sounds as though it were written "in the first flush of enthusiasm" and "before the opposition had assumed its later and more sinister forms." One of his remarks I would like

¹ See above, p. 65, n. 1.

to amplify a little. He says that "our Aramaic author was not a trained historian, capable of foreseeing that opposition . . . would inevitably break out again in other and perhaps violent forms." Even a trained historian, however, would have made as bad a mess of predicting the near future as our untrained historians do of reconstructing the remote past. Even Peter and the apostles, including Paul, could not have foreseen what was going to happen, although probably they and every other well-informed man knew that the trouble was not *all* over, and felt that the findings of their Council would be likely to need supplementing at an early date. As for Paul, it is reasonable to suppose that neither his views of church polity nor his theology had been finally and rigidly settled at this time. The account of his further work, as it is continued in chapters 16 ff., sounds distinctly as though he shared the feeling of the others and was satisfied, for the time being, with the triumph achieved at Jerusalem; and *if the account is practically contemporary*, this is precisely what we should expect. In general, I believe that every chapter in the remainder of the book, from 16 to 28, is much more comprehensible and convincing when seen to be a contemporary record than when supposed to have been compiled a few decades later.

I confess, of course, my failure to understand the details of Acts 15:20 and 28, the specific recommendations to the Gentile converts. There lies behind them a great background of ideas and habits of which our ignorance is almost total. Only this much seems quite clear, indeed certain, from the whole context, that no one of the four things named is either a religious requirement or thought of as connected with specifically Jewish customs. Both Peter and James have just said plainly and with emphasis: There shall be no yoke laid on the Gentiles. On what ground is the favorite term "compromise" applied to the decision of this Council? Apparently only on the ground of verse 21: For from days of old the teachings of Moses have been set forth, by the Jews, in all the Gentile cities. But is not this merely James's (or the narrator's) rather naïve explanation of the fact that all through the known world these four things were normally regarded as the requirements of morality and decency? The Gentiles, the writer seems to

say plainly, *hold the same opinion as the Jews with regard to these particular things*. This, he believes, must be due to Jewish influence continued through many generations. What the Council said to the converts of the pagan world was this:

We have no ordinances whatever to impose upon you, nor any restrictions which would have the appearance of turning you in the direction of Judaism. But we remind you that the new religion will be judged in the world by the conduct of its members, and therefore ask you to keep yourself from those things which by people of sound morals everywhere are regarded as offensive. If you can do this, it will be well for you [*εὖ πράξετε*].

Where, in all this, is the compromise? It is of course possible to doubt the writer's implied assertion that these things were included in what was commonly regarded as the highest standard of morality in the Gentile-Jewish world at this particular time. We do not know from other sources whether it was so or not. Here apparently is an opportunity for us to learn something from a contemporary record, though what we are told takes us only a very short distance. The decision of the Council at Jerusalem was (so we are explicitly told in Acts; so it is plainly implied in Gal. 2; so all the clear evidence seems to show) that Gentiles and Jews were to be absolutely on an equality as regards the religious requirement. It is quite true that encouragement of the Jewish Christians to continue in their racial customs would often and of necessity create the appearance of an "inner circle" in the brotherhood; and wherever this was true it could only be irritating and perhaps misleading to the Gentile converts. This seems to be precisely what Paul means in his indignant words to Peter, repeated by him in Gal. 2:14. But the dispute is over a matter of policy, not of principle. When my colleague Professor Walker¹ speaks of Peter and James and their associates as thenceforth working among the Jews, "of course with maintenance of the law" as binding, he expresses what is now widely believed, but, I think, not justified. I should prefer this instead: "*never* with acknowledgment of the Jewish law as binding," seeing that this is the express statement of Acts 15, against which we have no clear testimony whatever. Neither Paul, nor Luke, nor Peter, nor the Aramaic document knew anything about

¹ *History of the Christian Church* (1918), p. 28.

the "double *standard*" which plays such an important part in the theory with which I am taking issue.¹

We are not in such a position of certainty in these difficult matters as to enable us to cut loose from any one of the few documents which we are so fortunate as to possess. Bacon (p. 3) accuses Harnack of fitting the Pauline Epistles to "the procrustean bed of Acts," and seems himself to wish to turn the operation in the other direction. But is it not better to do without procrustean beds? Whether my interpretation of the supposed disagreement between Acts 15 and Gal. 2 is intrinsically more probable in its details than those which I am antagonizing is a question by itself, and perhaps not an important one; what is of very great importance is the fact that more than one interpretation is possible. For mine the claim can at least be made that it is based on the extant documents just as they stand and regarded as straightforward and ungarbled records.

To return for a moment to the gratuitous theory of Luke as an exponent of Paul's teaching: It would be quite possible, on the evidence of our sources, to argue that Luke had some distaste, not only for theology in general, but also for Paul's in particular. It is truly astonishing how little theological interest of any sort is to be found in Acts 16-28. Arguing a priori, according to current notions, one might well have pronounced such a phenomenon inconceivable. Beyond all question Luke was not a theologian, and since that was the case we may be sure that Paul's theology was a hard nut for him to crack. Paul was not such a clear, methodical, and systematic writer that it is easy to comprehend at first hearing the doctrines and arguments which he sets forth. I wonder whether any human being ever accomplished this feat. It is strange that no ambitious young scholar has yet propounded the thesis that Luke was actually a bit bored by Paul's preaching and controversial discussions, much as he loved the man. We have some evidence that Paul was not a captivating speaker (compare II Cor. 10:10 with Acts 20:9); and it may not be purely accidental that Luke, who was glad to be Paul's traveling companion, especially on the water, generally left him, as the record

¹ See, for instance, Bacon's article, pp. 21 f.

seems to show, whenever he stayed long at any one place! Of course he could not possibly have foreseen that (thanks to the providential preservation of a few letters) the church was destined to build itself up on Paul's teaching rather than on that of Barnabas, or Apollos, or Peter, or John, or still others.

But from my point of view the most surprising example of maltreatment of the source in the interest of the theory is to be found in the exegesis and "critical analysis" of Acts 28 by the school to which some of my reviewers belong. The process is the familiar one of deciding at the outset what the nature of the document *should have been* and what it *must have contained*; and then, since it does not say what was desired, assuming that it has been altered.

I would first like to consider a statement made by Professor Jackson on page 359. It is possible that I have misunderstood it, and it may be that I do him injustice; if so, I am heartily sorry. He speaks of "the problem of reconciling Acts 28:17 *ad fin.* with all that is elsewhere known of Paul's attitude toward the Jewish leaders." Well, what *was* his attitude toward the Jews? The question, like all such questions, is more complicated than we sometimes assume, and we cannot at this distance be quite sure of knowing all about it. There are some facts, however, which are perfectly well attested. He had been fiercely antagonized by the Jews from the very first (as a matter of course), and his life had often been in danger from them. He held the unshakable conviction—as did also the Twelve Apostles and all of the "orthodox" church—that the Gentiles had the same right to Christianity as the Jews and had no need whatever to come in by the way of Judaism. On the other hand, he had been a Jew himself and was proud of the fact. His heart yearned toward his own race with its glorious heritage of history and religious truth and its unique Law which had been the "schoolmaster" to bring the world to the knowledge of Christ. In his Epistle to the Romans, 10:1, he exclaims: "The desire of my heart and my prayer to God is that Israel may be saved." Did he mean this, or was it a mere form of words? Was he willing to do anything himself toward this end? See also in the same epistle his emphatic words at the beginning of chapters 3 and 11. "What advantage has the Jew? Much, in every way!"

"Could God abandon his own chosen people? Never!" And in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, 9:20, he says: "To the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might win over the Jews; to those under the law as though I myself were under it, in order to win over those under the law." Had Paul forgotten all these things? He was not the man to be driven from his course by continued persecution, or to claim release from responsibility because a majority of his people had rejected him. As he says in I Cor. 10:33, "I seek not my own advantage, but that of the many, that they may be saved." We are fortunate enough, moreover, to know what had been his customary method of beginning work in any new city or region to which he journeyed. He seems invariably to have begun with the Jews, if any were to be found, approaching them as a Jew who was loyal to his people; telling them that he had a message which was *for Israel first of all*; declaring that their laws and ordinances and the Prophets were merely God's preparation for something better; and seeking to show them the roots of Christianity in their own customs and beliefs as based on their sacred Scriptures. Thus he had done at Salamis (Acts 13:5), Antiochia (13:14 ff.), Iconium (14:1), Philippi (16:13), Thessalonica (17:1 ff., where it is said that he preached first to the Jews "according to his custom"), Corinth (18:2-5), and Ephesus (18:19; 19:8).

We should therefore feel very sure that at as early a day as practicable after his arrival in Rome he would arrange for a meeting with the leading Jews of the city. This is what he does. We should also expect that he would emphasize (as always elsewhere, under like circumstances) the value of the religion of his people, with its laws and customs, given through Moses, which afforded them special access to Jesus the Messiah. This also he does. What he says to the Jewish leaders in Acts 28:17-20 is, it seems to me, in perfect agreement both with what is narrated in Acts and also with what we learn from Paul's Epistles. He had never at any time or in any way antagonized the Jewish laws and customs *as holding good for the Jews*. Indeed, he himself, though they no longer held good for him, had more than once observed them for the sake of spreading the gospel, and had prescribed this course to other Christians, for whom also these customs were quite worthless

save as an occasional means of conciliation (I Cor. 9:20; Acts 16:3; 21:26). It would have been strangely blind and contrary to all his teaching if he had wished to take away from his own people that bridge by which the God of their fathers had destined that they were to pass over into the Christian brotherhood. *Potentially* the Law was already done away and a thing of the past; *in actual fact* it was to continue to the end to be the "schoolmaster" for those who had been obdurate at first. Paul certainly did not suppose that the Jews who refused to listen to *his* preaching had lost their last opportunity! Where then is the problem of reconciling Acts 28:17 ff. with what is elsewhere known of Paul's attitude toward the Jewish leaders?

Professor Jackson (*ibid.*) goes on immediately with the following sentence: "How could a disciple of Paul who knew of the Epistle to the Romans make [in Acts 28:17-31] the Jewish elders of Rome ignorant not only of his existence but of that of the Christian sect?" I can only reply that neither of these statements is justified. Verse 22 says in so many words that the existence of the sect *was* known to them (!); and in verse 21 it is *not* said that they had not heard of Paul, but only this, that they had heard *no evil* of him. It might seem from the very fact of their using this qualifying adjective, *πονηρόν*, that they meant to imply their knowledge of his existence; probably in fact they had heard of him; but as it may be that they are merely making a polite reply to his introductory words in verses 17-19 (in which he had said *that the Jewish authorities had judged him worthy of death*), it is unsafe to draw any conclusion.¹

Professor Bacon² discusses this last chapter of Acts at greater length, from a point of view which appears to be the same as that

¹ I confess to feeling somewhat baffled by the sentence here quoted from Professor Jackson, for whose opinion I have such high regard. Very soon after the publication of my "Composition and Date of Acts" he was so courteous as to send me a first draft of his objections to some of my conclusions, and among his arguments was the very one which I am here discussing. I replied promptly, stating my view of Acts 28:17 ff. substantially as above; his statement in the *Harvard Theological Review* was therefore not made hastily, but presumably after renewed consideration of the passage. I should be tempted to suspect some misunderstanding on my part if it were not for the fact that Professor Wilson in his "Unity of the Aramaic Acts" (p. 329, the long note) also takes issue with Professor Jackson on this point, using the same arguments and very much the same words that I had used in my letter of December 3, 1916.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 18 f.

of Professor Jackson. His statement of the argument is more detailed and his critical position sufficiently clear. Verses 17-29 are regarded by him as a later interpolation. Two reasons are given for this belief. The first is that the passage does not contain what Bacon would have it contain. It has no mention of "the great Roman church," and deals entirely with Jews instead of taking account of the Epistle to the Romans, although Paul some three years before this had announced to the brethren at Rome his intention of visiting them some day. Bacon finds here an "extraordinary discrepancy." Why should this writer "report Paul's entry precisely as if Rome were virgin soil for the missionary" and "depict Paul's beginning there as if no such church existed"? To be sure, the matter-of-fact reader at once interjects the plea that the Roman church *had* received the first mention,¹ the narrator telling of Paul's "warm welcome by 'the brethren' through a body of delegates sent all the way to Appii Forum."² Ah, *this* was written by "the Diarist," not by the interpolator! is Bacon's reply. His first argument, compactly stated, is accordingly this: Verses 17-29 are an interpolation because they do not say over again at greater length what had already been said in verse 15. Which sounds a bit arbitrary.

In the second reason which he gives³ for his theory he turns from sins of omission to those of commission. The passage is seen to be a later insertion because of its literary poverty, in that it deals in mere tiresome platitudes. It "conforms completely to the stereotyped formula of the Apologia" (whatever that may mean); it gives "a stereotyped representation"; the interpolator "brings his story to an end with the usual moral"; he puts us off with "glittering generalities." The cut-and-dried formula which arouses his scorn is the

¹ We do not know what weighty messages from Paul these brethren may have taken forthwith to the rest of the church. We do not know what strong reasons (we can easily conjecture some of them) Paul may have had for wishing to approach the Jews *as soon as possible*, considering the circumstances of his arrival. It is in any case natural to suppose that the writer of this history could see at least as plainly as we can that any extended mention of the Roman church and its history and doings would lie quite outside the plan of the book as he had conceived it.

² Quoted from Bacon, *op. cit.*, at the beginning of p. 19.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

following, as he himself states it: (1) the gospel is offered to the Jews; (2) a few believe, the rest oppose; (3) the messengers turn thereupon to the Gentiles, declaring that so the Scriptures had predicted; (4) the Gentiles gladly receive the message. Now it is certainly true that we should not expect to find, in the writing which this purports to be, a parrot-like repetition of an overworked program. If the presence (real, not merely fancied) of such a literary weakness can be shown, we might see in it some excuse for condemning the passage as inferior to its context, though perhaps not even then for rejecting it as an editorial insertion. Let us see. Undeniably these things are stereotyped formulas and glittering generalities for Professor Bacon; possibly they were such even at the time when he supposes the Book of Acts to have been compiled; but this fact of itself does not prove that they were such for Luke and his readers. It is certainly not necessary to remind Bacon that every stock phrase has had its day of primitive strength, and that for every conventional mode of representation there was a period when it was new and fresh. I hope I am not dealing unfairly with the argument when I say that it seems to me just a little like reasoning in a circle, thus: How do we know that verses 17-29 are late? Answer: Because of the stereotyped formulas. But how do we know that this representation was stereotyped at the time when the passage was written? Answer: Because it is late!

Taking Bacon's observation for what it is worth and giving Acts 28:17-29 the benefit of any doubt which there may be as to its date, we certainly obtain the presumption that the passage is *early*, not late. There is no justification, moreover, for speaking of the representation here as "stereotyped"; it is merely a simple and natural account of *the actual course of events*. To take up the four successive steps of the "formula": (1) *Did Paul*, on his arrival at Rome, give his own people, the Jews, an opportunity to hear what he had to tell them? It is quite incredible that he should not have done so, not merely because it had always been his custom everywhere, nor even when to this is added our knowledge of the loyalty which he so constantly and even passionately expresses, but still more because of the very circumstances of his journey; he had been brought to Rome because of alleged wrongs done *to*

the Jews. What he had done was really "for the hope of Israel," and his defense concerned these Roman brethren of his vitally. Should they not hear from him his new truth? (2) Did the Jews of Rome in fact accept Paul's gospel? No one will doubt that what happened is precisely what is told us in verse 24; we can hardly imagine any other result. Most of them would have none of his new teaching. (3) What can he possibly have done, thereupon, but tell them the stern truth, and just why it was that he, Saul the Pharisee, the pupil of Gamaliel, was the apostle *to the Gentiles*? Of course he appealed to the Scriptures; without their support he would have been badly off indeed, and they were his only effective weapon at this juncture. These Jews, like Paul himself, *believed* the Scriptures. Quotations like this one from Isaiah were not platitudes to them. (4) Paul's added word (vs. 28), that what the Jews rejected the Gentiles would accept, is both the indispensable conclusion of his argument and also just what Luke desired for the ending to his book.

This is all natural and inevitable and simply told. There is no ready-made program here save that furnished by unchanging human nature; neither the facts nor their order could possibly have been different. Even this, however, is not all. Bacon, on page 20 of his article, approves, even with some emphasis, my statement of the underlying idea of the Book of Acts, that it is "the wonderful transition from Jewish sect to world-religion." Now it is certainly the most natural supposition that the author of the book conceived and executed this idea under the inspiration of the time when the transition actually took place, not a generation later, when it was already an old story. Why suppose, without necessity, a weak and improbable literary performance instead of a record whose compelling motive is evident? Might not even that creature of hypothesis, "the Diarist," have had sufficient insight to enable him to see and chronicle this wonder? The fact is, this very passage, verses 17-29, is eminently fitted to be the heart of the chapter, *if what we have before us is a contemporary account*, whoever wrote it. If I could suppose it to be late I could almost agree with Bacon that it is not impressive. Not merely this passage, however, but the whole chapter, taken just as it stands, gives evidence of coming from

the time and place of these occurrences. The very things mentioned by Bacon as astonishing tell their plain story to this effect. The strikingly brief mention of "the brethren" in verse 15 is natural enough *at Rome itself* and within a short time of the event. If Luke had been writing in Syria or Asia Minor it would have been more likely to occur to him to tell who these brethren were. If he had been writing some decades later, when the little company had really become "the great Roman church," and after Paul's letter to the brethren there had become the property of the whole Christian brotherhood, he would pretty certainly have given what Bacon chides him for not giving, some mention of the progress of Christianity there, and perhaps an allusion to the Epistle to the Romans. As far as Theophilus is concerned, we may probably take it for granted that he had heard of the presence of Christians in Rome, but that he had no special reason for interest in their welfare.

As for the Epistle to the Romans, if Acts 28 is a contemporary narrative we can be pretty certain that Theophilus knew nothing about the letter, and therefore no allusion to it, or to the relation of Paul to the Roman church, could have been of any value. To suppose, however, that the compiler of Acts, *writing many years later*, could have contented himself with this summary treatment of the Roman material "taxes credulity to the breaking point."¹

So far then from having before us here the concoctions of a later day, we have a fresh draft from the fountainhead. If ever any authors had the right to draw this picture of the transferring of the new religion, it belonged to these two, the Aramaean and the Greek; for their productions, so far as we know, were the very first to portray it! Wilson² remarks the fresh enthusiasm of the Aramaic history, at its climax in chapter 15. The same thing, in a different literary dress, is to be seen in chapter 28. The true climax of the whole narrative is the latter half of this chapter, where the story is told of the last meeting between the Jews, the rightful "heirs of the promises," and their best friend, Paul. To a representative body of their leading men at Rome, the capital city of the world, the apostle gives his message; and when they will not hear it he utters his reproachful warning for them and all

¹ See Bacon, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 329.

their race, ending with the long-familiar words from the Book of Isaiah.¹ This quotation (which, or its equivalent, it is easy to believe that Paul actually used on this occasion), pronouncing the judgment of God himself on his as yet unbelieving people, made the best possible ending for the particular drama sketched by the Judean author and Luke. It is indeed the real ending of the book; though several considerations, the artistic among them, made it quite indispensable to add a few words telling whatever could be told of Paul's fate.

¹ Bacon, pp. 10 f., 18 f., treats this passage from the best known of all the Prophets, so strikingly apposite to the circumstances depicted all through this book, from the beginning to the end, as though it had been discovered by Mark and could be obtained only from him (in fact only a small part of it is in Mark)! It would be very strange if Luke had not heard Paul use it often. It may be added, in passing, that Bacon's description, at the beginning of page 11, of Luke's proceeding in his Gospel, 8: 10, is not borne out by the facts.

[To be concluded]

POSSIBILITIES OF BEAUTY IN THE CONGREGATIONAL ORDER

CHARLES E. PARK
Boston, Massachusetts

The "Congregational Order" is a term that once was frequently used, but has of late years sunk more or less into oblivion. The term was applied to the theory of church management, church polity, and church worship which was adopted three hundred years ago by our own Puritan and Separatist churches of New England. Those groups of worshipers who banded themselves together as churches under the bonds of a covenant, who sedulously managed their own affairs, resenting any interference on the part of an external authority, who were their own authority, and who lived together as churches upon the terms of a self-respecting sympathy and a friendly independence are said to belong to and to constitute the Congregational Order. For the first few generations of New England history these churches of the Congregational Order were the only churches. They held the field without rivals. Their meeting-houses dotted the landscape, and their membership included the entire freeman population of these New England colonies. It was a slow and difficult matter to break down the exclusiveness of this New England theocracy. And it was not until New England had been settled for upward of fifty years at least that churches of the ecclesiastical order began timidly to come into existence and fight for their own survival in this unfriendly and inhospitable Puritan atmosphere.

These churches of the Congregational Order were alike not only in their theory of church polity and constitution but also in their devotional practice. Their method of conducting church worship was distinctive. While there were slight variations in custom as between the several churches, for every church in this and in all

other matters was a law unto itself, yet the similarity of their underlying contention as to the true nature of a church found its expression in an essential similarity in their accepted manner and custom of conducting the various church offices or occasions, not only the Sunday services of worship, but the minor activities of baptism, admission, the Lord's Supper, and church discipline. It is therefore permissible to say that the term Congregational Order covers not only the theory of church structure and polity but also the practice of church worship and devotional procedure.

My purpose is to examine this Congregational Order of church worship, not in a mood of ridicule or of hostility, which we are bound to admit has become more or less the fashion among us of late, but in a mood of sympathy and reasonable open-mindedness, and to see if there can be found in it anything of that aesthetic value which we are coming more and more to demand as an essential quality in our church services. Such an examination will be timely and very much to the point. During the last generation or so there has grown up an increasing interest in the emotional or the sensuous side of church worship, the side that appeals primarily to the senses rather than to the thought of the worshiper. We have been feeling, very properly, that an act of worship, in order to be thoroughly satisfactory, must bring all sides of the mind into some sort of exercise and some sort of gratification; it must have its direct effect not only upon our powers of thought and speculation but also upon our powers of volition and emotional reaction. It must not alone guide the intellect; it must also uplift the feeling and stimulate the will. An act of worship must properly bring the whole creature into responsive participation, so that the influences of that act of worship may find entrance through all available channels and may exert their maximum of power upon the worshiper.

Interest in the emotional or the sensuous possibilities of Congregational worship is due in a measure to the feeling that those possibilities have been ignored, and that it is high time that they were recognized and cultivated. We feel that that side of the Congregational worshiping capacity has been starved, and therefore it is to that side that our attention of late has turned. This feeling of emotional hunger, of vague dissatisfaction with the supposed

emotional or aesthetic paucity of Congregational worship, has engendered in many Congregationalists a sort of a factitious hospitality toward rites and ceremonies, the mystic symbolism, the awe-compelling decencies and pomp of the ecclesiastical and hierarchical orders, with all their music, and color, and vestments, and appealing imagery, and lovely pageantry. Just because that side of human nature demands its proper gratification in an act of worship, and just because Congregationalists have unquestionably denied that craving, it follows most naturally that the revolt takes place. One draft of this rich chalice of ritualism mounts to our brains like new wine. We are captivated, enthralled.

It is not surprising at all that those forms of organized religion which employ the aesthetic or the emotional appeal are very much in vogue just now. In fact, when one considers how comparatively sterile our own Puritanism is in emotionality, how persistently we as Congregationalists have employed the intellectual appeal to the virtual exclusion of all others, and when one couples with that the undeniable fact that the speculations of theology have largely lost their interest for a generation which has been more concerned with matters of social and industrial moment, more concerned in cultivating the secular arts and sciences of this worldly life than in constructing philosophical or theological hypotheses, it becomes evident that the appeal of Congregational worship is strongest just where the ordinary citizen of the day is least inclined to respond, and is weakest just where the ordinary citizen is most inclined to respond. Is it not fair to say that Congregationalism is, or has been up to very recently, largely out of touch with the prevailing temper of the times? Tendencies would at least seem to support such a statement. Not only are the ritual forms of worship better attended, but among Congregationalists there is the widespread endeavor to supply what has appeared to be their own lack—to “enrich” their service by the introduction of expensive music, anthems, chants, responses, and by the adoption of certain stated forms of worship, such as liturgical prayers, confessions of faith, and in many cases vestments, processions, and lay readers.

In view of these things an effort to inquire intelligently into the aesthetic possibilities of those few forms of worship which

are distinctly Congregational cannot be wholly untimely. Such an effort must precede any attempt to cultivate those hidden possibilities.

It is necessary to remember in the first place that Puritanism arose originally as a protest against empty formalism and spiritual barrenness. To this extent Puritanism in worship was itself an effort to preserve the "beauty of holiness"; an effort to rescue the aestheticism of worship from the decay of a meaningless superstition into which it was bidding fair to sink. While it may be affirmed with some justice that in certain fields art is its own excuse for being, it is safe to say that in religious worship there cannot be such a thing as art for art's sake. Beauty in worship is wholly dependent upon sincerity. A religious service is impressive and dignified and therefore beautiful in exact proportion as it is meaningful and vital to the spiritual interests of the worshiper. That is one of the fundamental canons of religious expression. The moment sincerity is lost, that moment beauty, dignity, impressiveness, are utterly destroyed.

It is a familiar historical fact that the Church of England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had sunk to a very lamentable condition. Its livings were looked upon as sinecures and were sought by a priesthood whose first concern was the securing for themselves of an adequate livelihood. Its teachings and moral influences were unable to stem the tide of pleasure-loving jollity which flooded the rural communities of England during those years, finding expression in the boisterous and often cruel and unclean pastimes of the countryside, such as bear baitings, Maypole dances, and carousals. It was from these sports that there arose the affectionate nickname "Merrie England." Against the degrading tendency of these and similar customs the church could not offer any effective resistance. Perhaps the church did not try to resist. At all events the moral safeguards of religion were not in evidence, and the church of course had to take the blame.

Add to this the vast amount of simony and fraud that was practiced in the frantic scramble to procure lucrative ecclesiastical offices and privileges, the dual holdings, the absenteeism, the general indifference to the spiritual needs of the people, and the grasping

avarice of men in high places, all of which is mercilessly shown forth in Hugh Latimer's sermons, and we can paint a fairly vivid picture of the Church of England at that time. It was pervaded with corruption, spiritual indifference, and hypocrisy. Its forms of worship were emptied of their true content and stood forth as mere forms and nothing more. Its outward semblance became a hollow farce, a shell within which the preserving spirit had died. Its beauty, to the discerning eye, was withered because it was no longer informed by that sincerity which is the very life of beauty. Henceforth it bore much the same relation to real beauty that the pressed flower bears to the living blossom.

Never fear but that there were discerning eyes to note and deeply resent the change. Those were the eyes of Puritanism. Those eyes were sharp enough to detect the danger which always attends formalism in worship, the danger of hypocrisy, the danger of forgetting the spirit of worship, in dependence upon its technique. And they were not slow in drawing the perfectly logical, although by no means necessary, conclusion that this decadence had taken place, not in spite of, but because of, its ritualism. Accordingly, as the Puritans increased in power they took form as a spirit of protest against the corruptions of the church, and against the ritualistic customs which in their eyes were both identified with those corruptions and in a measure the cause of those corruptions. They nourished in their hearts a deep-rooted hatred of all set forms of worship—a hatred that was inflamed by two great forces which were then most rife: the influence of Martin Luther and his German Reformation, and the influence of the Bible, which was undergoing its several English translations and was being more and more read in private. These two influences fell into exact alignment with the natural trend of Puritan prejudice and served to cement those prejudices into a mighty fortress of hatred.

Ecclesiasticism became the scarlet woman of Revelation, and the wizards and necromancers who peep and mutter, the Pharisees who were likened unto whited sepulchers, the phylacteries, the vain repetitions, the much speaking, the offering to idols, all found their equally detestable counterparts in the intoning priesthood, the clerical favorites and place hunters, the surplices, genuflections,

crucifixes, and written prayers of the Church of England. These were all rags and tags of popery or prelacy, and pope and prelate were Antichrist.

As against all this, the Puritan set up his manner of worship—a worship which in its utter austerity, simplicity, and informality offered as great a contrast as was possible to the formalism and ritual of the established churches. And he did this, not because he hated beauty, but because in his clear sight that which ought to have been beautiful had ceased to be beautiful since it had lost its sincerity. The Puritan protest was as a matter of fact a revolt in the interest of beauty, in that it was an attempt to rehabilitate worship in that vesture which can alone give it any real beauty, the vesture of spiritual sincerity.

In attempting to do this they of course went to the other extreme; but any fair-minded man must agree that there was ample justification for extreme measures, and that the aesthetic theory upon which they unconsciously labored, that worship must first of all be sincere and then it will of its own accord be impressive, dignified, and beautiful, was and is a sound theory.

These then were the antiritualistic prejudices which the Puritans brought to New England. And this was the mold in which they took pains to cast the outward habits and expressions of worship in the churches which they proceeded to erect. All things must be honest, genuine, sincere, in strict accord with biblical injunction. Their church buildings, or, as they did not disdain to call them, their meetinghouses, were plain, unadorned, substantial structures, costing as much as they could well afford. They were not niggardly with their money, but their money was spent for commodiousness and solidity of structure rather than for comfort and ornamentation. It is perhaps fair to say that in appearance these earliest meetinghouses were uniformly ungainly and repellent. One is tempted to conclude, in some instances, that they took some pains to secure the greatest possible degree of ugliness as to location, surroundings, and appearance. Doubtless in a few isolated cases a meetinghouse might have been found that offered suggestions of grace, and that pleased the eye with the subtle charm of line and

proportion. We can hardly avoid considering such cases purely accidental.

There was nothing about the building within or without to suggest physical comfort. The windows were clear glass. The seats were rough benches or forms. At one end or at one side was a platform upon which stood the pulpit. Below it stood the communion table. The seats for the ruling elders and deacons, where there were these officers, were the seats of honor nearest the platform. Some of the meetinghouses had bells hung in a little cupola on the roof. This bell was rung to summon the worshipers on a Sabbath day. Services were at nine o'clock or earlier on Sunday morning and at two o'clock on Sunday afternoon. Where there was no stationary bell the worshipers were notified that it was church time by the beating of a drum, or perhaps in some instances by ringing a hand bell, such as a town-crier would use, up and down the village street. The ministers wore no vestments save the simple black preaching gown with the white bands. There was no instrumental music at first. The bass viol and other instruments made their appearance gradually and against much opposition. The church organ, or, as it was called, the "chist o' whistles," aroused violent alarm and opposition which it took years to overcome, and it was not generally permitted until well on into the nineteenth century. What music there was, being wholly vocal, unaccompanied, and interrupted every two lines to permit of the lining out of the next two, must have been excessively painful to any delicate musical year.

The full complement of officers in the original churches comprised the two teaching elders, the two ruling elders, four deacons, and one or two widows. The teaching elders were also called the pastor and the teacher. They were held in equal honor. Their functions have been combined in the modern minister, but they were more or less distinct at that time. Even today, when we speak of a minister of our acquaintance as being an ideal pastor but not much of a scholar, or as being a recluse, a scholar, a fine preacher, but not much of a pastor, we are drawing the very distinction which was openly recognized at that time, and which

constituted the difference between pastor and teacher. The one, as his name implies, was the pastor of the flock, whose duty it was to have charge of the intimate spiritual and moral welfare of his people. His preaching was called exhorting and was calculated to arouse and inspire. The other, the teacher, was the theological instructor. He was the student, the writer, the theological educator. His sermons were doctrinal essays or lectures calculated to guide the people in their thinking and lead them to hold correct orthodox convictions.

The two ruling elders were usually the two weightiest and most influential laymen of the town or parish. They might be called the business managers of the parish. They had oversight of the countless social relationships. Matters of discipline were referred to them. Applications for admission to the church or dismissal from the church were addressed to them.

The deacons were the treasurers, collectors, and disbursing agents of the church. Contributions were handed to them, and needy members of the parish applied to them for assistance.

The widows, or, as they were called in later times, the deaconesses, were women whose office was to minister to those cases of need or distress in which a man for obvious reasons could not gracefully interfere. A widow must be at least sixty years of age and physically strong enough to endure the very considerable hardships and labors of her position. In addition to these qualifications there was doubtless demanded of her a certain native tact and refinement of nature. For these reasons it was seldom that this office could be filled. There were few if any churches whose complement of officers included the widows.

It would be a mistake to draw the lines hard and sharp between these various official functions. There was much overlapping and duplication of functionality. All four elders had a voice in questions of discipline and in granting admissions or dismissals. One or the other ruling elder might sometimes act as the preacher or, to use the common phrase, "bear testimony." Yet in a general way their several duties were as I have tried to outline them.

All the officers had their stated places at the Sunday service. The teaching elders were upon the platform, the ruling elders and deacons in their appointed seats directly under the platform, the most eminent seats in the meetinghouse, suggested of course by the "chief seats in the synagogue." Service began usually at nine o'clock or perhaps a little earlier. First there was an invocation by the pastor, in length fifteen minutes or so, the people standing. Then the teacher read a chapter of the Bible, expounding it as he went along. Then a psalm was sung. As there were no psalm books, the words were lined out by one of the ministers, two lines at a time. Some gifted member in the congregation was expected to "set the tune" and take the lead in singing the two lines after they had been lined out. These psalms were metrical paraphrases of the psalms in the Bible, rendered in rather grotesque English rhyme and rhythm. As translations they were often grossly misleading, so much so that the learned New England divines could not endure to have them used, and accordingly put their heads together and compiled a new translation, the famous Bay Psalm Book, or the psalm book used in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay. Copies of this Bay Psalm Book are now exceedingly rare and are worth considerably more than their weight in gold. To be exact, there are but nine copies known to be in existence, and one of these was sold in the middle of the nineteenth century for over \$1,200. This Bay Psalm Book, printed in 1640 by Samuel Day, of Cambridge, was the first considerable bit of printing done in the colony. It ran through six or seven editions and was in well-nigh universal use throughout the New England churches of the seventeenth century. The later editions were equipped with music as well as with words. John Eliot, one of the three translators, frankly declares in his preface that the paraphrases are not cast in especially good poetic form, and warns the reader that literal accuracy of text has invariably been sought at the expense of poetical technique. This is so apparent to us as we read these clumsy and often uncouth lines that it is reassuring to be told that even they were quite aware of this defect and took pains to explain it. Some of these paraphrases, however, are clothed in a certain rugged beauty which

gives them a peculiar charm. Here, for example, is the Twenty-third Psalm:

The Lord to mee a shepheard is,
want therefore shall not I.
Hee in the folds of tender-grasse,
doth cause me down to lie:

To waters calme me gently leads
Restore my soul doth hee;
he doth in paths of righteousness:
for his names sake lead mee.

Yea though in valley of death's shade
I walk, none ill I'll fear;
Because thou art with me, thy rod,
and staffe my comfort are.

For me a table thou hast spread,
in presence of my foes;
thou dost anoint my head with oyle,
my cup it over-flowes.

Goodness and mercy surely shall
all my dayes follow mee:
and in the Lord's house I shall dwell
so long as dayes shall bee.

For tunes they had at their disposal a collection of some forty arranged by Thomas Ravenscroft, Bachelor of Music, and printed in 1621. These were for the greater part perfectly simple, familiar, old plain songs, with here and there an air borrowed from French, Dutch, or Italian sources. They strike us as being all very much alike, so that we are not surprised to read in Sewell's diary that intending to set the psalm to one tune he realized after it had been sung that he had actually set it to another. Some of these old tunes, such, for example, as Winchester, Dundee, and York, are in constant use among us today and may be found in any well-edited church hymnal. Others have fallen into disuse and probably would be recognized by very few, even if they were heard. Some of their names were Wells, Salisbury, Bristol, Gloucester, Christ Hospital, Martyr's Tune, etc. Psalm 23 was usually set to Winchester, and we can very easily imagine the effect of those simple,

stinted phrases sung in unison, two lines at a time, to that stately and dignified old tune.

To return now to the morning service, there was first the fifteen-minute invocation by the pastor, then a chapter was read and expounded by the teacher, then a psalm was sung. Then followed the sermon and exhortation by the pastor; then a lengthy prayer by the teacher, concluding with a blessing or benediction. There was nothing fixed about this order. Sometimes there was a long prayer before the sermon as well as after. And sometimes there was a second psalm sung at the close of the service just before the blessing.

The Lord's Supper was observed once a month at the conclusion of the morning service, which by the way might easily have been two hours or more in length. Notice of the Lord's Supper was given generally two weeks before the day of its observance. It was administered to none but members of the church and such visitors as came with letters testifying to their membership in some other church. Non-communicants were, however, permitted to remain as witnesses to the ceremony. This sacrament was conducted with great simplicity. The teaching and ruling elders seated themselves about the table, the deacons and members of the church sitting in silence meanwhile upon their forms or benches. One of the ministers offered prayer, then blessed and consecrated the bread and wine according to the formula in the eleventh chapter of I Corinthians. Then he passed the bread in a charger to those at the table, and they in turn to those upon the benches. So it went from hand to hand without the least formality until all had eaten, and the charger was passed back again to the table. The same way with the cup, after which the other minister offered a prayer, a psalm was sung, and with a short blessing the congregation was dismissed.

However lacking in formality this morning service may have been, the afternoon service was if anything still less formal. One is tempted to think of the afternoon service as the business meeting of the church. The congregation gathered at two o'clock. There were the same features, the invocation, the chapter from the Bible, the psalm, except that in the afternoon these portions of the

worship were performed by the minister who did not perform them in the morning. Then there was the sermon or discourse upon doctrine by the teacher, concluded by a prayer. Then there came the baptisms which were to be performed. These were administered by either pastor or teacher, in the deacon's seat. The service of baptism, if one may call it a service, consisted of an address or exhortation delivered to the congregation, the persons to be baptized, or, if children, to the parents; then prayer; then the formula, attended by the sprinkling of the water; then another prayer. This ended, there came the contribution. One of the deacons rose and said, "Brethren of the congregation, now there is time left for contribution, wherefore as God hath prospered you, so freely offer." No plates were passed, but a wooden box was placed in the deacon's seat, and the people came forward up one side of the church, put their money, or their pledges written on bits of paper, into the box, and passed down the other side of the church and back to their seats. Offerings were not confined to money or pledges. Any chattel property useful to the church, such as silver plate for the communion table, might be given. If it would not go into the box, it was placed in the deacon's seat. After the contribution there followed other business, such as acting upon applications for admission, or hearing cases of discipline and "denouncing" sentence. Candidates for admission were carefully examined beforehand by the elders as to faith and rectitude of living. If found satisfactory they were presented to the church on a Sunday afternoon and requested to make a public avowal of penitence and of the operation of grace in their own souls. Questions might be put to the candidate, and the testimony of any member of the church was invited either for or against the candidate's admission. When all were satisfied, the question was put whether it was the will of the church to admit this candidate to membership. The members of the congregation signified assent by raising their hands. One of the ministers then rehearsed the covenant to the candidate and asked him if he agreed thereto. Upon his affirmation the minister then promised that the church would observe toward him all the obligations of the covenant relation. Then there was a prayer, and the candidate was a member of the church in good and

regular standing. This was done without abbreviation or expedition for each separate candidate, and where there were any number the proceedings dragged out until very late in the afternoon.

Matters of church discipline were treated in the same cautious, painstaking fashion. If there was time a concluding psalm was sung, and with prayer and blessing the congregation was at last dismissed.

Now out of all this description it is difficult for us of the present generation to picture the olden-time church worship as anything but an oppressive occasion. It was unendurably tedious, utterly lacking in grace or tender charm, and marred by all too obvious physical awkwardness and discomfort. Our minds cannot avoid conjuring up the grotesque little details of the scene. If it was summer time there was the heat and the suffocation, the stertorous breathing, and the drowsy drone of insects forming a sleepy background of sound for the nasal whine of the preacher, which went on and on as though it would never cease. If it was winter there was the scuffling of frostbitten toes upon the bare floor, the squirming of aching bones upon the hard, cold benches, the constant coughing and sneezing from throats that had not as yet adjusted themselves to our New England climate. All this it is impossible to deny, yet I would like to maintain that under all these distractions there were features in their customary practice which, properly developed, might be assembled into a form of public worship that would be thoroughly Congregational, thoroughly consistent with the theory of the Congregational Order, and at the same time as dignified, as impressive, and therefore as beautiful in its way and for its worshipers as the splendid pomp of the full cathedral mass.

In the first place, there is the atmosphere of sincerity, the disdaining to do anything meaningless, the absolute refusal to look upon this occasion as a sacramental rite, and the insistence that it shall be either an honest expression of the worshiper's own prayer and spiritual experience, or else nothing at all. The genuineness of the action and the difficulty of performing the action in any but a genuine way, that in itself is priceless and must form the basis for any structure of beauty.

In the second place, there is the simplicity, the paucity of detail, the very lack of ritualistic adornment, beginning with the architectural plainness of the meetinghouse and extending straight through the entire fabric of usage. That simplicity has unlimited aesthetic possibilities. Classic beauty is the beauty of line, of proportion, of suggested functionality. Pagan beauty is the beauty of extraneous color and superfluous ornamentation. The Puritan usage in public worship contains possibilities of classic beauty. Any architect will tell us that an open floor space, a bare wall, a plain, solid area, have great aesthetic value. Not only is it restful in itself to eyes that are weary with seeing, but it is also quieting and reassuring to the mind.

All our mental processes flow along in sequences that are logical and intelligible. Unconsciously the first thing we look for in a landscape, in a range of hills, in a system of waterways, is the topographical trend, the "lay of the land." The first thing we strain for in listening to a symphony is the dominant theme. The first thing we seek in reading an epoch of history is the single great ethnic or political tendency that characterizes that epoch. The first thing we strive to grasp in viewing a new building is the central meaning or structural principle of the fabric. The well-ordered mind is forever on the lookout, perhaps quite unconsciously, for the essential unity, the original functionality, the informing principle, in every object it contemplates; that unity, once grasped, makes the whole intelligible. But where that essential unity is so disguised or concealed as to elude the mind's search, there the mind is wearied and bewildered.

Every real artist shows the genuineness of his artistry by having mercy on the minds which are destined to contemplate his work. He never leaves them in doubt or "keeps them guessing" on these matters. Like Virgil, he placards his masterpiece with an obvious *arma virumque cano*, realizing that in so doing he is handing to all beholders the passport which will admit them to full understanding and enjoyment of every subsequent detail.

Where ornamentation is so lavishly applied that it distracts attention and serves to disguise the unity or the structural principle of the fabric in question it becomes grossly out of place. There is

but one excuse for such ornamentation—that the essential unity of the fabric is so hideous or deformed that it ought to be disguised, as in the case of some poor, misshapen girl who overloads her clothing with frills and ribbons in order to conceal her misfortune.

Assuming that such is not the case with an order of worship, one readily sees the value of the canon of simplicity. Just as in a piece of architecture the plain area, the simple column, the unadorned wall surface, not only rests the eye but reassures the mind by permitting it to grasp at once the structural theme of the whole fabric, so by analogy a method of worship that presents to the participant a sequence of well-proportioned plain areas, where but one thing is done for an appreciable length of time without distracting accessories and interruptions, possesses its undeniable value and beauty. It gives opportunity for the purpose of the occasion to assert itself to the worshiper, to come home to him with consistent force and sink in. For, after all, the experience of coming to yourself like the prodigal lies at the very heart of religion. Worship is among other things an act of self-recollection, or self-unification. To set up this process of self-unification in the soul of the worshiper is a prime purpose of every order of worship. When by its own simplicity, sincerity, and unity of design an order of worship can induce such a process it has earned the right to be called beautiful. It functions truly.

In the third place, there are a number of little customs, fixed ways of doing stated things, which, while quite inconsiderable in themselves, might when taken together constitute a humble ceremonial, or body of symbolism, that would be both beautiful and faithful to the Congregational tradition. For example, the formula by which the deacon invited the congregation to make their weekly contribution, which I have quoted above; again, the reading of the hymns before they were sung, which I suppose was a remnant of the custom of lining out the hymns, and which suggested those early days of poverty and deprivation when there were no hymn books, and when it cost real pains to worship God; again, the custom, which had a certain vogue in the New Haven colony, for the entire congregation to rise when the preacher announced his text and to remain on their feet while he sententiously read it

through; again, the custom which ordained that the elders should be actually seated about the communion table when the Lord's Supper was observed; again, the exceedingly sweet and tender formula of exchanging the covenant vows when one was admitted to the church, by which the candidate promised to observe the spirit of the covenant toward the church, and the church promised a corresponding faithfulness and loyalty toward the candidate—these and other customs are, I think, peculiar to Congregationalism. They are quaint, and their very quaintness gives them a great charm. They are strongly reminiscent of the directness of procedure, the singleness of aim, of our Puritan ancestors; softened by time, their very angularity becomes amiable; and, reminding subsequent generations of the austere and serious purpose of our ancestors, they stand as symbols rich in meaning, that cannot fail to beautify and dignify Congregational worship of today and help to hold it true to the lofty spirit of worship which has helped to make our country what it is.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

BABYLONIAN RELIGIOUS TEXTS

In Volume X of the Publications of the University Museum¹ (University of Pennsylvania) Dr. Langdon has edited a number of most interesting and important religious texts selected from the rich treasures of the Philadelphia museum. In Part I (1915) appeared a somewhat lengthy discussion of an old Babylonian (Sumerian) work which Langdon called the "Sumerian Epic of Paradise, the Flood and the Fall of Man." Had the title contained fewer words associated in our minds with the early chapters of Genesis this fragment of Sumerian literature would have received far less attention than was otherwise the case. The curious will find the literature of the controversy which arose over this text and the title Langdon gave it in an article by Professor Barton in this *Journal* (XXI, 571 f.).² Into the technical matters involved we cannot enter here. In view of the many obscurities of the text, the reviewer believes that the choice of title was unfortunate, to say the least. It seems certain that the text was part of a larger work in which there were arranged in "epical" fashion a series of myths and folk tales concerning the beginnings of the world and the human race. Such myths and tales have arisen in every corner of the world. Whether some of the biblical stories and their Babylonian originals go back to this collection of Sumerian tales cannot be determined so long as the meaning of so many passages in the portion of the work preserved eludes our grasp.³

¹ *Epical and Liturgical Texts*. By Stephen Langdon. Philadelphia: The University Museum, 1915-17. 227 pages and 70 plates.

² See pp. 576 f.; also Langdon in *AJSL*, XXXIII (1917), 245-49, and the *Expository Times*, XXIX (1918), 218 f.

³ Professor Jastrow, with his intimate knowledge of the religious literature of the Sumerians and Babylonians, has cleared up many a passage which remained obscure to Langdon (see *AJSL*, XXXIII [1917], 91-144). But I fail to follow him in his translation of what he calls "perhaps the most interesting episode of the tablet" (ll. 20-32 f., col. 2). The sign which he reads *maš* = *lalu*, on which his whole interpretation of this section depends, is clearly the *gi*-sign, as a reference to the immediately preceding lines (20 and 22) will show. For the form of the *maš*-sign in the early texts, see Ranke, *BE*, VI, Sign-list, No. 24, and Myhrman, *BE*, III¹, Sign-list, No. 37. Of the first sign in l. 25 Jastrow says that it "is again *uš* as in ll. 24 and 26. Correct Langdon's text accordingly." But neither the photograph of the text nor the original, which I examined carefully, bears out this somewhat dogmatic assertion. There is doubt as to the sign. Again in l. 24 Jastrow would "read *dirig* = *malu*." But where was the *dirig*-sign ever made like this?

The texts contained in Part II (1917) are of the greatest importance because of their bearing upon the much-discussed question of the deification of early Babylonian kings. Whether Langdon's translations of the liturgical hymns to Ur-Engur, Dungi, and the other kings of the dynasty of Ur are accepted as final or not, there are enough passages in these hymns about whose meaning there can be no doubt to make it evident to the unbiased reader that the honors bestowed upon the rulers of this dynasty were such as gods, not men, receive. It is interesting to note that the late Babylonian theologians had the name of Bur-Sin, another king of Ur, in their lists of gods.

The last part (III) contains the text of "the South Babylonian version of the second book of the epic *ša nagba imuru*, 'He who has seen all things,' commonly referred to as the Epic of Gilgamesh."

Dr. Langdon deserves the gratitude of all Assyriologists and other students of the Babylonian religion for his industry in making accessible these interesting but very difficult texts. The reviewer hates to look for the fly in the ointment, but he cannot refrain from calling attention to the many evidences of hasty editing found in this volume. To mention a few examples: On pages 112 f. the numbering of the lines in the translation does not conform to the numbering of the lines in the autographed text, Plate VII. In the transliteration of the same text (p. 114, l. 9) we find *pa-ē*, but the text shows only the *ē*. The English of the translations is frequently as obscure as the Sumerian original. But in spite of these defects the volume is an important contribution to our knowledge of the religion of the early inhabitants of the Babylonian valley.

D. D. LUCKENBILL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE HEBREW PROPHETS

Professor Gordon is already favorably known by his book on the *Poets of the Old Testament*. He now gives us a companion volume on the prophets.¹ The purpose of the author is to present the prophets "in the clear light of history as the great figures of the ancient Revelation, the men through whose word and influence the vision broadened toward the perfect day." After an introductory chapter on the dawn of prophecy the great figures of Hebrew religion are taken up in succession,

¹ *The Prophets of the Old Testament*. By Alex. R. Gordon. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916. 364 pages. 6s.

beginning with Elijah and ending with Jonah, or rather with the writer of the story that goes by his name. Extended quotations from the discourses of the prophets are made and set in their proper light by sketches of the various situations in which they were spoken. The translation of these passages is based on a critically revised text and shows acquaintance with the best authorities. The book may be confidently recommended not only to scholars but to the thoughtful layman.

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
NEW YORK CITY

A NEW EDITION OF THE ARABIC BIBLE

In June, 1916, the American Press in Beirut, Syria, finished the printing of a new and important issue of the Arabic Scriptures, namely the fourth edition of the First Font Reference Bible.¹ Its editor, Dr. Franklin E. Hoskins, is to be congratulated on the successful completion of the task which has occupied him for more than seven years.

The version thus reprinted is the one originally prepared by Eli Smith and Cornelius Van Dyck, aided by famous native scholars, and deservedly celebrated as one of the best translations of the Scriptures. As is well known, it has been the standard for all Protestant missionary societies working in Arabic-speaking lands throughout the world, and the history of its printing now extends over more than half a century, during which time more than a million volumes have been sent forth (86,000 in the year 1910).

The first edition of the whole Bible was issued in 1865, the translation having been begun in 1848. It was printed from types, the beautiful "Beirut character" prepared with such taste and skill by Eli Smith, and consisted of a thousand copies. The edition was followed by numerous issues of the complete Bible or of portions, especially the New Testament, with or without vowels, the most of these editions being electroplated.

The second edition of the Reference Bible, issued in 1885, was also printed from types, with a slightly enlarged page and other improvements. This consisted of three thousand copies and sufficed for eighteen years. When a third edition was called for, in 1903, Dr. Hoskins, now in charge of the task, urged that it be put into plates, because the work of printing and proofreading, with all the diacritical points, vowels, and other signs required in an Arabic volume such as this, is so immensely

¹ *The Arabic Bible*. Beirut: American Press, 1916.

laborious. But the American Bible Society was unable to bear the extra expense and doubted the success of an attempt to raise the money, so the plates were not made. The printing of this third edition was finished in 1906, and though it consisted this time of six thousand copies, with an extra thousand of the New Testament alone, it was practically exhausted within five years.

The fourth edition, which has been set up in type and corrected in four successive proofs once more, and is now ready for distribution, has involved much more labor than any other since the first, and contains important changes. It is not a revision of the Van Dyck text, but includes such a thoroughgoing alteration in the matter of marginal references as to increase greatly its value to the reader. The references of the older editions have been replaced by a complete new set more in keeping with modern biblical learning and founded upon the new references of the English Revised Bible of 1885 and the Standard Edition of the American Revised Bible published in 1901, with such necessary additions and omissions as the Arabic language required or allowed. By a system of marks, explained in the prefaces, the references are now divided into classes ranging from exact verbal quotations or equivalents (thus providing in the gospels a sort of harmony) to more remote allusions. Proper names are tabulated where they first occur, with something of the completeness of a concordance. A new feature introduced for the benefit of unlearned readers, who could not be expected to find the place at once in less familiar parts of the book, is the consecutive numbering of chapters from Genesis to Revelation.

New type has been used throughout, and the form of the page has been improved in such a way as to save considerable expense in future printing from the 1,424 plates which are now ready. The page now measures eight inches by ten, and presents a very attractive appearance. The Press may well be proud of its new achievement, and the editor of the success of his task, which has been no easy one. The actual writing of copy for this edition began in 1908 and was completed in 1915. The New Testament was finished first, and a separate edition of it in three thousand copies was struck off in 1912. Four thousand copies of the complete Bible were already ordered in advance from the first impression to be made from the new plates.

It is obvious that no Bibles can be shipped from Beirut at present, and it may be that the distribution of the original edition will have to wait for some time. But an excellent facsimile edition of the New Testament, reduced to octavo size by the photographic process and

dated in 1917, has been issued by the American Bible Society in New York City. We may well hope for this new work of the Beirut Press even greater success than has attended its previous editions of the Scriptures.

CHARLES C. TORREY

YALE UNIVERSITY

MOHAMMEDAN TRADITION ABOUT JESUS¹

Every student of Mohammedan literature who is familiar with the Christian Scriptures has noted with interest the occasional quotations, often misquotations, from the New Testament in the writings of learned Muslims. Since Jesus ("ʿIsā the Son of Mary") is to them one of the greatest of all the prophets, those of his deeds and words to which they give credence have weight for them. Hence the citations or reminiscences are almost always from the gospels. Some of these passages are collected in the present volume, whose author is professor of Arabic in the University of Madrid. According to the announcement in his Preface, another volume is to follow.

The limits of this first part of the work are determined merely by the fact that these particular anecdotes and sayings happen to be collected in Ghazālī's *Iḥyā ʿulūm ad-dīn*, where they illustrate the value of self-denial and the true wisdom. They are reproduced here in the order in which they there occur. First the Arabic text is given, followed by variant readings and elucidations derived mainly from the *Iḥāf* (the commentary on the *Iḥyā* by the learned Mohammed Murtaḍā); then is added a Latin translation, together with a paragraph of comment in which the biblical original, if such there be, is indicated, and other literary parallels are noted. It is hardly necessary to say that the collection is a somewhat miscellaneous one; indeed, some of the anecdotes and sayings have nothing to do with Jesus or his words. Nos. 66 and 93 concern only Zachariah, No. 13 only the Virgin Mary, and Nos. 12, 52, 69, 78, and 95 only John the Baptist. From the catalogue of authors and editions used (pp. 343-47) it is evident that the contents of Part II will also be a more or less accidental excerpt from a part of the available sources. To make even an approximately complete corpus of the

¹ *Logia et Agrapha Domini Jesu, apud moslemicos scriptores, asceticos praesertim, usitata: Collegit, vertit, notis instruxit Michaël Asin et Palacios. Fasciculus prior. (Patrologia Orientalis, ed. Graffin et Nau, Vol. XIII, fasc. 3, pages 335-431.) Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1916.*

material would of course be out of the question; moreover, our author says in his Preface (p. 339) that he has not excerpted his authors systematically and thoroughly (except in case of the *Iḥyā*), but has only taken those *dominica verba* which have happened to come under his notice in the course of his reading.

Some classification of these quotations and *agrapha* according to their resemblance to the New Testament and other known literary sources would have been useful. There are, first, numerous direct citations, formally or substantially accurate; such as the greater part of No. 55 = Matt. 6:3, 17, 18; No. 57, reproducing three of the Beatitudes; No. 56 = Matt. 5:38-41. Secondly, there are sayings plainly based, at least in part, on the gospel text, but departing from it more or less widely. Such are the latter part of No. 55, based on Matt. 6:6; No. 33, "Whoever prays for the one who has wronged him, chases away a devil"; No. 59, which begins with a bit from the parable of the Sower, but continues with something altogether different; No. 62, which begins by quoting almost verbatim the dialogue of Jesus and his disciples regarding the great stones of the temple (Matt. 24:1, 2; Mark 13:1, 2), and then makes Jesus continue with some rather commonplace moral reflections. Thirdly, constituting the bulk of the collection we find anecdotes and sayings of Jesus which either have only a vague resemblance to New Testament passages or else (more often) are quite foreign to it. Thus, for example, No. 25: The disciples of Jesus said to him, "Show us a course of action which will bring us into paradise." He answered, "Never speak." "But," they objected, "that is too hard for us." He replied, "Then speak only what is good." In line with this last maxim is No. 29: Jesus and his disciples passed by the carcass of a dog which had been dead some days. "What a stench!" the disciples cried; but Jesus said, "How beautifully white his teeth are!" One of the most interesting of the anecdotes is No. 102, which is given in five different recensions, the last of which, much longer than any of the others, is from an anonymous manuscript in the Madrid library. This is the legend of the saint (in this case Jesus) who interrogates a skull which he finds, learning from it a story of past wickedness and its punishment, and (in the two longest recensions) receiving a description of the Angel of Death and of the tortures of the Inferno. The appended notes give some information as to other occurrences of the material of the legend, but are too meager to be quite satisfactory, especially in the case of the Inferno, which is treated here (p. 431) as a purely Mohammedan creation, although it has very striking parallels in both pagan and

Christian Greek, and was doubtless derived from the latter through the medium of Syriac.

Against those who, like D'Herbelot, accuse the Mohammedans of deliberately altering and perverting the form of this New Testament material our author maintains, very justly (pp. 335 f.), that the strange, often bizarre, appearance of these "words and deeds of Jesus" is mainly the result of uncontrolled oral transmission by ignorant men. He seems inclined, nevertheless, to give to these *agrapha* undue importance in the history of Christian tradition. Thus he expresses the opinion (p. 338) that the most of this material is of Christian origin; and further (p. 339), that it may all be ultimately derived from a written (Christian) source or written sources, whether from an apocryphal gospel hitherto unknown or from perverted forms of the already known apocryphal or even canonical gospels. So for instance in his comment on No. 30 he suggests that the *agraphon*, in which John the Baptist is put at least on an equality with Jesus, to whom he imparts some instruction, is derived from a heretical gospel denying the divinity of Christ. It may indeed be true that some portion of these hitherto unheard-of words and deeds is of Christian origin, since ignorant Christians, like ignorant Muslims, invented foolish tales and sayings. But the hypothesis of Christian written sources is neither necessary nor probable; indeed, with only the evidence thus far at hand it is hardly permissible. When he goes on to say (p. 341) that this material may give to New Testament scholars the basis for new investigations, "*quibus et agraphorum problema clariore luce patescat, et logiorum catalogus augeatur et tam vexata quaestio de oralibus evangeliorum fontibus uberiori documentorum copia ad veritatis scopum paulatim attingat,*" we must dissent emphatically. There is nothing whatever in the material here presented which can throw light on the gospel tradition or contribute anything of importance to our understanding of the so-called New Testament Agrapha. Carelessly transmitted and half-remembered bits of the gospels, or of saint-legends, were embellished by Muslim story-tellers, or pieced out with bits of the proverbial philosophy which has such an important place in the Arabic speech and literature. A typical example is No. 82: Jesus said, "Look at the birds; they neither sow nor reap, nor store away; but God provides for them day by day. If you reply: 'We have larger stomachs than they,' then consider the camels," etc. Oftener still the *logia* here presented are simply characteristic sayings and anecdotes of the extreme ascetics of Islam. Thus No. 26: The true service of God consists of ten parts; nine of these consist in silence, and one in fleeing from

mankind. Or No. 21: Jesus said, "O company of apostles! Make your stomachs empty with fasting and your bodies naked; then perchance your hearts may see God." John the Baptist is occasionally represented as one superior to Jesus and able to give him instruction merely because of his more ascetic habit of life.

In the Preface (p. 341) the author confesses that he has only slight acquaintance with the history of Christian literature. This is in fact less of a handicap than it might seem to be; and his industry has provided us with some very useful illustrative material, in the comparatively few cases where such material was ready to hand. The question of literary parallels ought to be treated more thoroughly, however. It is also unfortunate, and perhaps less easy to condone, that he sometimes fails to understand his Arabic text. For instance (p. 357, l. 9), the word *أمتهم* is not *unmmatuhum*, "their family" (l. 15), but *amithum*, "cause them to die." The two attendants of the Angel of Death are described as having faces "like the faces of dogs with their teeth showing and with eyes glaring like flames of fire" (مثل وجوه الكلاب بادية) (p. 425). He renders (p. 426, l. 6): "*Similes erant faciebus canum in deserto commorantium* (!), *dentes eorum sicuti accipitris [rostrum] (!), oculi eorum velut flamma ignis ardentis.*" The Arabic text describes the death struggle, step by step, "until the soul came into the throat," حتى بلغ الروح الحلقوم (whereupon the Angel of Death seized it and the man died) (p. 426, bottom). But the rendering here is (p. 428, bottom): "*usque dum in spiritum gutturis pervenit*"—whatever that might mean. Another very bad misunderstanding of the Arabic is on page 423, below, including the whole of the last three lines of the translation. In general, the Arabic texts are not edited with sufficient care. I have noticed here and there readings which are plainly false, while the corrections are obvious. It is a little disconcerting, too, to find the investigator in this particular field repeatedly writing the name of the notorious purveyor of biblical traditions, Ka'b al-Aḥbār, with the dotted خ, and transliterating it accordingly (always *Akhbār*).

But in spite of these blemishes the book deserves a hearty welcome as an interesting and useful contribution to the literature of mediaeval asceticism, and for the service which it renders in making generally accessible a part of the Mohammedan legends and traditions regarding

Jesus and other New Testament characters. For the second volume, which will be awaited with interest, is promised a complete index of the material presented.

CHARLES C. TORREY

YALE UNIVERSITY

A SURVEY OF THE GREAT RELIGIONS¹

With the vast extension of research work in the various fields, the much-needed synoptic view of all the world-religions, gathered into one volume, treated in a uniform way by one hand, seems more and more hopeless of realization. The present work is a heroic attempt to meet this need. It forms one of the series of University of Chicago Publications in Religious Education and is intended to be used as a textbook. Beginning with the religions of primitive peoples the author then treats the religions of Babylonia and of Egypt, which he believes to be nearest to the original type; then the allied religions, those of the Hebrews, Judaism and Mohammedanism; moving eastward he takes up Zoroastrianism, the religions of India, China, and Japan. The religions of Greece and Rome and Christianity complete the list.

The book will be an exceedingly helpful outline for beginners in the study of the history of religions. There is hardly one important element in any of the religions which does not receive mention. Professor Barton gives in each case, where possible, a sketch of the political history and outlines the items of the religious development. The purpose of the book is evidently to catalogue the elements which should enter into the study of the religions, not to give the student an appreciation of their values. As an outline to blaze a trail through the maze of world-religion this work will be heartily welcomed. Professor Barton has given a great deal in little space.

The chief defect of the book is not its atomistic character, but the method of approach. Professor Barton would agree that a genuine understanding of any element of human life can be secured only by seeing how it functions in the life-situation which produced it. From this point of view there should be a real appreciation of every phase of every religion and a sympathetic effort to understand its rise, growth, and meaning. Yet he seems to start with the presupposition of a body of truth which is eternal, which God reveals, and of which Christianity is the noblest manifestation. He says: "The universal presence among

¹ *The Religions of the World*. By George A. Barton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1917. x+349 pages. \$1.50.

uncivilized men of religion of some sort is evidence that in no part of the world has God 'left himself without a witness'" (p. 14). "Zoroaster was a great religious genius who caught something of eternal truth and successfully interpreted it to men" (p. 136). "Jesus is the greatest of all teachers. He knew so much more of God and truth and the soul than they that he stands supreme in the religious sphere. None has revealed God as he did" (p. 305). From this "eternal truth" standpoint it is doubtful whether Christianity can be properly understood, and with Christianity as the standard the other religions can be treated only as more or less successful blunders toward light. This probably accounts for Barton's unsympathetic treatment of China and for slighting references to many so-called "superstitions."

One could wish that the author were not so decided on certain points. For instance, *was* the fertility, palm-tree deity as important a figure, even in the Semitic world, as Barton thinks? *Was* the greatest triumph of Egyptian thought in the realm of ethics? Is it fair to call the Babylonian religion "to the end" a religion of grown-up children? Did Gautama admit the existence of gods? The author is surely mistaken when he says (p. 199), "In most of its varied manifestations Hinduism suffers by the divorce of religion from life." If there is anything that is agreed upon it is that Hinduism *is* Hindu life. It can be defined in no other way. Used as a textbook the work will have to be checked, as the author expects it to be, by other works. The reading lists and topics are a notable feature of the volume, though Snouck Hurgronje should not be entirely overlooked in the field of Islam.

The time has probably come when no single scholar should be expected to write a textbook of this kind; the field is so vast that authoritative, sympathetic treatment of every religion will require the collaboration of a group of specialists. Simply to rewrite secondary sources cannot be satisfactory and may be exasperating.

A. EUSTACE HAYDON

CHICAGO

THE NEW ARCHAEOLOGICAL DISCOVERIES

It is a delight to turn away for a little time from a world at war. Professor Cobern's *New Archaeological Discoveries*¹ carries us back to the time, now almost forgotten, when the scholars of all nations strove

¹ *The New Archaeological Discoveries and Their Bearing upon the New Testament and upon the Life and Times of the Primitive Church.* By Camden M. Cobern. Introduction by Edouard Naville. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1917. xxxiv+698 pages. \$3.00.

together in friendly rivalry to uncover the long-hidden secrets of the ancient world. It is a fascinating story, and Professor Cobern tells it brilliantly and circumstantially. He has himself visited and in some cases assisted in the excavations that have gone on in Italy, Egypt, Greece, and Palestine. He has studied at first hand many of the documents he describes and evaluates. He combines imagination and the enthusiasm of the discoverer with scholarly appreciation and insight. What he writes comes, therefore, with charming freshness and interest.

The title of the book must be broadly interpreted to cover the wealth of materials it holds. The first part of it centers in Egypt and tells the story of the papyri and ostraka and the light they have thrown on New Testament language and customs. The recent discoveries of textual materials in Greek and the versions are recorded back as far as Codex Sinaiticus and Tatian's Diatessaron. Much is made of the fact that all the recently recovered texts and fragments confirm the substantial accuracy of the modern critical New Testament texts. A chapter deals with recently discovered early Christian documents, from the *Didache* to the Gospel and Apocalypse of Peter, from the Oxyrhynchus Logia to amulets and private letters. The second part of the work deals with excavations and discoveries in the Graeco-Roman world mainly outside Egypt, telling of "finds" in catacombs and cemeteries and in some forty cities that played a part in the early history of Christianity. What has been learned by the re-examination of classical texts and from newly discovered or freshly studied Jewish writings is briefly recounted. The excellent illustrations add greatly to the interest and effectiveness of the text. One is glad to see the faces of a considerable number of scholars who have contributed to the results recorded. It is unfortunate that definite references to the plates are not given in the text.

Professor Cobern is right in claiming that his book has no competitor. Its nearest rival, Professor Deissmann's *Light from the Ancient East*, gives no attention to textual criticism and does not tell the story of the excavations and discoveries which have given the new light. The great merit of Professor Cobern's work is that it gathers up from innumerable scholarly tomes and scattered magazine articles the results of all that has been accomplished in recovering and interpreting the documents, written and unwritten, that bear on the economic, social, and religious history of the centuries immediately preceding and following the birth of Jesus.

The task of criticizing so useful a piece of work is unwelcome, particularly in view of the author's modesty with regard to it. As to fulness

it leaves little to be desired. No two persons could agree as to what should or should not be included in a work of such proportions, covering so wide a field. One would think that the Epistle of Barnabas, Vetios Valens, and the Paris Magic Papyrus deserved at least brief mention, since these were made available by publication more recently than some of the documents mentioned and are equally important. Should more attention have been paid to Jewish literature? The book is already long enough.

One suggestion is obvious. Room for more material might have been found and the cogency and usefulness of the book greatly increased by a more logical arrangement. The reader gets the impression—it may be incorrect—that he is following two or three series of lectures, delivered to different audiences, or in successive semesters, and varying as to illustrative material, but recurring again and again to certain great themes. Every teacher does it—not always varying the illustrations. But in a book it is unnecessary thus to repeat. What Professor Cobern has actually done—no doubt unconsciously—is to take the outline of *Light from the Ancient East* and work into it his other subjects and materials. In so doing he has not always arranged his additions logically, and he has made himself the trouble of doubling back on his own tracks. In the last chapter, the second section on “Some Literary Habits of the First Century Illustrated by the Papyri” belongs with the section of Part I, chapter ii, which discusses the grammar, style, and vocabulary of the New Testament. The author “once more calls attention” or “again reminds the reader” (pp. 584, 588) of facts already touched. The Pastor of Hermas is twice discussed (pp. 41, 251). In some instances much space has been allowed unimportant subjects. Mr. Buchanan’s attack on the Greek text hardly deserves four pages (pp. 195-99).

Professor Cobern has been content to do the work of a collector, writing for a popular audience rather than for scholars. In such a work it is important that hare-brained hypotheses should not be aired. In the main the author has followed safe authorities and has hit upon that intangible “consensus of opinion” which the uninitiated desire. In a few instances he seems to have gone astray. The impression is given that Mark was originally written in Latin for a Roman church which spoke that language (p. 199). It is stated categorically that the Synoptic Gospels, “and in fact the entire New Testament with the exception of a very few small pieces and perhaps (sic) the Gospel of John,” were written between 60 and 80 A.D. (p. 373; cf. p. 103). There

seems to be no doubt whatever that the Scillitan martyrs had already a Latin version of parts of the New Testament. Indeed a very early date for both the Syriac and Latin versions is assumed (pp. 180, 192).

It is Professor Cobern's enthusiasm which leads him astray. Very naturally he wished to make his audiences feel the importance of the discoveries he had undertaken to describe. It would appear, also, that in common with some other archaeologists the author wishes to be considered a defender of the faith. The tone of Professor Naville's Introduction with its jibes at higher criticism (pp. xv, xxiv) is the tone of the book, but it does not obtrude itself unpleasantly. The over-enthusiasm of the popular lecturer shows itself in weak superlatives and occasionally in contradictions. The discoveries of 1890 and 1897 are each more important than any other (pp. 6, 8). There are two "oldest Christian sermons" (pp. 277, 278, 291). Two theories are adopted to explain the lost ending of Mark (pp. 199, 583).

Not all the errors and inconsistencies can be so charitably judged. It would appear that the volume had been hastily thrown together and carelessly put through the press. Inaccuracies are numerous. It is stated that Mark "closes with a preposition (16:9)" (p. 583). Dr. Milligan as a *textual* critic is authority for an early dating of Acts (p. 103). One of Mrs. Lewis' palimpsest "finds" is on the same page (p. 185), and in the same sentence called both Syriac and Greek. "Assos" is substituted for "Athos," and a very early date is set for the Hermas manuscript (p. 251). One sentence lacks a predicate (p. 111, top); another closes with a colon, the quotation which should have followed going into a footnote (p. 382, top). The seven spirits are reduced to six by confusing ς and ζ (p. 158).

On the mechanical side the book is not a credit. One cannot attempt to catalogue the typographical errors. The Greek is trying, especially the breathings and accents (cf. p. 35 with three mistakes; pp. 36, 151, 158, 324, 378). "Politikan" is a strange word (p. 323). Of English blunders one of the worst is in Dr. Naville's Introduction, where "non-technical" should stand for "*now* technical" (p. xxiii). Is it allowable to murder German (cf. *Inhalts* as a title, pp. 149, 153, and an extra *k* in *Bruchstücke*, p. 152)? The references, so far as tested, appear fairly accurate, but no consistency is maintained in abbreviations or methods of reference. One serious error was linking Dr. Conybeare with Helbing instead of with Stock (p. 107, n. 14a). The cumbersome numbering of footnotes is another evidence of carelessness and haste.

In spite of these flaws the book will serve a very useful purpose in bringing to many readers a new freshness and joy in the study of the New Testament and the early church due to the recovery of the Mediterranean world.

C. C. McCOWN

PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION

TWO LUTHER BOOKS

Our Catholic friends deserve credit for the scientific devotion with which they defend their faith and oppose the Protestant. While the Protestants have never translated the greatest Lives of Luther, nor the works on the Reformation by Brieger, Egelhaaf, von Bezold, Thudichum, and others, and only very occasionally a Luther monograph, the Catholics have put into English nearly every great book against Luther and the Reformation, including Janssen's *Germany*, Pastor's *Popes*, Grisar's *Luther*, and now Denifle's *Luther*.¹ The space allotted to this notice will not permit a critical examination of its numerous points. In the second edition Denifle toned down occasionally the extreme harshness of his judgments, omitted some of his most opprobrious and offensive sentences, and in part rearranged his material for the sake of clearness. On his side it can fairly be said, and is acknowledged by Protestant scholars, that the following general results are to be placed to Denifle's credit: (1) By calling attention to errors of the Weimar editors of the works of Luther he summoned those men to a more scientific appreciation of their task. (2) By showing the misunderstandings or misrepresentations by Luther of mediaeval theology or other mediaeval matters, in which his Protestant biographers have not corrected him, he challenged the latter to a more diligent and accurate study of mediaeval sources. The mediaeval part of Denifle's *Luther* is by far its most valuable and, corresponding to his wonderful knowledge of that field, will long remain to instruct students. (3) He brought up for decision the important question as to Luther's later representations of his cloister life, and as to what that life really was. (4) Our study of Luther in the field of doctrinal history has been helped by Denifle.

As to the justice of Denifle's treatment of Luther in detail, the student should always look up the original passages and their context, and

¹ *Luther and Lutherdom*. By Heinrich Denifle. Translated from 2d ed. of the German by Raymund Volz. Vol. I, Part I. Somerset, Ohio: Torch Press, 1917. Li+465 pages, 8vo. \$3.50.

also read the answers to Denifle published in Germany. *No Roman Catholic judgment of Luther on any point, much less Denifle's, can be taken without independent verification.* One or two corrections may be permitted. Protestants do *not* place Luther above Christ (p. xxxiii). Many have criticized him relentlessly. "Liberal Protestants do not stand on Christian ground" (p. xxxv). The following statements are hardly correct: "Protestantism congenitally a disturber of the peace"; "Protestants have destroyed in Germany all peace" (p. xxxvi). "High schools" should be translated universities (p. vii). For *ne* read *né* (p. xvi). *Evangelische Bund* should be retained, and not translated Evangelical Alliance (p. xxi). Passage in Latin, page 18, note 53, is *not* offensive. Passage on polygamy (p. 18) is not at all fair to Luther. The now celebrated "Pecca fortiter" passage is treated without any fairness whatever (p. 19). On the "otiosus and crapulosus" passage and the "fall," in Wartburg see Kolde's review of Denifle (p. 18, notes). Luther was *never* in the "clutches of the syphilitic Hutten" (p. 42). "Turn about" (p. 43 and elsewhere) is the translation of *Umschwung*. Luther's reference to Franciscans professing the gospel is held down to mathematical accuracy (pp. 74 ff.). Denifle gives much of his case away when he finally admits (p. 86) that one enters orders because of dangers, etc. Page 103: Luther did not mean that by God's grace men could not be faithful to their wives, but simply referred to a fact of human nature. Page 105: The concession in note 208, though contemptibly small, contradicts the text. Page 107 and note 219: Not, "I do not live according to what I teach," but, "I do not live the things I teach, because I am wearied in this office; so much is lacking that I will seek the glory that many things impose upon me." His many duties kept him from inwardly living in the things he teaches. There is gross mistranslation of Latin on page 108. It should be: "I am exposed and mixed up with (or enveloped by, *involutus*) company, drinking, titillation, negligence, and other bothers," etc. Pages 108-9: Simply a confession in Luther's frank way of what every person has felt, and by no means justifies Denifle's conclusion. Page 110: for "Alexander" read "Aleander." No space for further corrections.

Dr. Reu's book¹ is a godsend to Luther students. It seems too good to be true that a scholar in an English-speaking land has produced a résumé of the whole Luther literature since the celebrations of 1883 so full, so well digested, so intelligent, so accurate. Dr. Reu is the able

¹ *Thirty-five Years of Luther Research.* By J. M. Reu. Chicago: Wartburg Publishing House, 1917. vii+155 pages. \$1.00.

editor of the *Kirchliche Zeitschrift* by the same publishers, and is the author of a large work in Catechetics in German and the editor of a very extensive collection of sources of catechetical instruction, also in German, which has won high praise from continental experts. The present work is divided: (I) Factors Which Brought about a New Period in Luther Research. (II) Fields in Which New Material Was Discovered. (III) New Editions of Luther's Works. (IV) Researches on Particular Phases of the Life and Theology of Luther. Under this last there are twenty-seven sections. A general statement is given and then in the notes at the back full bibliographies. In the notes the author sometimes includes quotations from sources and modern German writers. The illustrations are Luther portraits, facsimiles of old title-pages, etc. Though I have noted an occasional omission, the work is wonderfully complete and is invaluable to all students of the Reformation.

JOHN ALFRED FAULKNER

DREW THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
MADISON, N.J.

A NEW VOLUME ON GERMAN CATHOLICISM¹

This volume, the fruit of over twenty years of painstaking investigation in the field of ecclesiastical and civil law, traces the constitutional development of the Catholic church in Germany in the modern period as it has been determined by the Canon Law on the one hand and by civil enactments on the other. The sovereignty claimed by the mediaeval church has been superseded, practically, by that of the modern state, both in matters ecclesiastical and civil. The legal status of the church in modern Germany has varied greatly since the sixteenth century. It has experienced many changes, even since the establishment of the empire, as a result of the interplay of forces ecclesiastical and political. The same thing is true with respect to the individual states composing the larger unity. Here too the position of the Catholic church has varied greatly from time to time, and from state to state, being determined largely by the strength of the Catholic population and the pressure which the church has brought to bear upon legislation.

The work before us is divided into four parts, the first two of which embrace the major portion of the book. It deals, first of all, with the constitutional history of Catholicism as seen in the development of

¹ *Verfassungsgeschichte der katholischen Kirche Deutschlands in der Neuzeit auf Grund des katholischen Kirchen- und Staatskirchenrechts*. Dargestellt von Joseph Freisen. Leipzig und Berlin: Teubner, 1916. xxiv+455 pages. M. 12.

ecclesiastical law in the period under consideration. It is assumed that in its fundamental principles the government of the Catholic church does not and cannot change; that whatever deviations from these principles history records are due to the exigencies of the historical situation and the necessary readjustments by the church to enactments by the state. Trent served as a foil to the Reformation. It sought to correct past mistakes and to equip the church for the reconquest of lost territory. Its decrees are still basic in the legislation of the Catholic church. It marked a turning-point in its government. By the reorganization of the Curia into congregations of cardinals, the appointment of standing nuncios, etc., the Pope henceforth dominated the church. Failure of the Papacy to nullify the effectiveness of civil law deemed injurious to the church, together with state prevention of the execution of its ancient prerogatives by the church, led at length to the working out of concordats between the church and various German states. These were essentially a compromise, a *modus vivendi* between institutions irreconcilable in their assertions of sovereignty. Next to Trent the Vatican Council of 1870 determined the government of the church. Still more recently the extensive legislation of Pius X has introduced still further innovations. Through a commission appointed in 1904 the Pope undertook a complete codification of Roman ecclesiastical law, an undertaking not yet completed.

The major portion of the book deals with the government of the Catholic church as modified, practically, if not in principle, by civil enactment. The author traces the course of imperial law relating to the church from the Reformation to the present; the provisional arrangements of the sixteenth century; the provisions of the Peace of Westphalia, of the Rhine and Germanic confederations, and of the modern German Empire. The legal equality established in 1648 between Catholics and Protestants was modified, practically, by the principle *cujus regio, ejus religio*. Territorial churches came to possess decided advantages, while confessions which possessed no legal standing in 1624 received none in 1648. Actual enjoyment of civil and political liberty, guaranteed to Catholics and Protestants alike, varied materially in different states. Subsequent legislation tended to make real these fundamental guaranties. Since 1871 matters affecting religion have been left to the individual states, imperial laws dealing with these questions only as they are indirectly involved.

There follows a careful survey of the development of civil law as it relates to the church in each of the twenty-five constituent states of

the empire, including Alsace-Lorraine and Austria. Notwithstanding marked differences in historical development and present conditions, a certain uniformity of plan is yet possible in the handling of materials dealing with these several territories. First comes a survey of territorial changes and the intermingling of confessions. The jurisdiction of the Catholic church in these various territories in pre-Reformation times is indicated, and also the changes wrought by the Reformation. The steps are traced by which Rome has sought to rehabilitate herself in lost territory, by influencing legislation. Constitutional developments and modifications introduced by statute law are given detailed consideration. Included here are laws dealing with the delimitation of dioceses, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, worship, marriage and divorce, education, the administration of ecclesiastical property, taxation, etc. It is evident that political pressure, supplemented by the growing tolerance of the last century, has made it possible for Rome to make steady advance in territories lost in the sixteenth century. The degree of that progress has been determined by the numerical strength and consequent political power of Catholicism in the various states. In each instance these considerations are brought to a close by a brief survey of legislation as it affects other religious bodies aside from Catholics, Lutherans, and Reformed, together with a statistical summary. In this connection it may be noted that in accordance with the census of 1910, Germany had some forty million Evangelicals and about twenty-four million Catholics out of a total population of sixty-five million.

The book closes with a cursory treatment of the various charitable, philanthropic, cultural, and social agencies developed by German Catholicism in the modern period to propagate her interests and to advance her position.

The conclusion of the whole matter, so far as the constitutional development of the Catholic church in Germany is concerned, is this. Theoretically the government of the Catholic church rests upon the Canon Law as it has developed through the centuries, and upon nothing else. Practically, however, the church has been driven by circumstances over which she had no control to recognize, if only temporarily and under protest, the controlling power of civil regulation. To all intents, therefore, the constitution of the Catholic church in Germany consists of the laws of states dealing with ecclesiastical concerns plus those laws of the church which have not been affected by action of the state. To this undesirable situation the church perforce adjusts herself through "administrative" practices, viz., dispensations, tolerations, and accom-

modations. Her policy is, as opportunity offers, to bring into effective action those ecclesiastical laws which have been made ineffective or "latent" by reason of state interference.

The impression left by this exhaustive, scholarly, and thoroughly scientific piece of work is to intensify Harnack's vivid word picture, uttered twenty years ago—the Catholic church of Germany is a crouching lion, its claws attenuated or concealed, but none the less a crouching lion, prepared to spring whenever opportunity offers at the throat of German or world-Protestantism.

HENRY HAMMERSLEY WALKER

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION

The first part of a recent book by the late Professor Denney¹ is occupied with the basis of reconciliation in experience, its historical development, and its presentation in the New Testament; the second part treats of reconciliation as related to human need, as achieved by Christ, and as realized in experience. The historical survey concerns itself with only the high lights of the subject as determined rather by the author's sympathies than by the facts available, and closes with McLeod Campbell, Bushnell, and Ritschl, on the ground that nothing of significance has appeared since their day. In the doctrinal portion of the work several points receive principal attention—sin, sin and death, sin and the wrath of God, propitiation through the death of Christ on the cross. The ideas here expressed are identical with those of his "Studies in Theology," lectures delivered in the Chicago Theological Seminary in 1894, and in "The Death of Christ." (1) Sin is defined in accordance with the Westminster Shorter Catechism as any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God. Since sin is irrational, the rationale of it cannot be discovered; evolution aids us only so far as the particular form and not the principle is concerned. In no respect is sin to be regarded as inevitable or referred to man's nature as sinful. Some reference is made to the social aspect of sin, yet the definition of it is purely individualistic and theological. (2) The wages of sin is death. Death is conceived of as not simply a physical event but a moral experience; it may be indeed a debt of nature, but it is far more than this—it is morally significant. The entire course and constitution

¹ *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*. By James Denney. New York: Doran, 1918. vii+339 pages. \$2.00.

of things under which we live reacts against sin, and this reaction, when complete, is fatal. Thus God punishes sin. Here the author makes a supreme effort to concentrate the whole meaning of the divine reaction against sin upon the fact of "death." Victory over death is at the same time a victory over sin. (3) Sin deserves and receives the wrath of God which is disclosed in the reactions against evil already referred to, but this is prophetic of the final day of wrath in which the inexorable judgment of God is to complete its fatal work upon the evildoer. (4) This wrath of God is, however, only one element of the divine attitude against sin; love which judges and repels evil provides a "propitiation" in order that the divine justice against which sin has been committed may be satisfied. There is thus an objective atonement necessary if God is to be true to himself and to his moral order in the world. (5) God makes this propitiation to himself through the blood of Christ. The sufferings of Christ had to do with our sins. His head was bowed in submission to God's sentence upon sin because he had to endure all that was involved in God's reaction against sin; hence his sufferings were penal. It was not enough that he live the life of holy love; "if he had not died for us he would have done nothing at all." But for his death we must have died in our sins. (6) The final chapter on man's part in reconciliation answers to positions advanced in earlier chapters.

One cannot lay down this book without some comments both in general and in particular. In the conception of sin as exhausted in its relation to God alone, in the emphasis on death as that in which is gathered up the punishment of sin, in the view that in the death of Christ God offers to himself a propitiation for sin so that his wrath is expressed and his justice satisfied, we are introduced to a type of thought which is far removed from present-day interest. The incarnation is retired to a secondary place, the social aspect of sin and social agencies for the recovery of men to virtue are almost wholly ignored, and the atonement is conceived of as having objective efficacy once for all toward God and not as a process of personal and social regeneration inaugurated indeed by Jesus but continuously and ever more widely extended by those who share his spirit of good-will toward God and men. In a word, these lectures are a brave and impassioned attempt—destined perhaps to be the last—to revivify the moribund Anselmic conception of sin and salvation.

Two or three minor considerations may be added. The Epistle to the Hebrews is represented as teaching that Christ's reconciling work was completed once for all by his death, whereas it regards him as con-

tinuing that work in the most efficient way in the celestial world. It is claimed that the Gospel of John follows the rest of the New Testament: redemption is effected through a sacrificial act consummated upon the cross instead of through revelation in accordance with its Greek point of view. The influence of the mystery-religions upon the development of the idea of Christian salvation is regarded as negligible. If the main contention of the argument is valid, then St. Paul, by means of a single overworked passage in the third chapter of Romans, becomes instead of Jesus the sole authoritative source of the doctrine of reconciliation. Here and there the author's impatience toward views with which he is not in sympathy betrays him into an intolerant temper and into the substitution of preaching for exposition. Many concessions are, however, made to the modern spirit and to the results of liberal scholarship, especially in favor of Ritschl. Here, as in the "Studies in Theology," one comes upon a not infrequent characteristic of Scottish theology: views diametrically opposed to one another are warmly advocated in various parts of the book, with no consciousness of their irreconcilable contradiction.

All criticism aside, the work is one which embodies the results of wide research, deep insight, and rich first-hand experience of that which is so ardently reported; there are passages in it of great beauty and force; its description of sin and deliverance from it which is offered in the gospel will find response in many hearts. A pathetic interest attaches to this series of the Cunningham lectures in the fact that while Principal Denney had practically completed them by his own hand, he was prevented from delivering them by his illness and death.

CLARENCE A. BECKWITH

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

A SOCIAL THEORY OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION:

If we really mean what we say when we talk so earnestly of democracy, there is a development ahead of us which will modify all of our institutions. We have only as yet attempted democracy in any serious way in the political sphere, and there is very much still to be done in that direction. We have made some beginnings of understanding the quality of a democratic family, but as yet great confusion prevails, so much so that sometimes the autocracy has simply been shifted to the

¹ *A Social Theory of Religious Education.* By George Albert Coe. New York: Scribner, 1917. xiii+361 pages. \$1.50.

younger members of the family. Schools are experimenting with democracy in self-government and in the reorganization of the curriculum. In the industrial sphere we have scarcely dared to think democratically, so forbidding is the menace of Bolshevism.

But philosophically and practically we are committed to the democratic way of life. Things must give way to persons, and persons must live together in self-determining communities, and all life must be free. Democracy is far more than a scheme of politics. It is a social faith. It is a religious faith. Therefore it is inevitably an educational problem. The people who are going to create a democracy, if such is ever to be in the world, are the children who have grown up in democratic institutions with an increasing understanding of the values of the democratic organization of life.

Coe has frankly met the issue in a book which puts religious education in the forefront of our national duty. He has adopted the modification which many have wished to make of the great Hebrew phrase, "Kingdom of God," and has taken as a starting-point that religion is concerned with achieving in the world the democracy of God. The whole human problem is then for each person and each social group to have appropriate part in a free world-community animated by the spirit of love, which is the spirit of God. There can be no more vital religious concept than that of the ongoing divine enterprise for the achievement of a human community life.

With this guiding theory Coe discusses the whole process of religious education. And the theory vindicates itself in every page of the discussion. Education is interpreted in social terms. Religious faith is seen as a developing social experience. The curriculum is to be organized in such a way as to help the child to be an effective member of his society, entering as far as his experience permits into a consideration of the social problems of modern life. Sin is a social conception, and all instruction regarding sin and punishment for sin must be a process of "socialization." The various institutions within which the child grows up—the family, the school, the state, the church—afford their largest opportunity of education by reason of the child's social relations within them. The whole process is a life-process, and whatever is not vital is out of place.

It may easily be objected that the author has covered too much ground, especially as he has gone into the question of organization of religious education, including considerable discussion of curriculum, and has devoted a whole section of his book to the criticism of existing practices in the various types of Christian education. But it was neces-

sary to cover the whole field in order to make good his thesis that the entire process of religious education is to be socially conceived and carried out.

There will be room for many volumes working out this principle in detail, but it will be difficult to add anything to this vigorous and scholarly statement of fundamental principles. How little this vital theory is understood and how much it needs to be understood may be evident from an examination of the practices of almost any of our churches.

There are certain particularly valuable elements in this work. It makes accessible to students of religious education the serious objections which psychologists have found to the recapitulation theory, whose picturesqueness has led so many popular writers into somewhat grotesque representations of boy life. In opposition to those writers who have regarded adolescence as a complete break with childhood life Dewey has given a warning that adolescence is not another name for magic. So Coe argues for the genuineness of childhood religion and finds a continuity between childhood and youth experience. This leads to a vigorous criticism of the theory that the sex impulse is the root of religion and of social institutions. Whether the parental instinct will bear all that he puts upon it is a question that will need careful consideration.

The author's classified bibliography is not a mere list of books, but is a careful presentation of the most significant works on various aspects of religious education.

THEODORE GERALD SOARES

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT

BRIGHTMAN, E. S. *The Sources of the Hexateuch, J, E, and P, in the Text of the American Standard Edition, According to the Consensus of Scholarship*, edited with Introductions and Notes. New York: Abingdon Press, 1918. 395 pages. \$3.00.

This will prove a very useful book. It presents the student with an apparatus nowhere else found in precisely this form. The text of J, E, and P, each in turn is printed in a continuous story. This makes it easy to read any one of the documents from first to last without interruption due to the intrusion of materials foreign to it. This is distinctly worth while, if J, E, and P are to represent anything specific and characteristic in the student's mind, for few will take the pains necessary to follow each of the sources through when they are interwoven, as in the Received Text. Nor is it sufficiently easy and attractive a task when the text is analyzed into parallel columns as in the Oxford Hexateuch, to say nothing of the high cost of the latter. The last

excuse for ignorance of the content and spirit of the sources of the Hexateuch is now removed.

The text of D is not included, because the bulk of it is found in continuous form in the book of Deuteronomy. J^a is differentiated from J^b by the use of smaller type. Editorial material within each document is marked in the same way. P is not subdivided into P^a, P^b, and P^c, but P^a is clearly indicated. Where there is serious division of opinion with reference to the analysis, brief footnotes cite the chief writers in support of the varying views. The text is organized in logical paragraphs, numbered consecutively throughout each document, and in connection with each paragraph heading the corresponding paragraph numbers from the other documents are listed.

The book does not claim any degree of originality for its subject-matter, but only for its arrangement. It reveals a vast amount of labor in checking up the views of many authorities, and it evidences sound caution in not departing too widely from the standard writers. Its aim is to give the situation regarding Hexateuchal criticism as it is generally accepted at the present time, not to indicate the lines along which Hexateuchal investigation is likely to run in the immediate future. The plan was well conceived and has been excellently executed. The proofreading is almost perfect. Procksch is everywhere robbed of his first *c* and Meissner is given but one *s* (pp. 158 f.). It is a sign of encouragement when the publishing house of a great church like the Methodist Episcopal sends forth such frankly modern works as this and the series of Introductions by Eiselen. May other church publishers hasten to follow.

J. M. P. S.

LUTZ, HENRY FREDERICK. *Early Babylonian Letters from Larsa*. [Yale Oriental Series. Babylonian Texts, Vol. II.] New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917. xii+41 pages and 57 plates. \$5.00.

The second volume of the Yale Oriental Series, consisting of *Early Babylonian Letters from Larsa*, puts one hundred and fifty-two new texts at the disposal of scholars. The volume is the work of H. F. Lutz, Ph.D., a former pupil of Professor Clay.

Aside from the texts the book comprises a rendering of thirty-three of the texts, with an Introduction of six pages, lists of personal and divine names, and geographical references. This is primarily a text volume. It is to be much regretted that the original plan of the series, that, namely, of accompanying all texts by at least a tentative interpretation, could not be carried out in this case. This applies with peculiar force to letter texts, and is the more to be deplored since the editor in the sample translations seems to have sensed the original with a fair degree of success in this most difficult material.

His chief failure appears to be in XVIII, where the mutilated line (12) has misled him. I would suggest *li-ik-ta-i-iš-su* and render lines 11 ff., "I went to him and spoke as follows: let be given him as Abu-wakar has instructed me, 'give a female slave.' (He answered me), he shall pay me, had I not come to a slave owner? I will give a female slave to no one. Send over thy messenger and let him give away a female slave" (i.e., see if he will do so). XXII, lines 29-31, might be rendered: "The oxen, to the city I have designated, they shall remove."

In the proofreading "by" in the heading of XXIII has apparently fallen out and in I, line 13 (translation), the order of words is confused.

The first appearance of the name *a-ba-ra-ha-am* in XXVIII (No. 15), line 12, (cf. Plate LVI) is of considerable importance and the discussion of its relation to

"Abram" and "Abraham" (pp. 5-7) offers a most suggestive solution of that problem by regarding these various forms as dialectical variations of an original west-Semitic "Ab-ra-ham," which became "Abram" by migration to Babylonia and subsequently returned to the West as "Abraham."

The content of the texts translated deals principally with business relations, but is not without religious interest (cf. XXXI). The texts on the whole are very well preserved and well copied. Their complete elucidation should be well worth the effort.

L. W.

KRAELING, EMIL G. H. *Aram and Israel or The Aramaeans in Syria and Mesopotamia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1918. xvi+155 pages. \$1.50.

To the average reader of the Bible the terms "Aram" and "Aramaean" mean little or nothing. Of course he knows that the language of Jesus was the Aramaic, which sometime somehow had displaced the Hebrew tongue in Palestine. Perhaps he will also remember that portions of the Old Testament were written in the Aramaic, but of the people from whom the Jews borrowed this language he will probably profess to know nothing. And yet this apparent dearth of knowledge is due to the fact that our English versions of the Bible render the terms which should appear as "Aram" and "Aramaean" by "Syria" and "Syrians." The "wars with Syria," which form the subject of so many chapters of the historical books of the Old Testament, were wars which the Israelites fought with their first cousins, the Aramaeans.

But with the Old Testament as practically our only source of information the history of these people remained obscure and our estimate of them was decidedly unfavorable. Now, however, numerous Assyrian inscriptions and an increasing number of documents from the Aramaeans themselves enable us, if not to write an adequate history, at least to sketch the main outlines of the story of their development. As our author puts it: "Of the Aramaeans we know just enough to give an impressionistic design of who they were and what befell them" (p. 2).

Dr. Kraeling's "impressionistic design" is always interesting, readable, and scientific. The sources are never left out of consideration. Only in the case of some of the etymologies offered or accepted does the reviewer find himself at variance with the writer. But these are never put forward without proper caution, and in any case they have little bearing upon the main theme.

The book deserves a wide reading. Its simple and easy style makes it stand out in striking contrast to so much of the recent literature on topics connected with the history of the ancient world. Nor does one feel that the author has any ax to grind. It is a book that will interest all students of the Old Testament, and it ought to entice many of these to make more frequent excursions into the larger history of the ancient Near East.

D. D. L.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

Barton, George A. *The Religion of Israel*. New York: Macmillan, 1918. xv+289 pages. \$2.00.

CHURCH HISTORY

Faulkner, John Alfred. *Wesley as Sociologist, Theologian, Churchman*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1918. 173 pages. \$0.75.

Spearing, Edward. *The Patrimony of the Roman Church in the Time of Gregory the Great*. New York: Putnam, 1918. xix+147 pages. \$2.00.

DOCTRINAL

Ames, Edward Scribner. *The New Orthodoxy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1918. ix+127 pages. \$1.00.

Hefelbower, S. G. *The Relation of John Locke to English Deism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1918. viii+188 pages. \$1.00.

Leckie, J. H. *The World to Come and Final Destiny*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1918. xiv+362 pages. 10s.

LeRoy, Edouard (translated by Lydia G. Robinson). *What Is a Dogma?* Chicago: Open Court, 1918. 89 pages. \$0.50.

Sellars, Roy Wood. *The Next Step in Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1918. 228 pages. \$1.50.

Wobbermin, Georg (translated by Daniel Sommer Robinson). *Christian Belief in God*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918. xix+175 pages. \$1.25.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

Carus, Paul. *The Dharma*. Chicago: Open Court, 1918. vi+134 pages. \$0.50.

Carus, Paul. *Virgil's Prophecy on the Savior's Birth*. Chicago: Open Court, 1918. 97 pages. \$0.50.

Starr, Frederick. *Korean Buddhism*. Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1918. xix+104 pages. \$2.00.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

McConaughy, David. *Money the Acid Test*. New York: Missionary Education Movement of the United States and Canada, 1918. xi+193 pages. \$0.60.

Quayle, William A. *The Dynamite of God*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1918. 330 pages. \$1.50.

MISCELLANEOUS

Boynton, Richard Wilsbn. *The Vital Issues of the War*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1918. xix+134 pages. \$1.00.

Mathews, Shailer. *Patriotism and Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1918. 161 pages. \$1.25.

Schroeder, Theodore, and Ida C., *Heavenly Bridegrooms*. New York: Reprint from *Alienist and Neurologist*, 1918. 121 pages.

Segal, Hyman. *The Law of Struggle*. New York: Massada Publishing Co., 1918. 161 pages. \$1.00.

Sinclair, Upton. *The Profits of Religion*. Pasadena, Cal.: Upton Sinclair, 1918. 315 pages. \$0.50.

VALUABLE BOOKS FOR CLERGYMEN

Pagan Ideas of Immortality during the Early Christian Centuries.

By PROFESSOR CLIFFORD H. MOORE, of Harvard University.

The Ingersoll Lecture for 1918. It will surprise some to see how many points of resemblance existed between early Christianity and certain pagan philosophies. Such a comparison prevents grave historical error on the part of the student.

The Religious Thought of the Greeks. By PROFESSOR CLIFFORD H. MOORE, of Harvard University. 385 pages. \$2.00.

A history of Greek religious thought from the Homeric poems to Plotinus and Origen in the third century of our era; with a discussion of ancient morality, Roman religion, the conquest of Rome by Greek thought, Oriental cults, and the relations between Christianity and Paganism.

"An exceedingly interesting and satisfying book for the intelligent and thoughtful reader."—*Rochester Theological Seminary Bulletin*.

The Religious History of New England. King's Chapel lectures.

Readable histories of the Congregationalists, Unitarians, Baptists, Quakers, Episcopalians, Methodists, Universalists, and Swedenborgians in New England. 360 pages. \$2.50.

"These lectures provide entertaining reading, and the student will gain much knowledge set out with the warmth of feeling felt by men dealing with subjects dear to their hearts but with no pride of sect or narrowness of outlook."—*London Times*.

"Should appeal to a large circle of readers and would easily serve as a textbook on the religious history of this section."—*Homiletic Review*.

Metempsychosis. By PROFESSOR GEORGE F. MOORE, of Harvard University. 75 cents.

The Ingersoll Lecture for 1914. A study of the doctrine of transmigration, which has recurred in modern and occidental as well as ancient oriental systems.

The Spiritual Interpretation of History. By PROFESSOR SHAILER MATHEWS, of the University of Chicago. 227 pages. \$1.50.

Starting with the determination to be fair, the author works toward his conclusion that history exhibits forces which should renew allegiance to a threatened idealism, and confidence in the might of right.

"Never leaving his discussion with a mere academic conclusion, the author brings every argument and suggestion to bear upon the obligation and the opportunity of the individual and the church to add their all to increase the momentum of the cosmic tendency."—*The Survey*.

Harvard Theological Studies.

- I. **The Composition and Date of Acts.** By CHARLES C. TORREY, of Yale University. 75 cents.
- II. **The Pauline Idea of Faith in its Relation to Jewish and Hellenistic Religion.** By W. H. P. HATCH, of the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge. \$1.00.
- III. **Ephod and Ark: A Study in the Records and Religion of the Ancient Hebrews.** By WILLIAM R. ARNOLD, of Andover Theological Seminary. \$1.50.
- IV. **The Gospel Manuscripts of the General Theological Seminary.** By PROFESSOR C. C. EDMUNDS and W. H. P. HATCH.

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
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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

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FEDERATION OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES IN AMERICA—AN INTERPRETATION

GEORGE CROSS

Rochester Theological Seminary, Rochester, New York

For a number of years there has been in operation a plan for the federation of Christian churches in America, and considerable progress has been made toward the realization of its aims. The inauguration of this movement on a broad scale is partly an outcome of many tentative efforts in the past of individuals or societies in local centers to secure the combination of churches of different denominations or of members of these churches in some undertaking that concerned the well-being of all but bore no relation to denominational dividing lines. It is partly the result of a growing conviction that the Christian message should be given to the whole world in the shortest possible time, and that it should be regularly applied to the whole range of life in every community. The occasional attempts at united action here and there have grown into a general adoption of an articulated policy. Nearly all intelligent Protestants have come to feel that no single denomination of Christians can hope to appropriate the whole field of religious endeavor or persuade the others to enter into its ecclesiastical communion and that, even if it were able to do so, there would be no unmixed gain; for in such an eventuality many important elements necessary to the highest community life would be wanting. In fact, the whole trend of life in civilized lands during recent times has been

toward the obliteration of provincialism in ecclesiastical and political affairs, as well as in industry, education, and morals. Increasing mutual appreciation and sympathy, the establishment of an unwritten law of interdenominational comity, and actual union of forces along many practical lines were already a reality before steps were taken to adopt the imperativeness of co-operation as a controlling principle in the relation of churches to one another and to embody it in an organization. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America represents the principle.

The conviction underlying its activities is expressed in one of its authorized publications thus: "In the providence of God the time has come more fully to manifest the essential oneness of the Christian churches of America in Jesus Christ as their divine Lord and Saviour and to promote the spirit of fellowship, service, and co-operation among them." The "plan" is "to express the fellowship and Catholic unity of the Christian Church," to promote a larger "influence upon the moral and social life of the people" in every community where the federation is able to operate. There is no intimation of proposed changes in the order, doctrine, or liturgy of any of the present churches, but it would seem natural, and in fact inevitable, that questions on these points should arise in time and demand careful attention. But of that we shall speak later.

Let us glance for an instant at the kinds and the extent of work already undertaken, and what is further contemplated. Local churches are encouraged to enter into united evangelistic services, to combine in obtaining trained teachers in their schools, to keep public attention fixed upon social conditions with a view to remedying social evils, sanitation, municipal corruption, injurious industrial situations, bad housing, etc., so as to make the whole community feel the impact of the Christian conscience. Wholesome forms of recreation, meetings for the open discussion of public questions, and better educational opportunities and methods for the whole population are promoted by joint action on the part of the churches. Interdenominational comity is urged as a means of overcoming waste in men and materials in the work at home and abroad, over-churched districts being relieved of surplus organizations, duplication in mission fields being avoided so as to reach fields untouched

hitherto, and the whole of the activities of the churches being brought under the direction or counsel of some committee or league made up of representatives from all. The time is believed to have come when "a federation of churches of some kind is necessary, from the smallest village to the greatest city, and from these to the Christian bodies of the nations of the world." By these measures and by supporting great non-denominational or interdenominational organizations formerly in the field, as the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., International Sunday School Association, Society of Christian Endeavor, Bible societies, tract societies, foreign-mission and home-mission conferences, it is hoped that "the last defence of close sectarianism" may be taken away and a clearer field for Christian evangelism be open. The aim is to go much farther. The dreadful menace of a non-Christian civilization armed with the powers of physical and spiritual destruction, no longer merely looming up before us, but with its unspeakable desolation lying before our very eyes, has accentuated the conviction that the world can be saved only by Christianizing international relations. Therefore the churches are to organize and operate with a view to bringing their united spiritual power to bear directly on the deliberations and decisions of national and international assemblies. The program outlined is surely a vastly ambitious one. Let us seek whether we may understand its meaning, for the whole prospect fills us with inspiring, though grave, concern.

I

The first point of capital importance in the consideration of this subject is that *we find ourselves today in the presence of a movement consciously Protestant in principle, looking to the union of Christians, in contrast with earlier attempts at union in principle avowedly Catholic.*

Basic to the earlier effort to secure the union of Christendom is the confession, "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church." The conviction underlying the present effort may be thus expressed: "I believe in the mutual co-operation of all the Christian churches in one purpose." The former is of ancient origin, the latter distinctly modern. The former finds its standard in the past and seeks to

recall Christendom to a unity of faith and order that has been lost, but the latter directs its efforts toward the future creation of a unity that will preserve all the values of the present free and unimpeded diversity in the life and thought of all the churches. Characteristically, the former has always been mainly under the direction and control of the clergy, while the latter is principally a response to the will of an intelligent laity.

1. The story of the Catholic effort for unity is well known to the students of Christian history. It arose in the midst of the strife and confusion that seemingly threatened the early Christian community with spiritual disintegration and extinction; for many separate groups had sprung up in support of conflicting traditions, customs, and interpretations, all professedly Christian. Dangers arising from the attacks of outer foes were made more threatening by reason of inner division. The way of safety lay in unity. From the very outset the sense of spiritual unity was strong in Christian hearts. It manifested itself continually in deeds of mutual love and forbearance. Christians were early taught—especially where Graeco-Oriental culture entered in—to consider themselves as one in spirit with the Lord and as in their entirety constituting his mystical body. To defy this essential unity by tearing the body in sunder was to violate the very principle of their religion. The principle of unity had to be guarded because the interest of salvation itself was at stake.

While the earlier Christian hope of a salvation to be revealed at the last time when the Lord should descend for judgment, and the striving to prepare for that event by repentance and good works were never altogether forgotten, still the accepted view of salvation in orthodox circles came to be that of a metaphysical or mystical union with the Deity. As there was but one Saviour, Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Son of God, so there was but one instrument of salvation, namely the mysteries or sacraments that mediated to men the life divine, and there was but one institution that administered the sacraments, namely the church. In a word, salvation was sacramental. The church formed herself round the sacrament—she was herself a sacramental institution, God's sacrament to a lost world. Therefore, as there was but one salvation, so there could be but one

church. A plurality of churches was as little to be tolerated as a plurality of incarnations or a plurality of gods.

Thus "the church" came into the "credo." It is significant that the confession of belief in the one true church precedes (in the order observed in the ancient creeds) the belief in the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection, and the life everlasting. From the purely Catholic point of view, therefore, the unity of the church, or the union of all Christians, is no mere method adopted for accomplishing the great Christian enterprise, but it is an essential of the Christian communion with God.

Consequently the guarding of this unity became a matter of supreme importance. The church was "holy"—distinct from all secular, natural, worldly institutions—for the sacramental grace was deposited in her alone. All the saints were found in her exclusively—she was the church catholic, or universal, and all other so-called churches were false and without salvation. Finally, in her official successors of Christ's apostles she had preserved inviolate the true apostolic tradition. The sacraments in the hands of a duly consecrated apostolic priesthood constituted the church. There was One Holy Catholic Apostolic Church.

We may note in passing that the exigencies of government, institutional necessities, the imperativeness of a thorough administration and preservation of this church system under the permeating influence of Roman imperialistic ideals, became a second chief factor in the development of the Roman Catholic church and provided means of enforcing the demand for unity upon all who would be Christian. Catholicism is a system of government as well as a sacramental system.

A true Catholic is shocked by the spectacle of open divisions in Christendom. The cleavage that produced an Eastern and a Western church long ago is a wound that still rankles deeply in the Catholic heart, and both of these churches have tried to keep up the fiction of a real unity. But the Protestant Reformation, with its individualism, is to the Catholic mind a wicked heresy wantonly seeking to break the church into fragments, and the steady multiplication of these mutually discordant Protestant bodies seems to the Catholic a practical proof of the truth of the charge.

A Catholic effort to effect a union of Christendom necessarily proceeds from the point of view just enunciated and, conversely, all efforts proceeding from this point of view emanate from Catholicism. The union must be formal, churchly. A professedly heaven-born institution seeks to recall to her tutelage her disobedient and erring children—the priestly idea. Whatever concessions may be made to other “churches” on other matters, on this point there can be no compromise. The leaders of the movement looking to the federation of the churches probably know this quite well, or, if they do not, it will be brought forcibly to their minds when the final issue is reached.

An interesting corroboration of the interpretation here offered appears in an article, “The Basis of Reunion,” by Walter W. Seton, published in the *Hibbert Journal* of October, 1918. Dr. Seton says:

It is difficult to conceive anything more disastrous than the success of a propaganda which might unite all the so-called Protestant bodies into one federal union, leaving out altogether the Roman communion and the Orthodox communions [he means the Greek and other Eastern churches]. Such a result, if achieved, would be the worst possible travesty of the true unity of the church as conceived by her divine founder; and, moreover, it would be in a position of unstable equilibrium, for it would be based upon no sound principle but merely on devices of human ingenuity and resourcefulness. Reunion can mean one thing only—the restoration of complete communion between all branches of the Christian church throughout the world—Roman, Orthodox, and Protestant—which confess our Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour, and the formation of all such communions into a visible unity. That is the one kind of union worth praying for or working for.

Farther on the author adds, “For Churchmen, the horizon is heavy with clouds.” Dr. Seton evidently seeks to disparage the federation movement as much as he fears it. Whether it be based on a principle that is “sound” will appear, we hope, as we proceed.

2. *The federation movement is a product of the Protestant spirit and proceeds consciously along Protestant lines.* It seeks an issue inherent in Protestantism.

The Protestants abandoned the Catholic church with varying degrees of reluctance, intelligence, and thoroughness. Some shrank from a complete rejection of the sacramental view of salvation and sought only a reduction instead of a repudiation of sacraments.

Some declared their intention to be only the purification of the church and not the formation of new churches. Some declared that they were the true representatives of the ancient doctrine of the church and denied that they were in favor of doctrinal innovations. Some maintained in one form or another the legalistic position which the Catholic church had assumed and rested their claims on external supernatural authority. Except from the point of view of historical interest, it matters little to us today what special form their apologetic assumed, for in any case it bore the peculiar stamp of that age, with its merits and defects. Men are seldom able to expound satisfactorily to the mind of a later age their reasons for radical action. But over and above everything else the important fact stands before us that the Protestants came out of the Catholic church, and that they stayed out. That they had sufficient reason for leaving it they were assured, and, with time, the assurance has hardened into an ineradicable conviction.

We have had four hundred years of Protestantism. The days when it felt that it must justify itself as against Catholicism have long since passed. It is not specially concerned to justify its right to be. The consciousness of a great call which came to our Protestant ancestors has become an overwhelming inspiration. The tremendous moral achievements of Protestantism, its organized strength, its evident leadership of the nations of Christendom, its development of inner spiritual power in its faith and hope and love, its mission of mercy to mankind, remolding, as it does, the forms of life that preceded it wherever it touches them—these things simply make it impossible that intelligent Protestants should occupy their energies in discussing whether they made a mistake in coming out from Catholicism or entertain the proposition of a return from whence they came. Questions of sacramental efficacy, the right to ministerial ordination, apostolic succession, the legal basis of a religious organization, do not interest the multitudes of busy men who are absorbed in the aim of bringing human hearts into fellowship with God by the immediate contact of human heart with human heart. It matters little to them whether the spiritual organisms that have come into being in the course of the Protestant

evangel are called churches, or societies, or by some other name. They are present in the world as mighty facts, and their achievements are their justification.

The multiplication of religious denominations has been a natural outcome of the Protestant spirit. No institution that ever existed has had the right to inhibit the individual from communicating his heart's convictions to those who will hear. If a religious community in which he has been nurtured ceases to satisfy his heart's longings, then let him create another community in which his love for human fellowship can come to its most perfect fulfilment, and none can claim a right to find fault with him for so doing. It is a very noteworthy fact that the great religious revivals that have swept over Protestant countries from time to time have been followed invariably by an increase in religious denominations. Each one of these has arisen from the desire to promote some great spiritual interest that seemed endangered or neglected by other bodies already in existence. Protestant bodies have come into being, not out of the institutional interest, but in the interest of the spiritual life. Each Protestant denomination represents a type of that life. In other words, Protestantism expresses the worth of the individual soul in its relation to God and the community life.

At this point the distinctive character of the present approach to a true Christian unity comes to light. It has been pointed out that many Protestants were very reluctant to break away from the Catholic church. They inwardly shrank from a step that seemed to many to destroy the unity of Christendom. The ultimate unity of all Christians has continued to be an aim dear to the Protestant heart. It is disclosed in their distinction of the "visible" church from the "invisible" and their hope of a heaven of all the righteous. They are persuaded that Catholicism tends more and more to spiritual division as freedom and intelligence increase, because of its artificial character. A so-called universalism that destroys individualism turns out to be particularism. The individual, truly understood, has the principle of universalism within him. We shall attain to a truly worthful and abiding universalism by being, each man of us, true to the peculiar endowments God has bestowed on each. It is not necessary that Christians should be formed into

one exclusive *organization*. It is necessary that they constitute in their totality one great spiritual *organism*.

This is the point of departure of the movement for the federation of the Christian churches, as I understand it. It recognizes absolutely the right of any body of Christian believers to form themselves into an order—call it a church or what not—for the evangelization of their own souls and the redemption of mankind. It recognizes the distinctive contribution of each of these bodies to the well-being of the Christian commonwealth. But at the same time it points out that our great enterprise can be accomplished only when there is such a communion of soul with soul as makes men members one of another. Moreover, the force that cements this communion of soul is no external endowment bestowed by priestly hands and conveyed in some specially selected and sanctified portion of material nature, but it is found in the divine summons of Christ to one great task for all. It makes no difference by whose human act this is brought to men, for every believer is a priest of God, if there be priests at all. This unity of Christendom is sought by allowing free movement to the initiative of the individual, in the confidence that in coming to his own true self by the working of immanent energies he will find his true relation to his fellows and constitute with them at last a perfect human community. The unity which Catholicism seeks is a unity of control, and the first condition of it is the submission of the individual to a power that comes upon him from without, and in whose prerogative he has no part. The unity which Protestantism seeks is unity of purpose, a unity toward which the first step to be taken is to summon the spirit of each man to an exercise of powers hitherto unexperienced by him but potential in every man. The chief implications of this last statement must now engage our attention.

II

A further insight into the meaning of the federation movement is obtained by discovering its underlying view of the Christian religion with respect both to its origin and to its mission. This interpretation is suggested by the frankness with which the gospel is to be offered to the native intelligence and will of every man, no matter what

his antecedents, without the mediation of any preparatory or accompanying rite or ceremony. It is also suggested by the evident purpose to associate the purification and ennobling of all the natural forms of human community life and action with the ordinary attempt to win the individual to a good personal life. Here also it will be found helpful to set forth the fundamental likeness and contrast to the Catholic interpretation of the nature of the Christian religion.

1. *To the Catholic mind man is a fallen creature of God in a fallen world.* With the disobedience of man the grace of God is withdrawn, so that this world and the men who inhabit it are in themselves destitute of the true life of holiness and righteousness and are subject to death. Being separated from the supernatural, both are purely natural. The natural is the common, the undivine, the profane, and it moves on to death. There are, therefore, two worlds, the human and the divine, which are different and opposed in kind and quality. The divine, the supernatural, is eternal; the human, the natural, is to pass away unless the divine and supernatural can be brought into it from without. The divine purpose is to save men, if they will accept salvation. The divine way of saving fallen men is to bring into this natural world of which they are members, the holiness and righteousness of that higher world where God and sinless beings dwell in holiness and peace. The means of bringing about this change must also be supernatural, or else these will taint the good thing they are meant to bestow. The Christian religion is the divine provision for bringing men into this heavenly life. It is a supernatural order interpolated into the natural order. It embraces the revelation of the higher world, the coming of Deity into the world in the body of flesh (which thereby becomes a sacrament of the divine), and the preservation and application of this divine presence and saving power by sacramental means, whereby at last men are delivered from corrupt nature and exalted into the heavenly place. The laws of the working of this supernatural grace are different from, higher than, and may work in opposition to, natural law. Thus supernatural institutions and natural institutions are apart and contrary in character, and the only way of safety from the evil of the natural is to bring the latter

into subjection to the supernatural. To take a concrete instance: In this world two swords are wielded, the sword of the church and the sword of the state, the one spiritual and the other material, the one to be wielded by the church and the other for the church. All institutions which are in opposition to this supernatural church must perish, because they are of purely natural origin.

Contact with the natural is dangerous, for it may prove contaminating. Since the motives of the natural life are of this world and undivine, the demands of the Christian life reach their climax in the withdrawal from the natural and the extinction in each man of the natural motives. The ideal of life is the ascetical, and the highest virtue in life is the virtue of self-renunciation. This is the price of admission into the supernatural order. The monk and the nun are the highest types of this supernatural life among men, and all others actually partake of this true goodness only in so far as they follow the same ideal. Hence the Catholic movement for the unity of Christendom is a movement to bring all men to obedience to the supernatural institution in which the saving grace is deposited and through which it is imparted. Wherever the sacramental view of salvation obtains, this and nothing less is essential in the end.

2. *The great structure of human life which the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America seeks to build up* *reposes on a different basis.* As has been already indicated, its presuppositions are the ultimate presuppositions of Protestantism, and its methods are the Protestant methods. Whatever equivocation and confusion may have existed among Protestants in the past, owing to the lingering influence of the Catholic contention on these points, the actual progress of Protestant Christianity through a dozen generations has clearly differentiated the Protestant view of the nature and mission of Christianity.

Observe then how valiantly Protestantism has maintained the worth of the natural order of life and its institutions among men. Natural human affection, marriage, the family, the home, are regarded as fundamental to universal human well-being. They are not regarded as concessions to human weakness or tolerated as evils that cannot be fully extinguished in a corrupt human nature, but they are regarded as constituting the sphere in which true

human goodness can best be cultivated. The love of the sexes is sanctified, not damned. The married man or woman is more to be esteemed (other things being equal) and can make a larger contribution to the totality of human good than the celibate. The family is of more account than the brotherhood, and the home than the monastery. Note one result—the relatively small proportion of illegitimate births in Protestant countries.

Observe how deeply Protestantism has cherished the worth of material nature, the order of the physical world. It has not feared the possible effect of scientific research upon religion and morality. The treasures of the universe are for man's good, and the mathematician, the physicist, the geologist, the biologist, and all the investigators of nature's secrets are also showing men the way of salvation. Hence the life of industry, trade, commerce, and all the natural ways of making one's living, so far from being detrimental to the attainment of the highest Christian character, furnish exalted privileges to him who seeks to cultivate this character in himself, and are invaluable avenues of approach to the commerce of soul with soul in the life of God.

Observe also how Protestantism has upheld the dignity of the civil and political life. What struggles it has made to uplift the national spirit and protect the sanctity of the national life! With what indignation it has rebuked those religious institutions that seek to undermine the loyalty of the citizens of the state! Its honored leaders and heroes have been, not the recluses who mourned the degeneracy of their age and fled the world lest it defile their souls, but the men who have bravely assumed the burdens of citizenship and statesmanship and have found in this sphere the assurance of the presence and favor of God. Hence civil and political institutions are also divine in origin and constitute a realm in which the saving grace of God is at work.

In short, Protestantism denies that the natural and the supernatural are separate (except for abstract thought), it denies that the supernatural is ever the unnatural, and it denies that humanity and divinity are two mutual exclusives. It finds the supernatural within the natural, and the divine in the human. The way of salvation and the normal way of life are the same road. The vicari-

ous life and death of the Saviour are normal for all humanity, and not an exclusive road for one who comes into life and fulfils it in an unnatural way. And the great God of heaven, whose children we are, is he whose presence sets every common bush afire with divinity. Hence the sternness with which Protestantism brings the guilt of the sinner home to him. Sin is unnatural. It is a violation of nature—one's own and God's. It is not a misfortune to which we fall heir by physical birth, as if nature could be charged with being its handmaid, but it is the antagonism of the man to his own true nature, as also to God.

These are the prevailing presuppositions as respects the nature of the Christian subjects, that underlie the federation movement. It seeks to unite heaven and earth in one. It seeks to sanctify the common things, the common tasks, and the common institutions of human life. It seeks to establish at last a human unity that shall not cut across the common secular life of men but be built up in and through that life. It seeks no single institutional unity as a supreme end, but the unity that arises when one common aim permeates all institutional action, as well as all individual action, so that in their entirety they shall constitute one vast organism in which the divine Spirit may operate and may manifest himself. The holy Christian unity which it presents as an ideal is to be constituted, not of a portion of the race segregated from the lost majority or lost remainder, but of the human family united in the consciousness of a common purpose—the supernatural unity realized in the natural.

III

It is necessary to say a word about the *forms in which the working out of this Christian unity shall come to expression*. We shall confine our attention to those modes of expression which have been the most commonly recognized in the churches, namely, the liturgical, the confessional, and the institutional.

I. *The liturgical expression of Christian unity*.—The spirit of devotion has tended in Catholicism to regularity and fixity of form, in Protestantism to spontaneity and freedom. Both are natural consequences of their opposing conceptions of the nature of Christianity. The former tendency flows from the view that the

Christian salvation issues from the entrance of a heavenly order into the disorder of our earthly existence, demanding conformity as a condition of salvation. Here the liturgy becomes a system of rites or ceremonies revered as vehicles of the spiritual life and is to be observed in strict obedience to authority. The latter tendency accords with the view that the relation of the individual to God is immediate, and that his worship expresses the effort of his own free spirit to come into communion with God. It nurtures the habit of private devotion and varies with the moods of the worshiper. In public devotion it degenerates sometimes into irreverence.

The federation movement will tend to modify greatly the worship of the churches that come within it; for it will tend to produce that deeper appreciation of the worth of the individual Christian which issues from the discovery anew that in the exercise of his personal faith in God the Christian finds himself a member of a communion of faith, and that in his personal devotions he is consciously an organ of its expression. This organic relation to the universal Christian spirit is especially manifest in the act of public worship, for there the communion character of prayer and praise to God comes to consciousness powerfully. Out of this richer sense of spiritual communion is supplied a corrective of the deplorably common looseness of public devotion in many Protestant churches. While, therefore, the future liturgies of the churches must be free from the sacramentalism that regards any rite as essential to salvation, or that allows proxies in the religious life, and while they will be various and flexible, in keeping with the variety of types of spirituality in the churches, they will, on the other hand, take on that more stately and dignified character which flows from the consciousness of a broader and more comprehensive unity.

2. *The confessional expression of Christian unity.*—It is officially stated that "the federation of Christian churches has a confessional basis . . . there are certain natural lines of cleavage which must be observed in forming a church federation as in forming a federation of any other character." The federation receives into its membership only the Protestant evangelical churches, and it pro-

ceeds evidently upon the doctrinal basis of the Evangelical Alliance of 1846. This Alliance distinctly affirmed that it "proposed no new creed, but aimed simply to bring individual Christians into closer fellowship and co-operation on the basis of the spiritual union which already exists in the vital relation of Christ to the members of his body in all ages and countries." Its consensus, in nine points, of the various evangelical confessions is distinctly Protestant in tone, but it is not formally offered as a creed, being "simply an indication of the class of persons whom it is desirable to embrace within the Alliance." This amounts to saying, of course, that if some other test than the doctrinal be found a better and surer indication of the persons whom it is desirable to associate in the movement this will be of greater interest than the doctrines they profess.

What the Alliance sought to do with individuals the federation seeks to do with churches. In its preamble to the Plan of Federation it says (to repeat a quotation already given): "In the providence of God, the time has come more fully to manifest the essential oneness of the Christian Churches of America in Jesus Christ as their divine Lord and Saviour, and to promote the spirit of fellowship, service, and co-operation among them." Doctrinal discussions are, in fact, carefully avoided because, no doubt, of the danger of a growth of divisive influences. Nevertheless the doctrinal implications of its position must be squarely faced sooner or later. The time is ripening for this step. Some of the most significant of these implications may be very briefly indicated here:

First, there is something of greater worth to Christian churches than the doctrinal beliefs they may hold, since these are intellectual renderings of that which in the souls of men is a more powerful and abiding bond of union, namely, the inner communion with God in Jesus Christ.

Secondly, this communion with God in Christ is constituted by participation in the divine purpose to establish a universal human kindom in which the Spirit of God is regnant, and it is thoroughly *moral* in character, in contrast to the supposed mysterious union of human nature with the divine, which is *metaphysical* in character.

Thirdly, the means of establishing this communion are found in all the normal relations of men to one another in this world. These become channels for the communication to one another of the holiest gifts we possess, even life itself. Hereby also we share in the vicarious life and death of Jesus Christ.

Fourthly, creeds and confessions of faith, being attempts to make clear to our minds the pathway by which this end is to be reached, are worthy of our profound reverence and respect as aids to the religious life, but the acceptance of these creeds can never be a condition of salvation or be binding upon the human conscience. The repetition of them from age to age unchanged is detrimental to the Christian life, since the latter is always being progressively fulfilled and needs a progressive interpretation. (A curious commentary on this point is supplied in the discussions of "The Liberal Position" by Dr. Sanday and Mr. Fawkes in the number of the *Hibbert Journal* above referred to. When one says, like Mr. Fawkes, that "Faith is a fixed quantity" and proceeds to reason that an intelligent modern man can still recite the ancient creeds as his own, it is pretty plain that mental equivocations and reservations are unavoidable or indispensable.)

3. *The institutional or practical expression of this unity.*—The Federal Council places its principal emphasis at this point. Organization and methods are of great account in this movement. Indeed they are essential to a unity which is more than mystical or sentimental. It is to be noted that the local church is the unit of organization for the federation. Local churches are first of all federated, but other Christian associations not bearing the name of churches are associated with them. It is not desired to separate these local churches from the larger corporate religious unions to which they belong; but, at the same time, in bringing them into action in a sphere beyond that of their own denominations the federation is seeking to become an interdenominational organization. It would seem that in the course of time present denominational boundaries must fade away.

Such a program will require for its execution Christian statesmanship of extraordinary power and skill. Thoroughness of co-operation must be combined with freedom and flexibility. It is

perhaps too soon to declare the form it must assume, but one may hazard the statement that neither the monarchical nor the oligarchical form will do. It must be thoroughly democratic. Therefore, cherishing the greatest liberty for the individual person and the individual church, it may be expected to assume the intercongregational type of organization.

The scheme involves grave dangers also to both faith and freedom. It involves danger to faith because the attention to those external achievements which are sought in the social, civil, and political realms may lead men to forget that the chiefest thing in all the world is a humble, contrite heart, and the sin which is charged to Romanism may be recharged some day to Protestantism. The other danger is that organization may be pressed so far that the institution may seem to have a right in itself to exist, and men may forget that the best title any order has to our regard lies in its faithful ministry of the spirit of Jesus Christ to the sinful, troubled, seeking souls of men.

JESUS AS A TEACHER: TOWARD AN INTERPRETATION

J. WARSCHAUER
North Shields, England

I

The attempt to write what for want of a more accurate term we still call a life of Christ has been hampered from the earliest times by a twofold difficulty, which has never been successfully surmounted, because to a large extent it is really insurmountable.

There is first of all the difficulty of so combining the various incidents handed down pellmell by tradition as to make them present an orderly and intelligible sequence. We are not thinking of the truly desperate task of reconciling the synoptic with the Johanne tradition; but confining ourselves to the former, or looking for the moment at the earliest of our witnesses alone, we find that it is possible to arrive at widely divergent conclusions as to the value of the Markan scheme, Professor Burkitt, for example, maintaining that "the narrative of Mark . . . in its main outlines and arrangement fits without violence into the framework of secular circumstances and events," so that "we are not at liberty seriously to disturb" its proportions,¹ while Weinel bluntly states that "the narrative frame into which Mark has fitted the old tradition concerning Jesus is quite defective and disfigured by apologetic tendencies."² But when we have devised what we regard as a plausible, probable arrangement of our material, in which one occurrence seems naturally and convincingly to lead on to the next, we are confronted by the even more formidable task of fitting into this framework of events the recorded sayings of our Lord—to divine, that is, when this or that word was really spoken. This latter task frankly defies accomplishment, and the guesses of the synoptists

¹ *The Gospel History and Its Transmission*, pp. 103-4.

² *Jesus im XIX. Jahrh.*, p. 75.

are only guesses, often conflicting, the identical utterance being inserted in different settings as we pass from one Gospel to another.

The fact is, and it cannot be too plainly realized, that the facilities of the synoptic writers in this respect were no better than our own. At the time when they composed their treatises a great many of the teachings of Jesus were still current, but recollection as to when or where he had uttered this or that saying was already hopelessly lost. It is now generally understood that within a generation of his death there existed a written collection of such remembered sayings—the quarry, (Q), to which both Matthew and Luke are so largely indebted for the non-Markan material in their respective gospels; but which saying belonged to what occasion was, as a rule, not so much matter for surmise as rather past all accurate surmising.

Matthew is so conscious of this that he has recourse to the simple expedient of grouping events and sayings in alternate sections, a fact which even the casual reader cannot fail to notice. Thus, after relating the ministry of John and the Lord's baptism and temptation, he places at the very opening of the public ministry of Jesus the three long chapters of teachings known as the Sermon on the Mount; these are followed by a series of nine miracles and a narration of the general progress of the work of Jesus, after which we have seven parables, and then go on to events again. Clearly, such an arrangement is too artificial to represent the real order in which things happened; Matthew did not know that order, and his mechanical grouping is a confession that he did not know it. Not only is the sermon on the Mount anything but a consecutive deliverance, made on some one occasion, but some of the most characteristic of the sayings of which it is compiled, those in which the Lord most definitely repudiates the Mosaic law, plainly do not belong to the opening stages of his activity but to that intensely critical phase which preceded his withdrawal from Jewish territory. Matthew, in plunging us straightway *in medias res*, is actuated by strategic and not by historical considerations: here is what he rightly felt to be the program of the Gospel, and he sets it in the forefront, for his readers to grasp at once. From his point of view Matthew was perfectly justified, as was Luke in

assigning to a supposed Samaritan ministry an embarrassing wealth of surplus material for which he could not find room elsewhere. What we have to bear in mind is that our Gospels were written, in the first place, not as works of history but of edification, and that purely historical considerations were at most of secondary interest to the sacred writers.

We shall accordingly abandon the ingenious but quite futile guesswork which points to this incident as having given rise to this parable, and to that admonition as having been called forth by that episode; nor shall we imagine that in seeking to understand Jesus as a Teacher we either can or ought to find some likely niche for every one of his utterances. On the other hand we shall, for the purposes of such an interpretation of the mind of Christ, have to keep certain principles clearly before us.

1. In the first place, and as a quite necessary precaution, we must remember that we have at most only a selection of the Lord's sayings, representing, no doubt, the most priceless gems that fell from his lips, but necessarily incomplete. When we reflect that the whole of the sayings reported in our first three Gospels could be read aloud, with proper impressiveness, in some five or six hours, the inference is fairly obvious; we can perceive plainly enough what were the topics which predominantly occupied the Master's thoughts, but we can never say with positive certainty that because we find no reference to some other topic in his utterances that he never referred to it. There is nothing to warrant such an argument from silence, which is only the silence of the documents.

2. Again, we must not make the fatal mistake of approaching these fragments of the Lord's deliverances as though they constituted a system or a code of legislation. Any attempt to work them up into a "handbook of Christian ethics" is foredoomed to failure, and all such handbooks are artificial productions. Jesus did not set up to be a second Moses, replacing one body of rules and enactments by another; his teachings bear the mark, not of prepared addresses, but of inspired impromptus, flashes of wayside wisdom called forth by wayside incidents, striking illustrations and similes prompted by some actual situation, memorable epigrams, aphorisms, paradoxes, all of them revealing a highly original, individual

mind, but at the farthest possible remove from a systematic treatment of the principles of either faith or conduct. Jesus was not a systematizer; but the words which he spoke were spirit, and were life.

3. Thirdly, and this is of the highest importance, we shall have to remember all the way through that Jesus devoutly shared the eschatological hopes of his age and people, that he was looking forward to the close-impending dissolution of the world, and that such expectations could not but color many of his precepts. Here we shall find the principal explanation of not a little that puzzles us in some of his injunctions; we shall recognize that this and that saying was framed with a view to certain temporal circumstances, or the outcome of certain current presuppositions, and consequently applicable to those circumstances only, but not binding upon those who are quite differently situated, or upon an age which no longer holds the presuppositions in question. Jesus, like every teacher with a living message, addressed himself to his own generation first and foremost, a generation facing many specific problems to which nothing in our day corresponds; and we shall accordingly discriminate between what was meant by him for that particular phase and what remains valid for all time in his teaching.

4. It is perhaps scarcely necessary to add the general caution that we cannot be certain of possessing his words in the form in which he uttered them; that we can see for ourselves, by comparing Gospel with Gospel, how naturally and inevitably they underwent modification in the process of transmission from mouth to mouth; that occasionally he was misunderstood even by his original listeners and consequently no doubt often misreported; and that in any case our Greek Gospels furnish us only with translations, the infallibility of which we have no reason to assume, of the Aramaic dialect which he spoke.

II

The Jesus of the Synoptic Gospels comes before us unmistakably as a teacher, and is so addressed alike by his disciples, by the general public, and even by his opponents; this point is obscured for us by the English translation, which renders the term by Master, the Revised Version giving teacher as an alternative, whereas it is

simply the correct equivalent of the original. It is therefore well to emphasize the fact that where we read the term Master in the Gospels, especially as addressed to Jesus, the Greek, with only three exceptions,¹ reads διδάσκαλος, διδάσκαλε, and the term actually used was without doubt "Rabbi."² In the eyes of his contemporaries, of friends and foes, Jesus was a rabbi, a teacher.

The reason why it is necessary to lay such stress on this elementary fact is that we have witnessed of recent years a very determined endeavour to represent the teaching activity of our Lord as something quite secondary and relatively negligible. The eschatological element in his thought—an element which we have no desire whatever to minimize—has been proclaimed to be the only thing of any significance in his ministry; so much so that an eminent theologian like the late Father Tyrrell did not scruple to maintain that of the two constituents in the deliverances of Jesus that which he called apocalypticism, viz., the eschatological hope, was the central, and what he called moralism, only an incidental one. "What need," he asked, "of a new ethics for an expiring humanity?" Jesus expected the end of the age in the immediate future; therefore he could not have troubled much about teaching a way of life! The answer to such a complete inversion of the facts is the circumstance, just noted, that Jesus was habitually addressed by the people as Teacher; and the still more overwhelming answer is, of course, the mass of teachings themselves that have come down to us, and which his contemporaries evidently cherished as of exceeding worth, and by no means only of "incidental" interest.

When, therefore, a scholar of such acknowledged eminence as Professor Burkitt states rather joyfully that "there is nothing in the creed about Christ as a teacher of the higher morality—in fact, he is not spoken of as a teacher at all," he is merely making a statement about the creed, but not about the Christ of history, who, notwithstanding his eschatological prepossessions, was very distinctly a teacher, known as such in his lifetime, and remembered as such after his death. By the time the Gospels came to be written, the fervent hopes of the Kingdom being "at hand" were little

¹ Luke 8:24; 9:33 uses ἐπιστάτης, "overseer," and Matt. 23:10 καθηγούμενος, "leader."

² Cf. John 1:38.

more than dying embers, while the Christian ethic burned with a steady flame; in other words, the perishable perished, the enduring endured.

These preliminaries disposed of, we are now in a position to ask, What were the ruling ideas of Jesus in the domain of conduct? He is a teacher of what Professor Burkitt somewhat scornfully calls "the higher morality"—much as people used to refer to "the higher criticism"—precisely because his whole view of morality is based upon religion, upon the fundamental conviction of God's Fatherhood, his care for and good-will toward the individual. This conviction was peculiarly his own; by which we do not mean that others did not call God by the name of Father, but that he stood alone in the intensity with which he realized this truth and made it the criterion of all his thinking and acting.

It was this fact—the Divine Fatherhood, and the consequences flowing therefrom once it became a fact, and not merely a theory—which carried him in instance after instance beyond the limitations of his age and race, rendered him so unconscious of those limitations that he was not conscious of transcending them. Formally, his scheme of thought was bounded by Jewish nationalism, inasmuch that he declared himself to have been sent to none but the lost sheep of the house of Israel;¹ but in reality and in practice these boundaries were overthrown and done away with in the light of the conviction that God was the universal Parent, who maketh his sun to rise not only on Jew and Gentile alike, but on the evil and the good,² and in the exercise of his bounty ignores far deeper divisions than those of nationality. Nominally the gospel message, the good tidings of salvation, is solely intended for the Hebrew race³—a thought expressed in such uncompromising terms as leave no room for the posthumous injunction to make disciples of all the nations;⁴ but whenever Jesus develops his theme, there is never a question of anyone being shut out from the Kingdom on racial grounds; the standard is simply that of doing good or leaving it undone. Jesus the eschatologist is bounded in his vision by the affairs and aspirations of his own little nation; Jesus the moralist immediately

¹ Matt. 15:34; cf. Matt. 10:6.

² Matt. 10:5.

³ Matt. 5:45.

⁴ Matt. 28:19.

becomes a universalist, because he preaches a universal ethic, the inevitable inference from the universal Fatherhood of God: "Which of you that is a father. . . . If ye then how much more shall your Heavenly Father" In such language the narrowness of nationalism is left behind for good and all. Nothing is more striking than that he who had forbidden his disciples to go into any city of the Samaritans was to frame the immortal parable of that "good" Samaritan,² whose practical kindness to the Jew who had fallen among robbers placed him so infinitely far above the level of the priest and the Levite who passed by on the other side.

It is perfectly easy—and perfectly futile—to point to details such as these as instances of self-contradiction and inconsistency; what we do see in them is the Lord's own specific genius asserting itself victoriously over those less generous conceptions which formed a portion of his inheritance. We see him at one moment to all appearance securely fettered in the old views which he had taken over from his environment, as we all do; the next, he has burst his fetters without a conscious effort, as the butterfly bursts the dead integument of its chrysalis stage and unfolds its wings in the sunshine.

III

And just as Jesus, by dint of his one governing belief, passed beyond the barriers of Jewish nationalism, so the same assurance of God as Father carried him beyond the confining hedge of the Jewish law almost ere he was aware of having passed its frontiers. We may take it that there was a period when the Lord conceived himself to be simply resisting the ever-advancing encroachments of tradition,³ while holding fast to the law itself. This has been the experience of reformers over and over again; they imagine themselves to be merely protesting against the abuses of a system, when in reality there is an irreconcilable difference, a gulf, deep, if not yet wide, fixed between the system itself and their essential outlook, a gulf which they may be some time in perceiving, and which their opponents may perceive before they themselves do. It is thus quite possible that Jesus did say, "It is easier for heaven and earth to

² Matt. 7:11; Lk. 11:13.

³ Luke 10:25-37

³ Mark 7:8-13.

pass away, than for one tittle of the law to fail.¹ It is quite possible that he did say, "Whosoever shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, shall be called least in the Kingdom of heaven."² It is strongly possible that he protested, genuinely shocked and even distressed, against the suggestion that he had come to destroy the law.³ He sincerely believed his quarrel to be only with the tradition-mongering and casuistry of the scribes and Pharisees, whereas he stood for the Divine law in its purity: "Full well do ye reject the commandment of God, that ye may keep your tradition. For Moses said"—and so forth; that is the attitude of one who means to vindicate God's ordinance against human inventions. When he is asked, "What shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?" he immediately and characteristically retorts, "What is written in the law? How readest thou?"⁴ This again was merely the inherited attitude which he shared with the great mass of faithful Jews; and yet his innermost certainty that God was the Father of mankind led him by imperceptible degrees first to question, then to criticize, and in the end boldly to reject the law as the ultimate authority.

From the strictly Jewish point of view, God was the supreme and absolute Ruler and Lawgiver, who had chosen to promulgate these particular statutes, but might quite as easily have given an entirely different set of commandments, and was in any case entitled to implicit, unquestioning obedience to his will, just because it was his will—*Hoc volo, sic jubeo; sit pro ratione voluntas*. Jesus, on the other hand, saw in the law the will of a Father, not an arbitrary Ruler, the expression of *good-will* toward men, his children; the law, then, was for men's sake, and to be obeyed because it ministered to their well-being, from which it was a short step to the rejection of any particular enactment that did not promote, but rather came into conflict with, human well-being. The Sabbath was made for man: which meant that it was to be observed so far as it was a help, but that its prescriptions might be set aside unhesitatingly when they became mere burdens, or hindrances to well-doing. Here Jesus stands with one foot across the threshold, not

¹ Luke 16:178; cf. Matt. 5:18.

³ Matt. 5:17.

² Matt. 5:19.

⁴ Luke 10:25 ff.

of the Pharisaic tradition, but of the Mosaic law itself, to which he tenders only a conditional submission. When, however, he made his protest against such established principles as "an eye for an eye;"¹ when he laid down the rule, "Swear not at all;"² still more, when he set aside the whole ritual concerning clean and unclean food,³ he had stepped outside the tabernacle altogether, and he who had once deprecated the breaking of one of these least commandments had grown conscious of the gulf between his way of looking at conduct and the old dispensation, between morality and legality. Once more, it was his own ethical and spiritual genius triumphing over the trammels of that current opinion which he had shared at first, but in due time was bound to shed, even as when that which is perfect is come, that which is imperfect is done away.

And now, from what has been said up to this point, an important inference follows. In considering the teaching of Jesus we shall not feel compelled to regard every reported saying of his as necessarily of the same authority as every other such saying, but recognize that the mind of the great Teacher underwent development; and we shall judge each one of his utterances by the criterion which he himself applied—and applied as a solvent to the principles of nationalism and legalism—that is, the supreme truth of God's good Fatherhood. Whatever cannot be reconciled with this truth we shall set aside, after due and reverent examination, as unreservedly as he himself set on one side his earlier unquestioning acceptance of every jot and tittle of the law. If, for instance, we come upon reported deliverances of his which seem to teach endless punishment in the world to come, we shall in the first place gravely question whether some figurative phrase of his has not been misunderstood by literal-minded hearers; and in the second, we shall be acting in accordance with the precedent set by himself if we use his own standard of judgment, and say, "Which of you, being a father," would so treat even a grievously disobedient child? "If ye then . . . , " how much less your Father which is in heaven? We may thus formally dissent from some saying attributed—and possibly quite wrongly attributed—to our Lord, and yet be in

¹ Matt. 5:38.² Matt. 5:34.³ Mark 7:14-23.

entire agreement with his spirit. For whatever else may be doubtful, it is not doubtful at all that he taught that God's relation to men was that of a parent to his children, and we not only can but must reject anything that is out of harmony with that basal axiom.

IV

We have seen that Jesus, at the commencement of his public career, still shared his people's attitude toward other nations and their veneration for the Mosaic law; that traces of this earlier outlook remain among his sayings; but that he proceeded, probably by very rapid stages, to emancipate himself from these inherited limitations, substituting universalism for nationalism and morality for legality. We must now go on to glance at certain other features in his teaching which are apt to perplex us until explained, and see if some satisfactory explanation is not available.

The message of every teacher or prophet is inevitably conditioned and colored by the environment in which he is delivering it, and especially by the opposition he has in view; even if it is to be "for all time," it must first of all be "for an age"—for *his* age—or he will be beating the air. The man who has nothing to say to his contemporaries is not likely to have anything to say to their descendants. That his contemporaries may spurn his message with ignominy makes no difference; it has to be addressed to the living present if it is to be received by the unborn future. This simple truism applies to our Lord as much as to any other teacher; his teaching took the particular form it did because of the particular system of thought he was fighting, and the extreme form in which that system prevailed accounts for the extreme form in which he frequently states his contrary positions. He is not expounding his ideas in the serene tranquillity of some grove of Academe, but in the heat and dust of battle; the circumstances under which he spoke did not lend themselves to careful balancing or making allowances for exceptional cases, but called for bold and clear-cut pronouncements. We shall not be going too far if we say that the one-sidedness with which he had to deal could only be redressed *there and then* by a corresponding measure of one-sidedness of his own. Everyone knows how true this is in steering a boat which

is making straight for the river's bank: a quick and even violent pull in exactly the opposite direction is the only way to restore the vessel to the middle course, which is the one desired by the steersman. Now we submit that a great many of the teachings of Jesus are to be understood and in practice interpreted on precisely the same principle; the heightened language, the absolutism, the paradoxical form which meet us again and again in his precepts find here to a large extent their explanation.

Let this suggested principle of interpretation be brought to the test. Pharisaism gave the most explicit sanction to the practice of retaliation, a sanction which encouraged the dangerously vindictive temper of an oppressed people: Jesus, shocked by the manifestations of this vengeful spirit, warns his hearer that even to be angry with his brother brings a man within danger of condemnation,¹ that being the one way in which he can restore the balance. His compatriots were over-ready to return blow for blow; he commands his followers rather to suffer a second blow than to pay back the first in kind,² an injunction which only a literalist would take literally, while he was speaking to Orientals. Pharisaism made divorce easy, and that on quite frivolous grounds: Jesus declares marriage to be indissoluble under any circumstances whatever,³ striking a note of such uncompromising absoluteness that by the end of the century, when Matthew composed his Gospel, it was already found necessary to add a qualifying clause to his pronouncement.⁴ Pharisaism made much of vows and oaths in the routine of everyday life, and naturally the next step was the devising of all sorts of disingenuous subterfuges to absolve a man from his oath, or even to make the oath itself a subterfuge to excuse him from carrying out his natural obligations.⁵ Jesus, aghast at the sanctified deceitfulness which flourished as the result of this bad popular custom, exclaims, "Swear not at all."⁶ Pharisaism, with its doctrine of merits, made the law-observing Jew God's creditor, entitled to demand a *quid pro quo*.⁷ Jesus on the other hand asks, "Doth the master thank the servant because he did the things that were

¹ Matt. 5:22.

² Matt. 5:39.

³ Mark 10:5-12.

⁴ Matt. 5:32; 19:9.

⁵ Mark 7:11, 12.

⁶ Matt. 5:34.

⁷ Luke 18:12.

commanded?"¹ a question the application of which would be obvious to his hearers. Again and again he finds that men decline the sacrifices of discipleship under the plea of home ties, a plea frequently covering self-love or timidity; whereupon he retorts, "If any man cometh unto me, and hateth not his own father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple."² Did the Lord, then, really mean that in order to be a Christian a man must uproot the natural affections and replace them by an unnatural hatred of his nearest? No; but this and all the declarations we have passed under review are only so many sharp tugs at the steering-rope, extreme efforts called for at the time and under the circumstances, with a view, not of driving the boat into the opposite bank, but of restoring it to midstream. If the result is to impress upon us the fact that there are claims and causes which must take precedence even over the claims of home; that the name of God should not be invoked save with a deep sense of solemnity; that so holy a bond as matrimony must not be dissolved, nor armed resistance resorted to, except as last, unhappy necessities, we shall have understood Jesus aright, and the moral gain will be incalculable.

But having said so much, it has also to be recognized that in some respects, and these the most important, Jesus' root-and-branch antagonism to the prevailing system is not subject to such deductions, but was necessary and justified to the last syllable. The scribes and Pharisees,³ regarding all the prescriptions of the law—and no less those added by their tradition—as equally holy and binding, the ceremonial as much as the moral, had in course of time come actually to exalt the ceremonial *above* the moral law; as Jesus expressed it, they were eager in observing the tithing of the lowliest garden herbs, at the expense of the cardinal virtues—the weightier matters of the law—judgment and mercy, and faith.⁴ Jesus unhesitatingly reverses this valuation, and from the whole body of multifarious commandments selects as the supreme and

¹ Luke 17:9.

² Luke 14:26.

³ We are not denying that there were sincere and pious Pharisees, any more than that there were scribes who had been made disciples to the Kingdom of Heaven (Matt. 13:52).

⁴ Matt. 23:23.

governing ones the love of God and of one's fellow-man.¹ The scribes and Pharisees thought so highly of a scrupulous observance of the Sabbath that they looked upon an act of healing performed on that sacred day as a desecration; Jesus stoutly maintained that to do good to a fellow-being took precedence over the *minutiae* of a technical infraction of Sabbath law.² The scribes and Pharisees placed the whole emphasis upon the outward performance of legal statutes, which might often spring simply from the calculating desire to accumulate merits, so as to have a claim upon divine repayment with interest, a disposition which in turn was bound to lead to self-complacency, self-righteousness, and downright hypocrisy; Jesus laid all the stress on rightness of motive, upon the intents of the heart, which might exalt a very imperfect performance in the eyes of God, while in the absence of the right motive the act had no value whatever. The scribes and Pharisees did their so-called "righteous works" for purposes of display and self-glorification, making a show of their devoutness;³ Jesus looked upon such ostentation, always tinged with hypocrisy, in utter distaste, and commended privacy and reticence in these intimate concerns of the soul.⁴ The scribes and Pharisees were wholly intent upon the reward which in their view God would measure out on strict book-keeping principles, and in exact proportion to the number of legally commanded deeds they had done; Jesus is by no means averse to the idea of divine reward waiting upon faithfulness, loyalty, endurance, and the like, but not only does he shift the emphasis from the legal to the moral field, but his valuation of God-pleasing conduct is qualitative and not quantitative, and Paul focusses the truth as it is in Jesus most accurately when he says that love is the fulfilment of the law.⁵ The scribes and Pharisees held a notion of holiness, of clean and unclean, which was almost wholly concerned with externals, with taboos which declared uncleanness to consist in eating such and such food, or to be contracted by touching a person suffering from such and such a disease; Jesus, with uncompromising directness, sweeps all this legal lumber away, abrogates the cere-

¹ Mark 12:29-31.

² Mark 3:1-6.

³ Matt. 23:5.

⁴ Matt. 6:5, 6, 18.

⁵ Rom. 13:10.

monial law, and makes his great declaration as to cleanness and uncleanness consisting, not in the food, but in the thoughts of a man.¹ That marks a culminating point, as it marked the Lord's final breach with the law. In all these matters, too, we see Jesus laying down principles which were entirely unaffected by his eschatological expectations, but which are and remain of permanent validity.

V

But now we must pass to another group of his teachings, in which we can almost certainly trace the influence of those expectations; teachings which had regard to that end of the world as at present constituted, to which Jesus looked forward as impending in the nearest future. Under this heading we shall first of all glance at his view of property.

In doing so we shall remember first of all that Jesus was a child, not only of his race and age, but also of his class. He was the son of humble people, moving habitually in an environment of poor folk, among the lower strata of a population oppressed and exploited by all above them. As has been well said, "Grinding poverty, bootless labor, anxious care for the morrow, constant suffering from the pride, the greed, and the lust of the well-to-do classes, discontent with the Roman yoke, the Idumean dynasty, and the heavy burdens of taxation, envy and distrust of the rich, the cultured, and the respectable, were characteristic of his social environment. . . . A man cannot have spent most of his life at a carpenter's bench . . . without looking out upon the world through a carpenter's eyes."² Making allowance for a touch of exaggeration in the last sentence, it remains true that Jesus lived in a society where wealth almost always exposed its owner, and that too often justly, to suspicions as to the means by which he had accumulated it—usury, extortion, the ways of the tax-farmer and his underlings; where great possessions, therefore, were more or less a moral reproach, and where on the other hand "poor" and "God-fearing" were almost synonymous terms, since the godly were all but sure to be needy. This outlook, which makes itself felt again and again in the Psalms, naturally colored the thought of Jesus; and if we thus find him hurling

¹ Mark 7:15-23.

² N. Schmidt, *Prophet of Nazareth*, p. 254.

indiscriminate denunciations against the rich and the comfortably off, contrasting their present ease and luxury with their future condition of hunger, want, and worse,¹ we have to take into account the particular phase of civilization, the particular social milieu, in which he lived and spoke.

To sum up, when he says, without any qualification whatever, "Blessed are ye poor," "but woe upon you rich," he is speaking in and of and to his own age; when on the other hand he points out the deceitfulness of riches, their tendency to harden those who own them, and the temptations inherent in the love of wealth, he proclaims truths and warnings which human nature will never outgrow.

But there is more than this to be said on the subject under debate. In the slight estimation which Jesus placed upon settled possessions of any kind, in the advice not to make material provision for the future, but rather to sell all one owned and give the proceeds to the poor,² we hear quite plainly the conviction that property was a useless thing to trouble one's self about on the eve of the great supernatural consummation, upon the very verge of the coming age. Again and again, when men have cherished similar expectations, they have acted in a similar manner, giving away or spending recklessly all they had; but since all such expectations have remained unfulfilled, and since we do not conceive ourselves to be about to witness the expiration of the world as we know it, it is not incumbent on us, as it certainly would be impossible for us, to carry out such precepts.

The same considerations underlie and explain the Lord's attitude to social life in its various aspects—to marriage, the family, the nation, the functions of government, legal tribunals, and the like. All these things, he believes, are coming to an end in the nearest future, together with the dispensation of which they are part and parcel, and are thus of little interest in his eyes; why lay down any rules with regard to institutions which would presently, as soon as the Kingdom dawned, be done away with and be known no more, even as yesterday when it is past? In such a frame of mind one would not trouble about invoking a judge to divide an inherit-

¹ Luke 6:20, 24; 16:19-31.

² Matt. 6:19; Mark 10:21; Luke 12:33.

ance between one's self and another;¹ one would not be anxious for the morrow,² seeing that the morrow might bring the end which in any case was at hand; one would feel it superfluous to resist the evil,³ or to vindicate one's rights, seeing that the Avenger was at the door;⁴ one would submit to the secular demands of the heathen government, whose sands were already running out;⁵ sooner than go to law about an upper garment one would yield the undergarment too;⁶ what did it matter, when in a little while all this momentary order, or disorder, of things would be "erased like an error, and canceled," all the vexatious tangle be straightened out, and all existing conditions be reversed, so that the first should be last, and the last be first.

These, then, are merely temporary elements in the thought of Jesus, which we can without difficulty detach from its permanent kernel; they envisage conditions wholly different from those under which we live; they are the products of an expectation which we do not share, and once we realize this, we can say quite simply and without want of reverence that they are not, and cannot be intended to govern our actions, any more than the garb of the Palestine of the first century is adapted for the Britain of the twentieth.

VI

When it thus comes home to us that our Lord did not "legislate" or issue rules we can follow upon questions of social ethics or economics, that he gives us no theories of civil government or international relationships, that we have no saying of his on such subjects as art or science, education or philosophy, we are apt to feel that his teaching is scanty and incomplete to a degree, covering but a small corner of the great field of human life and action. Such a conclusion, however, natural and plausible as it appears on the surface, would nevertheless reveal a serious misunderstanding of what Jesus intended his message to be and to effect. If one wanted a multiplicity, a perfect network of rules covering every conceivable situation in which a man could find himself from the cradle to the

¹ Luke 12:13-15.

² Matt. 5:38.

³ Mark 12:17.

⁴ Matt. 6:34.

⁵ Luke 18:7, 8.

⁶ Matt. 5:40.

grave, the scribes had already exercised all their ingenuity to elaborate and codify just such a system; there were six hundred and thirteen laws, leaving no relationship or emergency unlegislated for; there were thirty-nine kinds of acts forbidden on the Sabbath; there was nothing left to chance that human foresight could provide for or against. But the Lord's intention was not at all to set up a rival system to this one; to its multifariousness he opposed simplicity, to its endless prohibitions two great commandments, and all the way through he addressed himself directly to the individual soul and its duty in the sight of God. God and the soul are his theme, and what, he exclaims, shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? "With magnificent singleness of aim he makes straight for his one object, viz., to bring about man's undivided allegiance to God." The gospel is not a law of commandments contained in ordinances; Jesus, fully conscious of the abuses which flourished around him, social, political, economic, "lays hold of the evil which he finds among men, not by this or that excrescence, but by the root. He wishes to create new men; once created, they will live and move in new fashions. He did not consider himself called to guide earthly and natural institutions along the line of a slow but steadily growing perfection; he had other work to accomplish. And yet he did accomplish this work, too: for Christianity and civilization have gone hand in hand."¹

A religious teaching which is thus addressed to the individual soul may easily degenerate into a barren pietism; the essential healthiness of Jesus' outlook, his human interests, his strong sense of fellowship with men, warded off any such danger. For he sees the individual always in relation to his fellow-individuals, whether as the member of a household, as employer or employed, conferring a benefit like the Good Samaritan or receiving it like the man whom he befriended, and so on, in every variety of relationships. And the very fact that, next to the commandment, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," he places "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," not as secondary in importance, but as "like unto it," proves how far he was from losing himself in that spiritual egoism which is solely intent on saving its own soul, no matter what may be the

¹ Schrenck, *Jesus and His Teaching*, p. 166.

fate of others here or hereafter. When Jesus, in the judgment discourse,¹ makes entrance to the Kingdom dependent on simple practical kindness, when he proclaims as the standard, "Inasmuch as ye did it—inasmuch as ye did it not unto the least of these," he does more to place human relations on a sound basis than by an elaborate code, providing minutely for this special case or that special category.

On one fundamental aspect of his teaching we can hardly lay too much stress—it was positive, in contradistinction to the scribal system, which consisted very largely of prohibitions, of lists of things to be eschewed. This radical defect was inherent in the fact, previously noted, that the system placed religious and moral relations and duties upon a purely legal level; it followed that the moral ideal inculcated by scribes and Pharisees bore a predominantly negative complexion. A man was accounted righteous who had not transgressed this and that and the other regulation, who had abstained from forbidden kinds of food and refrained from forbidden kinds of acts on the Sabbath. Such a kind of righteousness is, when one gives one's mind to it, not unattainable; it can generate no moral enthusiasm, but on the other hand will give birth to the fatal self-complacency which enumerates its merits when standing before God; "I fast twice in the week; I give tithes of all that I get." But when the moral ideal is expressed in positive terms, "Thou shalt love," we get something infinitely stimulating just because entirely unattainable; for no one can say, "I have loved enough, as much as I am bidden," and thus hold himself absolved from loving any more. There can be no end to this obligation; nor will one who seeks to fulfil it wish that there should be an end, for no one loves against his will. That is why Jesus speaks of the righteousness which he enjoins as something that exceeds the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees; it is a righteousness not of law but of love, and partakes of the infinitude of God himself.

It is here that we perceive the explanation of the Lord's insistence on the ideal of forgiveness, as that which brings us nearest to God: the law cannot forgive, must take its course, but God can

¹ Matt. 25:31-46.

and does forgive, because he is a father, and his name is Love. True, the divine pardon is conditioned by repentance and amendment, nor can we conceive that Jesus imposes the duty of pardoning upon his followers on any other terms; for to forgive and reinstate the unrepentant, while a possible, and to generous natures often a tempting, course, is to put a premium on transgression. It was when the prodigal had arisen to return to his father, with sorrow and shame in his heart, that the father frankly and fully pardoned him; then, and not before, even though he longed to do so all the time; nevertheless, where there is true repentance, there, the Lord tells us, is the duty to forgive, not seven times but seventy times seven; that is, without limit.

And so he rises to his sublimest paradox, the coping-stone of his whole edifice, which must bring this all-too-imperfect survey to a close—the command to love our enemies. We are to aim at that temper which is farthest removed from the censoriousness and vindictiveness of Pharisaism, the frame of mind and heart in which we can see the divine imprint even on the brow of our injurer, still acknowledge his kinship with us (since he is still God's child), grieve over his fall from grace as manifested in the wrong he has done us, and desire his restoration rather than our paltry personal vengeance.

Such a disposition towers above the range of the ordinarily human as the Lord Christ himself towers above our feeble stature. Nevertheless, we are to imitate him, and thus to grow; we are to put away more and more of our imperfection, and approach a little closer to the Divine perfection; and if we will try to love, we shall discover that we have underestimated our powers of loving, which, like all other powers expand with use. He that loveth is born of God, is like God; and he who loves most will come closest—though closest is far off—to the fulfilment of Christ's ideal, realized in him alone: "Ye therefore shall be perfect, even as your Heavenly Father is perfect."

LORD MORLEY'S RELATION TO HISTORY, TO THEOLOGY, AND TO THE CHURCHES

HERBERT L. STEWART
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia

When a statesman and writer approaching his seventy-ninth birthday gives to the world two volumes of *Recollections* he may be taken as having intimated that his public career is over, and that estimates of his significance may begin to be formed. This *Journal* is no place in which to consider Lord Morley as a politician, and it may well be doubted whether this aspect of his work can yet be judged anywhere with complete fairness. He lived and moved amid fierce contentions, and their record has so far been given us only by those contemporary men whose interest was strongly enlisted on one side or on another. That soil is perhaps still too hot and too convulsed for the composed tread and unbiased survey of the real historian. Moreover, Lord Morley as he has appeared in state affairs is among those who have most to lose by being estimated too soon. Again and again he has put his personal fame to the hazard for the sake of some project that must take long to justify itself. For his eye has ever been on the distant vision, and it has been a central part of his creed, both in theory and in practice, that those who see beyond their age must make no ignoble compromise with those whose horizon is narrow and whose immediate demands are peremptory. But it is not too soon to consider him from another point of view, and one which in these pages may appropriately be taken. Pierre Proudhon was, in all conscience, a man of sufficiently secular mind, but it was he who declared amid the tempest of French socialism two generations ago that "at the bottom of our politics we always find theology." And Lord Morley himself has recalled to us more than once how Ernest Renan on his visit to Jerusalem saw Turkish soldiers on guard by the Holy Sepulcher to prevent the two types of Christian enthusiasts from shedding each other's blood on the sacred spot. One cannot

help feeling that the agnostic chief secretary for Ireland viewed his own function in that land of warring creeds under the same ironical light. And partly from such experience, partly from prolonged reflection, he has given us many a view of spiritual matters upon which it is worth our while to dwell.

The present paper will consider Lord Morley as a bookman, and very specially as a bookman who has had his say upon the deepest things of all, at much length and through a long literary career. There is little risk of our judging him too rapidly in this respect. His most important writings are already many years old. Excepting the *Life of Gladstone* and *Recollections* they have been from thirty to forty years before the reading public. And they deal with subjects which one can scarcely hope to become much better able to estimate as time goes on.

I

Lord Morley has himself defined for us the vocation of the man of letters, a class which he regards, rather arbitrarily perhaps, as having originated in the circle of the French *Encyclopédie*. The world of intellect, we are told, requires not only its creative men but its critics, its appreciators, its popularizers. It is this subordinate office which belongs to literature, and it is by literature that stimulus is given to two precious qualities, breadth of interest and balance of judgment.¹ The man of letters has to "diffuse those fruitful ideas which society is at the time in a condition to assimilate." Lord Morley here describes himself, and he has not exaggerated his own claim. Nothing indeed that he has ever written makes any pretense to be an independent artistic masterpiece. He is not among the creative spirits; not to be named with Rousseau, with Carlyle, or with his own master, John Stuart Mill. His work has been to evaluate, to sift, to help his age in distinguishing dross from pure gold, to separate for us the writing that is significant of much from the writing that is significant of little. But he has always taken this task as a lofty one, and he has made it lofty.

No essayist of his time has had more of the quality which we may call intellectual nutritiousness. A literary estimate by Lord

¹ *Voltaire*, pp. 107-8; cf. *Diderot*, chap. ii.

Morley conveys what is worth more than any mere facts or judgments on the special subject of which it treats. As Emerson said of the work of another, the sentiment that it instils is of more value than any thought that it contains,¹ for it sets a pattern by which the reader may learn how to form such estimates for himself with insight. In no one do we find greater fidelity to that golden rule of criticism, so finely stated yet so systematically disregarded by Carlyle, that he who has not appreciated the degree of truth in the man he criticizes is thereby disqualified from detecting the degree of his error. It is just because Lord Morley has observed this principle with such resoluteness, even in cases where his personal bias must have been hardest to restrain, that his literary work has been so penetrating and so educative. Compare, for example, his generous tribute to the Jesuit teachers of the eighteenth century² with the wholesale diatribe against that order in Carlyle's *Latter Day Pamphlets*. One could scarcely say which critic was farther removed, both by temperament and by opinion, from Ignatius Loyola. But it is easy to say which has shown the more judicial mind. It is not surprising to learn from *Recollections* that many a growl was heard in the agnostic set of the *Fortnightly Review* because the editor published so sympathetic an account of men like Joseph de Maistre, acknowledging both a subtlety of mind and a sincere loftiness of purpose in those who led the French Catholic reaction after the return of the Bourbons. Or take such a group of articles as those on Turgot, Machiavelli, Macaulay, George Eliot, Cardinal Newman. With what lucidity and with how admirable a sense of proportion is the reader shown how to seize in each case the central significance, how to keep detail in true perspective, how to think himself in turn into the intellectual climate within which each of these so different figures moved, how to ask and sincerely to answer the question wherein lay the strength and wherein the weakness of each. Where will one obtain a sounder discipline in the mental attitude with which the great movements and the great men of the past should be approached? One need not agree with a single judgment that his critical guide has pronounced. But one cannot fail to acquire from him as by

¹ Essay on "Self-Reliance."

² *Diderot*, p. 17.

contagion that detachment from prejudice, that historical and objective way of looking at persons, that hospitality toward elements of value from every quarter, through which alone an intelligent and a just estimate may be reached. That he should have conspicuously helped to form this habit in the reading public is the highest glory of a "man of letters," and Lord Morley is entitled to it in a very special degree.

Mr. H. G. Wells has somewhere declared that the sole justification for writing is "poetic gift—the gift of the creative and illuminating phrase." A strict formula perhaps, and one that would condemn some writers whom we could ill spare. It would be hard, for example, to find a place within it for Professor Bury or Professor Saintsbury. But it would make room at once for the authorship of Lord Morley. When he is at his best he is a master of the *callida iunctura*, the phrase that grips the mind and gains in significance the longer we reflect upon it, the vivid, arresting collocation of words into which thought is packed close, and by which far more is suggested than is actually said. One may quote just a few illustrations. Many have said it since, but it was Lord Morley who first said that Carlyle had "compressed the golden Gospel of Silence into thirty fine volumes."¹ It was he who spoke of the "luminous haze that made the Coleridgean atmosphere."² It was he who warned the shallower sort of Emersonian that "a platitude is not turned into a profundity by being dressed up as a conundrum."³ And it was he who declared, with a piercing truth which most of us are reluctant to admit, that liberty owes at least as much to the mutual hate of the Christian factions as charity owes to their mutual love.⁴ The fastidious in style may, for aught I know, see much to criticize in Lord Morley. But the reader who seeks to be instructed must welcome the trenchancy, the limpid directness, the virile and even pugnacious emphasis of a man who always has his own thought clearly before him, and to whom language is but the mobile instrument of ideas.

Though he has the gift of an epigrammatist, our author has never aspired to the poor fame of a coiner of *bons mots*. His atti-

¹ *Misc.*, "On Carlyle."

² *Ibid.*, "On Emerson."

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Rousseau*, II, 17.

tude to his age is above all apostolic. From his first article to his final *Recollections* he is a man with a moral and spiritual message. If he writes about the past it is to cast light on the present, if he analyzes the thought of a Machiavelli or a Montesquieu it is to fit us all for estimating the policy of living statesmen, if he sets before us the France of Turgot and Vauvenargues it is to elicit general laws of human nature and general rules of state wisdom. Many a reader of his *Voltaire* must have been astonished at the paragraph in which he complains that no sense of what is called "holiness" entered into the manifold endowments of the sage of Ferney.¹ Yet there is no occasion for surprise. Whether the gospel according to John Stuart Mill is capable of being suffused with holiness may perhaps be doubted. But if this can be done, Mill's favorite disciple was the man to do it. He more than almost anyone else has introduced a certain flavor of sainthood into the teachings of his harsh rationalistic group. Matthew Arnold thought religion was no more than an emotional coloring of morality, and in this sense Lord Morley is as nearly religious as a man can be who looks back to Bentham as one founder of his cult. He admits as a sort of personal weakness that in the highest eloquence he always expects the element of "unction." Hence his sympathetic attachment to men from whom intellectually he was separated wide as the poles—a Bossuet, a Lacordaire, a Newman, even a Chateaubriand.

Of a truth there has been at times abundance of unction in Lord Morley's own rhetoric. It may be worth while to illustrate this at some length from the fiery little volume in which, forty years ago, he showed how the enthusiasm of unbelief may be as radiant as the enthusiasm of faith. From the editorial chair of the *Fortnightly Review* he was directing a campaign against English religion. In the notable band of his lieutenants were such men as Leslie Stephen, George Meredith, Cotter Morrison, and T. H. Huxley. The champions on each side are now almost all gone, and the old battle cries are well forgotten. That was the period, now so long behind us, when archbishops were baited about the Six Days, and biologists made merry over the Gadarene swine.

¹ *Voltaire*, p. 227.

The curious may still recognize the same obsolete pugnaciousness if they look at an article by Sir Edwin Ray Lancaster, whom Professor Pringle-Pattison has described with such aptness as "a doughty survivor from the wars of last century."¹ But one feature of the conflict is still worth reviving. We read in *Recollections* that during 1877 not a month passed in which the pages of the *Fortnightly* did not riddle with criticism some central doctrine of the Christian faith. The purpose of the articles was twofold: first, to expose as fundamentally superstitious the leading tenets of Christian theology, and secondly, to denounce as dishonest the timid reticence of those unbelievers who failed to proclaim from the housetops just what they thought about the creed of their fellow-countrymen.

It was this second aim which Lord Morley made specially his own, and the papers he contributed were afterward brought together in the book called *On Compromise*. It was a manifesto on behalf of intellectual candor and unflinching plainness of speech. The English public, as the author saw it, was in two respects grievously insincere. Its clergy signed a creed which was remote in many cases from their genuine belief, and which, as fettering free inquiry for the future, should, he thought, in no case be signed by any candid man. Laymen who in the privacy of their own souls held no creed whatever were at pains to disguise their actual attitude and even pretended, for the sake of its good moral influence, a zealous adhesion to traditional dogma. We know this problem only too well. It is that of church formulas and the limits of permissible concealment—an old problem indeed, at least as old as the time when Socrates vowed the cock to Aesculapius, and Cicero inspected the entrails of a chicken according to the rule of the college of augurs. Lord Morley decides the casuistical point with sharpness. Compromise may be the life of politics, but elsewhere it is treason to truth.² By what means can mankind be led forward from darkness to light or from a dimmer light to a clearer if we must forever accommodate our words to the general taste, deal in cunning equivocation lest we wound our neighbor's sensitiveness, beware of the

¹ *The Idea of God* (Gifford Lectures), p. 163.

² *On Compromise*, pp. 19, 20.

"high" and hold fast to the "safe"?¹ Why sacrifice a permanent social gain to an immediate comfort and make a virtue out of intellectual cowardice? Truth itself was everywhere falling into disrepute. The superiority of one conviction to another was scarcely admitted. The flippant skeptic was reinforcing the intolerant orthodox and nourishing the same cynical contempt for straightforwardness of mind. Dogmatic assertion on the one hand was met with "giggling epigrams" on the other, until mutually hostile views were thought of as merely interesting, like the mutually hostile beasts in a menagerie.²

The chief vials of our author's indignation, however, were poured out upon the signatories to a creed. For his own part he would have the world know that he was not to be called a doubter. He rejected "positively, absolutely, and without reserve the whole current belief of the day in one and all of its theological expressions."³ But his charge against the clergy was that their creed, whether true or false, was stereotyped for all time. The creed-bound man had taken a pledge that he would seek truth no more. The system that encouraged him was like a civil polity which should penalize an industrial invention and load with bounties the steadfast adherent to an antiquated method;⁴ and the tampering with veracity had begun to bring forth its inevitable results. "Broad" churchmen, though fully cognizant of the desolating effect of criticism, yet consented for the sake of material ease and social prestige to go through life masked and gagged. Those dwelling in the tower of ancient faiths were looking about them in constant apprehension, misgiving, and wonder, with the hurried, uneasy mien of people living amid earthquakes.⁵ Why not have the fortitude and the manlike resolution to prepare for what must come? A new world-outlook must supersede that of Christianity, as Christianity itself had superseded Judaism. The great step, he assures us, is already being taken by a few. It is being taken in pain. As of old, the first outcome must be to send not peace but a sword. Households must be divided against themselves. What ultimate form would in the issue emerge none could yet tell. "For we, like

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.² *Ibid.*, pp. 160, 161.³ *Ibid.*, p. 37.⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 130.⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

the Hebrews of old, shall have to live and die in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and being persuaded of them, and embracing them, and confessing that we are strangers and pilgrims on the earth."¹

This is unctuous enough, and a word will be said of it later. Many will be surprised that Lord Morley should here confirm his own position by citing the authority of Cardinal Newman! Yet his assault on compromise is exactly in the spirit of that famous paragraph in the *Apologia* which depicts the verbal navigators down the channel of No-Meaning as keeping skilfully equidistant from the Scylla of Aye and the Charybdis of No.² But might not the bitter words against an equivocating clergy have been applied best of all to that dear friend, Matthew Arnold, of whom so kindly mention is made in *Recollections*, the bold spirit so passionate for preserving the Church of England as by law established, but who at the same time denied even a low degree of probability to the belief in God?

II

It is as a writer of "lives" that Lord Morley is known to the widest circle, and no doubt he is known best of all by his *Life of Gladstone*. The most famous biography in the world was written by an extremely stupid man, and the smart aphorists tell us that his stupidity was the root of his biographical greatness. One suspects that there must have been some other root as well, or great biographers would be more numerous than they are. Yet there is an undoubted advantage in having the portrait of a thinker drawn by one who will give us all that he has seen just as he saw it, one who is not himself so original as to pick and choose, one who will not presume to arrange the perspective according to his own critical interpretations. There is too much of Plato in Plato's *Socrates*, and the *Memorabilia* is all the more valuable because Xenophon knew so little of his master's drift that he can be trusted not to have altered his words. Yet this sort of "objective" writing, as Nietzsche would have called it, is of little use when the subject is a man of action rather than a man of thought. Gladstone was both, and Lord Morley has done well to treat him in both ways.

¹ *On Compromise*, pp. 152-53.

² *Apologia*, p. 103.

A mere chronicle would have been as much out of place in the political history as the obtrusion of the critic himself in the record of his hero's inner or speculative life.

This duty of interpretation was all the more incumbent upon Lord Morley where he was speaking of great events in which he had himself played no inconspicuous part, and in which his recollection, combined with the papers placed at his disposal by the Gladstone family, enabled him to speak with an almost unique authoritativeness. It will be an immense boon to posterity that so elaborate an account was completed by one who knew so much and was at the same time so incapable of the smallest wilful distortion. But this book could not here be adequately discussed without entrance upon those matters of recent partisanship which I have at the outset pledged myself to avoid. Suffice it to say that the great qualities of breadth and grasp and charity, so notable in Lord Morley's other works, have not failed in his memoir of Gladstone. Perhaps in no single volume that could be named are the salient features of public life in the nineteenth century shown with such graphic power, such manifold provocation to thought, such a wealth of suggestiveness for him who will yet have to read the moral of that restless period.

One must dwell a little more fully upon our author's biographical achievement in a different field. Perhaps his finest literary work was to compel a revision of current English ideas upon Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau. In three striking biographies, marked equally by vivacious narrative and critical acumen, Lord Morley went far to rescue the just credit of these three remarkable men. Two generations ago a general obloquy had descended upon the French *philosophes*. Carlyle compared the record of their doings with the *Acts of the Christian Apostles*, pointing out that the latter could be read in an hour, while the former, expanded in inverse proportion to its importance, covered acres of typography, and would furnish reading for a lifetime.¹ This feeling was not due to that old Tory reaction against French liberalism which Carlyle himself has done so much to end. What Sir Henry Maine wittily called "Eldonine"² had been largely eliminated from the

¹ *Essay on Diderot*.

² *Essays on Popular Government*, Vol. I.

blood of a people which had itself passed through the purifying flames of a Reform Act and of Chartism. But such is the practical character of our race that we could approve what the French had done while alternately denouncing and deriding the abstract theories by which they had justified it. Danton and Robespierre were sooner forgiven by the British people than Voltaire and Diderot were understood by the British learned. It was easier to make allowance for the September massacres than for the impieties of the *Dictionary* or the wit of *Candide*. Even Napoleon could find more apologists for his imperialism than Rousseau for his social contract. For the excesses of revolutionary violence belong to human nature in general, while the type of thought in philosophedom belonged to that eighteenth century, against which the reflective spirit of the nineteenth was in fundamental protest.

In one respect indeed the Encyclopaedic group had got no worse treatment from history than it deserved. Clio is a revengeful Muse, and these men had provoked her much. D'Alembert in one of his foolish moments expressed a wish that all records of the past should be obliterated at a stroke, and the cynic will be quick to add that Rousseau's actual procedure in argument often assumes some such radical clearance to have been already carried out. "After all," exclaimed Voltaire, "history is nothing but a parcel of tricks that we play upon the dead." More important than these outbursts of pettishness is the fact that some of those who indulged in them were themselves historians, but that they wrote with a signal lack of what we now call historical sympathy. That human nature is much the same in every age, that no period is to be sharply divided into tyrants and oppressed or into tricksters and their dupes, that one epoch blends with the preceding and with the next in unbroken development, and consequently that the past must be sympathetically explained before it is censoriously judged, are lessons which the historical method has at length impressed upon us. It may be an excess of charity which teaches that to know all is to forgive all, but the maxim has a deep kernel of truth, and Voltaire was as much in need of invoking it for his own protection in the future as he was unaccustomed to using it

to temper his harshness toward the past. How slight was his power of projecting himself in thought into a society other than his own is obvious from the profane and obscene poem in which he outraged the fame of the virgin heroine of France. Neither he nor Diderot felt any difficulty in treating great stretches of human experience as areas of total blindness or of a cruelty that was unrelieved, in dismissing great religious and great social structures as the result of conscious and sustained deceit, or in supposing that some *philosophe* might by the power of his pen transform the reign of credulity into the reign of reason with the abruptness of the first creative word, "Let there be Light."

By an ironical fate the spirit which these men inspired built up the repulsive legend which long surrounded their names. They were estimated with little regard to their environment, to the tyrannies and frauds which wrung from them so passionate if so exaggerated an outcry, above all to the great work they did for human freedom and progress. Rousseau was classed with the rest by that insular scornfulness which disdained to draw fine distinctions among foreigners. It was known that the *Contrat Social* had lain on the table of the Committee of Public Safety as the fitting scriptures for the guidance of Couthon and Saint-Just. It was known that Hébert and Chaumette had gone forth to desecrate churches and slaughter nuns, breathing the slogan of Voltaire, *Ecrasez l'infame*. It was known that the Hall of Assembly had been adorned for its blood-stained decrees with the symbols provided by "philosophic" history, its statues of Lycurgus and Solon, its Roman fasces emblematic of free speech, and its altar emblematic of law. Englishmen, who had themselves beheaded one king and deposed another, reflected with national complacency that they had not done their drastic work amid such wild excesses or to such grotesque accompaniments as these, and, following Burke, they laid the chief blame on the *philosophes*.

Thus the characteristic watchwords of the Encyclopaedic men became terms alike of ridicule and of horror. Illuminism, light of reason, progress of the species, rights of man, had had their day. Those who had sent such explosive phrases abroad were looked upon as nothing more than unclean spirits, hating the reverent

and the ordered, athirst for the blood of innocent and virtuous princes, trampers on religion, scorners of chastity, robbing mankind of its most precious things in this world and its most strengthening faith for the next. Pious people wrote tracts about them, depicting the atheist deathbed as beset by fiends, and Voltaire as finding no place for repentance, though he sought it carefully with tears. This picture, drawn especially from English pulpits and accepted implicitly by English congregations, was of course known by the learned to be very remote from the facts. But the learned had their own quarrel with the "prince of persiflage," and they did not trouble to do him justice even in their own learned minds. Hardly a competent writer before Lord Morley set himself in a popular work to apply to the Encyclopaedists that genuine historical treatment which they had failed to bestow on the victims of their own furious propaganda.

Thanks to him, the reader can now borrow from any city library three books setting forth what manner of men those were who stirred France to the depths. He will find a candid emphasizing of those particulars in which they failed not less than of those in which they were triumphantly successful. Lord Morley had drunk too deep of the Romantic poets, of the modern anthropologists, and of the nineteenth-century historians to be under any illusion about the weaknesses of Voltaire and Diderot and Rousseau. But he has also brought home to us how, in a nation so unlike our own that practice waits everywhere upon abstract theory, these men were the very moving spirits of what was good far more than of what was evil in the proceedings of the Assembly. He has pointed out how they were the first to awaken opinion to the iniquities of colonial misgovernment and to the horrors of the slave trade, how they were the earliest critics of the abominable system of revenue under the ancient régime, how they denounced the barbarities of the penal code, how they thundered against the sale and purchase of decisions in courts of law. He has made us realize how much all Europe owes to their fearless campaign for a free press against ecclesiastical censorship. "It was this band of writers," he exclaims, "organised by a harassed man of letters, and not the nobles swarming round Louis XV, nor the churchmen singing

masses, who first grasped the great principle of modern society, the honour that is owed to productive industry. They were vehement for the glories of peace and passionate against the brazen glories of war."¹ In a word, he has reconstructed for us the setting amid which valiant, if at times intemperate, men had to fight for those elementary human rights which we, thanks in a great measure to them, now enjoy. For it was intellectual France a hundred and fifty years ago, as it is France today, that led Europe in the struggle for the franchises of mankind.

III

Lord Morley could be a sharp literary critic when he chose, and he is himself a man of sufficient stature to make strictness a duty when one judges him. He once accused Lecky of habitual platitude and even proposed a little anthology of that historian's "vapid deliverances."² How would our censor fare himself if such anthologies were in fashion? He relates, for instance, in one place how Rousseau's system of musical notation was examined by a committee of the French Academy, and how the examiners exposed their own dense ignorance of the subject. Jean Jacques came out of the room cursing the impudence of *savants* who thought that because they knew other things they could sit in judgment on what they did not know at all. A natural comment, but could a more pompous platitude be pronounced upon it than the following? "His experience on this occasion suggested to him the most just reflection how even without breadth of intelligence the profound knowledge of any one thing is preferable in forming a judgment about it to all possible enlightenment conferred by the cultivation of the sciences without study of the special matter in question"³ Did not Lord Morley himself remark on a trite commonplace of Lecky, "Most true; excellent sense; but not startlingly new nor deeply impressive. As Rivarol said of his

¹ *Diderot*, I, 184.

² *Misc.*, Vol. IV.

³ *Rousseau*, I, 98. I cannot refrain from quoting here the best parallel to such a sentence which occurs to me. It is the deliverance on the resurrection of the body which Newman for purposes of burlesque puts into the mouth of a Bampton Lecturer. "All attempts to resuscitate the inanimate corpse by natural methods have hitherto been experimentally abortive."—*Loss and Gain*, p. 22.

friend's distich, *C'est tres bien, mais il y a des longueurs.*" It is a specimen of that pontifically pedantic style into which our author tends to drop through the corruption of his own best quality. And other specimens might be produced at will.

Again, he has a way, as all preachers have, of proclaiming as axiomatic truth that which easily passes for such until a little thought shows us that the reverse would pass for axiomatic equally well, and until a deeper thought warns us that such subjects are not material for a priori axioms at all, that they are to be settled by historical inquiry into what has been, not by airy generalizations on what must be. There is an old dispute as to whether morality will gain or lose by eager anticipation of a future life. Hear Lord Morley settle it: "The decay of a theology that places our deepest solitudes in a sphere beyond this is naturally accompanied by a transfer of these high solitudes to a nearer scene."² "Those who no longer place their highest faith in powers above and beyond men are for that very reason more deeply interested than others in cherishing the integrity and worthiness of man himself."³ Would it not be at least as plausible to say, "The strengthening of a theology that views this short life as the preparation for an endless future is naturally accompanied by a deepened concern about conduct, whose results are so momentous," or, "Those who believe that feeble man is made in the image of the Infinite God are for that reason more deeply impressed with the value of man's integrity than those who think of him as a chance product of mechanical causes and as the vanishing creature of a day"? "When the average of morals is low," says Lord Morley, "the need to prevent it from falling any lower is most urgent."³ "Not so," one might reply. "When the average of morals is high there is a special stimulus and encouragement to preserve it, and when it sinks low a little lower is of slight consequence" Mill would probably have called each of these dogmatic propositions a "fallacy of simple inspection." They illustrate the sort of pitfall which besets him who would deal with this high theme aphoristically. And our author might have been expected to be on his guard, for it is he who has told us with real force: "The worst of maxims,

² *Misc.*, II, 118.

³ *Recollections*, I, 89.

³ *Voltaire*, p. 311.

aphorisms, and the like . . . is that for every occasion in life or perplexity in conduct there is a brace of them; and of the brace one points one way and the other down a path exactly opposite."¹

This, however, is not the only respect in which Lord Morley's literary precept is better than his own practice. He has spoken of the peril that haunts superlative propositions. But has he escaped it? At all events in his earlier work he was exceptionally given to that gay, youthful exaggeration which makes a writer effective and picturesque at a shocking expense to accuracy and justice. Ferney, we read, was the center of the most universal and varied correspondence that any one man ever carried on.² For lightness, grace, spontaneity, you can find no second to Voltaire's letters at however long an interval.³ Theresa le Vaseur's family were among the most odious of human beings.⁴ Rousseau's appreciation of wit was probably more deficient than that of any man who had ever lived either in Geneva or in any other country fashioned after Genevan guise.⁵ No man that had ever lived showed more sterling interest than Diderot in furthering the affairs of those around him.⁶ In writing his political history Voltaire had before him the best attainable authorities and material, and no one was ever more diligent in putting them to the best possible use.⁷ Kingsley had less of the historic sense than any other professor that had ever sat in a chair of history.⁸ How can anyone be sure, or in the least degree confident, of these sweeping estimates? If the reader will underline each obviously rash superlative in one of Lord Morley's books, he will find in the course of an afternoon's perusal that the text has been considerably defaced. Yet how quick was our critic to stigmatize just this sort of offense, for example, in Macaulay!

Again, in his review of Mark Pattison's *Memoirs* he has told us that Pattison, though reputed to be of immense learning, was in truth no *crudit*. The reproach, such as it is, might be retorted upon the man who made it. We have indeed profuse evidence of Lord Morley's familiarity with wide fields of literature. The whole

¹ *Misc.*, IV, 77.

⁴ *Rousseau*, I, 115.

⁷ *Voltaire*, p. 289.

² *Voltaire*, pp. 318-19.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 319.

⁸ *Misc.*, Vol. IV.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

⁶ *Diderot*, chap. ii.

range of writers in France whose work prepared or expounded the Revolution he knows both profoundly and minutely. The great masters of English prose and verse have been for a long lifetime his constant companions, and probably few of his own time could pretend to so detailed and affectionate an acquaintance with the best that was appearing, both English and French, in the mid-Victorian decades. Moreover, that British school of speculation which began with Hume and was developed through the long line of Hartley, James Mill, Bentham, Austin, George Grote, down to John Stuart Mill, Leslie Stephen, and Herbert Spencer, he has assimilated with the thoroughness of ardent discipleship. His grasp of modern history, above all his knowledge of what Wellhausen called "the watersheds," is everywhere notable. But a man must be judged, not only in the light of what he has done, but in the light of that competence which he implies on his own behalf, and Lord Morley's claims are high. One must point out then how specialized he has been, how remarkable are the gaps in his attainment. Quite probably if he had acquired more his work would have been less valuable. Lord Acton, for instance, is a standing proof that beyond a certain weight of learning most heads become less sure and less steady. But, if one may be pardoned a Hibernianism, Lord Morley's writings show in a rather marked degree the traces of what he has left out.

For example, only a stray reference here and there in his *Recollections* suggests any interest at all in the masterpieces of classical antiquity. Sallust, Cicero's *De oratore*, now and then the *Iliad*, now and then a play of Sophocles, more frequently (and perhaps significantly) Lucretius' *De rerum natura*, were his resource when he felt in the mood for the ancients. But compare his diary, for example, with Macaulay's! His lack in this respect would not be so great a fault if he had abstained from rather crude judgments in a field which he had not effectively explored. He tells us that Mr. Asquith had a sounder training than his in Oxford days, and we may indeed be sure that Mr. Asquith would never have spoken of the Greek sophists as men "whose office it was to confirm, adorn, and propagate the current prejudice." Such a complete inversion of the truth about men like Protagoras and Prodicus and Gorgias

had, one would have thought, become quite impossible since the work of George Grote. And what would Lord Morley's Oxford tutors have said if he had written in a college essay what he afterward gravely published in the *Fortnightly Review*, to the effect that "before Montesquieu no single stone of the foundation of scientific history can be said to have been laid"? He adds indeed in a footnote that a germ of Vico's idea about cycles may be found in the remark by Thucydides that the future is likely to resemble the past! Among the things to be learned at Oxford—from such men as Mark Pattison—was just a wariness against this "human too much," a caution in declaring this or that doctrine to have made an absolute first appearance in the thought of So-and-So, a wise habit of suspecting the justice of that strong language which comes so quickly to the point of a facile pen. Scorn for the annalist and radiant enthusiasm for a possible philosophy of history are among the well-known phenomena of mental youth. Such scorn and such enthusiasm are likely to change places in the minds of old historians like the late Professor York Powell, who know how great a thing it is to make annals correct, and who feel about philosophies of history as Coleridge felt about ghosts, that they have seen too many of them.

IV

Perhaps the chief defect in Lord Morley's work is the incapacity he has shown to understand two great features of the period in which he lived—the neo-Kantian school in philosophy and the liberal movement among Protestant theologians.

It is hardly too much to say that for him the whole teaching of Emmanuel Kant was as if it had never been, and no student needs to be reminded how grave such an omission is from one's knowledge of modern thought. Over and over again we get a contemptuous allusion to "transcendentalism," as if it were a mere side aspect of intuitionist prejudice, a more or less ingeniously suborned prop for failing faith, one of the ramifications of what Voltaire to our critic's unceasing delight called "the Infamous." His remark in *Diderot* about judging men by a standard "half transcendental, half cynical"¹ makes one suspect that Lord Morley never knew at all what

¹ *Diderot*, Vol. I, chap. i.

Kant intended by the word "transcendental." The suspicion is borne out by many a reference to the same subject when he speaks of Coleridge, and in the papers on Carlyle and Emerson. His own point of view seems to have been tersely put in that aphorism which he quotes with evident relish, *Combien cette maudite metaphysique fait des fous!*¹ Nominalism he plainly thinks of as a triumphantly vindicated gospel.² Of the collapse of Mill in England beneath the criticism of writers like T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley he has heard as a disquieting and even an exasperating rumor, but of the grounds upon which that devastating attack rested he has little idea. He suspected that something serious was afoot in the world of dialectic as early as 1874, when he remarks of his old master's influence at Oxford that in that gray temple where they are ever burnishing new idols his throne may perhaps not be still unshaken.³ And years afterward, when he dined with Thomas Fowler at the Athenaeum, he records in his journal the distressing news that at Oxford it is as much as a man's life is worth to mention the Canons of Induction! The pathos of this will be appreciated by everyone whose philosophical training has been subsequent to the great change in the center of gravity of the schools. It is not indeed wonderful that a harassed politician, absorbed so long in the very unphilosophic struggles of statecraft, should have been unable to keep himself abreast of the currents of abstract thought. But we are here estimating him not as a politician but as a writer. Not even Condorcet or Godwin was more convinced of the perfectibility of the world through reason than was the youthful Morley that Mill must yet reign until all his enemies had been put under his feet. There is little to show that this belief was shaken even after so much of the characteristic teaching of Mill had become hopelessly antiquated.

In one respect indeed we must remember that the disciple broke away from his master's leadership. Mill's posthumous *Essays on Religion* is the subject of an angry paragraph in *Recollections*. The conclusion that on the whole a balance of philosophic probability leans to the side of belief in God was not to be endured even from

¹ *Diderot*, Vol. I, chap. i, p. 226.

² Cf. especially *Rousseau*, I, 172.

³ Paper on "The Death of Mr. Mill."

so revered a quarter. Hence it is pointed out to us with not a little acrimony that this view means a denial of the assured premises and the assured canons of evidence upon which the empiricist school reposed. So that after all Mill himself had insufficiently assimilated the "pure milk of the Millite word"! This is not the place to enter into any argument upon the great issue. It is enough to say that in those posthumous essays the empiricist chief gave a signal proof of his rare quality as a thinker. For Mill the poor pride of a symmetrical system had no compelling force, and the poor dread of inconsistency had no terrors. Not the least of his distinctions is just the candor with which he admits and even emphasizes each weak point that he has seen in his own structure of thought. Few men have been more free from that worst of all provincialisms, the provincialism of the system builder, the provincialism of him who has wedded himself, like Herbert Spencer, to a single idea as a key to every cosmic secret, and who forces every lock that he cannot turn. We know such men well by this time and have suffered much at their hands. Granted that Mill had absorbed from Kant a conception of personality which could not be fitted into the grooves of his old empiricism; granted that he had come to see, through the *Critique of Practical Reason* or otherwise, how inadequate were the sanctions of utilitarianism to explain the objectivity of morals, it is all to his credit that he should have set this in bold relief, caring little for its effect upon the assumptions to which he was formerly committed. Too many of the school of Bentham—and in this respect Lord Morley was among the number—resemble Mr. Galsworthy's English squire, in whom "a new idea invading the mind is met with a rising of the whole population, and either prevented from landing, or, if on shore, instantly taken prisoner."¹

Again, amid his manifold assaults upon Christianity is it not singular that our critic takes almost no notice of that liberal school of theologians which would indorse to a great extent his own objection against dogmas of the past, but which feels able to reconstruct the faith in a form at once more consonant with the first Christian message and more in harmony with the results of modern thinking?

¹ *The Country House*, p. 128.

When he speaks of theology, what he seems as a rule to have in view is an intolerant system which teaches the existence of a God at once all-holy and all-powerful, whose activities are in no way conditioned by human personality and human freedom, a system which looks upon man as totally depraved, upon redemption as involving the intellectual assent to a mass of incredibilities, upon eternal punishment as the fate of those who will not pretend such impossible belief, upon morality as resting on nothing else than fear of hell and hope of paradise, and upon a visible church as supernaturally empowered on earth to bind and to loose at will. He was of course aware that each of these positions would be indignantly repudiated by a great body of Protestant Christendom. It is perhaps unfair to suggest that he preferred to level his own attack upon that type of Christianity which was most readily vulnerable, however obsolete he knew it to be in the minds of the best Christian thinkers. And it may be that he had clearly considered and definitely rejected the newer as well as the older apologetic, the faith of Maurice and Henry Drummond not less than that of Paley and Manning. But if so, he has nowhere given us his grounds, nowhere come to grips with the latest and strongest type of opponent, and hence must be judged to have written irrelevantly to the existing phase of the matter in dispute.

It is with the Church of Rome that he loves to argue; it is a Bossuet, a De Maistre, a Newman, that he constantly refutes. And he once used a very revealing phrase, "the Protestant dilution of the theological spirit."¹ It seems plain that he looked upon Romanism as the candid, sincere specimen of Christianity, and upon the Protestant as having whittled away for dialectic purposes such portion of the Roman creed as had become increasingly difficult to defend, but which entered just as intimately into the whole structure as the portion that was thus arbitrarily retained. Even granting, however, that this curious interpretation of Protestantism were sound, was it not incumbent upon Lord Morley to demonstrate its soundness, to convict in argument the most recent Protestant apologists of having implied in the theology which

¹ *Voltaire*, p. 206.

they kept just the same incoherences as belong to the theology which they rejected?

Instead of this the identity is airily assumed. And there is a further assumption, in which our author's usual charity of mind has for once forsaken him. Is it fair, is it even intelligent, to say that every man who signs a creed has pledged himself to regardlessness of truth? Do candidates for ordination "virtually swear that they will to the end of their days believe what they believe then"? Or do they simply affirm that such is their faith at that crucial moment, without attempting to predict its possible changes, and certainly without giving any guaranty that they will hesitate to take such steps as conscience may prescribe if that faith should not prove lasting? It is sheer hysteria in Lord Morley to speak of a great multitude of high-minded men as "taking oath to lead mutilated lives."¹ Perhaps the imposition of a creed is improper, but it is by no means so obviously improper as would be required to justify a tithe of Lord Morley's vehement denunciation. The Christian church is not a society for scientific or philosophical research. It exists far less for the investigation and discovery of truth than for the communion of those who have embraced a great conviction about life and destiny, who seek in the ordinances of worship a spiritual strengthening and comfort, and who could scarcely profit by the ministry of those who did not share in the main the same world-outlook, trust the same sources of power, and cherish the same hopes for the unseen. Personally I cannot see that if a multitude of Lord Morley's fellow-countrymen choose to maintain a religious institution of this kind, believing it to be for their own unspeakable benefit here and hereafter, they deserve to be loaded by him with reproaches and to have their clergy stigmatized as fraudulent.

It may be said, however, that the *gravamen* of his charge is the connecting of a man's livelihood with the rigidity of his opinions, and the stimulus which is thus given to pretense among those who no longer believe what they believed at ordination. It need not be denied that there is force in this, and that in the English church there have been not a few who would have availed themselves of a

¹ *On Composition*, p. 38.

good opportunity, like the French priests in 1793, to rid themselves of an office which they no longer needed, even at the cost of publicly avowing their own shame. Such occasional abuses are inevitable, for there are dishonest men among clergy and laity alike; but is it not remarkable that those who have done most to reduce the chances of such scandal are just those broad church leaders whom Lord Morley has not thought it worth his while to notice? The general subject of subscription cannot here be entered on. The difficulties of either amending or abolishing creeds will not of course be appreciated by one who thinks the whole content of Christian theology false to the core. But Lord Morley must allow for the standpoint of those who consider that content to be essential truth. And in recent years, under the guidance of broad churchmen, it has not been found quite impracticable to distinguish that element in the creeds without which the whole heart would be taken from the church's faith from those other elements upon which the widest difference of opinion may be allowed. To put the matter sharply and concretely, does any honest man think it just that Dean Stanley or F. D. Maurice should be branded as having led a "prostituted life"?

The truth seems to be that our author at the outset of his career took his apostolic mission a shade too seriously. He conceived himself by the time he was thirty-two as the protagonist in literature of a great but struggling cause. He would champion the scientists and the experimental philosophers against the serried hosts of prejudice, of ignorance, of theological obscurantism. In Matthew Arnold's phrase he would seasonably disconcert the blind worship of his contemporaries. But to attack the Church of England in 1877 as Voltaire had attacked the French church in 1750, to conceive the cause of English agnosticism as similar to that of French freedom, the antagonists as similarly malignant, and the weapons of ridicule as similarly in place, was just a little suggestive of the enterprise of the knight of La Mancha, who mistook the roadside inn for a moated castle within which there lay no doubt a damsel in distress, and who advanced couching his lance against the honest innkeeper in the name of the Lady Dulcinea del Toboso. Let it be remembered that those were the days when

Swinburne was publishing his *Hymn to Man* and his *Songs before Sunrise*. They were the days when the *National Reformer*, under the editorship of Bradlaugh, was assailing Christian doctrine with a levity which our critic himself would, I fancy, now pronounce indecent. Julia Wedgwood was not far from the truth when she said that the danger of reticence was long past, and that the danger of rash and exaggerated emphasis upon one's own opinions had begun to replace it. Leslie Stephen himself declared in 1873 that there was no article in the creeds which might not be contradicted with impunity even in the pulpits of the church. Yet Lord Morley wrote almost in the tone of a pioneer! Beyond doubt he has long repented of some flamboyant adornments by which his polemic was then graced. He would not, I think, speak today of clergymen who read as the inspired word of the Supreme formulas which are to them as meaningless as the abracadabras of a conjuror in a booth. If report speaks truly he was once accustomed to write the name of God with a small *g*, until some disputant with more sense of humor retaliated by writing Morley with a small *m*. Nothing like that appears in the *Life of Gladstone*. And one is confident that in later times he was sorry to read a certain passage in his *Voltaire*. It is that in which he derides the "shivering mood which receives overmuch poetic praise in our day as the honest doubt that has more faith than half your creeds." Then we hear about "the sentimental juvenilities of children crying for light." How curious that sentimental juvenilities should be attacked in a phrase so crudely juvenile! The writer of *Recollections* came to appreciate Tennyson in a sense that would make such stupid mockery freeze upon his lips. But there it stands, in the awful permanence of print, and as we judge Lord Morley's career we cannot but remember it against him.

Yet with all his faults he is a great man, and it may be long before we look upon his like again. I have spoken of him, as I am sure he would wish to be spoken of, with candid insistence upon what seems inferior as well as with appreciation of what seems best in the volumes he has given us. But I would not close without one word less of admiration than of gratitude. To use one of Lord Morley's favorite epithets, his has been a "far-shining" figure

in the world of letters. But it has shone farther still in the twilight regions of politics and government, for it has shone there by qualities in comparison with which the richest gifts of intellect and the eloquence of the most silvery tongue are impotent to move mankind. One judgment about him is just now admitted by all, and nothing in the doubtful future of criticism can in the least disturb it. In statesmanship Lord Morley must always be thought of as a leader of high courage, of unswerving integrity, tenacious of liberal principles, and clear-eyed in their application, yet preserving withal the most generous good-will toward those who differed from him, and thus sweetening the bitter waters of political strife with the spirit of personal friendship and ample charity. To say this, with the eager approval of both friend and foe, is to say much, but we can say more. He has set the pattern in public affairs at once of a noble scorn and of a noble trust, scorn for the arts of the demagogue joined to unshakable trust in the heart of the masses. One man like him can thus leave a mark upon democratic statesmanship that will not soon be effaced. He can so elevate the moral tone that it will be just a little harder for those who succeed him to depress it. Lord Morley has made some of us at least more assured believers than we were in government by the people, and if it be just to say that the test of a system of government lies in the stamp of leader which it brings to the front, British democracy when challenged by such a criterion would do well to rest its case on such as he.

FACT AND FANCY IN THEORIES CONCERNING ACTS— *Concluded*

CHARLES C. TORREY
Yale University

One consideration presented by Professor Jackson in his letter containing the first draft of his criticism, mentioned above, led me to alter a view which I had expressed in my *Composition and Date of Acts*. In discussing (*ibid.*, pp. 18 f.) the passage Acts 8:10, I employed as one argument the supposed fact that the city Samaria (Sebaste) was peopled by pagans, and that few, at all events, of the Samaritan sect were to be found there. Professor Jackson remarked very justly that in that case I Acts would here contradict its otherwise consistent representation, that the first evangelization of the Gentiles was that by Peter. I accordingly went carefully through the available material bearing on the population of the city Samaria, and satisfied myself completely that the view which I had expressed was without satisfactory foundation, and that Wellhausen and those who, like myself, have accepted his conclusion without sufficient study of the reasons for it, have been too hasty. The city had not only a strong pagan element in its population, but was also (as we should expect a priori for every reason) one of the chief cities of the Samaritan sect.¹ The evangelization described in Acts 8: 4-25 was confined to this sect, as seems in fact to be indicated by the wording of the passage; note vs. 9, where it is after all not easy to explain away *ἔθνος* as a translator's error. Vs. 25, "many villages of the Samaritans," gives further evidence. In all probability, therefore, the carrying of the gospel to the Samaritan sect is intended in 1:8 (why otherwise should Samaria be specified?). The self-consistency of I Acts is thus maintained here as elsewhere. I wrote at once (December, 1916) to Professor Jackson, correcting my former

¹ I hope to discuss the evidence of this in some other place, when I have opportunity.

statement. I should add that the conclusion reached in my investigation of the translation-Greek of the passage 8:10, that the meaning originally intended was "This is the power of the God who is called Great," seems to me still the only probable one.

The whole question of the unity of I Acts has been ably discussed, with an affirmative conclusion, by Professor Wilson in his article entitled "The Unity of the Aramaic Acts." I need not say that I have been deeply interested in his arguments and gratified by his support. I too have become more and more firmly convinced, in my continued study of I Acts, that it is not only an organic and harmonious whole but also carefully proportioned, and a work of high literary merit in this, that it chooses from the mass of material which must have been available only such things as were truly typical. Nothing which it furnishes is trivial, everything is significant. One of the most important qualities of a historian is the instinct which enables him to *select*, and this quality at least the Judean narrator has in high degree. His work is more carefully planned than II Acts. The latter, mainly because of its very nature, is loosely put together and somewhat casual, with all the literary taste and skill which it shows. Wilson demonstrates with success (pp. 325-27, 330-32) how certain characteristic motives run, like colored threads, through the whole texture of the Aramaic document, from chapter 1 to chapter 15. The only place where he has found evidence of more than one stratum in the narrative is in chapters 4 and 5:17-42, where the one account has seemed to him to duplicate the other. This judgment of his was expressed in a former article of his, "Some Observations on the Aramaic Acts," published in the *Harvard Theological Review*, January, 1918, pp. 74-99. It is possible that he has modified it since then, as he does not mention it in his later article, but includes (p. 330) both 4:31 and 5:32 in his indications of unity. I will add merely this: On p. 91 he remarks that *the second account is heightened at every point*. Is not this good evidence of unity rather than of diversity of origin? This is the only natural course of events, the way in which the first impact of nascent Christianity against official Judaism must

actually have taken place. First a single incident, the healing of the lame man in the name of Jesus, which with the resulting excitement brought to the authorities the fact of a new and perhaps dangerous teaching. Peter and John were arrested, questioned, and finally threatened and let go. But not long after, the authorities found that the matter was much more serious than they had supposed. The adherents of the new sect had greatly multiplied, undoubted miracles of healing continued to be performed in increasing number, and the people not only of Jerusalem but also of the country round about were excited and inclined to be convinced. The small fire had become a conflagration. *It was plain that more drastic action was necessary, and this was accordingly taken.* Now this all, so far as the main course of events is concerned, has the ring of truth. Nor is the fact to be overlooked that 5:28 ff. takes full and very natural account of the preceding happenings described in chapter 4. Neither chapter could be dispensed with, either in this carefully constructed history or in the actual progress of the Christian beginnings.¹

Wilson (*Unity*, pp. 329 f.) accepts the date (49 or 50 A.D.) which I had supposed for the Judean document, and strengthens my argument. I cannot feel, to be sure, that the evidence on which I had based my conclusion is "slender." We have here several coincident facts, each one with the obvious possibility of great significance, *and they all point to precisely the same probability.* (1) The author *did not know* (since we certainly must assume that he was a truthful man) the extremely important fact that Silas,

¹ I would like to add also a word of caution at this point in regard to another hypothesis which Wilson proposes along with his suggestion of the doublet account. He is inclined to derive Acts 1:1-11 from Luke 24 (both, of course, in their original Aramaic form); see his interesting argument, pp. 92-99. This derivation seems to me improbable, because the disagreements are much more significant than the agreements. As for the latter, the main incidents of the interval after the resurrection, in their necessary order, were pretty generally agreed upon, we may certainly suppose, at the time to which Luke 24 and Acts 1 both belong. I wish that considerations of space made it possible for me to discuss here the other interesting suggestions made by Wilson in his *Observations*. Perhaps I may have opportunity elsewhere. I will only say here, in passing, that those who have had trouble with the truly difficult passage Acts 12:25 will find in pp. 82-84 a solution which is not only plausible but, to me at least, very probable. I should myself prefer decidedly the Aramaic preposition ܕ rather than ܕܐ but either one is possible.

instead of returning with Judas to Jerusalem, remained at Antioch and set out with Paul on a second missionary journey. (2) The following narrative (which immediately corrects his statement) shows that Paul and Silas set out *very soon* on their errand. This is most significant; here is obviously the plausible reason why the narrator did not know what he otherwise must soon have known. Men were going back and forth all the time between Antioch and Jerusalem, and it is at least natural to suppose that the very important question, *how the letter from Jerusalem was received in the Gentile city*, was answered without delay by more than one eager reporter. The one who brought to our narrator or his circle of acquaintance the news of what had taken place must have made the journey to Judea either before Judas (and, as he supposed, Silas also) had set out, or very soon after. If he had waited a few months, or perhaps even weeks, longer, he would have brought a very different report. (3) The Aramaic narrative *comes to an end at just this point*. This was an excellent place for an ending, but by no means the desirable ending place if more events of high importance, in the direct line of the narrator's chief interest, soon followed. Did no one care to know about the further career of Peter and John (both of whom, according to every tradition, went to labor *among the Gentiles*) and the other apostles, or—still more striking and immediately essential—about the dramatic scenes of the return of Paul to Jerusalem? This writer had been greatly interested in the career of Saul of Tarsus, his conversion, and his wonderful work in opposition to Jews and Judaizing Christians; why does he drop him *here*, when his most important labors had just begun?

On the basis of this last fact alone, the ending of the narrative at this point, an unbiased historian, asked to give an opinion as to its probable date, would unquestionably say this: that the presumption, no known fact forbidding, is that it was finished very soon after the event last described, the council at Jerusalem. But when to this fact is added consideration (2), and then the tell-tale misstatement of (1), the result is a very strong combination indeed. Could all this coincidence be accidental? The *one* weighty consideration which will seem to many to forbid accept-

ing my conclusion is the generally accepted view of the origin and date of the Synoptic Gospels. This is no difficulty for me, for I have long been entirely convinced, apart from any investigation of Acts, that these Gospels are of much earlier date than has been supposed, and that they are all three close renderings, without any considerable change, from Semitic originals. Mark I regard as practically a contemporary account. I believe that from the Gospels and from Acts we can get an essentially correct idea of the public career of Jesus and the manner of the earliest spread of Christianity. I mean in the near future to set forth in detail the evidence which has convinced me, and I am not without hope that many others will be convinced. Another "coincidence"—I will number it (4)—which I should add as still further confirming my own view as to the dates of the two halves of Acts is the very natural explanation now possible of the *interval* between Acts and "the former treatise," Luke's Gospel. With the date 50 for I Acts, 60 (when Luke was in Palestine on his two years' visit) for the Gospel, and 64 for II Acts, we have a wonderfully suitable and convincing series. Is *this* coincidence, again, purely accidental?

Two matters touched upon quite incidentally by Wilson are so important for my own point of view that I am unwilling to let them go without a word of comment. The first is in regard to "slavish" or "illogical" faithfulness of the translator or compiler to the document with which he is dealing. I have spoken already of the matter of close translation, but Wilson's expressed ideas are so typical of those commonly held that it may be well to return to the subject for a moment. Wilson (*Unity*, p. 324) speaks of "the psychological conceivability of such a process of slavishly literal and yet none too accurate translation as is here postulated on the part of Luke." See also page 334, *ibid.* In his *Observations* (p. 83), in speaking of the apparent mistranslation (his own discovery) in Acts 12:25, he says: "To suppose that the present Greek text with *eis* arose from the wrong interpretation of such an original seems to argue an almost incredible stupidity or carelessness on the part of Luke as translator." So, doubtless, very many scholars would say. But we need not waste

time on the psychology of Luke, since his proceedings of this sort are the merest commonplaces in translation-Greek, of which we fortunately have a considerable amount. He renders in just the way (*mutatis mutandis*, since some allowance must be made for the personal equation and for peculiarities of circumstance and immediate aim) in which all the translators of that day performed their task. We need not query whether it is "conceivable," for we have the fact before us in many hundreds of examples, including the work of the best and most learned of the Alexandrine translators, which is saying a good deal. Just such slips as these attributed to Luke are present in all the other renderings, usually in far greater number than here. In both Matthew and Mark they are quite numerous.¹ And do our modern scholars always realize how difficult a matter it is to render a lengthy text without mistakes? I could exhibit renderings made in high-class scientific publications by scholars of note, in this year of grace 1918, which quite throw into the shade any of the blunders attributed to Luke. We must bear in mind also that the whole attitude of mind of the translator then, much more than at present, was that of *close attention to the letter* of the original. In this same connection Wilson expresses surprise at the fidelity of Luke to the *material* of the source he was incorporating. In *Unity*, (p. 334), speaking of the considerations which might have led Luke to alter the "forty days" of Acts 1:3 which contradicts the last chapter of his own Gospel, he says: "To have altered that passage . . . would have impaired the symbolism of the entire opening section of Acts, and Luke's scientific impulses were surely not strong enough for such heroic measures as that." I should say,

¹The language of the Synoptic Gospels has not yet been adequately examined from the Semitic side. Wellhausen and Dalman have gone but a short distance, leaving the main work still to be done. The whole subject of translation-Greek is to a large extent an unworked field. New and very important light can be thrown on the proceedings of the earliest Christian narrators and compilers in their use of sources. The materials of a complete solution—and the only possible solution—of the Synoptic problem are now at last at hand, as I hope to show in further investigations which are already far advanced and in large part ready for publication. I realize, indeed, that some kinds of evidence can be fully appreciated only by those who have worked laboriously through the mass of material, observing how certain facts and principles demonstrate themselves a hundred times over.

on the contrary, that it was partly because of his scientific impulses that he did not alter it. The "science" of one age is not necessarily that of another, and in *that* age compilers did *not* ordinarily alter documents. Again, page 332, in answering (affirmatively) the question whether Luke or any other person can be conceived to have allowed a misstatement to stand in his source, correcting it himself later on, he says: "The supposition is not an easy one, and yet who shall set logical limits to the things of which the human mind is capable? Certainly no modern scholar would treat a document in such a peculiar way." But here, again, we are not reduced to the necessity of hypothesis or general probability. The process in question—precisely this—is the ordinary method of oriental historiography. Many of the views which I have been opposing in these pages would not, I think, have been expressed if their supporters had steeped themselves in oriental, and especially Semitic, literature. For we are not dealing with "modern scholars" and methods in these biblical books. All the best Mohammedan historians of the early period, for instance, scholars deserving of the highest respect, habitually put side by side without change the most flatly contradictory accounts of the same events. Whether this method appeals to us or not, it is before us in thousands of very familiar examples. There are numerous well-known instances in the Old Testament; is not one of them the seemingly impossible case of the account of the flood in the days of Noah? Even in the Synoptic Gospels we have illustrations of this truly oriental method. The narrators of that day have at least the appearance of realizing better than we how difficult it is to know with certainty just what happened in a given case; and they were not so cocksure of their own little one-sided interpretations as we often are of ours. The historian might add his own opinion, or leave out whatever material he did not need to use; but to alter deliberately, in the interest of "harmony," the wording of his source was quite another thing—and a *very unusual thing*.¹

¹I have long been convinced that nine-tenths, at least, of the "tendency alterations" seen by modern commentators in the books of the Old and New Testaments are not such in reality.

The other matter to which I have referred is a misconception less illustrated than suggested by words which Wilson uses. He speaks (*Unity*, p. 331 f.) of the accounts of Pentecost, Paul's conversion, and the incident of Cornelius, as "thickly encrusted with legend," and the inference from the context is that they are therefore not contemporary accounts, but productions of a later day. This is a view very generally held, and my protest against it is again based on the study of ancient oriental peoples and documents. The mere fact of (to us) incredible *details* does not even make it probable that the account is late, to say nothing of any necessity in the case. It is more than fruitless to conjecture "how long a time would be required" for this or that story of divine intervention to grow up; even in modern Jerusalem, or Hebron, or Jaffa, they could easily, and do, make their appearance overnight; they have been matters of course there from time immemorial, but are especially characteristic of the ancient time. In the best of the histories and biographies which have come down to us from this early age and this part of the world we have a solid core of fact overlaid with what Wilson rightly terms "embellishment"—and the embellishment, or rather its material, is generally older than the main account! Part of it is artistic, but the most of it belongs to the psychological background. We must of course bear in mind two things: first, that these records were composed in good faith by able writers who certainly were not far removed from the times and scenes described; and second, that while the people are not mistaken in the long run as to the *general course* of events in their day, there is very likely to be great uncertainty and a conflict of reports as to *details*, and the latter require only the briefest time for making their appearance. Students of the earliest Christian records will do well, as I have said before, to study the oldest lives of Saint Simeon Stylites, which we are fortunately able to date accurately, and they will see how just such "embellishment" as we are here considering arose, and was generally believed, during the lifetime of the saint, although *the main account of his life* is in each case a true one. Yet these histories of the saint, I should say, have by no means the same high proportion of trustworthiness as our narratives in

the Gospels and Acts. How soon after the events which it describes can the Gospel of Mark have been written? There is very little in it which, *judging from the evidence in hand which we can control*, might not have been written down during the lifetime of Jesus, and nothing at all which might not easily have been composed within a few years after the resurrection, since there is in it no evident allusion to, or building upon, later circumstances or events.

To return to the special incidents in Acts singled out by Wilson. His conclusion as to the happening on the day of Pentecost is the same to which I myself had come. There must have been a time when the phenomenon of "speaking with tongues" first appeared in the Christian community. No circumstances of which we have knowledge could have been so likely to give rise to this manifestation of spiritual ecstasy as the scene in the upper room, when the disciples were waiting with splendid faith for *something*—they knew not what—and the *Ruach Elohim* seemed to come in like a rushing wind. The rest is interpretation, and quite inevitable. Upon the question whether the explanation of the phenomenon as utterance in foreign languages preceded or followed the true explanation, the account throws no light whatever; for we may be very sure that the rank and file of the Church would never have placed the experience of the Twelve Apostles on this most momentous occasion on a par with and equivalent to the experience of the ordinary believer, which was almost immediately seen, we may suppose, to have nothing to do with foreign tongues, and was rated low enough by Paul, who however thanked God (I Cor. 14:18) that he was more expert than any of his hearers in exercising this curious gift. In any case, the glossolalia of the Twelve meant in the belief of the church, almost or quite from the first, the proclamation of the new truth in the languages of the Gentiles.¹ Why may not the story of the Pentecostal

¹ We should naturally suppose that the *first* explanation of the glossolalia would have been that of speech in foreign languages; not merely because the idea of proclaiming the gospel to the brethren living in other lands must have been constantly in the mind of the disciples from the very first, but still more because of the impression which the phenomenon in its earliest appearances would inevitably produce. This is the way the speech of a foreigner sounds to those who hear without understanding it. There were once brought to me in New Haven phonographic records

awakening be contemporary, and of high value for us? I can see no reason. The same can be said of the account of Paul's conversion in Acts 9,¹ and of the story of Cornelius. I believe that I Acts is a document whose value, from beginning to end, will be prized more highly as its nature is better understood. As in the similar literature of which I have spoken, we have two main elements: the broad outlines, which are solid and true, belonging to the world for all time; and the incidents, the details, which are essential to the mental habit of the time and place. Seekers after historical verity will of course interpose here that we cannot ordinarily draw a sure line between the fact and the fiction, and that we are therefore without a trustworthy picture of the successive events. Quite true; we could not in any case have such a picture, and we do not need it; what we have is better. If by some miracle there could have been produced, instead of our Gospels and Acts, a "historical" account of the bare events—that which often seems to us so desirable—we should be much worse off than we are at present. As it is, we are sufficiently provided with the essential facts, and have in addition what is more important still, the materials which enable us to get somewhere near the heart of the people themselves, learning something of their point of view and the background of their theological and religious conceptions. Without these "embellishments" which so often distress us, both life and truth would be gone from the record.

I ought to add, that Wilson's own view of these matters seems to be substantially the same as mine. In regard to the Cornelius incident, for example, he says (p. 331): "There is no reason to doubt the essential fact," and he expresses himself similarly in many other places.

of the utterances of an uneducated young girl in a Maine town, who "spoke with tongues" in religious ecstasy. It was believed by many, I was told, that the speech was Hebrew; on this I was to give judgment. The records were very interesting to me; it seemed a clear case of "tongues" like those of the Apostolic age; but it is perhaps needless to say that the "language" was not Hebrew, nor any other with which I am familiar.

¹ Wilson's remarks (*Observations*, pp. 84-89) on the three accounts of Paul's conversion seem to me admirable.

The one long and detailed review of my *Composition and Date of Acts*, by Professor Bacon in this *Journal*,¹ deserves some further answer here. While agreeing with me in many matters, in others he sharply attacks both conclusions and principles, aiming the faithful blows of a friend in most vigorous fashion. I hope to give an equally frank and friendly rejoinder.

Bacon accepts at the outset, as I have said, my main conclusions as to the language of the two parts of the book, but remarks (p. 4, note 3): "Allowance should be made for some degree of overstatement as to the absence of Semitisms from II Acts (p. 7) and absence of revision by the Greek editor from I Acts." I plead not guilty to the charge, and would like to see the evidence. Bacon has *one* instance, proceeding: "e.g., in 1:18-20. (Note τὴν ἐπισκοπὴν in vs. 20.)" Sure enough. Any one who is so fortunate as to have a Greek Old Testament within reach can readily satisfy himself that the quotations in vs. 20 are taken directly, as usual, from the LXX of Ps. 69:26 and 109:8, and that in the latter passage in particular the citation is exact, including the τὴν ἐπισκοπὴν!² Until something better than this is produced, then, I shall continue to cherish the belief that my statement was a fair one.³

On pages 8f. three "historical" objections—"egregious anachronisms"—are opposed to my suggested date for I Acts, all three apparently put forward by Bacon with considerable confidence, and all three quite worthless for the purpose in hand. The Theudas-Judas problem I had mentioned in my work (p. 71), remarking—all that it is possible to say with any certainty—that the mixing of dates had its origin in second-hand information misunderstood, and that the source of it was *not* Josephus. The only question to be raised here is whether it is possible that the original account

¹ January, 1918, pp. 1-23.

² Was Bacon misled by the familiar words of the *English* (Authorized) version: "And his *bishopric* [!] let another take"?

³ As for II Acts, if Bacon will take another look at my pamphlet, p. 7, he will see that I merely said that "there is no evidence of an underlying Semitic language." The "Semitisms" which I happened to mention are only typical; more could easily be added, and, as I remarked, there are different ways in which they can be accounted for.

should have been written, or the transfer of information otherwise made, before the year 50. Of course it is possible. The thing might have happened at any time after, even immediately after, the execution of the sons of Judas. It is easy to think of a score of ways in which the mistake might have occurred, whether we suppose a formal historical document or not. For instance: A writes to his acquaintance B, who has joined the rebellious sect called Christians: "Better get out of it while you can. It will not do to resist the authorities and follow upstart leaders. Remember Theudas, who boasted . . . etc. And now again see what has happened to the sons of that misguided and ill-fated man, Judas of Galilee, who uprose in the days of the census, . . . etc." B had never heard of Theudas, which is not in the least surprising,¹ but from the order of mention formed the very natural but too hasty conclusion that he preceded Judas of Galilee. He had no intention of "getting out" of the persecuted Christian brotherhood, and saw instantly how the comparison of the uprisings under Theudas and Judas could be used as a literary embellishment in the historical work (our I Acts) which he was writing. Why not? It is as legitimate to exercise the imagination in favor of our writer as to use it against him. He may well have been one of the fugitives from Jerusalem in the year 44, or a resident of some other city of Judea. Putting the allusion to these two insurgents into the mouth of Gamaliel proved to be an unfortunate literary touch, to be sure, both because the surmise as to the date of Theudas was mistaken, and also because the account would have been better off, as literature, without this addition. It may possibly have been an afterthought on the part of our author, or even an improvement inserted by some later hand. Gamaliel's speech is decidedly more forcible when this illustrative paren-

¹ We need to remind ourselves that at the time of this Theudas incident, in the year 44 or 45, the church had just been undergoing one of its first severe persecutions, the one in which James the son of Zebedee met his death. The Christians of Jerusalem had been obliged to flee for their lives, and had other things to attend to than such trivial matters as the brief disturbance made by Theudas and his four hundred followers. Bacon argues (p. 8, below the middle) that if our author did not know of Theudas he cannot have been acquainted with any of the far greater happenings ("these recent events") of the years 44-49—a thesis which it would be rather difficult to maintain.

thesis (vss. 36-38a) is left out. Our otherwise high opinion of the literary skill of this writer would be maintained here if we could suppose that in the text as he originally wrote it verse 38b followed immediately upon verse 35. The two examples are not very impressive in themselves, nor are they as well handled as we should expect.

The second argument, equally time-worn—though hardly so in the form given it by Bacon—concerns the mention of the centurion Cornelius and the “Italian cohort” in chapter 10. He expresses himself as follows (pp. 8 f.):

In adopting the date 49-50 for the Aramaic Document we shall also be compelled to suppose that the Roman garrison, established after the suppression of this revolt of 45-46 in Caesarea, the capital of the province, had long been resident there during the reign of Agrippa and that its commandant had even endeared himself to the whole Jewish population. . . . Or can it be that the author of I Acts did not remember that the rule of the procurators with its “Italic cohort,” stationed in Caesarea did not begin till after the death of Agrippa?

These are amazing misstatements. Either Professor Bacon has not himself consulted the original sources of our knowledge concerning these matters or else his memory has served him very ill. In the first place, we have no information whatever, aside from Acts 10:1, as to the presence of an Italian cohort in Caesarea *at any time*. It is a mistake to suppose that we hear of one “stationed” there under the procurators. Then as to our being “compelled to suppose” that the Roman garrison had been in Caesarea for some time previous to the year 45: is it possible that Bacon is unaware that just this, the idea of which calls forth his sarcasm in the footnote to page 8, was true? It is one of the few things which we happen to know definitely and with certainty about the Caesarea of this period. If he will consult Josephus *Antt.* xix. 9. 2 he will see it expressly stated that the Roman cohorts (σπείραι) which were in Caesarea in the days of Gessius Florus (66 A.D.) were the very same that had been there in the time of Herod Agrippa, before the rule of the procurators! Josephus tells us how Claudius, in sending Cuspius Fadus to Judea on the death of Agrippa, gave him the order to remove to Pontus

the troops stationed in Caesarea and Sebaste and replace them by others; but then goes on to tell how the order was speedily countermanded, so that the cohorts were *not* transferred (οὐ . . . μετέστησαν), but remained just as they were and ultimately became one chief cause of the troubles under Florus¹. It has even been shown to be probable, and is, I suppose, generally believed, that practically this same Roman garrison had been in Caesarea for a long time before the reign of Agrippa.²

Bacon says (*ibid.*): "It seems really a pity that Agrippa should not have known of the presence of this amiable officer when, shortly after (Acts 12:19-23), he came down to Caesarea threatening war against 'them of Tyre and Sidon'"; implying that if there had been Roman troops there they would certainly have been called out on this occasion and have been mentioned in the account given in Acts. Anyone who will read Josephus, however, can see that Agrippa and these Roman troops of Caesarea were well acquainted with each other, though the king was disliked by the soldiers because of his partiality for the Jews.³

Some excellent scholars have indeed doubted the statement of Acts 10:1 that one of these cohorts in Caesarea was *Italian*; so especially Schürer, *Geschichte*, I, 462 f. We happen to know, from inscriptions, of at least one "Italian cohort" in Syria between the years 69 and 157;⁴ but the presence of one in Judea, in the time of Agrippa (41-44 A.D.) or earlier, has been questioned for two chief reasons: first, and most weighty, *the postulate of a late date for Acts*; and second, the reflection that a band of Italian troops would not have been likely to serve under a Jewish king. This latter reason is of very little weight. We are not dealing with modern Europe, nor even with an independent Jewish kingdom, for Judea was completely under Roman control. It may well be that the very *cohors Italica* about which we have information a few years later was stationed in Caesarea at this time.

¹ Cf. *Bell. Jud.* ii. 12. 5; 14. 4-6; 15. 3.

² Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes*, I, 460 f.

³ There is indeed a "bad break" here (see Bacon's footnote, p. 9), but it does not fall to the account of the author of I Acts.

⁴ See Schürer, *ibid.*, note 53.

There was certainly no city in all Palestine where it would have been so likely to be located at first.

From the time of the Emperor Augustus onward, the "auxiliary" troops recruited in the provinces were reinforced more and more by bands of native Italian volunteers. The reason for this was not primarily love of adventure, but the fact that in military service, now a dependable trade, the cohort offered lighter labor and more attractive conditions than the legion. The famous military historian Flavius Vegetius¹ states this with some emphasis, and tells us that there was a rush to enlist for service in foreign lands; that is, in the cohorts of the auxiliary army. He says (II, 3) in regard to the legions: *Magnus in illis labor est militandi, graviora arma, plura munera, severior disciplina. Quod vitantes plerique, in auxiliis festinant militiae sacramenta percipere, ubi et minor sudor et maturiora sunt praemia.* These were the conditions in general. As for Caesarea in particular, it was a new city, built for the Roman emperor, in the Roman style, and in the interest of Roman customs and civilization. It had a climate like that of central Italy. Herod governed for the Romans a part of their empire, and was eager to make the connection with the motherland as direct and strong as possible. This was true also of his sons, and indeed of the whole Herodian family. Augustus, for his part, was especially concerned to establish order and security in this rather troublesome province; he may also have thought it desirable to encourage the Romanization of the new capital in every practicable way. At all events, he or his advisers could hardly have done a wiser thing than to include an Italian cohort among the native Syrian auxiliaries, stationing it in this city and putting in command of it a man of just the qualities of Cornelius.

During the period with which we are concerned there were five cohorts of foot-soldiers in Caesarea.² As usual, they were mainly troops recruited in the region where they were to serve, the bulk of them in this case being men of Sebaste and Caesarea, as Josephus informs us. *A portion, however, came from outside*

¹ Quoted in Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung*, II, 453.

² So continuously, it seems, from 4 B.C. down to the time of Vespasian; see Schürer, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

Syria (*Bell. Jud.* ii. 13. 7); Josephus is not concerned to tell us the origin of these. The troops of Sebaste and Caesarea, we are told, were hostile to the Jews, and also ill-disposed toward the house of Herod. They celebrated in a most unseemly manner the death of Agrippa, although he had dealt generously with them (*Antt.* xix. 9. 1). On the occasion of the conflict between the Syrians and Jews of Caesarea in the time of Felix, the Syrian soldiers aided their fellow-countrymen, while the part of the garrison that was not Syrian seems to have kept out of the disturbance (*Bell. Jud.* ii. 13. 7). When the troops of Caesarea were called out to suppress the serious Jewish uprising of the year 52, described in *Antt.* xx. 6. 1, it may be remarked that *four* of the five cohorts of foot-soldiers were employed. It is at least a reasonable supposition that the remaining cohort was the *σπεῖρα Ἰταλική* of Acts 10:1, and that it was deemed politic to keep Cornelius and his Italian soldiers out of these local quarrels as far as practicable.

The third "egregious anachronism" is in regard to the date of the famine in Judea mentioned in Acts 11:27-30 and 12:25. Bacon, page 9, speaks of "the frightful famine of 46-48," and wonders how a contemporary narrator can have forgotten that it "was not *before* the persecution and death of Agrippa (11:27-30), but at least a year or two after it." The representation in Acts, however, as scholars generally have understood it, is precisely the contrary of what Bacon affirms! The *prophecy* took place before the persecution under Agrippa, indeed before the year 41, but the *fulfilment* came several years later. The position of the brief allusion to the latter in 12:25, *after* the account of the death of Herod Agrippa, makes the thing plain enough.¹

After this we are quite prepared to read in Bacon's article, page 9, that these "mistakes" on the part of the author of I Acts "are mere examples from a whole series of corroborative evidences." Where "egregious anachronisms" are being manufactured in this

¹ The *date*, 46-48, which Bacon assigns to the famine looks like a slip of the pen. *Jos. Antt.* xx. 5. 2 tells us that the famine began in the time of Cuspius Fadus and continued into that of his successor Tiberius Alexander; see Schürer, *Gesch.* I, 567, note 8. The date of the transition is not exactly known, but was probably the year 45. The famine may be dated 44-45, or 45-46 at the latest.

untrammelled way, there is no need to stop at three, or ten, or a score.

It is not surprising that Bacon should insist, with considerable use of italics (p. 9, below), that for theological reasons it is necessary to suppose that Paul's view of the resurrection and the immediately succeeding events (which view Bacon first interprets arbitrarily and then styles "the Apostolic tradition") antedates the general view contained in the Gospels; whereas it seems to me quite plain that every particle of literary and theological probability points in the other direction. The assumption is essential to Bacon's general position, and I have sufficiently expressed, above, my own view as to what is likely to constitute primitive popular tradition. It is on the other hand unexpected to see him using as arguments the careless assumptions which are becoming too familiar, handed from one to another, such "securities" as may be had from any curbstone operator in theological speculations, but are not to be looked for in the possession of a scholar of Bacon's rank. Thus, page 9: "A date in the later years of Domitian, when expressions such as 'suffering for the Name' (Acts 5:41) had begun to obtain currency." Where, I would ask, does he get his information that the phrase "began to obtain currency" in the later years of Domitian? Certainly not from general probability, for on that ground we should expect that both the fact and the characteristic Jewish form of words used to express it would have appeared within a very short time after the death of Jesus. Certainly not from any direct testimony; nor from any body of early Christian literature which could afford a basis for judgment. On the contrary, the assertion which I have quoted is merely a begging of the question.

As I have said, Bacon is far from believing in the unity of I Acts, and is especially sure that chapters 13 and 14 originally belonged elsewhere. He asks (p. 6) how we can explain the "truly marvelous coincidence" that the story told in these two chapters is continued in chapters 16 ff. My own explanation of this is a simple one. I believe, first, that the account of events given by the two writers is substantially *true* and not a mere invention; and second, that the translator of I Acts, being, obviously,

the same man who composed the Greek of chapters 16 ff., naturally continued where his source had left off. It is the same "marvelous coincidence," then, which we have in any book in which chapter 2 goes on from just the point where chapter 1 had finished. "What ground," Bacon asks (*ibid.*), "have we for imagining this happy and romantic discovery" of the Aramaic document? (The discovery was certainly a "happy" one, though not surprising; Bacon's *Autor ad Theophilum*, he tells us [p. 11], "was really in search of such documents," and doubtless many were to be had in Palestine at the date I have supposed; the "romance" I leave, here as elsewhere, to my colleague.) I will try to answer his question. We have precisely the same ground that we have for believing that the Chronicler of the Old Testament made the happy find of an Aramaic document which he transcribed *and continued* (as no one doubts) in his Book of Ezra, or that he made a similar find *and continuation* in his Book of Nehemiah. We see him doing these things before our very eyes—just as we see them done in the Book of Acts. Bacon remarks incidentally (p. 7) that "Acts," Preaching, and Travels, of apostles (i.e., what we have in Acts 13 and 14) are "a *Greek* type of literature," and not an Aramaic type. How in the world does he know this? He rejects with some asperity (p. 16) my expressed opinion that if the hypothesis of translation of I Acts is accepted it is not likely that any convincing theory of its composition will be put forth. As to this, I appeal, first, to his own remark (or is it that of another author? I suspect composition) on the next page, to the effect that my demonstration of translation "deals the *coup de grace*" to Harnack's attempt (in I Acts) to build theories of composition and date on mere phenomena of vocabulary and style. Some ground, then (and it is ordinarily the *only* sort of evidence that has a chance of being generally convincing in such cases), has been taken from under those who would find "A, B, and C sources" in I Acts. How did the case stand before this? I turn next to what Bacon (or rather, the other author) says on page 16, near the top: "Probably there is not a single advocate of the theory of composite origin who would not say the same," viz., that "he has been convinced by none" of the theories put forward by others

than himself. "Each finds enough of error in the method of his fellow-workers to reject much of their individual results, and enough of truth to corroborate, strengthen, and enlarge his own." It would seem, then, that my statement may stand as I made it. I certainly have not expected "to relieve [those who are in search of mares' nests] from all further trouble." It is easy to "analyze" any document, if one is equipped with a microscope, a magnifying glass, and an eye trained to look for discrepancies; and I have little doubt that there will be scholars not a few who will see in Acts separate Peter, Paul, Philip, Stephen, Barnabas, and Silas documents, besides Caesarean, Ephesian, Roman, and other sources, all united by that *deus ex machina*, "the redactor." Bacon recognizes, indeed, an underlying and well-conceived plan, however obtained, in I Acts, and approves (p. 21) my statement of it—which he attributes to Harnack.

There appears to be a wish to make a curious distinction, even in the title of the article (see also pp. 14, 16, 18 ff.) between "philological criticism"—which in the further discussion seems to mean ascertaining facts—and "historical criticism"—which seems to mean dispensing with them. Of course what we are all striving after, in these researches of ours, of whatever nature, is the *history*, and I am far from wishing to seem unconscious of all the valuable work which my colleague Bacon has done and is doing in this most important field. But is not the term "historico-critical" sometimes used in these pages where it is not accurately descriptive of the real process? I am taken to task (pp. 14, 16, 18, 20) for paying so little attention in my pamphlet to the work of some foreign scholars. I had at least the wish to be fair to all; but having reached, as it seemed to me, totally new standing-ground, I found my point of view so different from, and irreconcilable with, that of the investigations referred to, that any attempt to argue with them in detail would be a waste of time at present. I felt it to be best to state my own conclusions as briefly and clearly as I could. Then, when one competent scholar after another sees and sets forth (more sharply than I could) the precise points at which his view clashes with mine, as Bacon has done in his review, I can attempt, as I am doing here, to defend my

opinion. In the very few cases where conclusions recently published and germane to my argument had gained, or seemed likely to gain, considerable acceptance, I took account of them, as e.g., Norden's discussion of Acts 17. I read carefully through Wellhausen's "Noten zur Apostelgeschichte" and his "Kritische Analyse" without finding in either one of them a single new idea which I could regard as useful. How it was possible for him to study the Greek of the first half of the book again and again without ever seeing the evidences of translation, is hard for me to understand. Krenkel's comparison of Josephus is a thick book which requires either a very long (and extremely thin) discussion or else only a few words. How many zeros does it take to make a finite quantity? Harnack's recent work in this field might seem to demand more immediate attention. Wilson, *Observations*, page 90, speaks appreciatively of Harnack's work *as compared with that of the other dissectors of the book*; but on the next page remarks that his "more pretentious efforts issue, by his own confession, in little more than general probability"; and on page 99 he speaks of "those elaborate reconstructions such as Professor Harnack has built up only to decide that they are too shaky for permanent habitations."¹ Theories which fall of their own weight when even their own author looks at them critically certainly do not *require* to be treated in a small pamphlet like mine. The fact is, there is no portion of the Bible which has offered such an opportunity for wild guessing as the Book of Acts. On a basis of conjecture other conjectures are built up into a high and complex structure, by a method which one is tempted to call "aërial criticism," since it has no point of contact with solid earth. A favorite way of laying the foundation is indicated by Bacon on page 16: "The task of comparing the point of view of the Autor ad Theo-

¹ This is just the impression which Harnack's recent investigations in Acts have made upon me also, that the most of his conclusions are neither sound nor useful. Like the other workers in this particular field, he found himself reduced to mere conjecture, in the *impasse* to which the study of the book had come partly because of the supposed necessity of late dates, but still more because of the bewildering fact that diverse authors seemed to be writing in the same well-marked language and style! But when he proceeds to designate a series of oral sources (such as the testimony of the daughters of Philip) he abandons, as Wilson, p. 90, justly says, all genuine literary analysis.

philum with the often apparently quite different point of view of his sources"—that is, comparing things about which we cannot possibly, in the nature of the case, have even approximately satisfactory knowledge. We are told, on page 20, "precisely" the doctrinal standpoint of the *Autor ad Theophilum*; and another would tell us, on perhaps equally good ground, that it is "precisely" the opposite.¹ And it is on the basis of what is assumed here that the book is made a scrap-basket and its writers discredited. This "aërial" work is generally interesting and occasionally useful, but it never has any important bearing on historical research.

Bacon derives from my demonstrations of translation one or two general principles which, if they could be allowed, would be veritable bombshells—everywhere. The first of these, stated on pages 17 f., is to the following effect. Since it is shown that the *translator* of a document uses, in the rendering, his own vocabulary and peculiar habits of speech and shows traces of his own literary style, therefore (!) the *transcriber* and *editor* of a document in his own language presumably rewrites it in his own form of words. The other principle results naturally from this (p. 18): Mere similarity of style and vocabulary counts for little or nothing as an evidence of homogeneity. Nothing of the sort is true, however, in either case, but precisely the contrary. Both "principles" have indeed occasionally been adopted, in sheer desperation, especially in the "aërial criticism" of the Old Testament, but also in the New; see for example the words of Bousset quoted by Bacon (p. 18, note 1). The fact, perfectly demonstrable and in accord with every probability, is that the translator uses, of course, his own language; the transcriber or editor retains the wording of his document with the least possible change, generally with no change at all. I know of no exception to this rule in

¹ As for the author of I Acts, we do not know whether he was Jew, or Gentile, or proselyte; whether he wrote in Jerusalem, or Hebron, or Gaza, or Antioch, or Caesarea; for what readers he wrote, or with what immediate purpose; whether his "doctrine" was of this type or that (seeing that he writes objectively). It seems plain that he had spent the most of his life in Judea; and it appears to be with satisfaction that he narrates the complete discomfiture at Jerusalem of the "Judaizers" who came from Judea to Antioch in the interest of the Mosaic law.

either Old Testament or New.¹ It is also the rule in the oriental profane literature, of whatever sort or language. *Wherever*, in the Gospel or Acts, Luke's own vocabulary and style appear, Luke is either translating or composing freely. And if in the Gospel, for instance, Luke's own characteristic forms of speech are seen to be mingled with unmistakable material from Mark or Matthew, the explanation, barring the possibility of later harmonizing hands, is that his own rendering was colored by sight or memory of the other Gospels.² Language and style have always been, and will always continue to be, among the very best of criteria. A man may easily change his opinions, or his chief interests, from time to time; his language and literary habits are not so readily altered or concealed.

The hypothesis that the two demonstrable sources in Acts are the *only* documents in the book will, I believe, be found to satisfy all requirements save those of theologico-conjectural (sometimes termed historico-critical) research. It will not be easy to find good ground for going behind them. I cannot imagine where Bacon has found the "mental inertia" (p. 6) which is said to lead scholars to assume the priority of Semitic documents over Greek, in any case where the matter could be in doubt; certainly not among the Semitists, for they could save themselves a good deal of trouble and responsibility by supposing the Greek to be the original. It is of course simply a matter of evidence, in each and every case. Nor have I ever heard of "the common assumption of priority of Aramaic over Greek in early Christian sources" (p. 7) except to this extent, that the background of the earliest tradition is, admittedly, Aramaic, and we ordinarily expect to see water flow from the spring into the stream rather than vice versa. Bacon thinks (p. 22) of a possible attempt to find a Greek

¹ Even that arch-refashioner of tradition, the Chronicler of the Old Testament, rarely makes verbal changes in his sources, but writes out in page after page and chapter after chapter just what he finds before him. When he wishes to introduce his own views he adds single sentences, or paragraphs, or whole chapters. Of course he omits whatever he does not need.

² I should slightly modify now some things which I said in my *Translations Made from the Original Aramaic Gospels*. I was not then so sure as I am now that Luke used *only Semitic sources* in compiling his Gospel.

source *back of the Aramaic* in chapters 13-15 of Acts; but the experience of the one who should make the attempt would certainly be that which is described in someone's definition of the science of metaphysics: a blindfolded man in a dark room, trying to get hold of a black cat—which isn't there. I can hardly think that the suggestion (p. 23) that the quotation in 15:16-18 gives evidence of an original *Greek* document, behind the Aramaic, is meant seriously. Where, Bacon asks, is this form of verse 17 found? and he answers, "*Only* in the LXX." But in the very next sentence he (or the other author?) contradicts this statement flatly and finally by showing, beyond all question, that this precise form was *in the Hebrew* which the Greek rendered. He certainly would not be so rash as to attempt to prescribe the geographical limits within which this form of the Hebrew text circulated, or the extent of its popularity. It probably had been familiar for centuries, in all parts of the Jewish world. A multitude of just such variants, as we well know, were current in Judea and Jerusalem; many of them found their way, as *gerē* and *kelhibh*, even into the text which was made official more than half a century later than this. The very fact of these much-used variants was the chief reason why a "standard" had to be adopted at last. The proof-text in this form is particularly attractive here, as Bacon and others have remarked; is it difficult to suppose that the Aramaic author was intelligent enough to see this?

This is quite sufficient in reply; but I myself should not stop here. To me, it is a certainty that the Hebrew text just as we have it in our Book of Amos, 9:11 f., fully meets the need of this important passage. By "the remnant of Edom" is meant (as I believe parallel passages show conclusively) those from the hostile nations of the world—"Edom" is a standing designation of them—who shall survive the great catastrophe ushering in the messianic age. The God of Israel keeps them for himself, his name is put upon them. As we are told in Isa. 25, he will take away the veil that is now over all the foreign peoples, and will wipe away all tears from their eyes; and in Isa. 66 it is said that he will even take from them some to be his priests and Levites. The church of the Messiah "will gain possession of them" (Amos

9:12). Nothing more than this could possibly be required for the passage in Acts; though, as I have said, the other form of the Hebrew is more striking.¹

I trust I have not seemed, in the preceding pages, to claim for myself a monopoly of fact, leaving all the fancy to those who hold views differing from my own. On the other hand, I believe I have shown that certain conjectures which form the basis of widespread views of the composition and date of Acts are less plausible now than they were formerly. New material, of truly fundamental importance, has come to light, and it will make necessary a revision of long-accepted theories. The task calls for specialists in more than one field, but the work of sifting and co-ordinating will of course belong especially to the expert New Testament scholars, such as my opponent for the nonce, Professor Bacon. And may all this debating, with its necessarily emphatic *sic et non*, bring us nearer to a true understanding of these writings which are among the most important of all time!

¹The passage in Amos is one of a great many, intimately connected in their underlying thought, which seem to give a choice between two interpretations: the one broad and noble, worthy of the great Hebrew seers; the other narrow and vindictive, worthy—I am tempted to say, of a type of Old Testament exegesis which is all too common at present.

CRITICAL NOTES

THE QUALITATIVE USE OF *vómos* IN THE PAULINE EPISTLES

In their treatment of the Greek article New Testament grammarians have been forced to consider its frequent omission, or, as Professor Robertson¹ prefers to say, its absence. They have noted its non-appearance in various instances and have listed these.² Among the cases in which the article may be omitted Green, in 1842, mentions the intentional omission of the article in order that the inherent signification of the noun may without impediment emerge.³ This view, which is another way of describing what has more recently been termed the qualitative usage, he puts forward with diffidence and caution. The German grammars do not mention the qualitative usage. The English and American works of Moulton⁴ and those of Robertson recognize that anarthrous nouns may express a qualitative idea, but offer no thorough-going doctrine of the article which sets forth a definite principle governing its presence or absence. This is apparently for the first time attempted in Professor Ernest D. Burton's *Notes on New Testament Grammar*.⁵

- A qualitative noun may be defined as a noun (in Greek always anarthrous) whose function in the sentence is not primarily or solely to designate by assignment to a class but to describe by the attribution of quality, that is, of the quality or qualities that are the mark of the class designated by the noun. In Burns's line "A man's a man for a' that," "man" is in the first instance indefinite, in the second qualitative.

¹ A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research*, (New York, 1914), pp. 790 ff.

² So Winer, *et al.* Cf. also Kühner, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, (Hannover and Leipzig, 1898), I, 598 ff., where 13 cases in which the article may be omitted are enumerated.

³ Thomas Sheldon Green, *A Treatise on the Grammar of the New Testament*, (London, 1842), pp. 142-43.

⁴ James Hope Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*, Vol. I, Prolegomena. 3d ed., Edinburgh, 1908.

⁵ On page 23 of his *Notes on New Testament Grammar* (Chicago, 1904), under the heading "Syntax of the Article," Professor Burton says:

"a) The article is in general either (1) Restrictive (demonstrative), or (2) Generic.

"b) Nouns without the article are either (1) Indefinite or (2) Qualitative (adjectival)."

This nuance, which in English is frequently accomplished by the prefixing of the indefinite article, is in Greek achieved by the omission of the article. Commentators and translators have often failed to appreciate its significance.¹ About nine hundred nouns are used qualitatively in the Pauline epistles. Of these *νόμος* furnishes one of the best examples both of the qualitative usage and of the failure of translators in rendering it into English.

This important word appears in Paul 117 times. It occurs frequently in some of the other New Testament literature, though it is entirely absent from the Johannine epistles and the Apocalypse, as well as from the Petrine epistles and the Gospel of Mark. Outside the Pauline writings it is used generally with the article and with reference to the Mosaic Law or to the Old Testament.² In Paul, however, *νόμος* frequently occurs without the article, being used qualitatively, that is, with especial emphasis upon the essential law-quality of law, its "lawness," so to speak.³

Of the 117 instances in Paul, 46 are preceded by the article (usually restrictive), the context in the great majority of cases showing that the law referred to is that set forth in the Old Testament. Among other instances may be cited: Rom. 2:14*b*, where the naturally lawless Gentiles are credited with actions that are in accordance with the Jewish Law; 2:20, where the Jew is represented as having or believing himself to have the form of knowledge and truth in the Law; 3:21, where it is affirmed that the non-legalistic nature of God's righteousness is attested by the Law and the Prophets.

In a few instances *νόμος* refers to some other code or statute defined in the context, or, by metonymy, to a force having an effect similar to

¹ Moulton, *op. cit.*, p. 83, "For exegesis there are few of the finer points of Greek which need more constant attention than this omission of the article when the writer would lay stress on the quality or character of the object. Even the Revised Version misses this badly sometimes, as in John 6:68."

² For example, Matt. 12:5: "Or have ye not read in the law that on the Sabbath day the priests in the temple profane the Sabbath and are guiltless?" John 12:34: "We have heard out of the law that the Christ abideth forever." See also: Luke 2:22; John 1:46; Acts 28:23; Heb. 9:22; Jas. 1:10.

³ Yet one must not fall into the error of thinking that it is always the legalistic quality of law that is prominent in the apostle's mind. In Rom. 13:10, *πλήρωμα οὐκ νόμου ἢ ἀγάπης*, it is the ethical element of law which is to the fore. *Νόμος* used qualitatively presents this emphasis upon the essential character of law, while at the same time designating it as the law referred to in the context. This is usually, but not invariably, the Mosaic Law variously viewed. Cf. Burton, "Redemption from the Curse of the Law," *American Journal of Theology*, xi (1907), pp. 624 ff.

that of a law, as in Rom. 7:22-23: "For I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members." See also Rom. 7:2, 3; 8:2a.

Numerous examples of the qualitative usage of *νόμος* might be presented and discussed,¹ for example, Rom. 2:23a: *ὃς ἐν νόμῳ καυχᾶται, διὰ παραβάσεως τοῦ νόμου τὸν θεὸν ἀτιμάζει*; Here in the prepositional phrase *νόμος* is qualitative. The Jew is represented as glorying in a religion whose distinguishing feature was its legalism. This legalistic character was as a matter of fact expressed in the Jewish code, but it is here not the code itself which the apostle has specially in mind but the legalistic nature of the Jewish religion. In the second half of the sentence, on the other hand, he refers to the code as such. When in the first clause he says, "thou who gloriest in law," it is obvious that if pressed to explain what law he had in mind he would have said, "the Jewish law," but it is equally obvious that, though making covert or unconscious reference to that law, his primary emphasis is upon its essentially legalistic character. Omitting the article in English in the first clause allows the intention of the Greek to make itself felt: "thou who gloriest in law, dost thou through transgression of the law dishonor God?"

Rom. 2:25 is another example: *περιτομή μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ ἐὰν νόμον πράσῃς; ἐὰν δὲ παραβάτης νόμου ᾖς, ἡ περιτομή σου ἀκροβυστία γέγονεν*. To bring out the qualitative force of *νόμος* here one might read, "if thou be a law-keeper . . . if thou be a law-transgressor," "if thou be a keeper of law . . . a transgressor of law." The insertion of the definite article in translation, as in the Revised Version, completely obliterates the qualitative usage and alters the sense of the passage.

Of the 71 occurrences of *νόμος* without the article in the Pauline epistles, 35 are in prepositional phrases. From this fact it might be assumed that nouns in prepositional phrases tend to be qualitative. More extensive data are needed, however, to justify such an assumption. What is clear is that in Paul *νόμος* in prepositional phrases tends to be qualitative. In all the Pauline epistles only 12 instances of *νόμος* with the article in prepositional phrases occur. In the rest of the New Testament the proportion is reversed, there being only 7 instances of

¹ *νόμος* is used qualitatively in the Pauline epistles in the following passages: Rom. 2:12 (*bis*), 13 (*bis*), 14 (*ter*), 17, 23, 25 (*bis*); 3:20 (*bis*), 21, 27 (*bis*), 28, 31 (*bis*); 4:13, 14, 15; 5:13 (*bis*), 20; 6:14, 15; 7:1, 2a, 7, 8, 9, 25 (*bis*); 9:31 (*bis*); 10:4, 5; 13:8, 10; I Cor. 9:20 (*qualiter*); Gal. 2:16 (*ter*), 19 (*bis*), 21; 3:2, 5, 10, 11, 18, 21 (*bis*); 23; 4:4, 5, 21; 5:4, 18, 23; 6:13; Phil. 3:5, 6, 9; I Tim. 1:9.

anarthrous *νόμος* in prepositional phrases to 29 in which the article is used. The data as regards the prepositional usage of *νόμος* both with and without the article in the whole New Testament are as follows:

With the article:

ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, Matt. 5:18; Acts 28:23; Rom. 7:2, 3, 6; 8:2
 διὰ τοῦ νόμου, Rom. 7:8
 εἰς τὸν νόμον, Acts 25:8
 ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, John 12:34; Rom. 2:18; 4:16
 ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, Matt. 12:5; 22:36; Luke 2:24; 10:26; 24:44; John 1:46;
 8:5, 17; 10:34; 15:25; Rom. 2:20; 7:23; I Cor. 9:9; 14; 21
 κατὰ τοῦ νόμου, Acts 6:13; 21:28; Heb. 7:5
 κατὰ τὸν νόμον, Luke 2:22, 39; John 18:31; 19:7; Acts 23:3; 24:14;
 Heb. 9:19, 22
 μετὰ τὸν νόμον, Heb. 7:28
 παρὰ τὸν νόμον, Acts 18:13
 ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου, Rom. 3:21; Jas. 2:9

Without the article:

ἔχρη νόμου, Rom. 5:13
 διὰ νόμον, Rom. 2:12; 3:20, 27; 4:13; 7:7; Gal. 2:19, 21; Jas. 2:12
 εἰς νόμον, Rom. 9:31; Jas. 1:25
 ἐκ νόμου, Rom. 4:14; 10:5; Gal. 3:18, 21 (mg.); Phil. 3:9
 ἐν νόμῳ, Luke 2:23; Acts 13:39; Rom. 2:12, 23; Gal. 3:11, 21; 5:4;
 Phil. 3:6
 κατὰ νόμον, Phil. 3:5; Heb. 7:16; 8:4; 10:8
 περὶ νόμου, Acts 18:15
 ὑπὸ νόμον, Rom. 6:14, 15; I Cor. 9:20 (*quater*); Gal. 3:23; 4:4, 5, 21; 5:18
 χωρὶς νόμου, Rom. 3:21; 7:8, 9

Of the 71 anarthrous instances, nearly all (61) are qualitative, the omission of the article having the effect, not of assigning the law referred to to a class of laws, as if it were one of many, but of emphasizing its quality as law. In many instances where the noun is limited by a qualifying genitive, itself anarthrous, it is the quality expressed by the whole compound expression, or especially that which is conveyed by the genitive, which is emphasized.¹

¹ A qualitative noun may be modified by a noun which is itself qualitative, as, e.g., in Rom. 1:1, εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ; 1:4, υἱοῦ θεοῦ; πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης; 2:29, περιτομή καρδίας; 7:25, νόμος θεοῦ . . . νόμος ἁμαρτίας. In such collocations both words are qualitative, the stronger qualitative emphasis naturally lying upon the second term, the qualitative qualifier.

Similarly in the oft-recurring phrase ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, while Paul no doubt has in mind the Old Testament Jewish Law as the concrete thing by legalistic obedience to which men were expecting to be justified, yet it is its quality as a legalistic system upon which he throws emphasis, and the proper translation would be, "by works of law." So also in Rom. 7:25 we should read, not "the law of God . . . the law of sin," but "a law of God . . . a law of sin."

In all these instances the qualitative usage of *νόμος* is clear and in some cases striking, particularly in passages where the qualitative and the definite usages stand side by side, as in Rom. 2:14, 23, already discussed, 3:21; Gal. 3:18-19; 4:21. Taking the last mentioned as a further illustration, it is evident that the apostle's meaning is, "Tell me, ye that desire a legalistic type of religion, are ye not acquainted with the Jewish law?" Or, more briefly, "Ye that desire to be under law, do ye not hear the law?" Doubtless the "law" the legalistic Galatians wished to be "under" was actually the Mosaic Law, but it is not that as such which Paul has in mind in the phrase "under law." That condition would be equally abhorrent to his mind, whether it were the Mosaic or some other legalistic code. "Under law" meant actually in his own experience and doubtless in the Galatian tendency which he denounces specifically the Jewish Law.¹ Nevertheless it is not that or any other specific system which is designated by the phrase "under law," but the essential character of such systems, their law-quality. Had the revisers rendered this passage with the insight that marked their translation of Rom. 6:14-15, where, amending the Authorized Version, they correctly read, "for ye are not under law but under grace. What then? shall we sin because we are not under law but under grace?" the apostle's meaning would have been more adequately expressed.

Insistence upon the recognition of the qualitative force of *νόμος* in Paul is more than a mere grammatical punctilio; it is a necessary element in correct interpretation. Its recognition enlarges the apostle's religious philosophy from an anticodal polemic to a wide-sweeping assertion of spiritual freedom. He insisted on absolute spiritual liberty, and his breach with legal morality was complete. To limit his reference to the Mosaic code alone is in many instances to reduce the force of his statement and to narrow his thought.

¹ To say that a noun is qualitative is not to deny to it specific reference to a particular thing. The function of a qualitative noun is, however, not primarily to designate, but to lay stress upon the qualities of that to which the noun refers. In the case of *νόμος* the qualities are those that distinguish law, but the particular law in mind is usually the Mosaic Law or the Old Testament in general.

In the translation of νόμος the revisers have generally ignored the distinction between the definite ὁ νόμος and the qualitative νόμος, in so far as the latter is concerned. When the context makes it reasonably clear that it is the Mosaic Law that Paul has especially in mind, they have taken this as warrant for translating νόμος "the law," obscuring the fact that his emphasis is upon its law-quality.

The insertion in some instances of alternative readings bears witness to the revisers' uncertainty and increases the difficulty of interpretation upon the basis of the English text. In the following conspectus the Revised Version renderings of anarthrous νόμος in the Pauline literature are divided into two groups, viz., those passages in which a text reading and a marginal reading are given, and those passages in which a text reading only is given. These are then subdivided into their various possibilities. Carried out to its fullest extent the conspectus would present a series of 27, based upon the possible choices between the text and marginal readings of "law," "a law," and "the law." To present this series in full is unnecessary, inasmuch as only a few of these possibilities are actually adopted by the revisers. The arrangement of the facts presented is, however, such that in every passage in the Pauline epistles where νόμος without the article appears the single correct rendering is indicated, together with the Revised Version's divergence therefrom, where such occurs.

1. Anarthrous νόμος is rendered by "the law" in the text and "law" in the margin:
 - a) When the marginal reading should have stood in the text: Rom. 3:20 (*bis*), 28, 31 (*bis*); 4:13; 5:20; 7:1a, 8, 9.
 - b) When the rendering should have been "a law." In no instance.
 - c) Correctly. In no instance is the reading of the text correct.
2. Anarthrous νόμος is rendered by a text reading only as follows:
 - a) By "law":
 - (1) When the rendering should have been "a law." In no instance.
 - (2) When the rendering should have been "the law." In no instance.
 - (3) Correctly. Rom. 3:27a; 6:14, 15; 7:2a; I Tim. 1:9.
 - b) By "a law":
 - (1) When the rendering should have been "the law." In no instance.
 - (2) When the rendering should have been "law." Rom. 9:31a.

- (3) Correctly.¹ Rom. 3:27b; 4:15; 5:13b; 7:23a; Gal. 5:23.
- c) By "the law":
- (1) When the rendering should have been "a law." In no instance.
 - (2) When the rendering should have been "law." Rom. 2:12 (*bis*), 13 (*bis*), 14 (*ter*), 17, 23, 25 (*bis*); 3:21; 4:14; 5:13a; 7:25 (*bis*); 9:31b;² 10:4, 5; 13:8, 10; I Cor. 9:20 (*quater*); Gal. 2:16 (*ter*), 19 (*bis*), 21; 3:2, 5, 10, 11, 18, 21 (*bis*), 23; 4:4, 5, 21; 5:4, 18; 6:13; Phil. 3: 5, 6, 9.
 - (3) Correctly. In no instance.

While the larger number of the above-mentioned possibilities are merely theoretical, and actual examples of such translations do not occur, it is important to exhibit them, and that their failure to appear is not due to any intrinsic improbability or to the watchfulness of the revisers is indicated by the 48 instances in which νόμος is translated "the law," when a correct rendering would have required "law."

In the 10 instances where the revisers were in doubt or disagreement among themselves as to whether the rendering should be "the law" or "law," they have in every instance placed the incorrect rendering "the law" in the text and the correct reading "law" in the margin.³ In one instance they have read "a law" where the rendering should have been "law." In one instance the anarthrous and qualitative νόμος has been incorrectly rendered "that law." In five instances they have read "a law" correctly, and in five they have read "law" correctly. Thus out of 71 instances of anarthrous νόμος, 61 are palpable mistranslations, though in 10 of these the correct rendering is given in the margin. That the obviously qualitative Pauline usage of this word could so completely fail of recognition in the revision of the New Testament is an evidence of the need that New Testament interpreters, upon the basis of either the Greek or the English text, give attention to the qualitative usage of nouns; it is, moreover, a sufficient apology for such an investigation as the one here presented.

A. WAKEFIELD SLATEN.

CHICAGO, ILL.

¹ In Rom. 4:15; 5:13b; Gal. 5:23, "no law" is regarded as equivalent to "not a" or "not any law."

² In Rom. 9:31b εἰς νόμον οὐκ ἔφθασεν is translated, "did not arrive at *that* law."

³ It is to be noted that the 10 instances where an alternative reading is suggested are in no way different from the 48 instances where the reading "the law" was chosen without such marginal variation.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

EPHOD AND ARK¹

In a number of early passages the ephod is certainly a garment, apparently an apron, or loin cloth, worn as a sacred vestment. Samuel wore an ephod when he ministered at Shiloh (I Sam. 2:18), and David wore an ephod when he danced before the ark (II Sam. 6:14). In the Priestly Code the ephod is still a garment worn by the High Priest (e.g., Exod. 29:5). In contrast to these passages the ephod appears in other contexts, not as a garment, but as a solid object made of gold, carried about by the priests and consulted by them to obtain oracles. Thus Gideon made an ephod out of 1,700 shekels of gold taken from the Midianites, which served as the medium of Yahwe's rule at Ophrah (Judg. 8:22-27). Micah made a silver ephod, which was an instrument of divination at his sanctuary (Judg. 17:1-5; 18:5). At the temple in Nob the sword of Goliath was kept wrapped in a cloth behind the ephod (I Sam. 21:9). Throughout the Book of Samuel the priests are described as "carrying an ephod," not "wearing an ephod," as even the Revised Version and the Jewish Version still translate (I Sam. 2:28; 14:3). When Abiathar fled to David, he came down "with an ephod in his hand" (I Sam. 23:6). When David wished to ascertain the will of Yahwe, he said to the priest, "Bring hither the ephod" (I Sam. 23:9b; 30:7), and the priest by this means gave the divine response. It has been recognized generally that the latter passages cannot be reconciled with the idea that the ephod was a garment; and accordingly it has become usual to speak of an "ephod-idol" as implied in these cases.

A different solution of the problem is proposed by Professor Arnold. It starts from the fact that in I Sam. 14:18 the present Hebrew text reads: "And Saul said to Ahijah, Bring hither the sacred ark" (אֲרֹן הָאֱלֹהִים). For this the Greek text of Vaticanus reads: "And Saul said to Ahijah, Bring hither the ephod." It has been almost universally assumed by modern critics that the Greek text of this passage is correct,

¹ *Ephod and Ark. A Study in the Records and Religion of the Ancient Hebrews.* By William R. Arnold. (Harvard Theological Studies, III.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918. 170 pages.

because in the Hebrew text of the similar passages I Sam. 23:9b; 30:7, we read, "Bring hither the ephod"; but Arnold argues that on every principle of sound textual criticism the Hebrew of I Sam. 14:18 is to be preferred. "No slip of the pen or careless reading can have produced ארון האלֹהִים from an original האֶפֶד; while it is simply inconceivable that a Jewish scribe should have gone out of his way to corrupt a harmless text, and incidentally bedevil the whole orthodox theory of the religious institutions of Israel, by consciously substituting the one for the other." To the present writer it seems that this contention is entirely correct. If "ark" was the original reading, we can easily see why it should have been changed to "ephod," because it contradicted the teaching of the completed Pentateuch with regard to the nature and the uses of the ark; but if "ephod" was the original reading, then no reason appears why it should have been changed to "ark." Accordingly, on the text-critical principle that of two readings that one is to be regarded as correct which most readily explains the origin of the other, the preference in this case must be given to "ark" rather than to "ephod." "Ephod" in the Greek must then be a deliberate scribal correction of "ark" which has escaped correction in the Hebrew.

The objection to this conclusion may be raised that the ark was at this time at Kirjath Jearim (I Sam. 7:1) and remained there until David brought it to Jerusalem (II Sam., chap. 6); it cannot, therefore, have been with Saul at the battle of Michmash. This objection is not very forceful, since the ark might have been brought up temporarily to Michmash, even though Kirjath Jearim continued to be its headquarters. Professor Arnold, however, deals with this argument in a much more thoroughgoing fashion. He shows that the notion that there was only one ark is a pure assumption of Jewish tradition based upon the centralization of worship at Jerusalem inaugurated by Deuteronomy, and that the older literature shows that there were many arks, just as there were many sanctuaries. "The historical ark of Yahwe was not a unique but a manifold object, attaching to every Palestinian sanctuary that possessed a consecrated priesthood; and the theory of a single ark, corresponding to that of a single legitimate sanctuary, is the last surviving Deuteronomistic conceit in the theological science of the present day" (p. 27). "There is not a single pre-exilic reference—not even in Deuteronomy and Kings—which is actually incompatible with the hypothesis of a manifold box; whereas there are no less than five passages, besides I Sam. 14:18, which are incompatible with any other hypothesis" (p. 34).

The word which our version renders "ark" is generic and means simply "box." It is used for the coffin in which the body of Joseph was carried from Egypt (Gen. 50:26; cf. Exod. 13:19), also of the money box at the door of the Temple (II Kings 12:10 f.; II Chron. 24:8, 10 f.). In Phœnician it means "coffin." In I Sam. 3:3 we read, "And Samuel was asleep in the temple of Yahwe, where there was a sacred box." This is the correct translation of *אֲשֶׁר שָׁם אָרוֹן אֱלֹהִים*, which does not mean, "where the ark of God was," as our version renders it. The statement implies that this particular box belonged to a genus, just as we might speak of an altar, or a communion table, in a Christian church. In I Sam. 4:3, which comes from a different document from the preceding passage, and therefore has no knowledge of the "sacred box" in 3:3, we read: "Let us procure the box [of the covenant] of Yahwe from Shiloh. . . . So the army sent to Shiloh, and caused to be transported thence the box of Yahwe Şebaoth." At the first mention of the box the author of this document finds it necessary to define it by saying that it was at Shiloh and that it belonged to Yahwe Şebaoth, or, as Professor Arnold translates it, "Yahwe Militant." This was the same box that was captured by the Philistines, was restored to Israel, and was kept in the house of Obed Edom at Kirjath Jearim (I Sam. 5:1-7:2). Inasmuch as it has already been defined in chapter 4, it was not necessary to define it again in this section, but when after a considerable interval it appears again in II Sam. 6:2, we are told that David brought up "the sacred box which was especially dedicated to Yahwe Şebaoth." Here the author finds it necessary to discriminate this sacred box from others as the one belonging to Yahwe Şebaoth, which was the name under which Yahwe had been worshiped at Shiloh.

On the other hand, in I Sam. 14:18 Saul does not say, "Bring hither the box of Yahwe Şebaoth," but merely, "Bring hither the sacred box" (*אֲרוֹן הָאֱלֹהִים*), which does not suggest in any way the identity of this box with the one that was originally at Shiloh and later at Kirjath Jearim and Jerusalem.

In I Kings 2:26 we read: "I will not put thee to death, because thou didst bear the box of Yahwe before David my father, and didst share all the sufferings which my father suffered." This box also is not called "the box of Yahwe Şebaoth," and it cannot have been the box of Shiloh, Kirjath Jearim, and Jerusalem, since Abiathar did not carry that before David at the time when he was a fugitive in the wilderness of Judah. It must have been a third box different from both of those that we have just considered.

In like manner Jer. 3:16, in an oracle delivered to the remnant of the Northern Kingdom, the prophet says: "And it shall come to pass, when you increase and multiply in the land in those days, declares Yahwe, that men will no longer speak of the 'box of Yahwe' nor will it enter their minds, nor will they invoke it, nor will they resort to it; neither will it be manufactured any more." The box here referred to cannot be the individual ark of the Temple in Jerusalem but is an institution of the northern tribes. Professor Arnold accordingly concludes that there was probably an ark, or oracular box, at every important sanctuary of ancient Israel, just as there was a holy stone, an ashera, and an altar. To the reviewer it seems that he succeeds in establishing his contention.

If then the ark was plural, there is no reason why we should not accept the reading of the Hebrew text in I Sam. 14:18, "Bring hither the sacred box." The primitive oracular use of the ark is confirmed by three other passages. In II Sam 11:11 we read: "The box and Israel and Judah are lodged in booths." Here it is assumed that the box for taking the omens habitually accompanied the army of Israel, as in I Sam. 14:18. In II Sam. 15:24-29 we are told: "And behold also Zadok and Abiathar bearing the sacred box. . . . And the king said unto Abiathar, Art thou a seer? Return to the city in peace. . . . See I will linger in the lowlands of the wilderness until word come from you to inform me. So Zadok and Abiathar took the sacred box back to Jerusalem and remained there." The point of this remark, as Professor Arnold for the first time shows clearly, is that David says to Zadok, "You are not a seer who can tell me at a distance what is happening at Jerusalem, you are only a *kōhēn*, 'a diviner,' who gets responses from the sacred box. Therefore return to Jerusalem, where you can be of use to me by keeping me informed of all that takes place there, and take the sacred box back with you, which you alone know how to use." Here the ark as the physical medium of priestly divination is contrasted with the second sight of the clairvoyant. In Judg. 20:27 also we read of a sacred box of which the children of Israel inquired, Shall I again go out to battle with my brethren of Benjamin?

If these conclusions are correct it follows that "Bring hither the ephod" in the Greek text of I Sam. 14:18 is a deliberate change in the Hebrew manuscript from which the Greek was translated, in order to save the unity and sanctity of the ark as described in the Priestly Code. In that case it is probable that "Bring hither the ephod" in I Sam. 23:9b; 30:7, is due to a similar change. The original reading in both verses must have been, "Bring hither the ark," for the situation is

precisely similar to the passages that have just been considered in which the ark is the medium of divination. In like manner all the other passages in which the "solid ephod" is mentioned are open to the suspicion of having undergone a similar change. When the priests are called "carriers of the ephod" (I Sam. 2:28; 14:3), and when Abiathar comes down to David "with an ephod in his hand" the original reading was not "ephod" but "ark," for in numerous early passages the priests are said to carry the ark (e.g., II Sam. 15:24-29). The ephod of gold that Gideon made (Judg. 8:27) he "deposited" (וַיִּצַב) in Ophrah. The same term is used of the ark in I Sam. 5:2; II Sam. 6:17; 15:24. The Deuteronomic comment "and all Israel played the harlot after it there" indicates also that it was used for oracular purposes, as was the ark. Micah's silver ephod (Judg. 17:1-5) was "inquired of" by the priest in precisely the same manner as the ark (Judg. 18:5). At the sanctuary in Nob the "ephod" had apparently similar oracular functions (I Sam. 21:9; 22:10, 13). In all these passages, if "ark" be substituted for "ephod," the difficulties vanish, and the history at once becomes clear. The conclusion accordingly follows that the only real ephod was the loin cloth with which the priest was "girded." The "solid ephod" passages, therefore, should be added to those in which the ark is mentioned in early literature in forming our idea of the nature and uses of the ancient Israelite ark.

The ארון אלֹהִים, or "sacred box," was a Canaanite institution found probably at every important sanctuary. When these sanctuaries were appropriated to the service of Yahwe, their "sacred boxes" were called "boxes of Yahwe." They were regarded as miniature temples, in which the deity dwelt and through which he manifested his power. Revelation was effected by means of lots that gave either an affirmative, a negative, or a neutral answer. These were drawn out by the priest who consulted the oracle. The box was small enough to be carried by a single priest, but occasionally it was carried by two priests. It accompanied the priests wherever they went, and was the medium by which they gave their *lōrōth*, or oracular decisions.

The discussion of all the passages involved in this study is accompanied with an elaborate text-critical and exegetical commentary that is of the greatest value in elucidating many obscure points in the earlier historical books. An excursus investigates the meaning of the divine name יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת, Yahwe Šebaoth. Professor Arnold rightly points out that, inasmuch as there is no article with Šebaoth, this name cannot be translated "Yahwe of the hosts," referring either to the armies of

Israel or to the armies of heaven. He maintains that the genitive must be taken in an adjectival sense as in **שַׂר צְבָאוֹת**, "military commander," over against **שַׂר צָבָא**, "a commander in chief," and **שַׂר הַצָּבָא**, "the commander in chief," so that the title means "Yahwe Militant." The difficulty with this view is that Yahwe, being a proper name, is definite and therefore cannot be construed before **צָבָא** in the same manner as **שַׂר**. It would seem as though it were necessary to regard **צְבָאוֹת** as in apposition with **יְהוָה**, like **אֱלֹהִים** in the combination **יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים**. A second excursus, which bears no relation to the foregoing discussion, investigates a troublesome passage in the Elephantine Temple Papyrus.

Taking it as a whole, this treatise on the ephod and ark is the most important study of these subjects that has yet appeared. It clarifies our thought in a way that no other critic has hitherto succeeded in doing.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON

HARTFORD THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
HARTFORD, CONN.

THE BOOK OF DANIEL¹

Doctor Wilson essays the thankless, and to many it will seem hopeless, task of rehabilitating the authenticity and historical character of the Book of Daniel. He is convinced in the case of this book "that the methods pursued by many so-called higher critics are illogical, irrational, and unscientific" (p. xiii). After this warning we might expect that his own discussion would be unimpeachably logical, rational, and scientific. As a matter of fact it is characterized by a most perverse critical method. After a few preliminary remarks on the argument from silence, he plunges at once into the question, Was Daniel a historical character? and then takes up a number of particular historical difficulties in the Book of Daniel. A "so-called higher critic" would think that there were several preliminary questions to be answered before the historicity of the Book of Daniel could be investigated. To this "illogical, irrational, and unscientific" individual it would seem that the trustworthiness of a book depended upon its composite or unitary character, its age, its authorship, its use of reliable sources, and similar antecedent facts. Is Daniel a historical personage? Are the statements of his book that are unsupported by external evidence trustworthy? These are problems whose solution depends upon our answer to the earlier question,

¹*Studies in the Book of Daniel. A Discussion of the Historical Questions.* By Robert Dick Wilson. New York: Putnam, 1917. xvi+402 pages. \$3.50.

Is the book the work of a prophet of the Babylonian period, or of an apocalypticist of the Maccabean period? Doctor Wilson, not being a "so-called higher critic," can dispense with these preliminary investigations and prove the historicity of Daniel without determining when and by whom it was written. In his Introduction (p. iii) he tells us that he proposes in a second volume to investigate the evidence for the age of this book from its language, and in a third volume the evidence of the canon and of post-exilic literature with regard to its date. This is a strange critical method, that begins with the problem of historical character and ends up with the external evidence to the age of a book!

To show the futility of this method one may take a modern counterpart. In a Roman Catholic life of Saint Francis Xavier the statement is made that, while he was celebrating mass on the deck of a ship off the coast of India, he lost overboard a golden crucifix given him by the Pope; but on landing he was rejoiced to see advancing toward him a gigantic sea crab bearing the crucifix in one of its claws. A "so-called higher critic" would ask first, Who is the authority for this statement, when did he live, and what kind of a man was he? and would postpone judgment with regard to the credibility of the story until these preliminary questions had been answered satisfactorily. He would discover that this incident is narrated not by an eyewitness but by a later biographer, and that this biographer was a Jesuit, who believed that "the end justifies the means," and that a lie *ad maiorem gloriam Dei* is justifiable. He would conclude, therefore, that this was a fiction and would waste no time in investigating whether it might not have happened. Doctor Wilson, on the contrary, following the analogy of his treatment of Daniel, would ask nothing about the age or authorship of this story; but would say, The silence of Xavier's contemporaries proves nothing with regard to this miracle, because one can never prove anything from silence. This story ought to be given the benefit of the doubt. "A man is presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty. A book, or document, is supposed to be true until it is proven false" (p. 23). Then he would gather much learned evidence to show that popes were accustomed to give crosses to missionaries, and would determine the maximum weight of such crosses. He would also investigate crabs in the Indian Ocean, and would show that they were large enough and strong enough to carry a golden cross. From this he would conclude that nobody but an "illogical, irrational, and unscientific higher critic" would think of doubting the historicity of this narrative.

The case of Daniel is similar to this modern instance. The book is written in two languages. Dan. 2:4—7:28 is Aramaic, the rest is Hebrew. What is the meaning of this phenomenon? Did one writer use both languages, or have two different authors been combined by a later hand, or did a later writer make use of an earlier document? If this diversity of language indicates two independent authors, then we have two problems of age and two problems of historical character on our hands, instead of one. These questions are fundamental for the interpretation and for the historical character of the book, but Professor Wilson ignores them.

There is no external evidence of the existence of this book, or of any of its parts, before the Maccabean age. This is an argument from silence, and, as Professor Wilson remarks, "Silence does not prove that the event did not occur." Of course not. Ever since the time of Du Pin critics have recognized that the argument from silence needs to be carefully qualified. The silence must be complete, it must not be due to indifference, nor to intention, nor to accident; but making allowance for other possible explanations than nonexistence the argument from silence is valuable and has been employed with success for the detection of many classical and ecclesiastical forgeries. If a book fell within the scope of other authors, if they had no motive for ignoring it, if it was so famous that they could not fail to know it, and if, in spite of all this, they never mention it, their silence is rightly interpreted as evidence that the book was not in existence. This argument is used with perfect legitimacy and with telling effect in the case of the non-mention of the finished Pentateuch in pre-exilic literature, and also the non-mention of particular parts of the Pentateuch.

The argument is equally valid in the case of the Book of Daniel. In spite of the conspicuous place that Daniel occupies in this book, post-exilic writers are silent about him. Granted that in most cases this may be accidental, it cannot be so in Ben Sirach. In Ecclus., chapters 44—50, he sets out to enumerate the famous men in the history of Israel. He names all the prominent personages in the Law and in the Former Prophets; then Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the twelve Minor Prophets; then Zerubbabel, Joshua, the high priest of the restoration, and Simon, the son of Onias, the Maccabean high priest. He does not mention Daniel, Esther, or Mordecai. The omission here cannot be either accidental or intentional. It can be due only to the fact that the Books of Daniel and Esther had not yet been written in the time of this author (ca. 170 B. C.). Ben Sirach says also that there was no man like Joseph

in the history of Israel (49:15). This remark he could not have made if he had known Daniel, who in his interpretation of dreams and his rising to high position in a foreign court bears a close resemblance to Joseph.

The same conclusion is demanded by the absence of Daniel from the second collection of the Hebrew canon. This contains both exilic and post-exilic histories and prophecies, but it does not include either Daniel or Esther. These books stand among the "Writings" in the third collection of the canon. The only plausible interpretation of this fact is that, when the canon of the Prophets was closed, about 200 B. C., Daniel and Esther had not yet been written. The first reference to Daniel in Hebrew literature is I Macc. 2:59 f., that is, about 100 B.C. The external evidence accordingly seems to show that Daniel was written between 170 and 100 B.C., and that therefore there is no reason to expect that it will be accurately informed with regard to Babylonian history. If these arguments are not sound they ought to be refuted at the start, before one undertakes to defend the statements of this book in detail; but in order to find out what Doctor Wilson thinks on these matters we shall have to wait for his third volume, although perhaps we may guess what he is going to say.

The internal evidence of the book points equally clearly to its origin in the Maccabean period. Daniel is supposed to have lived during the Babylonian Exile, but the book nowhere suggests that he is the author rather than the hero. He is spoken of in the third person, and the extravagant praise that is bestowed upon him is more consistent with the supposition that someone is telling about him than that he is speaking of himself. "Daniel knew ten times more than all the wise men of Babylon." "Wisdom like the wisdom of the gods was found in him." "He was faithful, neither was there any error or fault found in him." The book shows nothing of that precise knowledge of Babylonia and of the period of the exile that we find in Ezekiel and Deutero-Isaiah, and that we should expect in a contemporary. On the contrary, whenever it touches Babylonian history it raises such a host of difficulties with Kings, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the Babylonian monuments that Doctor Wilson requires four hundred closely printed pages to devise hypotheses by which he may harmonize it with these early historical records. We have no such trouble with the prophecies of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Haggai, and Zechariah. They fit into the history of their times with perfect ease, and no labored defenses of their credibility are necessary. What is the reason for the difference in the case of the Book of Daniel?

In like manner Daniel is supposed to have lived under Darius and Cyrus in the early Persian period (6:28), but his book shows nothing of the circumstantiality of a contemporary of this period, and the difficulties with other historians are as great as in the Babylonian period. When, however, we come down to the Greek period as described in the visions, particularly in chapter 11, our author is so detailed and precise that he becomes one of our most valuable sources for the history of the Greek period. Here there are no apparent contradictions with other authorities, but the statements can be fitted into the history of that period with the same ease with which Isaiah can be fitted into the history of the Assyrian period. The persecutions of Antiochus Epiphanes, his desecration of the Temple in 168 B.C., and his effort to destroy Judaism are depicted with great detail and are in accord with the evidence from other sources; but all that lies beyond this is unknown to the author, except that he believes that Antiochus is going to be overthrown. This is not in accord with the analogy of genuine prophetic books, which are clear in their descriptions of the times of their authors and shade off into uncertainty as they look into the future; but it is exactly like the Book of Enoch and other Jewish apocalypses of the Greek period, in which history is related in the form of visions seen by ancient worthies, that grow increasingly clear as one approaches the time of the author, but that become obscure in the times that lie beyond the author. A "so-called higher critic" would infer from these considerations that Daniel was an apocalypse of the Greek period, and he would find confirmation of this view in the fact that the musical instruments played before King Nebuchadnezzar have Greek names, and that both the Hebrew and the Aramaic of this book are of a late type. If this conclusion is wrong it should be refuted at the outset, for no opinion can be formed with regard to the historical character of this work until we know when it was written; but Professor Wilson defers his investigation of these matters until his second and third volumes.

Coming now to details, in Dan. 1:1 we are told that Nebuchadnezzar carried away Jehoiakim and some of the vessels of the Temple in Jehoiakim's third year. Here the king of Babylon is called Nebuchadnezzar, נְבוּכַדְנֶצְצַר, but in all the Book of Jeremiah through chapter 26 and in chapters 32-52 (except 34:1; 39:5), and throughout the Book of Ezekiel, this king is called Nebuchadrezzar, נְבוּכַדְרֶצְצַר. This corresponds with the Babylonian form of his name Nabu-kudur[u]-uṣur and is unquestionably the original Hebrew transcription. In II Kings, chapters 24-25, he is called Nebuchadnezzar, as in Daniel; but in the

duplicate passage, Jer. chapter 52, the correct reading Nebuchadrezzar is preserved. Only in Jer., chapters 27-31, through some accident of transmission, Nebuchadnezzar is found, yet even here the reading Nebuchadrezzar has survived in 29:21. The late books, Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, uniformly say Nebuchadnezzar. Here accordingly, the Book of Daniel follows the late and incorrect usage of Chronicles instead of the usage of the monuments and of the early Hebrew records in calling the king Nebuchadnezzar instead of Nebuchadrezzar. How is this possible if, as Professor Wilson assumes, the book was written by Daniel himself? The only answer that one finds to this question is a footnote on page 167, which says: "Nebuchadnezzar may be the Aramaic translation of the Babylonian Nebuchadrezzar. *Kudur* in the sense of worshiper is the same in meaning as the Aramaic *kedin* or *kedan*." To which one may reply: (1) names of foreign kings were not translated in antiquity, but were transliterated; (2) if in this case a translation had been attempted, the whole name would have been translated and not merely a single element; (3) *kudur* and *kedin* are not equivalents. Why in his translation of Jer. chapter 25 (p. 49), does Doctor Wilson substitute without comment Nebuchadnezzar instead of Nebuchadrezzar of the Hebrew and of the American Revised Version which he professes to follow?

Another major difficulty of the Book of Daniel is found in its statements concerning Darius the Mede. In 5:30 f. we read: "In that night Belshazzar the Chaldean king was slain, and Darius the Mede received the kingdom." The natural inference from this statement is that Belshazzar, the last Babylonian emperor, was succeeded immediately by the Median emperor Darius; but according to the inscriptions and all our other ancient evidence Nabonidus, the last Babylonian emperor, was succeeded immediately by Cyrus, the first Persian emperor. Authentic history has no place for a Median empire between the Babylonian and the Persian empires. Doctor Wilson's answer is that Darius the Mede is the same as Gobryas, who, according to the Nabonidus-Cyrus cylinder, was appointed governor of Babylon by Cyrus. To be sure, there is no proof of their identity, but then ancient kings often had two names. Cyrus calls him *amel pihate*, or *pasha*, of Babylon; but the correct Aramaic translation of this would be "king" in the sense of sub-king(?). He really reigned as a vassal-monarch contemporaneous with Cyrus.

This hypothesis is irreconcilable with the data of the Book of Daniel. In Dan. 5:22 f, Belshazzar is said to have received the kingdom of Nebuchadnezzar, and in 5:31 Darius receives the king-

dom of Belshazzar; Darius therefore inherited the kingdom of Nebuchadnezzar. In 6:1 (2) Darius appoints over the kingdom 120 satraps, *אַחֲשֵׁרֵפְנִיָּא*. Doctor Wilson understands this of minor officials appointed by Gobryas as governor of Babylon, but the term "satrap" is not so used elsewhere in the Old Testament. In Dan. 3:2, 3, 27 the term is used for the highest dignitaries in Nebuchadnezzar's empire, also in Ezra. 8:36; Esther 3:12; 8:9; 9:3 it describes the governors of great provinces; and, according to Esther 1:1 there were 127 such satrapies in the Persian empire in the time of Xerxes. The usage is the same in the Persian inscriptions and in the Greek historians. In Dan. 6:25 (26) Darius sends an edict "unto all peoples, nations and languages, that dwell in all the earth," which implies that he has a world-empire. Moreover, in the visions of chapters 2 and 7, the first kingdom is evidently the Babylonian, and the fourth kingdom the Greek; so that the second and the third kingdoms respectively are the Median and the Persian. The author of Daniel accordingly believed that a Median empire intervened between the Babylonian and the Persian. The same conclusion is demanded by Dan. 6:28 (29), "So this Daniel prospered in the reign of Darius, and in the reign of Cyrus the Persian." Doctor Wilson says that this may mean in the contemporary reigns of Cyrus as emperor and Darius as sub-king; but in this case the author would not have named the sub-king Darius first, and he would not have said, "in the reign of Darius and in the reign of Cyrus," but "in the reign of Cyrus and Darius." The evidence accordingly is overwhelming that Darius the Mede cannot be identified with Gobryas, the governor of Babylon appointed by Cyrus, and that the author of Daniel holds the unhistorical idea that a Median empire intervened between the Babylonian and the Persian empires. Such an idea, of course, could not have been held by a contemporary of Cyrus.

Space will not permit a detailed discussion of the difficulties of the Book of Daniel in comparison with Persian history to whose solution Doctor Wilson devotes chapters viii-xiv. His method is the same as in the cases just considered. He piles up improbable hypotheses to prove improbabilities, when the simple solution of the whole problem is that the Book of Daniel is based upon late Jewish legend rather than upon the experience of a contemporary. It is like the traditional theory of the Pentateuch, which invents a thousand ingenious explanations of the difficulties in the way of Mosaic authorship and shuts its eyes to the obvious solution of these difficulties in the recognition that Moses did not write the Pentateuch.

Even if the discrepancies of Daniel with Babylonian and Persian history could be explained, what would one do with the other historical improbabilities of this book, namely, the admission of Daniel to the priestly order of the Babylonian soothsayers (9:4, 17-20); Nebuchadnezzar's demand on pain of death that the magicians tell him the dream that he has forgotten (2:5); Nebuchadnezzar's golden image 60 cubits high and 6 cubits broad (3:1); the punishment of a fiery furnace for those who would not worship this image (3:15); and the preservation of the three Hebrews alive in the midst of the flames (3:25); Nebuchadnezzar's seven years of madness, when he ate grass like an ox, till his hair was grown like eagles' feathers, and his nails like birds' claws (4:28-33); the handwriting on the wall at Belshazzar's feast (5:5); Darius' decree that no man should ask a petition of god or man for thirty days, on penalty of being cast into a den of lions (6:7); and Daniel's escape in the lions' den (6:19-23)? All these are stories that do not contradict known Babylonian or Persian history but put a severe strain upon our credulity. Doctor Wilson will have to write another volume to show that these are such natural and reasonable incidents and so well attested by contemporary witnesses that nobody but an "illogical, irrational, and unscientific so-called higher critic" would think of questioning them.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON

HARTFORD THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
HARTFORD, CONN.

POPULAR EXPOSITIONS OF HEBREW RELIGION

Professor G. A. Barton¹ writes the first volume of a new series known as "*Religious Science and Literature Series*" and edited by Professor E. Hershey Sneath, of Yale. It is designed for use with college classes in religious education. There is great need of competent textbooks in this field. Professor Barton comes to his task with exceptional equipment—not only is he a scholar of first rank in Old Testament matters, but he has also had years of experience as a teacher of the Bible to college girls, and he is master of a pellucid and objective style that makes his books a delight to read. The nature of the task set for Dr. Barton precluded his making that contribution to the progress of research in the Old Testament for which he is so well fitted. He has had to content himself with stating

¹*The Religion of Israel*. By G. A. Barton. New York: Macmillan, 1918. xv+290 pages. \$2.00.

clearly and concisely the main results of Old Testament study thus far attained. Our main interest, therefore, is to see where he places himself upon debatable questions. He aligns himself with the growing number of scholars who interpret early Hebrew narratives in the light of history, as showing that not all of Israel was in Egypt, but that part entered Egypt, while part took possession of northern Palestine. He reaffirms his adherence to the Kenite hypothesis of the origin of Yahweh worship in Israel. But he now recognizes that the hypothesis as originally formulated was too simple and feels forced to reckon with a knowledge of Yahweh in Israel centuries before the days of Moses. Even so, he insists upon the Kenite origin of this earlier Yahweh worship. The origin of the ethical decalogue is ascribed to the disciples of Elijah. He declares himself in sympathy with the more literal interpretation of Hosea's marriage, first presented by me in 1913, saying that it rests upon a less forced exegesis of the text than the more popular tendency view. He ascribes to Isaiah himself the messianic materials commonly assigned to later writers, such as 9:2-6 and 11:1-8. The view that Sennacherib twice invaded Judah finds favor with Dr. Barton. That Nehemiah preceded Ezra in Jerusalem seems certain to him, and he ascribes the introduction of the Priestly Code to him when he came back to Jerusalem in 432 B.C.

This is enough to show that the college student who tackles this book will not find it lacking in interest. The novelty of such a presentation to the average student will not fail to hold his attention. Topics for special consideration are given and special reading suggested that will enable the student to follow up his interest as far as he may wish.

J. M. POWIS SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Soon after the outbreak of the war well-meaning but ill-informed zealots and religious demagogues of many kinds rushed wildly into the public forum with the declaration that Germany had become what she is because of "higher criticism." The outlines of the thing they meant by the latter term could not always be seen through the word-fog of censure. But in most cases they meant the critical historical study of the Old Testament. The informed were able to watch these persons with a smile, for they were offering more than ordinarily convincing proof of their inability to reach conclusions in accord with the facts. Apparently they did not know that historical criticism of the Bible is neither the invention nor the peculiar possession of Germany. They did

not know that it had long been interned in German universities, away from the populace, as a potential foe of autocracy intrenched behind a traditionally interpreted Bible.

It is time to recall the fact that the essential principle of the modern critical study of the Bible consists in the frank avowal that the Scriptures present a long record of developing religious experience, and that the duty of the modern student is to discriminate between the better and the worse, the higher and the lower, in this evolving process. The implied attitude of discrimination toward the Bible makes it possible to place a just value upon the moral standards of the prophets and of Jesus; it makes impossible the exaltation of discarded and immoral standards of conduct by hierarchies or autocracies, simply because they happen to be in the Bible. Modern Christianity, in short, possesses in the dynamic Bible of the evolutionist a powerful agent of democracy; per contra, the static Bible of the traditionalist is the last bulwark of autocracy.

It is gratifying, therefore, to see that teachers in the Old Testament branch of biblical science calmly continue to view their subject in its larger developmental aspects. Professor Laura H. Wild, of Mount Holyoke College, has done this in a frank and able manner in her recent book¹ *The Evolution of the Hebrew People*. The author explains the aim of her volume by reference to her experience in teaching Sophomores who come to college with no adequate conception of the significance of the Bible in our civilization. Both in the choice of materials and in the method of treatment she acknowledges the duty of the biblical investigator to relate his findings to achieved results in allied sciences. One might, indeed, borrow a term from the botanists and say that this volume has to do primarily with biblical ecology — the relations of biblical ideas and facts to their historical environment.

The descriptive titles of the five parts into which the contents of the volume are divided afford a fair idea of its scope. They are "The Cultural Background of Hebrew Life," "A Sketch of the Development of Religious Ideas," "The Influence of Physical Environment upon the Development of the Hebrew Race," "Israel's Economic and Social Development," and "The Place in World Thought of the Great Hebrew Prophetic Teachers." Each of these parts is broken up into series of brief chapters. Those of the first part, for instance, are devoted to the older background of Hebrew life disclosed by the archaeologist;

¹ *The Evolution of the Hebrew People and Their Influence on Civilization*. By Laura H. Wild. New York: Scribner, 1917. xi+311 pages. \$1.50.

to prehistoric man and the origin and relationship of the great racial groups; and to a comparison of Semitic and Indo-European characteristics.

To gather from such large and constantly changing areas of human knowledge the pertinent facts and condense them into an interesting statement is not easy; but the author has produced a book that is capable of engaging and holding the attention not only of young people but of all persons who desire a comprehensive view of Hebrew life and literature in terms of modern thought and research. A well-selected list of books for supplementary reading on the subjects discussed is added at the end of the volume. In the opinion of the reviewer the book would have gained by the reduction of some items in the first half of the volume and a corresponding expansion of Part V. Spatially, at least, the higher levels of development have not received proportionate attention. But that is a matter of minor consequence. The author is to be congratulated on having produced a readable, useful book, permeated by the spirit and method of modern science, and one that should do much to promote the intelligent study of the Old Testament.

WILLIAM FREDERIC BADÈ

PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION
BERKELEY, CAL.

JEWISH THEOLOGY¹

Until recent years theology was the most neglected branch of study within Judaism. This was due to the widespread notion that Judaism has no theology, as the term is understood among non-Jews. Dr. Kaufman Kohler, in his earnest desire to work out a systematic theology of Judaism, sets this theory aside and enlarges the meaning of the term. But Judaism seems to have so many theologies as to baffle classification. Almost every theological conception, from the most mystical to the most rationalistic, can be supported by the authority of biblical, Talmudical, and later Jewish literature. The only possible method of presenting Jewish theology, *not* the theology of Judaism, is to put it in a historical form, which is an admission of the fact that in various ages Judaism presented various attitudes even on most fundamental questions. Dr. Kohler realizes that an impartial Jewish theology must include the mystical as well as the rationalistic elements of Judaism; for Judaism is essentially a religion of life.

¹*Jewish Theology Systematically and Historically Considered.* By K. Kohler. New York: Macmillan, 1918. xiii+505 pages. \$2.50.

To Kohler, Judaism is the religion of humanity. The religion of Israel is universal, and both Christianity and Islam, her daughter-religions, are but Jewish sects which have limited and perverted the freedom of the mother-faith. While asserting that Judaism is the religion of the free spirit, Kohler points out that, unlike Christianity, Judaism knows of no creed or dogma. It is ready to receive divine truth from any source.

The Jew is *born* into it and cannot extricate himself from it even by the renunciation of his faith, which would but render him an apostate Jew. This condition exists because the racial community formed and still forms the basis of the religious community. It is birth, not confession, that imposes on the Jew the obligation to work and strive for the eternal verities of Israel.

The book now under review, forming a volume of over five hundred pages, is, in effect, a revised edition of a work first published in 1910 under the title *Grundriss einer systematischen Theologie des Judentums auf geschichtlicher Grundlage*. A new chapter on Jewish ethics—which in connection with the idea of the Kingdom of God forms “a fitting culmination of Jewish theology”—is added to the new edition, together with much new matter occasioned by the development of theological thought since the publication of the original German edition, of which the present work is “a thorough revision and remolding.” There has been no change, however, in the beauty of the style and diction; in the concise presentation of the opposing arguments in support of conflicting contentions by the use of apt quotations, however arbitrarily chosen from the entire range of Jewish literature, skilfully worked into the text; in the clear definition of concepts; and in the vivid unfolding of the development of Judaism in the realms of history. It is divided into three main parts preceded by an introduction, in which the author discusses the conception of theology, the idea and the essence of Judaism, and the nature of its beliefs. The first, comprising almost half of the book, deals with the idea of God in Judaism. This is followed by over a hundred pages devoted to a Jewish estimate of man in his relation to God, the remainder of the volume being made up of a presentation of the theological ideas associated with Israel and the Kingdom of God. These large divisions are systematically arranged into short chapters devoted to the various aspects of the themes, the chapters which follow the historical development of the idea under consideration, being in their turn subdivided into numbered paragraphs. The work is a combination of methodical scientific investigation with a heartfelt enthusiasm for his belief in the superiority of Judaism. There can be no question, however,

that Kohler has been influenced by the best works of contemporary Protestant Christian theology. He fully accepts without any hesitation the modern critical position. The Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is denied, and miracle, as formerly understood, is rejected.

The points of difference between Judaism and Christianity are baldly set down, such Christian doctrines as the Trinity, the fall, and vicarious atonement being dealt with in no uncertain manner. Yet Kohler regards Christianity as a Jewish sect which has limited and perverted the freedom of the older faith. He sees in the apostle Paul, "the great antagonist of Judaism," a determined enemy of the Jewish faith, who misrepresented it intentionally. It was Paul who identified Judaism with legalism and thereby perverted it into an obscure faith. Jesus did not reject Judaism; he, a disciple of John the Baptist, preached merely against ecclesiastical greed and conceit, while the rational teaching that Judaism had ceased to have any meaning was the work of Paul (pp. 333-441).

The Jewish conception of the Law is defined as a means "not for the preservation of the Jewish race merely, as Christian theologians maintain, but for the sake of keeping its inner life intact and pure" (p. 347). This definition is in agreement with that of the late Dr. Schechter's *Studies in Judaism* (I, 233 ff.) and *Aspects of Rabbinic Theology* (pp. 116 ff.), and is quite in harmony with Kohler's stubborn opposition to the nationalistic interpretation of Judaism which is repeatedly attacked by him and incorrectly pronounced to be the consequence of irreligion (pp. 8, 395 ff.). While accentuating the mission of Israel, Kohler unequivocally condemns "the radical reformers" who, "not in the spirit of dissension, but for the sake of giving Judaism a larger scope and a wider outlook," advocate and practice the observance of Sunday as Sabbath (pp. 458 ff.). Thus he argues with great force for a Jewish traditional institution. In fact, throughout the book Kohler ably and fairly expounds the traditional elements of Judaism.

The accentuation of the differences between Judaism and other religions and of the differences of opinion within Judaism does not occupy such a large space as to make the work polemical. The historic method naturally demands a dispassionate presentation of the development of Judaism in its biblical, rabbinic, and modern aspects.

In the limited space of a review one cannot possibly do justice to a work of this nature. Despite some of its serious defects the great merit of the book lies in the fact that it is the first book in which an attempt is made to formulate methodically the theological contents of Judaism on a historical, yet critical, basis. It is indeed a book deserving "that

fairness of judgment to which every pioneer work is entitled." It is a successful summary of the present beliefs of the more advanced representatives of Reform Judaism, of which Dr. Kohler is justly regarded as the leader. Accordingly the book should be welcomed as the expression of the best that Reform Judaism has to say on its fundamental teachings and on the meaning of the sufferings of the Jewish people and the undying hope of the Jew in history.

JOSHUA BLOCH

LAKE CHARLES, LA.

QUALITATIVE NOUNS IN THE PAULINE EPISTLES¹

Dr. Slaten has undertaken the task of investigating the qualitative use of fifteen nouns in the thirteen epistles traditionally ascribed to Paul and the translation of them in the Revised Version. He accepts the doctrine of Professor E. D. Burton concerning the absence of the article with nouns in Greek—that is, that anarthrous nouns are either indefinite or qualitative. A qualitative noun, which, according to Dr. Slaten, is always anarthrous in Greek, is defined as one "whose function in the sentence is not primarily or solely to designate by assignment to a class but to describe by the attribution of quality" (p. 6). The fifteen words chosen for study are important and of frequent occurrence, and the recognition of their qualitative character, whenever it can be clearly made out, is a matter of primary moment for the translation and interpretation of the New Testament. This is the practical bearing of Dr. Slaten's work. But can we be sure in every case that a noun which has no article and is not indefinite was meant to be understood in a qualitative way—was intended primarily "to describe by the attribution of quality" rather than "to designate by assignment to a class"? Must not the qualitative force of a noun, which is sometimes as elusive as a delicate odor, be determined by exegetical considerations rather than by the mere absence of the article and the inapplicability of the indefinite idea? Dr. Slaten finds that out of 8,841 "nouns and noun equivalents" in the Greek text of the Pauline epistles "some 2,857 are used qualitatively," and that of these, 2,445 are adequately translated in the Revised Version; but in 412 instances the revisers have failed to reproduce in English the qualitative force of the original.

¹*Qualitative Nouns in the Pauline Epistles and Their Translation in the Revised Version.* By Arthur Wakefield Slaten. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1918. viii+70 pages. \$0.50.

Dr. Slaten has written a scholarly monograph, and New Testament scholars owe him a debt of gratitude for calling their attention to the qualitative force of certain nouns in the Pauline epistles.

WILLIAM H. P. HATCH

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

A NEW TRANSLATION OF THE GOSPELS¹

France, almost alone among Christian countries, has no standard translation of the Bible, though it has translations in plenty, no one of which is of outstanding quality or excellence. Bernard Shaw, in his screed on *Parents and Children*, observes, "The reason why the continental European is to the Englishman or American so surprisingly ignorant of the Bible, is that the Authorized English Version is a great work of literary art, and the continental versions are comparatively artless." The usual Shavian measure of truth in this observation any reader may easily verify for himself. It is notably true of the Ostervald version most widely used in France, and circulated by the British and Foreign Bible Society. Even in its latest revision it is neither attractive French nor an adequate reproduction of the spirit and substance of the original. It lacks color, atmosphere, dignity, impressiveness, life, interest—everything which makes the artless Greek and the Jacobean English noble works of art.

Now the Protestant Société Biblique de Paris is celebrating the centenary of its origin by the publication of a new Bible translation, intended to place at the disposal of everyone who can read the Bible at all in French the canonical writings in a form at once in the highest degree accurate, intelligible, and attractive. The translation is to render the best text that critical scholarship can reconstruct, and to provide such measure of introduction and notes that any reader may know without difficulty what the writers were meaning to say, as far as it can today be known.

There is already at hand the section containing the Synoptics (save for a small portion of Luke), from which we may expect a high measure of success for the whole enterprise. The translation has the quality of freshness, clearness, sonority, dignity. At times it is exceedingly happy,

¹ *La Sainte Bible. Traduction nouvelle d'après les meilleurs textes avec introduction et notes.* Edited by Adolphe Lods. Paris: Société Biblique de Paris, 1918. Deuxième Livraison: Les Évangiles Synoptiques. iii+128 pages. Fr. 70 (the entire work).

to the point of being translation and commentary in one. It has been done by so competent a scholar as Maurice Goguel, who has provided also two introductions (a part of the first was done by Louis Randon) and a series of footnotes. The introduction to the whole New Testament deals with the canon, the text, and Judaism in New Testament times; that to the Synoptic Gospels covers the solution of the synoptic problem and the salient characteristics of each of the three documents. Both are brief, elementary, accurate, and absolutely clear. The notes have the same excellent qualities. Variant readings are noted, and the sources of successive passages are indicated in the margin, along with the synoptic parallels. If the notes have a fault, it is that they are too elementary; they tell us the little things, but neither raise nor answer fundamental questions. The readers of the birth-stories here, for instance, will not be helped if they chance to inquire: Are these stories true? If not true, what is their origin, meaning, and value? What of the contradictions between Matthew and Luke? and the like. There must be French readers who raise such questions; is it beyond the province of a work like this to suggest reply? We await with expectation further issues of this significant enterprise.

CLAYTON R. BOWEN

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL
MEADVILLE, PA.

A NEW CHURCH HISTORY¹

The merit of this book does not consist in its originality, for it makes no claims to such, but in its remarkably complete presentation of the essential facts of church history in a form abreast of the best modern methods of treating and teaching that subject. In fact, we have for the first time a thoroughly satisfactory textbook. The method of Kurtz was quite antiquated. His well-known handbook presented merely materials for history. In the book before us we have the facts presented in their genetic relation in the church's life. The book reads well, no small virtue in a work of the kind. The reader wholly untrained in theology and mediaeval secular history may find too many novel ideas in the book to regard it as easy reading. That is not the fault of the book but the fault of the reader. There is hardly anything that could be omitted in the presentation of the subject. The author avoids as far as possible merely technical matters and modes of treatment, but the

¹ *A History of the Christian Church.* By Williston Walker. New York: Scribner, 1918. xiii+624 pages. \$3.00.

book is so packed with solid matter that to profit by it the novice will have to go slowly with it.

Next to the great merit of sound historical and didactic method is the excellent spirit in which the book is written. The author is a Protestant and writes primarily for Protestants. But this is not shown in any bias, for the book is as devoid of bias as could be desired, but merely in the selection of points of special interest to them, the rise of their distinctive tenets and ecclesiastical principles. The modern developments of the Roman church are not overlooked, but they are not on the same scale as matters of Protestant interest. This is the only indication of the author's position and is perfectly admissible. As to partisanship in matters that have been disputed among Protestants, there is not a trace, or any indication of anything but the broadest and fairest study of the actual facts as they have been generally established by the best scholarship of modern times, which is quite above the disputes of sects and churches.

The scope and proportions of the book may best be shown by a brief analysis of its contents. After a rapid survey of the "Beginnings of the Christian Church to the Gnostic Crisis" (pp. 1-50) the remaining one hundred and seventy-five years of the Ante-Nicene period are discussed (pp. 51-111), somewhat after the manner of Loof's well-known outlines. In the "Imperial State Church" (pp. 112-94) the councils and the great controversies are presented as the main theme. In the section on the "Early Middle Ages, 600-1100," the emphasis is placed upon the rise of the papacy (pp. 195-236), and dreary detail is avoided. By this brief treatment more space is left for the far more important "Later Middle Ages" (pp. 238-326), which is especially distinguished for its excellent treatment of scholasticism and a brief but impressive sketch of the system of Aquinas, as the most representative theologian of the Middle Ages. In discussing the Reformation (pp. 327-480) the author wisely regards it as extending well into the seventeenth century, in England until the Act of Toleration. The concluding section (pp. 481-590) is given to the "Transition to the Modern Religious Situation" and sketches the rise of modern theological parties, ecclesiastical developments, and religious life.

The book is provided with several useful maps and bibliographical helps, together with constant references to sources available in English.

J. C. AYER, JR.

DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE
PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH
PHILADELPHIA, PA.

HUMAN NATURE AND ITS REMAKING¹

Under the foregoing alluring title Professor Hocking has put in book form an expansion of the lectures which he gave on the Nathaniel W. Taylor Foundation at Yale in 1916. Christianity, in its doctrine of regeneration, has always maintained that a radical change of man's "nature" may be brought about. The specific sacramental or mystical means by which this transformation was declared to be effected have been subjects of theological debate and psychological criticism; but Christianity's mission is one of proclaiming and helping to effect alterations for the better in man's ways of life. To have this undertaking discussed by a philosopher rather than by a theologian is a promising procedure, and those who have to do with the Christian message will turn hopefully to this book.

It is confessedly a series of suggestive inquiries rather than a finished doctrine. In this lies its value—and its defect. The reader is constantly annoyed by short and often scrappy chapters, and by apparently inconclusive observations. The present reviewer has been unable to determine whether the closing paragraph is satire or an advocacy of a somewhat cautious belief in "values," without regard to their metaphysical support. Nevertheless the direction taken by Professor Hocking's inquiry is highly suggestive and ought to provoke much fruitful thinking.

It belongs to the "nature" of man—so runs the argument—to *remake* his way of living. While the animals rest content with the activities of their innate instincts, man's specific characteristic is the use of creative thought, with its inventions and its development of civilization. Hocking contends that human instincts have no such highly specialized muscular organisms as are found in the lower species. The same organism serves more than one instinct. Hence there is possible a "transmutation" of instincts so as to form a moral character capable of self-control. The "will to power," which is the central passion of man, may be so educated as to substitute control through ideals for mere brute supremacy.

Sin is the failure to interpret instincts in the interests of this "remaking" of life. The proper development of life consists in bringing so clearly to consciousness the harmful effects of such uncorrelated indulgence in instinctive behavior that the individual will be led to love a different ideal and reshape his conduct. Christianity offers as the supreme means of transforming men the possibility of participation in

¹ *Human Nature and Its Remaking*. By William Ernest Hocking. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918. xxvi+434 pages. \$3.00.

the divine life, and stresses the fact of "the divine aggression," in which God takes the initiative in empowering men.

It is through some such combination of practical analysis with mystic faith that the victory for idealism must be won. Our theologies have been, as a rule, too mystical and vague, and our ethics too analytic and rationalistic. To know exactly the facts concerning innate instincts and concerning human education, and to link these facts with an emotional power is to render a great service. In spite of its somewhat fragmentary character and the baffling vagueness of its religious mysticism, this book will stimulate thinking in a distinctly wholesome way.

GERALD BIRNEY SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

REINTERPRETATIONS OF CHRISTIANITY

In a recent book on the "new orthodoxy"¹ the author remarks that certain vital motives growing out of modern scholarship have contributed to "remarkable activity in the restatement of traditional faiths." The Great War too has provoked new discussion of some of the doctrines of Christianity.

No earnestness in the reaffirmation of the conventional views can satisfy those who are really awake to the problems and outlook of these days.

A new world of thought and ideals has arisen. Religion has taken its place in this new order, not as something aloof, but as something organic and integral with all other vital interests. All who truly dwell in this new world of the natural and the social sciences have certain attitudes and habits of thought in common. These constitute the new orthodoxy of method and spirit.

The author believes that there is "reasonable hope that the great historic development of religion represented by Christianity is destined to come to a new birth of power." The first stage of Christianity exhibited "a tremendously vital impulse to a higher, freer, moral life among informal intimate groups"; the second stage was organized Catholicism; the third stage was the Protestant Reformation.

It is not impossible that future historians will regard Protestantism as coming to its close with the end of the nineteenth century as a vital, ascending type of religion. In that century several of the most characteristic principles of Protestantism were undermined by a larger knowledge of history and science. Protestantism was individualistic; the new order is social. It assumed the

¹ *The New Orthodoxy*. By Edward Scribner Ames. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1918 ix+127 pages. \$1.00.

infallibility of the Bible, and that is no longer tenable. It exalted authority, and now there is no legitimate authority except that of experience. It denied that man is naturally religious, while it is commonly accepted today that man is incurably religious. We may well believe therefore that Christianity is entering upon a fourth great epoch, which has already been called by various names. It is referred to as the religion of the spirit, as social Christianity, and as the religion of democracy (p. 10).

The preceding paragraph outlines the main conception of the book and the goal toward which it moves. The little volume is a vital, stimulating, scholarly discussion, which satisfies both the mind and the heart. It breathes the atmosphere of life, progress, reality, and spiritual challenge to action. It will bring help and inspiration to many thoughtful religious people who are seeking to translate religious convictions into terms of modern thinking. Mr. Ames shows us that liberal thinking knows how to conserve the heart-values and give them first authoritative place in the control of life. Religion does not consist of sacred traditions to be re-enacted, a theatrical performance; but religion is life, reality, society, working out a dramatic meaning and attaining a divine goal. "It is this richness and inexhaustible nature of experience which constitutes its divine quality." The living God of Mr. Ames's religion is the chief actor in the familiar life of society, and our relationships to him are not assigned parts; we are rather workers together with God in building up the new social order, the world that is to be.

A book of real value in stating and answering the problem of its title is Cross's "What Is Christianity?"¹ And, deeply considered, it is the real, underlying problem of Christian interpretation in our critical age. Harnack's book was the pioneer of a large number of articles and books upon the subject. A great deal of light has been shed upon the problem and some significant and far-reaching changes have been effected in our methods of religious interpretation.

The value of the present volume is in its concrete and practical method of approaching the problem, and in the author's judicial treatment of the materials with which he deals. In successive chapters we have discussions of six outstanding types of Christianity — typical religious developments. These are apocalypticism, Catholicism, mysticism, Protestantism, rationalism, and evangelism. These movements are all sketched on their historic background and interpreted with fidelity as aspects of the religious impulse. They are followed by a final chapter entitled, "What, Then, Is Christianity?"

¹*What Is Christianity?* By George Cross. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1918. x+214 pages. \$1.00.

The limits of this review forbid more than a general appreciation of these chapters. Each chapter presents a useful characterization of the development with which it deals, with a keen appreciation of the religious values of the type. Both in these and in the final chapter there is a sense of proportion and philosophic appreciation, which marks the efficient teacher. The book is clarifying and edifying for those who are still facing confusion in dealing with the urgent problem, What is Christianity?

HERBERT A. YOUTZ

OBERLIN GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY
OBERLIN, OHIO

TWO RECENT VOLUMES OF THEOLOGY

Dr. Mullins' book¹ has great value in setting forth the attitude of many intelligent leaders of the church. We can readily believe that it is the work of a live teacher familiar with the experiences of the classroom and the many phases of modern problems as they touch theology. The discussions are fine and frank and interesting and will be of service to the intelligent lay reader as well as to the theological student. There is a spiritual insight throughout, a pedagogical vigor and conviction, as well as a breadth of view which marks the strong teacher. The volume will be welcomed by many readers.

The critical reader will at once want to know whether the book "follows the old lines," modernizing the older treatment, or whether it is completely critical and modern in method. Dr. Mullins' book belongs in the former class; it is the work of a modern-minded man dealing with the older theological presuppositions. The author frankly affirms, "Theology is like any other science in the fact that it is alive, it grows." This appreciation of growth is a first mark of modernity. It is the *application* of the principle, however, which makes the crucial test of theology. How shall we operate with the principle of progress? How "free" are we to apply it? At what points does it apply? "This does not mean that it goes beyond Christ and the New Testament," says Dr. Mullins in the sentence immediately following the one quoted above. The author attempts little or no critical estimate of "Christ" or the "New Testament," and it is evident throughout the volume that his presuppositions concerning the fundamental things are those of traditional theology rather than those of critical modern scholarship. He

¹ *The Christian Religion in Its Doctrinal Expression*. By E. Y. Mullins. Philadelphia: Roger Williams Press, 1917. xxiv+514 pages. \$2.50.

galvanizes the old very successfully with the newer meanings of life, but he does not undertake a critical restatement of religious truth in terms of modern thinking; and it is highly probable that the book in its present form is serviceable to the largest number of people.

In scope the book covers all the main topics of systematic theology, with more than five hundred large, well-printed pages.

The preface to a new volume on Christology¹ is furnished by Dr. Arthur C. Headlam, commending the christological position of his pupil, that is, the doctrine of "enhypostasia." According to Dr. Headlam, the author is engaged in expounding "what every one of us really thinks about Christ," namely, "that Jesus Christ who was God, became man" (p. xix). Now evidently this is a fair account of Dr. Relton's undertaking. He is expounding the enhypostasia. Our first question, however, is whether this is "what every one of us really thinks about Christ." And our second question is whether the author can conduct us to deeper insight by simply clarifying our conception of enhypostasia.

When Dr. Relton himself says in his Introduction (p. xxvii), "Christian theology in any age represents the attempt at full intellectual expression of every aspect of the truth revealed in the central fact of an incarnation," we have the strong feeling that "incarnation" is employed as a datum not completely accessible to thought, a purely factual matter to be accepted. The author starts with a presupposition which should itself be made the subject of critico-historical inquiry. He does not begin far enough back in the application of modern methods and thus inevitably introduces into the problem implication not assimilable to modern thinking. We have a like feeling in his use of other terms, for example, "revelation," in spite of his careful historical examination.

The volume is attractively printed, containing nearly three hundred pages. The treatment is methodical and falls into three parts. Part I reviews the ancient Christologies, tracing the forms of speculative thought down to Chalcedon. Part II takes up the history of the criticism of the Christology of Chalcedon and discriminates the more modern currents of thought that have tended to modify the classic theology.

The true significance of Part II in its relationship to the whole thesis may easily be missed, but those who will study carefully our treatment of dualism, and the analysis of the human and the divine both in themselves and in their

¹ *A Study in Christology. The Problem of the Relation of the Two Natures in the Person of Christ.* By Herbert M. Relton. New York: Macmillan, 1917. xxxv+278 pages. \$2.50.

relationship, will be able to appreciate more fully in the light of the results adduced in Part II how we have endeavored to find the basis of the doctrine of the Enhypostasia in the very constitution of both natures in the Person of Christ (p. xxxiv).

In Part III the author "reviews some recent attempts at christological reconstruction, and indicates the general drift of speculation." He commends his reconstructed theory of enhypostasia as the path which modern Christology must follow.

Dr. Relton's treatment is that of a man who is familiar with the history and who finds mental satisfaction in the conclusions to which he has come. No doubt the treatment will be convincing to those who sympathetically follow the clew which the author so ably expounds.

HERBERT A. YOUTZ

OBERLIN GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY
OBERLIN, OHIO

NEW BOOKS ON PREACHING

Gardner's *Psychology and Preaching*¹ is a book for study and not simply for reading. In fact ordinary reading will not discover the practical riches for the preacher. At first it seems more a book on psychology than on preaching; and the emphasis is on psychology from the nature of Professor Gardner's classes. He says in the Preface:

It is an attempt to make a thoroughgoing application of psychological principles to preaching. However, it is something more than an application. It has grown out of the author's attempt to teach homiletical psychology to young ministers; and he has found that many of them have so inadequate a grasp of psychology that a good deal of explanation had to precede the application.

There is need of such studies on the part of the ministry. Much crude, imperfect, and even injurious work is done by some preachers in their zeal to reach men. It is true that an instructive reading of life and common sense lead many to the best way of influencing men by speech, without knowing anything of the principles of psychology. But all preachers would be wiser and more helpful for such studies. The book of Professor Gardner is most heartily commended.

¹ *Psychology and Preaching*. By Charles S. Gardner. New York: Macmillan, 1918. xiv+389 pages. \$2.00

Especially suggestive and practical are the chapters on "Feeling," "Sentiments and Ideals," "The Excitation of Feeling," "Attention and Voluntary Action." Under the stress of religious devotion and desire for immediate results men will practice or approve sensational methods that lead to moral insensibility and the loss of the very capacity of faith and true emotion. Emotion in religion is given its true place, and especially fine is the discussion under "Feeling" for the need of generous culture for richness of religious feeling and sustained spiritual life. And a noble plea is made (p. 90) for culture as the condition of a spiritual ministry.

Under "Attention" Professor Gardner urges preachers to gain spontaneous attention by the use of illustration but does not guard against a wrong and excessive use—a tendency of the modern pulpit. Professor Gardner seems to ignore the truth so clearly taught by Dr. Adams, of the University of London, in *Exposition and Illustration in Teaching* that attention has moral value in proportion as it becomes voluntary, and that the constant use of illustration to secure involuntary attention may be a disintegrating rather than a strengthening influence. The closing chapter, "The Modern Mind," is the fitting close of a notably strong book.

A new volume¹ entitled *Pedagogy for Ministers* is evident material of lectures given to theological students, and is more homiletic than pedagogic. In some cases these chapters are only practical rhetoric, and again the common laws of interpretation. Thus the title may be misleading if it leads the reader to expect the rich suggestions of modern psychology and pedagogy applied to preaching. They are rather fragmentary and sermonic, popular addresses more than careful and thorough studies of the principles and laws of teaching. They are primary and simple, what the best teachers have always used, though they may not have thought out a philosophy of teaching.

While these lectures would not be suggestive to the man who had been trained in religious education or who had made a personal study of psychology for the preacher, they would be helpful to the average minister. Just such simple, untechnical discussions are needed. They are marked by good sense and catholic spirit.

Professor Hobart does not dogmatize and presents the ethical truth of disputed doctrines. The emphasis on teaching is good, prophetic of

¹ *Pedagogy for Ministers*. By Alvah Sabin Hobart. New York, 1917. 184 pages. \$1.00.

a more thoughtful and ethical Christianity. The chapter on "Creeds and Liturgies," true enough as far as it goes, is felt to be inadequate when compared with such a discussion as "The Ministry of Worship" in Coffin's Yale Lectures, *In a Day of Social Rebuilding*. It is certainly a pedagogic mistake to depreciate the responsive use of the Psalter, as he does on page 166. The brief suggestions on "Management of the Church" show good sense and spiritual insight. "If we degenerate to the plane of simply 'making the budget' it will soon rob us of any true partnership in the great undertaking of Christ."

ARTHUR S. HOYT

AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.
AUBURN, N. Y.

BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT

ORFALI, P. GAUDENTIO. *De Arca Foederis*. [Dissertatio archaeologico-historica Veteris Testamenti] Paris: Picard, 1918. vi+113 pages.

The Ark of the Covenant has received several full treatments in the last quarter-century. The author of this dissertation has laid them fully under tribute to this treatment. While his view of the Pentateuch is ancient, his use of similar objects of worship or cult-use in ancient peoples is quite progressive. Twenty illustrations add to the vividness of the narrative and to the necessity of taking a strictly up-to-date view of the Ark of the Covenant, its origin, and its use.

Chapter i is the most modern and best illustrated portion of the thesis, while chapter ii is the severest test of the open-minded character of the author. If now he should put together the facts of the two parts and treat them with equal candor, Catholic scholarship would feel the impulse.

Pr.

NEW TESTAMENT

SHELDON, HENRY C. *The Mystery Religions and the New Testament*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1918. 155 pages. \$0.50.

This tiny manual contains an astonishing amount of material. Forty-eight pages are devoted to the mystery religions, and a determined effort is made to say something about all of them. Then twenty-five pages state the general problems of their relation to Christianity, followed by sixty pages devoted to Pauline questions, and twenty-two pages on matters chiefly Johannine. The conclusion is that these religions had virtually no influence on apostolic Christianity; the Christian sacramental doctrine, in particular, was purely "spiritual" and free from magical admixtures. It is perhaps needless to say that in reaching these conclusions the entire burden of proof is laid on upholders of contrary views.

B. S. E.

ZAHN, T. *Introduction to the New Testament* (translated from the third German edition). New York: Scribner, 1917. 2d ed. xx+1720 pages. \$5.00.

By the use of thin paper the three bulky volumes of this introduction to the New Testament have been bound together and condensed into one-third of their former thickness. Reprinting has given the translators an opportunity to correct certain typographical errors and infelicitous renderings. Otherwise the material remains as before, even to the pagination. Users of this volume will certainly appreciate the more convenient form of the new edition. S. J. C.

"Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges." Cambridge: University Press, 1916.

PARRY, R. ST. JOHN. *The First Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians*. lxxii+284 pages. 4s. 6d.

BURNSIDE, W. F. *The Acts of the Apostles*. xlvii+275 pages. 4s.

These brief commentaries have been very carefully prepared and contain a large amount of information crowded into a very brief space. Each volume is furnished with an extended introduction and detailed notes interpreting words and phrases of the Greek texts. Each commentator is acquainted with the latest results of scholarly investigation. Harnack's early dating of Acts, which has been given so much more hearty a welcome in England than in Germany, is followed, thus placing the composition of the book not later than 62 A.D. In the commentary on Corinthians a series of "additional notes" takes some account of the recent researches of Reitzenstein and others on the relation of Paul to contemporary pagan religions, but the influence on Paul from this quarter is thought to be practically negligible. S. J. C.

RIEGEL, JOHN I., AND JORDAN, JOHN H. *Simon, Son of Man*. Boston: Sherman, French, 1917. xviii+260 pages. \$1.50.

This book is one of those freak products of a distorted imagination such as have periodically emerged in the course of the history of writing upon the life of Jesus. Had it been issued as pure fiction it might properly be assigned a place on our bookshelves, but as purporting to be serious history it is foredoomed to oblivion. It represents Jesus as the Jewish leader in the revolt against Rome in the year 66-70 A.D. For three and a half years he maintained himself against the Romans, but was finally carried off to grace the triumph of Titus and met his death when hurled from the Tarpeian Rock. S. J. C.

CHURCH HISTORY

MCGLOTHLIN, W. J. *The Course of Christian History*. New York: Macmillan, 1918. 323 pages. \$2.00.

The book seems misnamed, for it is a brief outline of church history, and Christian history and church history are by no means identical. The author attempts to give in 250 pages an account of the development and work of the Christian church from the time of Christ to 1914. The task was impossible, and the resulting superficial character of much of the book was inevitable. With the wealth of material available in handy books of reference it is hard to see the special value of such a slight narrative

for the college student, for whom the book is designed. The author avoids difficult points of theological controversy and keeps as far as possible to the broad highway of history. But in doing this it was hardly appropriate to spend more than ten times as much space on the Iconoclastic as on the Christological controversies. The disputes of Eastern theologians are often dreary reading, but there was something behind their fierce discussions which might have been interpreted by the author and a light thrown on a very difficult period and, as generally treated, on what seems a barren wrangle over words. To have shown the providential guiding of the church in the understanding of the incarnation and the person of Christ would have been helpful, but the councils after Nicaea are not mentioned. If the book is disproportionate in its treatment, there is an excellent turn given to the history in the emphasis upon missions and Christian work. The author evidently feels that the work of the church in extending and applying the gospel message is quite as important as defining the contents of that gospel in philosophical terms. The tone of the book is pronouncedly Protestant, even anti-Roman, but in respect to other Protestant denominations it is very fair. The best part of the book is the section of some sixty pages of questions and topics for investigation and discussion, with some really useful bibliographical hints. It would appear to most students of history that in the endeavor to be plain and brief, the narrative portion has lost what is essential in such a brief account, helpful and illuminating points of view and suggestive interpretations rather than smooth and commonplace generalities.

J. C. A.

"Early Church Classics." London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.

SRAWLEY, J. H. *The Catechetical Oration of St. Gregory of Nyssa.* 1917. 123 pages. 2s.

CLARKE, W. K. L. *St. Gregory of Nyssa—The Life of St. Macrina.* 1916. 79 pages. 1s.

HITCHCOCK, F. R. M. *Saint Irenaeus Against the Heresies.* 2 vols. 1916. xiii+146+151 pages. 2s.

The publishers of this series are to be commended most heartily for their efforts to bring the great classics of Christianity within easy reach of the reading public. These little volumes are handy, cheap, and attractive. They contain not only English translations, either of complete works or of the most important excerpts, but also well-chosen introductions and such interpretative notes as are from time to time found

S. J. C.

DOCTRINAL

ECKMAN, GEORGE P. *When Christ Comes Again.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1917. 287 pages. \$1.25.

This book is a vigorous protest against the literalism of premillenarianism. The New Testament teaching about Christ's return is here interpreted in a purely spiritual sense, and all kindred apocalyptic ideas in the New Testament are similarly allegorized—a method of treatment familiar since the time of Origen. Whatever doubts one may entertain about the validity of this method of handling Scripture, the author is

certainly to be commended for his vigorous protest against the crass literalism of premillennial teaching, for his warnings against its fundamental pessimism, and for his insistence that the Christian gospel is to win its way in the world not by a cataclysm but by a gradual triumph of the spirit of Christ already present among men.

S. J. C.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

ROGERIUS, ABRAHAM. *De Open-Deure tot het verborgen Heydendom* (edited by W. CALAND). Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1917. xlv+223 pages.

Rogers was a Jesuit missionary stationed at Paliacatta on the Choromandel coast of India from 1630 to 1640 A.D. His book, first published in 1651, was the first accurate, full, and sympathetic description of the religious practices and social life of the people of Southwestern India. Of it Burnell (*Indian Antiquary*, VIII [1878], 98) has said: "It is still, perhaps, the most complete account of South Indian Hinduism, though by far the earliest." Most of Rogers' information was derived from two Brahmins, especially from the one named Padmananha, who translated for him two hundred of the three hundred stanzas of the lyric poet Bharthihari. This was the first work of Sanskrit literature to be translated into any European language. Rogers is distinguished far beyond his time by the complete absence of a bigoted point of view. His observation and judgment are amazingly accurate, his attitude toward Indian life and thought is unusually sympathetic, and his understanding of what he saw and heard is remarkable. The book is still of great value. Rogers was more interested in the social life and in the philosophical theories and ideals of salvation which mark the higher forms of Hinduism than he was in mythology. We owe a debt of gratitude to the Linschoten Society for the beautifully printed volume, and to Caland for his many valuable notes.

W. E. C.

BALDAEUS, PHILIPPUS. *Afgoderye der Oost-Indische Heydenen* (edited by A. J. DE JONG). Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1917. lxxv+236 pages.

The book of Baldaeus was first published in 1672 A.D. It covers much the same ground as the book of Rogers noted above, but is much less original. A great deal is taken at second hand without criticism and understanding. Baldaeus did not possess the same keenness of observation, sureness of judgment in the matter of essentials, and sympathetic understanding which distinguish Rogers. The book is filled with long passages of very commonplace Christian polemic—omitted in this edition. The book gives the first full account of the avatars of Vishnu. It devotes much space to the stories of Rama and Krishna. The great detail with which the mythology is treated is in marked contrast to the treatment of Hinduism in Rogers' book. However, the legends are important because many of the South Indian sources for the southern versions of the myths are not yet available elsewhere. The long introduction gives a very valuable discussion of the earliest western knowledge of India, especially as reflected in the letters of the Jesuit missionaries. The notes and the index, which gives the Sanskrit equivalents of the many distorted transcriptions of Dravidian translations of Sanskrit names, are most helpful.

W. E. C.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

HORNE, HERMAN HARRELL. *Jesus — Our Standard*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1918. 307 pages. \$1.25.

The dedication, "To the Boys' Work Secretaries of the Young Men's Christian Associations of the United States and Canada, my friends, who follow and teach Jesus as Standard," gives the cue to Mr. Horne's purpose. The Canadian Standard Efficiency Tests for Boys were published in 1912. Three years later the author gave a series of lectures to connect the life of Jesus with these standards for charting a lad's life. This book is the outgrowth of that preliminary draft. The underlying idea is that "Jesus is our standard, both personal and social." The animus of Mr. Horne is not unlike that which prompted Thomas Hughes forty years ago when he wrote *The Manliness of Christ*. However, one cannot escape the feeling that what really has been done is to chart the life of Jesus according to standards already developed rather than to develop standards from an independent study of Jesus' life.

A sentence from the Preface at once explains the relation of the discussion to the Standard Tests and also gives the general outline for the treatise: "The now well-known 'fourfold development'—intellectual, physical, religious, and social (Luke 2:52)—is here broadened into five through giving independent recognition to the emotional element and by making the religious or spiritual an encircling test covering all the others." Mr. Horne disclaims any historical, theological, or critical attempts; his aim is rather to "present the Jesus of the Gospels as our human standard." In doing this he uses all parts of the four Gospels with equal freedom. This is seen in his use of John 8:1-11, concerning which he adds, "This story is omitted by most of the ancient authorities, and given variously by those who report it, but it is true to the ability and spirit of Jesus."

Withal, these studies cannot fail to be of use to the group to which they are dedicated, for making the life of Jesus vital and commanding to the early adolescent. They are developed with the painstaking care, the clearness, and the fine fervor which characterize all of the author's work.

F. G. W.

COPE, HENRY FREDERICK. *Religious Education in the Church*. New York: Scribner, 1918. viii+274 pages. \$1.25.

Here is a readable book, perhaps the author's knitting-work, whether at home or abroad, and therefore smacking of both the library and the field. The twenty-two short chapters are strung together in a fashion which does not appear as one sits down to the Table of Contents, but a perusal of the text reveals three, or say four, separate, well-related parts.

Chapters i-iv state the problem and the principles governing its solution. The problem of the church, "out in the hurried, tossing stream of human affairs," is like that of all social institutions, namely, the readjustment that comes only through finding out what is her specialty and then sticking to it. This specialty becomes clear as one views "all church work under the educational aim and function." Religious education includes all that is involved in the process of "training man as the child of God for the family of God"; it proceeds, as far as may be, in accordance with "scientific knowledge of the processes of human consciousness, of knowledge, reasoning, will, and action"; these laws are steadily being more fully discovered.

Chapters v-x relate this growing emphasis upon religious education to the established features of church life and thereby give a new setting to worship, the sermon, evangelism, and missions.

Chapters xi-xix are the heart of the book, as they show the possibilities of adjusting the existing institution to the imperious demand for "right social living," with the church in its entirety as a school to that end. It is in this direction that the church may at once expand and also specialize. Mr. Cope goes on to show how this task of the church relates itself to the home, to the public school, and to the community welfare at large; to graded social service, to the problems of leisure and its right use, and particularly to the developing social traits of the young people; to the training of laymen and women to be teachers, church officers, and social workers.

Chapters xx-xxii give practical suggestions for working out the ideal in concrete fashion. As this book finds its way into the hands of ministers, church officers, Christian laymen—inside the church or out—it will give one more shove in the direction of a social order whose chief concern shall be the "making of men and women."

F. G. W.

MORISON, E. F. *The Lord's Prayer and the Prayers of Our Lord*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917. vii+198 pages. 3s. 6d.

For two centuries the "S.P.C.K." has been preparing and distributing Bibles, prayer books, and other religious publications. The book in question is consistent with each of these items in asking what the Scriptures, and particularly the Gospels, have "to tell with regard to the meaning and implications of the Lord's Prayer." The premise is that this prayer presents an "epitome of all prayer . . . the spirit in which all converse with God should be offered." The body of the book is a scriptural exposition of the separate statements in the Matthew text; the aim is "to assist as far as may be those who would pray with the understanding"; the method is to interpret Scripture by Scripture, and hence the pages are rich with biblical quotations. The author's criticism of Matthew's Gospel may be turned upon him to the effect that "the impression can scarcely be avoided that in many passages spontaneity has been sacrificed to literary artifice." The last quarter of the book is given to an essay on "Enthusiasm in St. Matthew," to "Illustrations from Jewish Sources," to "Versions of the Lord's Prayer," and the "Prayers of our Lord."

F. G. W.

MISCELLANEOUS

HASTINGS, JAMES (editor). *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. Vol. IX, *Mundas-Phrygiens*. New York: Scribner, 1917. xx+911 pages. \$7.00.

In spite of the distractions caused by the war this monumental work is keeping up to its promise of an additional volume every year. The standards of the preceding numbers are maintained here, and the reader will be grateful for the large amount of valuable information furnished in most articles and disappointed in the general or homiletic tone of a few. In the present volume the articles on "Music" (55 pages), "Mysteries" (13 pages), "Mysticism" (34 pages), "Names" (46 pages), "Nature" (53 pages), and "Philosophy" (43 pages) are the most elaborate and are well organized.

While in the main a historical point of view prevails, the traditions of former exegetical method show rather strongly in some of the articles dealing with Christian ideas, as for example in the article on "Peace." Provision is made for eliminating the temptation to special interpretation of controverted topics by securing double treatment. In the articles, "Mysticism" and "Penance" excellent contributions by Roman Catholic scholars insure a fair presentation of the Catholic interpretation alongside of Protestant expositions.

In content and in treatment this is one of the best volumes yet issued.

G. B. S.

BOTSFORD, G. W., AND SIHLER, E. G. (editors). *Hellenic Civilization*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1915. xiii+719 pages. \$3.75.

This is the second volume in a series of source books published under the general title *Records of Civilization*. As defined by the general editor, Professor John T. Shotwell, of Columbia University, the purpose of the series is twofold: First, it aims to make accessible those sources of the history of Europe and of the Near East which are of prime importance. Secondly, in its treatment of these texts and by its bibliographies and special studies it covers the work of modern scholars in these fields.

Owing to the wealth of material the preparation of the present volume must have involved many serious problems of selection and grouping. While the main scheme is chronological, certain groups of material have been gathered about such topics as government, economics, law, science, art, education, and religion. The compass of this selection ranges from the earliest period of Greek civilization down to the time of Plutarch, but only a relatively small amount of space is devoted to the Hellenistic age as distinct from the Hellenic. For the most part, where available, standard English translations have been followed. The explanatory introductions to the selections and the full bibliographies including both ancient and modern writers make the volume an indispensable aid particularly to the study of older Greek civilization. There is still need for much fuller orientation in the Hellenistic period, but possibly this demand will be met in later volumes of the series.

S. J. C.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

- Burney, C. F. (editor). *The Book of Judges with Introduction and Notes.* London: Rivington, 1918. cxxviii+528 pages. 21s.
- Frazer, James George. *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament.* New York: Macmillan, 1919. 3 vols. xxv+569; xxi+571; xviii+566 pages. \$15.00 set.
- Knudson, Albert C. *The Religious Teaching of the Old Testament.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1918. 416 pages. \$2.50.

NEW TESTAMENT

- Robertson, John M. *The Historical Jesus: A Survey of Positions.* London: Watts & Co., 1916. xxiv+221 pages. 3s 6d.
- Robertson, John M. *The Jesus Problem: A Restatement of the Myth Theory.* London: Watts & Co., 1917. vii+264 pages. 5s.

DOCTRINAL

- Adams, John. *The Suffering of the Best.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1918. 164 pages.
- Franks, Robert S. *A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ.* New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1918. 2 vols. xii+449 pages. \$6.50.
- Snowden, James H. *The Coming of the Lord: Will It Be Premillennial?* New York: Macmillan, 1919. xxi+288 pages. \$1.75.
- Stead, W. T. *After Death—A Personal Narrative.* New York: Doran, 1914. 204 pages. \$1.25.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

- Barton, James L. *The Christian Approach to Islam.* Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1918. xv+316 pages. \$2.00.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Cohu, J. R. *The Evolution of the Christian Ministry.* London: John Murray, 1918. x+128 pages. 3s 6d.
- Gardner, John. *The Unrecognized Christ.* New York: Revell, 1918. 158 pages. \$1.00.
- Newton, Joseph Fort. *The Sword of the Spirit.* New York: Doran, 1918. 241 pages. \$1.25.
- Schenck, Ferdinand S. *The Apostles' Creed in the Twentieth Century.* New York: Revell, 1918. 212 pages. \$1.25.
- Shannon, Frederick F. *The Breath in the Winds.* New York: Revell, 1918. 173 pages. \$1.00.

MISCELLANEOUS

- Guthrie, Kenneth Sylvan. *Plotinus—Complete Works.* Alpine, N.J.: Comparative Literature Press, 1918. 1333+lxiv pages. 4 vols.
- Halstead, William Riley. *The Tragedy of Labor.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1919. 107 pages. \$0.50.
- Menge, Edward J. *Backgrounds for Social Workers.* Boston: Badger, 1918. 214 pages. \$1.50.
- Menge, Edward J. *The Beginnings of Science.* Boston: Badger, 1918. 256 pages. \$2.00.
- Whittaker, Thomas. *The Neo-Platonists.* Cambridge: University Press, 1918. xvi+318 pages. 12s.

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CHURCH UNION IN CANADA

ERNEST THOMAS

Wesley Church, Vancouver, British Columbia

The epoch of the Protestant revolution appears to be drawing to a close. The erection of absolute sovereign separate national states has not proved to be the satisfactory form of world-order. And the tendency to religious separatism has also shown many signs of yielding to a new impulse for a reassertion of a spiritual unity. In older nations, where the religious institutions are more rigid and where memories of the controversial origins are still vivid, the separatist feeling still prevents any organized expression of the new tendency; but in younger peoples the case is different. In Canada, more than anywhere else, the pressure of similar social conditions upon the various religious bodies while yet plastic tended to produce constant approximations both in temper and in organization. It is in Canada, therefore, that the most advanced movement to comprehensive church union has taken place with the prospect that in the immediate future a consummation will be reached marking the definite opening of a new era of church union.

Thirty-five years ago the reunion had become a fact within the families of churches. Presbyterians had united among themselves, and Methodists had also united among themselves. These achievements and the negotiations which led to them indicated both the direction and the means of advance. True, there had been a small percentage of Presbyterian churches which had on one ground or

another remained aloof from the united body, but as time passed by the personal and local considerations yielded to more permanent and national ones, and the unity has become complete. The Methodist union was complete from the first, save for the action of individuals, who here and there withdrew from the new fellowship. The Presbyterian traditions which were thus blended all derived from the various religious movements of Scotland; but the Methodist traditions were more diverse. There were two different centers of missionary work in the evangelization of Canada. One was found in the various Methodist groups in England, while the other consisted of the Episcopal type of Methodism in the United States. It may safely be claimed that the antipathies which had to be overcome in accomplishing these fusions were not less serious and the local rivalries not less strenuous than any which confront the United churches as they now seek a larger union.

Before the last century closed several conferences of an unofficial character had sought to evolve a scheme for more economical use of the church forces in evangelizing the country by means of a federal court or otherwise, in order that the scandal of competitive ecclesiasticism should be abolished or reduced to a minimum. In 1899 the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church declared definitely for a plan of what has since been called "co-operation" in new fields. For the purpose of this discussion "co-operation" has meant that the churches co-operate only in assigning certain districts to the missionary enterprise of certain churches. The main principle was that the new towns along one new line of railway would be assigned to one church, while the territory bordering on another new railway would be in the charge of the other body. This movement has reached a very high degree of development and has resulted in the elimination over vast areas of all overlapping of church work. The spirit generated in sessions in which the common task of evangelization was felt to be the supreme interest aided considerably in strengthening the demand for some more radical and constructive method in place of this purely palliative treatment of Protestant separatism.

Ere that movement for "co-operation" was fairly started, however, the Methodist General Conference met in Winnipeg in

1902. The moment was opportune. A great migration into the Canadian prairie provinces was then in progress, and the conference felt the challenge of this great field. Some felicitous words spoken by a fraternal delegation of the Presbyterian church contributed to the result, but whatever the personal and local influences the decision reached was momentous for the future of Canadian Christianity. The following resolution was adopted:

While this conference declares itself in favor of a measure of organic unity wide enough to embrace all the evangelical denominations in Canada, and regrets that hitherto all efforts and negotiations have failed to result in the formulation of such a comprehensive scheme, so that the outlook for it at present does not seem practicable;

Yet inasmuch as the problem of the unification of several of these denominations appears to present much less serious obstacles, since their relations are already marked by a great degree of spiritual unity, and they have already become closely assimilated in standards and ideals of church life, forms of worship, and ecclesiastical polity;

And since, further, the present conditions of our country and those in immediate prospect demand the most careful economy of the resources of the leading and aggressive evangelical denominations both in ministers and money, in order to overtake the religious needs of the people pouring into our new settlements, which economy seems impossible without further organic unity, or its equivalent;

This general Conference is of the opinion that the time is opportune for a definite practical movement concentrating attention on and aiming at the practical organic unity of these denominations already led by Providence into such close fraternal relations;

And whereas a definite proposal has been discussed to some extent in the press and elsewhere, looking to ultimate organic union of the Presbyterian, Congregational, and Methodist churches in Canada, this Conference, in no spirit of exclusiveness toward others not named, declares it would regard a movement with this object in view with great gratification believing that the deliberate friendly discussion of the doctrinal, practical, and administrative problems involved, with the purpose of reaching an agreement, would not only facilitate the finding and formulation of a Basis of Union, but would also educate the people interested into a deeper spirit of unity, and into that spirit of reasonable concession on which the successful consummation of such movements ultimately so largely depends.

And this General Conference would further recommend this movement to the prayerful interest and sympathy of the Methodist church in the devout hope that if organic union of the denominations named be achieved, it may be accompanied with great blessings to the church and to the nation at large and redound to the greater glory of God.

That a representative committee, to be composed of seven ministers and seven laymen, with the General Superintendent, be appointed to receive communications on the subject of the foregoing resolutions from the churches named, confer with committees that may be appointed by such churches, and report to the next General Conference.

Now it should be stated that the General Conference or the supreme court of the Methodist church met only once in four years, while the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church met annually. Thus this resolution was submitted to the Assembly in 1903 and referred to a committee. On April 21, 1904, for the first time a joint committee of the three churches met for conference pursuant to the foregoing resolution, and thus the organized movement for Canadian church union was definitely started.

It may be convenient to mention that the Methodist and Presbyterian churches were the two foremost Protestant communions in Canada and were approximately equal in numbers. The Congregational churches included considerably fewer members. There were many, however, who felt that there were other differences which neutralized this appearance of equality in strength. Some indeed felt that there were social differences, and while these were rarely referred to in public discussion they were no insignificant part of the more private discussion of the matter. At that time the Methodist church alone stood solidly for the total prohibition of the liquor traffic, and such an attitude was viewed with misgiving by more conservative elements in the old Scottish membership. On the other hand, there were many Methodists who viewed with grave uneasiness what appeared to them as a tendency to subordinate directness of moral and spiritual appeal to the conservation of social status. From the very first the situation was complicated by the fact that the real differences of social attitude and temper could not very well be discussed in the open without offense, and thus the arguments set forth in public did not fully represent the issue as it existed in the minds of large numbers of the people. Any transcript of the records, therefore, will fail to reveal some of the main elements in the actual discussion. Long ere the discussion closed the Presbyterians had accepted the Methodist position regarding the liquor trade.

On the eve of the first session of the joint committee three persons met in Montreal and talked over the situation. The first, a foremost Congregationalist, remarked, "The one outstanding difficulty in the way of progress is the self-complacency of the Presbyterians. They think they have all the scholarship." The second, reared in the Presbyterian fold, answered, "Yes, and the Methodists think they have all the piety." To this the third, a Methodist, added, "But neither has any to spare."

This slight incident exactly expresses one aspect of the misconceptions and misgivings which prevailed among the members of the joint committee; but there was more than this slight tendency to emphasize each other's peculiar quality. There had been church union in Scotland, and it had been brought about by a process which did not fully unify. The legal aspect of the case had not been rightly appreciated, and the courts of law invalidated the action of the church courts, so that had there not been a special act of parliament the whole property of the Free Church would have remained vested in the minority which declined to enter the union. Though the precedents in Canada had established a usage of having such unions consummated by acts of the federal and the provincial legislatures, the decision in the case of the Scottish churches aroused in some minds a fear that the whole effort was futile and might as well be ended at the start.

With this in mind the members assembled, and one magnificent Presbyterian set forth from his own point of view the hopelessness of amalgamating with people such as the Methodists, who were so lacking in this and that, and so abundantly supplied with this and that other. The utterance was frank and perfectly clear in meaning, and not less significant because it came from a tender, loving spirit. Then there spoke the foremost debater of the Methodist church of that day, who answered in kind, with equal definiteness of conviction, or of prejudice—as one prefers to describe it. What was the use of going farther? The hollowness of the whole proceeding was clear, and the members adjourned until the next morning!

The next morning, however, the Methodists felt they could not break negotiations to which they had invited their friends and so

preferred to declare the way still open. But the floor was asked on behalf of the Presbyterian delegation, which had a unanimous report to present. "A unanimous report!" So some good Methodists reached for their handbags and looked up their railway tickets; but as they listened they replaced the tickets in their pockets and stowed the handbags away indefinitely, for the report declared that after a frank discussion there had been discovered no insuperable barrier to union. And they all asked: "If the negotiations could stand the strain of the first impact may it not well be that the worst is over?"

It is well to recall such incidents as these as showing that the way was not without obstruction, personal, constitutional, and traditional. The outcome of that meeting, for which Christian Canadians waited with deep anxiety, brought comfort and hope; for it was a unanimous declaration by all the delegates that without committing either of their bodies to any specific policy the delegates were "of one mind that organic union is both desirable and practicable," and the whole subject was therefore commended to the favorable consideration of the chief assemblies of the churches concerned.

Thereupon, seeing that church union was well within the sphere of practical ecclesiasticism, the committees were strengthened, so that sixty members came from each of the larger bodies and thirty from the Congregational churches. The ground was surveyed in a preliminary way, and subcommittees were appointed to deal with the following aspects of the problem: (1) doctrine, (2) polity, (3) the ministry, including term of pastorate, (4) administration, and (5) law. These subcommittees worked at their assigned tasks, and the first to complete its work was that on doctrine. Indeed so very little difficulty was experienced here that some thoughtful observers wondered whether too little consideration was being given to the great facts of religion for which the United church should stand. However, on closer observation it became clear that the deep unity as to religious facts makes it easier to accept different formulations of those facts as they had been apprehended and interpreted in the light of different traditions.

Here it may be well to say a word about the general method and spirit of all the discussions which followed. Conceivably the committee might have proceeded by way of compromise, each group being willing to surrender some portion of its traditional heritage of practice, phrases, or antipathy, in return for similar surrenders on the part of others. This would have given us a great compromise, destitute of the dynamic elements of the several uniting bodies; and it has been too readily assumed that this is what really happened. On the other hand, that self-complacency from which so much had been feared passed away from the very first; and instead of each insisting on the completeness of its own endowment, each was conscious first of all of a great problem for which in certain particulars it felt inadequate. Thus there was a disposition to acquire from the other lives those very features which would make good the defects in one's own church life. Nothing was more significant than the frankness with which each acknowledged the deficiencies which had to be made good; for this very freedom of admission presupposed that the delegates already felt themselves so intimately one that they needed no self-defense nor sought vindication from the other. Thus the result tended to comprehension rather than compromise, embracing the characteristic features to which each communion held most tenaciously, and carrying these over into the new constitution or confession. For instance, when the pastorate was under discussion the Methodist at once recognized that the Congregationalist guarded the right of the local church to select its own pastor, and decided to maintain this element. The Congregationalist recognized that the Presbyterian guarded the local church from exploitation by pulpit adventurers and at the same time gave dignity and permanence to the office of the pastor, so this had to be conserved. The Presbyterian, however, was keenly alive to the waste involved in long vacancies and the scandal often involved in "preaching for a call," and so welcomed the Methodist provision for effecting all changes at a given period, with facility for change when desirable, without any stress within a local charge. Thus the best elements were fused in the new system.

The statement of doctrine bears evidence of its origin in this spirit of comprehension. The most notable contribution which the Congregational delegation made to the discussion was its splendid and successful effort to save the church from the rule of another dead hand. Let the statement of doctrine now drawn up become a test of the faith of our children, and we make certain new strife. Let it be a testimony of the faith which we find to be living and working in us in manifold forms, even without logical and reflective consistency, and we liberate religious life from the bonds of a theological dogma. The very freedom with which parallel statements are accepted as of equal value in history, without any effort to reconcile them in one philosophical statement, bears testimony to the practical spirit which was supreme in spite of the earnest desire of the older members to make sure that there be no break with the continuous tradition of the church. Thus we read:

We the representatives of the Presbyterian, the Methodist, and the Congregational branches of the church of Christ in Canada do hereby set forth the substance of the Christian faith as commonly held among us. In doing so, we build upon the foundation laid by the apostles and prophets, confessing that Jesus Christ Himself is the chief cornerstone. We affirm our belief in the Scriptures of the Old and the New Testaments as the primary source and ultimate standard of Christian faith and life. We acknowledge the teaching of the great creeds of the ancient church. We further maintain our allegiance to the evangelical doctrines of the Reformation as set forth in common in the doctrinal standards adopted by the Presbyterian church in Canada, by the Congregational Union of Ontario and Quebec, and by the Methodist church. We present the accompanying statement as a brief summary of our common faith and commend it to the studious attention of the members and adherents of the negotiating churches, as in substance agreeable to the teaching of the Holy Scriptures.

It would be impossible in the space available to detail the articles of the creed, but a few items of special interest may be selected as indicating the spirit of the whole statement:

On revelation.—We believe that God has revealed himself in nature, in history, and in the heart of man; that He has been graciously pleased to make clearer revelation of Himself to men of God who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit; and that in the fulness of time he has perfectly revealed

Himself in Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, who is the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of His person. We receive the Holy Scripture of the Old and the New Testaments given by inspiration of God, as containing the only infallible rule of faith and life, a faithful record of God's gracious revelations, and as the sure witness to Christ.

Of the divine purpose.—We believe that the eternal, wise, holy, and loving purpose of God embraces all events, so that while the freedom of man is not taken away, nor is God the author of sin, yet in his providence He makes all things work together in the fulfilment of His sovereign desire and the manifestation of His glory.

It is quite clear that we have here the various elements which have to be co-ordinated in any theology ere it can satisfy the religious life of men, rather than a well thought-out theology. A similar regard for the religious life in its fulness rather than for a premature formulation of that life in definition is seen in one article, which preserved for the new church that emphasis on personal religion which aroused so much misunderstanding and hostility for the early Methodists:

Of sanctification.—We believe that those who are thus regenerated and justified grow in the likeness of Christ, through the fellowship with Him, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and obedience to the truth; and that a holy life is the fruit and evidence of saving faith; and that the believer's hope of continuance in such a life is in the preserving grace of God. And we believe that in this growth in grace Christians may attain that maturity and full assurance of faith whereby the love of God is made perfect in us.

In view of yet later possible developments in the unification of Christianity it is noteworthy that no definite statement concerning the ministry or the government of the church is set forth to be a further embarrassment. The Lord Jesus Christ "has appointed a ministry of the word and sacraments and calls men to this ministry," and the "church under the guidance of the Spirit of Christ recognizes and chooses those whom He calls and should thereupon duly ordain them to the work of the ministry. . . . The worship, teaching, discipline, and government of the church should be administered according to His will by persons chosen for their fitness and duly set apart to their office."

It is clear that the doctrinal statement is carefully drawn with a view to inclusiveness rather than prematurely to exclude by negative definition. And in this character more than in any

specific statement the essential spirit and aim of the declaration of faith are revealed.

At once, however, arose a question concerning the status of this declaration. On this there is no ambiguity. It will be impossible for any court of the church in future to find itself tied down to condemn as heretical a minister whose character and teaching it approves, solely on the ground that the written standards of the church so define the faith as to prevent them from maintaining fellowship with such a minister. The living church is made supreme in all such matters, and no one can wonder that the Congregational delegates made this the one principle without which they could not enter the union. The freedom of the living church was their supreme care in the negotiation. And so it is that we read:

The duty of final enquiry into the personal character, doctrinal beliefs, and general fitness of candidates for the ministry presenting themselves for ordination shall be laid upon the Annual Conference (corresponding to the Synod or Union). These candidates shall be examined on the statement of doctrine of the United church, and shall before ordination satisfy the examining body that they are in essential agreement therewith, and that as ministers of the church they accept the statement as in substance agreeable to the teaching of the Holy Scriptures.

The second committee was charged with the formulation of the main features of the polity of the church. The same spirit of comprehension is manifested throughout, and the committee was specially happy in being able to preserve for the United church those specific courts and names around which cluster the fondest memories and characteristic traditions. Thus the first court superior to that of the local church will be the Presbytery, and above this the Annual Conference, while the supreme authority will be the General Council. The committee speedily discovered that under different names the several churches had officers and boards with substantially similar functions; but they recognized the importance of uniting the traditional Congregational freedom with "strong connexional ties and co-operative efficiency." The Congregationalists recognized from the first that their entrance into negotiations at all would presuppose willingness to abandon the

absolute self-government of the local church; but this involved a change which had been already substantially effected in many departments of the church, and whose further development had long been seen as necessary. The generous acceptance of this view of the situation gave them the more influence in their insistence that the connexional authority should itself not be bound too strictly by legal formulas in the interpretation of the fitness of a minister to represent Jesus Christ in the church.

Two distinct tasks confronted this committee. The one was to form a model constitution for the church, including the new charges which should be formed after the consummation of the union. The other was to provide some transitional process by which existing charges would be incorporated in the new body with the least possible disturbance or confusion.

As regards the latter, their organization and practices, including matters relating to membership, church ordinances, and societies enjoyed by them at the time of the union shall be retained at the will of the congregation, subject only to the general principles and legislation of the United church. In the same way the election of Congregational representatives to the next higher court may be elected just as at present. So, too, it is provided that any funds held in trust by the local church and not for the church at large shall not be interfered with by any legislation, either of parliament or by the new United church, without consent of the church which holds the funds. Thus guaranties are given against a recurrence of what some feared—the forcible subjection of the local church and its property to the new body.

Every new charge, and any old charge which so desires, shall be organized according to the new model constitution, which makes the pastoral charge the church unit. Its liberty is to be recognized, so far as is compatible with its hearty co-operation in the general work of the United church and with the exercise by the higher courts of their functions. Membership is conferred on “all who professing faith in Christ and showing their obedience to him have been received into the membership.” The spiritual oversight of the charge is vested in a board consisting of the minister, with the deacons, elders, leaders, or local preachers, while the financial

affairs are to be administered by a board of stewards or managers. These two bodies, together with representatives of the congregation or of special departments, shall meet quarterly for the review of the work of the charge.

The presbytery shall consist of all ordained ministers within the jurisdiction who are engaged in any form of church work, or who have been placed on the roll by the act of the Annual Conference, together with an equal number of non-ministerial representatives selected according to regulations to be made later. Oversight of the charges and the induction of pastors, as well as the powers of an appeal court, constitute the main functions of the presbytery.

Admission to the ministry, either as candidate or by transfer from other churches, is the concern of the Annual Conference, which is charged also to establish a balance of charges and ministers, so that every effective minister has a charge, and every charge shall have uninterrupted pastorate. General oversight of the religious life and church work of the territory included naturally falls within the power of this court, which includes in its membership all ministers on the roll of its presbyteries and an equal number of non-ministerial representatives.

The General Council is the supreme body and consists of ministers selected by the Annual Conferences and an equal number of other representatives. It meets biennially, and its presiding officer is the chief executive of the United church and for this reason may be without pastoral charge during his term of office. Its power of legislation is complete, subject to two qualifications. No additional condition of membership shall be laid down other than is found in the New Testament, nor shall the freedom of worship now enjoyed by any church be interfered with; and any rule affecting doctrine, membership, worship, or the government of the church shall not be permanently valid until approved by a majority of the presbyteries. The course of study for the ministry and the conditions of admission of ministers from other churches are regulated by this supreme council.

When we turn to the vexed question of the pastorate we find the way made quite plain. Each conference shall annually appoint

a settlement committee composed equally of ministers and laymen, which shall consider all applications from ministers or churches for settlements within its bounds. Any charge, on becoming vacant, may extend a call to a properly qualified minister, but the power of appointment is vested in the settlement committee. Any church or any minister may at the end of any church year seek some new arrangement, but the application must be in writing, and the reason given for the change must be satisfactory to the presbytery. The settlement committee has power to initiate correspondence with ministers and charges, and any church or minister has the right to appear before the committee. In the absence of a call being made when a vacancy occurs, the committee may fill the charge for the current year after consultation with the church. A minister once duly appointed to a charge has vested in him the right to the use of the church and the occupancy of the manse subject to the laws of the church.

As to the qualifications for the ministry, one of the surprises which came to the Presbyterian delegation was the discovery that other churches insisted on as high a standard as they did for themselves. The normal qualification for a minister is to be the attainment to the degree of B.A. with Greek, followed by three years' study on theology and one year's experience in preaching and pastoral work. For special cases slight modifications are provided: (1) two years of supervised preaching, with four years in college with a mixed course in arts and theology; (2) three years in arts, followed by the three years' work in theology and one in pastorate.

The provisions for administration look to the gradual consolidation of the various enterprises of the church, but the details of this part of the program are not of any general interest.

Finally the committee on law set forth the process by which enabling and incorporating acts should be secured from the provincial legislatures and the federal parliament. This legislation shall make certain that the complete autonomy of the church is secured in perpetuity, and that all property now held by or in trust for either of the negotiating churches shall be vested in the United church. And the name for the new body is to be "The United Church of Canada."

Such is the general outline of the scheme, and shortly after its completion it was submitted to the supreme courts of the three churches, securing in each case the indorsement of the body subject to the consent of the lower courts and the membership to which it was referred. The submission of the scheme to the people came to be involved in certain tangles of ecclesiastical politics which greatly complicated the issue. From the first the Presbyterians were most unfortunate in suffering a series of bereavements. Principal Caven, a peerless leader, with the confidence of the whole church might have piloted the movement successfully, but he was called away by death soon after the first meeting. Dr. Warden, who succeeded in the chair, soon followed him to the grave. Principal Patrick brought his strong, masterful personality into the chair, with all the downrightness of western vigor. Then came misunderstanding. The form of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly left room for the suspicion that, should the presbyteries approve of the scheme, it might be ratified without reference to the people. This provoked resentment and evoked strong and organized opposition to the procedure, which most unfortunately survived after the immediate cause was removed; and the opposition to procedure passed imperceptibly over into opposition to the scheme itself. From that time there was an organized party in opposition and something approaching party strife within the church, which made it obviously undesirable to hasten decision. The voting took place in the Methodist and Congregational churches during the same period as that in which the Presbyterians voted; and a significant fact stood revealed. The first returns of the Methodists were announced, indicating a vote of about 85 per cent of the members in favor of the union. Then came the returns of the Presbyterians, showing a vote less than 70 per cent, and accompanied by many incidents which were most painful to other churches. But the later voting of these other churches showed not the slightest deviation from the ratio of the earlier vote. The Congregational churches voted just as decisively as the Methodists. Then delay became imperative, while internal adjustments could be made; and some slight amendments were agreed to which smoothed the way for earnest folk who had misgivings about certain clauses in their

original form. Later came a second vote, with the result that the General Assembly deemed itself justified in declaring in 1916 that the other negotiating bodies be informed of their decision to proceed with the union, but delayed final action on account of the war until the second assembly after the war. This was followed by a year of very painful agitation, which the minority hoped would secure the abandonment of the project by the next assembly. But the assembly of 1917 simply declared that in view of the fact that the resolution of the previous year had set the time for action at the second assembly after the war, it would promote the harmony of the church if all active and organized propaganda were suspended in the meantime. The adoption of this resolution was followed by a few words from the president of the non-union party, in which he stated that he did not regard the action, thus taken unanimously, as in any way indicating any recession from the declaration of the previous year.

Thus matters stand and the General Assembly of 1920 will therefore face the situation after a period of healing, when, as the leader of the minority promised, the matter would be considered afresh with an open mind.

Meanwhile the Methodist General Conference of 1910 had declared its approval of the proposals and ordered that they be sent to the annual conferences of 1911 for approval or otherwise, and if approved that they be then sent to the membership of the church in the next spring. The result of this vote was that the next General Conference, in 1914, notwithstanding the internal difficulty of the sister-church, declared that it would still "abide in the confidence that all obstacles and objections to a comprehensive union of the churches will in the good providence of God be ultimately overcome."

Those opposed to the union in the sister-church were active in advocating as an alternative plan the full development of the "co-operation." This appeared strange to those outside their own circles, as demanding that presbyterians in selected towns should be called on to abandon their membership and asked to join the Methodist church, while in other towns Methodists would be required to reciprocate. This policy excited very strong opposition

in the Methodist church when presented as an alternative to union, though welcomed as a temporary adjustment leading up to the union; but it has meanwhile been carried out to such an extent that there are few small towns west of the Great Lakes where there is now any serious difficulty owing to the duplication of churches.

One other aspect of the case should be mentioned—the possibility of a wider embrace of the union movement. Just ere the formulation of the basis of union was completed letters were sent to the bishops of the Anglican church and to the authorities of the Baptist unions, inviting them to enter into the negotiations. The bishops replied, consenting to the appointment of a suitable delegation, provided that previous to any discussion or interpretation the four conditions of the Lambeth conference were unconditionally accepted. The joint committee was called on to “treat with us along the lines laid down by the Lambeth conference for the present year and to understand that no action agreed upon by the delegates can become binding on the Church of England in Canada until approved by the General Synod acting in full accord with the Anglican communion throughout the world.” Now the Lambeth terms included the recognition of the historic episcopate, subject, however, to local adaptations. What adaptations might have been found possible in friendly discussion must remain undiscovered, since discussion was declined until the terms were accepted. The other condition, however, indicated the extreme difficulty of forming any union with the Anglicans while they were not susceptible to that same pressure of national conditions which had avowedly compelled the other communions to enter upon negotiations. One can readily appreciate the considerations which dictated this prerequisite of maintaining the unity of Anglican action, but the conditions laid down clearly precluded any expectation of successful negotiation in that direction in the immediate future. When, however, the United church shall have become a fact and by its existence challenges the Christianity of Canada to justify continued division, the question will have to be considered in the light of new facts, not the least of which will be that three churches have by frank, friendly intercourse found a basis of union.

The Baptists sent a reply not less uncompromising, in which, having set forth their own principles, they declared that these principles made it "necessary to maintain a separate organized existence" and required them "to propagate their views throughout the world." Since that letter was written years have elapsed, and new viewpoints are being reached, so that large numbers of the members of that communion are not quite so certain that fidelity to their principles will always demand that they "maintain separate organized existence." The consummation of the union will throw upon the Baptist communion the responsibility of defending this separate existence, without affording them the protection which Anglicans find at hand in their relations with world-wide Anglicanism.

Meanwhile, during this period of quiet thinking and reconsideration, pending the second General Assembly after the war, some memories are growing less vivid, and other hopes and aspirations are gaining in strength and compelling power. It cannot be too clearly emphasized that at no time has the movement for union derived any considerable part of its driving power from petty or materialistic considerations. The search for bigness has never been discernible. The desire on the part of the most serious men of all churches to escape the limitations imposed on them by historical conditions has been a potent factor. The close comradeship between the ministers of the various churches during college days, in which they attended the same classes and mingled freely in the fellowship of college life, has done much to reveal the unsubstantial nature of the considerations which divide the churches. More influential is the fact that the historical lines of church division do not coincide with the existing divisions in living tendencies and schools of thought, or ethical and religious emphasis. Humility, awakened by a sense of the incompleteness of our own success, together with growing appreciation of the contribution made by other communions to the common Christendom, has brought most devout people to seek some more fully rounded type of personal religion and church organization; and it is hoped that the United Church of Canada will do much to realize that aim, blending Methodist enterprise with Presbyterian disciplined strength and Congregational freedom.

TROELTSCH'S THEORY OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH
Yale University

Ernst Troeltsch is commonly regarded as the chief systematic theologian of the "religionsgeschichtliche Schule" in Germany. He is also significant as representing the search for a theory of religious knowledge more satisfactory than that of the Ritschlians, but within the limits of an essentially Kantian point of view.

Speaking of the influences which have proved most decisive for his own philosophical and theological position, Troeltsch says:

My first philosophical authorities were Kant, A. Lange, and Lotze, through whom I was gradually driven to the idea of a critical metaphysic. My theological teacher was Ritschl. But I have been led gradually into opposition to the Ritschlian system at two points: first, with regard to supernaturalism, which, it seems to me, cannot be asserted in the light of the historical study of religions, Christian and non-Christian; and secondly, as concerns the all too simple overcoming of natural-philosophical and metaphysical difficulties through the mere theory of the phenomenality of nature—a solution of the problem with which I could not be satisfied in the light of a wider study of philosophical literature. The particularly decisive direction was finally given to my thinking by B. Duhm, with the peculiarities of whose position, of course, I do not fully agree. But once I was directed by him to the idea of development, I had to become informed concerning Hegel and the Hegelians. Finally I noticed that, as a result of all this, I had been brought into very close approximation to Schleiermacher.¹

In another connection he compares the attempt he makes to combine the results of historical and philosophical investigation with the similar attempt of his philosophical teacher, Dilthey, although he himself seeks, as he points out, to attain to more assured positions in this direction than those reached by Dilthey.² Indeed it may be said that Troeltsch's philosophy of religion, like that of Georg

¹"Geschichte und Metaphysik," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, VIII (1898), 52.

²"Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II (1913), 754; cf. "Religionsphilosophie" in *Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (edited by W. Windelband, 1907), p. 429.

Wobbermin, his successor at Heidelberg, arose out of the attempt to revise, combine, and mutually supplement the views of the theological professor in the University of Berlin (where both had studied), viz., Julius Kaftan, and those of their philosophical professor in the same institution, Wilhelm Dilthey. To both pupils, faced with Dilthey's *Weltanschauungslehre*, according to which, while no metaphysical system can amount to knowledge, that one is practically justified which expresses and promotes the highest type of life, the suggestion commended itself that the Ritschlian or semi-Ritschlian theology of Kaftan, with such minor modifications as might be found necessary, was, after all, philosophically the most defensible *Weltanschauung*, or metaphysical theory.

However, the Kantian metaphysical agnosticism of both Dilthey and Kaftan has left its trace upon the religious philosophy of Troeltsch (as well as upon that of Wobbermin), in spite of the avowed intention to correct the Ritschlian antimetaphysical bias. This will appear all the more remarkable when it is noted that, in speaking of Schleiermacher and the Ritschlians, Troeltsch characterizes their position as "dogmatic agnosticism." This means, he explains, that they have renounced exact and adequate knowledge in the religious realm as being impossible; that they use the term "knowledge" in a peculiar, non-theoretical sense, meaning by it attachment to confessional standards of belief in so far as these seem to be confirmed by their practical and emotional value, and holding that through religious faith access to the real grounds of life is possible, but that all confessional expressions of religion are symbolic and necessarily inadequate. Indeed the Ritschlian theology, continues Troeltsch, admitting as it does only so much of philosophy as it needs in order to get rid of philosophy, resigns itself, in its agnostic theory of religious knowledge, to being simply a mediating theology and therefore not strictly scientific. It supplements Schleiermacher's appeal to the consciousness of the religious community by turning back as far as possible in the direction of the Lutheran biblicism, thus becoming more objective without the agnosticism of the fundamental theory being given up at all.¹ The main task then to which Troeltsch

¹ "Rückblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert der theologischen Wissenschaft," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 200-209.

addresses himself in his philosophy of religion is to relieve and remedy as fully as possible the agnosticism of this "agnostic-epistemology" of Schleiermacher and the Ritschlians,¹ and thus at the same time to make that modern theology which attempts to carry out the program of Schleiermacher less dogmatic and more nearly scientific.²

More particularly, Troeltsch makes a twofold attack upon this Ritschlianism, to which he objects that it is too narrowly dogmatic, as well as being fundamentally agnostic. On the one hand he proposes to destroy and displace the lingering supernaturalism of its theology by means of *religious empiricism*. On the other hand, in opposition to its antiphilosophical and especially antimetaphysical bias, he seeks to introduce a formal *religious rationalism*. By means of empiricism he would overcome dogmatism, and by combining in Kantian fashion a critical rationalism with this empiricism he seeks to eliminate, or at least to mitigate, the agnosticism.

With reference to supernaturalism Troeltsch makes a distinction between what he calls an exclusive and an inclusive supernaturalism. The former, which would ascribe a supernatural character to one's own religion alone, he regards as forever overthrown by the criticism of Hume and Kant, who pointed out, not the impossibility of miracle, but the impossibility of proving that any particular event is miraculous. The comparative study of religions shows that the uniqueness of Christianity consists, not in the manner of its proof, as resting upon a supernatural revelation, but in its inner content. This comparative study also, in view of the fact which it discloses, that vital religion clings to the inconceivable mystery of a divine impartation to the soul, leads to the idea—as one possible interpretation of the facts—of an *inclusive* supernaturalism which would recognize revelation and miracle in all religions, in the sense of immediate acts of God which are to be distinguished from the customary course of the soul.³ Thus what Troeltsch calls a

¹ "Rückblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert der theologischen Wissenschaft," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 217.

² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 226.

³ "Religionsphilosophie," in the Windelband volume cited above, pp. 453-54; "Geschichte und Metaphysik," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, VIII (1898), 45, 69; "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 766.

"religio-historical theology,"¹ or "theology of historicism,"² would be, he thinks, genuinely possible. It would rest upon a metaphysic of history which would know how to select the simple, permanent, and true from the whole historical development, as its kernel, and how to set it forth for the religious consciousness upon the ground of faith in the rationality of human history.³ Troeltsch's procedure is, first, to establish the supremacy of Christianity for our own culture and civilization; secondly, to set forth the essence of Christianity; and thirdly, to give an exposition of the theological content of this essential Christianity.⁴ Thus the empirical method of appealing to the history of religion seems to give promise of liberating modern theology from its former perpetual oscillation between helpless agnosticism and the sheer dogmatism of *exclusive* supernaturalism.

Through this thought of revelation as common to all vital religion, however, an empirically oriented philosophy of religion is led to an appreciation of mysticism, and thus from the history to the psychology of religion. Here Troeltsch acknowledges the influence of William James and maintains that the result of religious psychology is to show that the original phenomenon of all religion is mysticism; that is, faith in the presence and activity of superhuman powers, with the possibility of union with them.⁵ Indeed without mysticism—that consciousness of inner contact with transcendent reality, that seeking of the supersensuous in experience and finding of the divine presence in concrete finite events and realities—without mysticism in this sense there is no real religion.⁶ This means then that the one true miracle which

¹ "Ueber historische und dogmatische Methode in der Theologie," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 738.

² "Geschichte und Metaphysik," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, VIII (1898), 69.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ "The Dogmatics of the 'Religionsgeschichtliche Schule,'" *American Journal of Theology*, XVII (1913), 10-15 = *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 509-14.

⁵ "Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft," in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, Teil I, Abteilung IV, p. 485; *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft* (1905), pp. 17 f., 35; "Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion," *Harvard Theological Review*, V (1912), 421 = *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 384.

⁶ "Religionsphilosophie," p. 478; *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, etc., pp. 20, 47, 52.

can be experienced by every man is revelation—not enlightenment merely, but experience of the life of God regenerating, liberating, uplifting the human soul.¹

Here Troeltsch seems to be on the very verge of passing completely beyond the dualistic theory of religious knowledge, according to which the divine reality is never directly and immediately present in human experience, and attaining to that realistic and monistic view according to which the divine *is* thus directly and immediately experienced. Indeed some of his language seems fully appropriate only from this latter point of view; and yet he is deterred just here by two difficulties. Of this revelatory presence of the divine in the human the supreme and most unmistakable instance is to be found in the case of the historic Jesus—if indeed he be truly historic. But the uncertainty of historical criticism as to the true picture of the historic Jesus is here a disturbing factor. In the interests of Christian revelation-faith Troeltsch insists that not everything concerning the historic Jesus can be left forever an open question; the essential points must be decided in one way or the other.² But this dogmatic dictating to the historian, not what results he shall obtain, but that he shall arrive at some definite result, is resented justly enough by Bousset, who retorts that it is rather the duty of the systematic theologian to lead religion beyond the realm of controversy as to particular matters of historic fact.³ Indeed Troeltsch himself appreciates the anomaly (pointed out by Bernouilli, *Ueber die kirchliche und wissenschaftliche Methode in der Theologie*) of theology absolutizing certain historical contents, whereas historical investigation must keep itself free from all dogmatic presuppositions.⁴

The other difficulty in the way of Troeltsch's escape from a dualistic and hence more or less agnostic theory of religious knowledge is theoretically more important. There is no scientific

¹ "Religionsphilosophie," pp. 448-49.

² "Rückblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert der theologischen Wissenschaft," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 213, 222.

³ "The Significance of the Personality of Jesus for Belief," *Fifth International Congress of Free Christianity and Religious Progress* (Berlin, 1910; Proceedings and Papers, published 1911), p. 214; "Kantisch-Friessche Religionsphilosophie und ihre Anwendung auf die Theologie," *Theologische Rundschau*, XII (1909), 429.

⁴ Cf. *Die Absolutheit des Christentums*, 1902, *passim*.

reason, he contends, for giving up that which is to be found wherever human life exists in its natural soundness, viz., religion as faith in revelation;¹ but the question arises, he admits, as to how revelation is to be recognized as such, or, in other words, how religious knowledge is possible. Revelation is, in any case, not a simple God-depicting effect of God's activity on the soul, but in it the human and the divine coexist in a complex mutual interpenetration.² Here then we pass naturally and necessarily from psychology to epistemology.³ As any narrow dogmatism was to be excluded by a broad empiricism, so the agnosticism which so easily besets empiricism is to be remedied, Troeltsch thinks, by a critical rationalism.⁴ This point is felt to be a crucial one, and it is held that if we are to reach assured reality in religion, as against mere psychological appearance, the appeal must be back from James to Kant.⁵ The question as to how religion, or the recognition of revelation, is possible, comes to be, from the point of view of Kantian presuppositions, What is the a priori condition of religious experience? or, in other words, How is religion possible *a priori*? Thus in Kantian fashion Troeltsch would say that without the concepts which grow out of the a priori categories of human thinking, religious sensibility is blind. But he would be quite as emphatic in urging, on the other hand, that the a priori alone, even when it is "the religious a priori," can give no religious knowledge but only empty concepts. For religious knowledge the religious a priori must have the material furnished through religious sensibility, or intuition.⁶ Speculative rationalism, developing consequences by analyzing the content of a concept, is to be excluded; at most it has only the value of a surmise as to the rationality of the world.⁷ The non-empirical but purely rational criterion which Kant

¹ *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, p. 53.

² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

³ Cf. "Religionsphilosophie," pp. 464-65, 472; *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, pp. 17, 18, 34, 47; "Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft," *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, T. I, Abt. IV, p. 485; "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 760-61.

⁴ *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, p. 18.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 23, 24, 25.

⁶ "Religionsphilosophie," pp. 475-76.

⁷ *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, pp. 21, 22.

employed in his later *Critiques* is not to be followed in determining the marks of normal religious experience, but rather the combination of the empirical and the rational upon which the first *Critique* insisted.¹ In the critique of religion Schleiermacher, it is maintained, is a better guide than Kant, because he is so much more empirical.² What Troeltsch is interested in is not the creation of a new religion of reason but the rationalization and regulation of the religious life as it actually exists; his method is not theological rationalism but criticism, which would effect a synthesis of empiricism and rationalism.³ In other words, the rationalism of Troeltsch in religion is a *formal* rationalism; it assumes that the religious a priori is already present in the most elementary religious experience, imparting to its fundamental nature the character of rational necessity.⁴ Mysticism is the union of pure or rational religion with impulse, the actualizing of the religious a priori.⁵ As it is in general, so it is in religion: what is at once the secret of reality and the fundamental problem of knowledge is the harmony of the a priori with the actual, of the rational with the extra-rational, of the universal with the unique;⁶ the ideal is a mystical, historical religion in thoroughly rational form.

Thus Troeltsch regards himself as the true exponent of the Kantian critical principle. As the first *Critique* faces the problem of the philosophy of science, viz., What are the a priori conditions of the possibility of cognitive experience? as the second *Critique* faces the problem of the philosophy of morality, viz., What are the a priori conditions of the possibility of moral experience? and the third *Critique*, the problem of the philosophy of art, viz., What are the a priori conditions of the possibility of aesthetic experience? so, according to Troeltsch, a fourth *Critique* must face the problem of the philosophy of religion, viz., What are the a priori conditions of the possibility of religious experience? In every instance, it is contended, genuine values are to be found where we have the

¹ "Religionsphilosophie," p. 472; *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, pp. 44-45, 51.

² *Ibid.*, p. 40; "Wesen der Religion," etc., *Kultur der Gegenwart*, T. I, Abt. IV, p. 476.

³ "Religionsphilosophie," p. 486; *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, pp. 23, 25, 46.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 23, 45, 51.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

union of rational form with empirical content. Valid religion then is not, as Kant himself seems almost to have supposed, religion within the limits of mere speculative reason, the product of rationalistic speculation, but actual, empirical religion—historical, more or less mystical religion—reduced by criticism to a thoroughly rational form.

While Troeltsch, however, follows the procedure of Kant's first *Critique* in insisting upon the combination of empirical content with the rational form, it is obvious that he means by the religious a priori something other than space, time, and causality, with which that *Critique* is concerned. What he has in mind is rather a religious a priori similar to the ethical a priori of the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the teleological-aesthetic a priori of the *Critique of Judgement*. As the ethical a priori gives to moral judgments the character of rational necessity, and as the teleological and the aesthetic a priori render the same service to their respective judgments, so, it is surmised, a critical determination of the a priori element in religious experience would reveal the basis for rational necessity in religious judgments. Thus Troeltsch regards it as only a naturalistic one-sidedness in the Marburg neo-Kantians that they allow only the first a priori, that of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, to be valid, and reject that of the later *Critiques* as being simply what they stigmatize as the "theological and dualistic residue" of the Königsberg philosopher's thinking, whereas in reality its place in the thought of Kant is quite fundamental.² Rationality in science, in art, in morals, and in religion has in each case a shade of difference in its meaning, but it always means autonomous validity.³

The possibility of rationalizing actual religion does not mean, according to Troeltsch, that any direct proof of the existence of

² "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 757-58. In an article entitled "Das religiösen Apriori bei Ernst Troeltsch und Rudolf Otto," in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* (1911), Karl Bornhausen says: "It ought not to be possible for Troeltsch to brush aside the neo-Kantian conception of the a priori so disrespectfully as he does. . . . The question arises whether clear insight into the changing character of our whole spiritual and cultural world does not compel us to give up the expression 'a priori' for the peculiarity of the ethical, aesthetic, and religious rational presuppositions. It is the epistemological a priori, the function of unity, which transforms striving into will, imagination into aesthetic contemplation, and feeling into religious faith" (pp. 196, 197).

³ "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 762.

God is to be attempted; all that can be carried through successfully is to show that there is an a priori law of the formation of religious ideas lying in the essence of reason, so that religious consciousness comes to be a necessity for the rational man.¹ "When we attend to the rational law involved in being religious it can be shown from the feeling of inner necessity and obligation that this being religious is a law of normal consciousness. . . . Being religious belongs to the a priori of reason."² As in all other demonstrations of worth, the proof of the rational necessity of religion is accomplished ultimately by falling back upon the universally valid concepts which are immanent within thought or reason;³ and one of these, it would appear, is the concept of God, the Object of religious faith. It is a fact that religion in all its forms asserts the real existence of the object of its faith.⁴

In his article "On the Question of the Religious Apriori,"⁵ Troeltsch agrees with his critic, Spiess, that the reduction of the religious phenomenon to a contained a priori proves nothing for the truth and right of the religious consciousness, but only provides against the losing of religion in the process of eliminating irrational forms of religion, such as the eschatological. But then, he claims, neither the right of the ethical, nor that of the aesthetic, nor even that of the logical is *proved* by the revelation of its a priori character. That by which all is proved is itself not proved. But the science of religion leaves religion standing as a normal constituent of human life, and regulates it out of its own a priori.⁶

Further than this Troeltsch does not give us much information as to what the religious a priori is.⁷ There are some further clews, however. As against Kant, it is claimed that there is no ready-made system of categories, but that, as life grows, the latent rational

¹ "Wesen der Religion," etc., *Kultur der Gegenwart*, T. I, Abt. IV, p. 486.

² *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, pp. 43 f.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴ "Wesen der Religion," *Kultur der Gegenwart*, T. I, Abt. IV, p. 487.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 761.

⁶ *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, p. 53.

⁷ Bornhausen, in the article cited, pp. 193, 196, characterizes it as an unknown x , not yet solved. Bousset maintains that Troeltsch fails to solve the problem as to how to derive from all religions and justify a norm for the phenomena of a particular religion ("Kantisch-Friessche Religionsphilosophie," *Theologische Rundschau*, XII [1909], 434).

content will be brought out by further analysis.¹ The law of the validity and a priori character of religion is to be sought, as it was by Schleiermacher, in the sense of the unity of the finite and the infinite which flows out of the essence and inner necessity of consciousness.² The religious a priori, moreover, gives a basis of substantiality to the inner unity of the other a prioris.³ Naturally too, it is in the highest religion that the a priori comes to its purest expression, and it is just this circumstance which makes that religion the highest.⁴

There can be little doubt as to Troeltsch's significance for present-day religious thought. His relation to the older Ritschlianism is best seen perhaps in his modification of the value-judgment doctrine. He bases his theology upon the recognition of the supreme *value* of Christianity among the religions of the world,⁵ thus carrying the Ritschlian principle into his "religions-geschichtliche" theology. But he goes farther and points out, after the manner of some other epistemological dualists, that in our recognition of the application of our representations to objects beyond our consciousness there is implied a faith in the normality of our intellect, and thus in the possibility of attaining to valid knowledge. This means that he not only admits but insists that a value-judgment is the foundation and strength of all human knowledge. But what he is especially concerned to make clear is that this value-judgment is one which establishes faith in the laws of thought and goes on to make use of these laws.⁶ Hence the unreasonableness of the Ritschlian distrust of rational-empirical

¹ *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, pp. 31, 51. This suggests to the empirically minded critic the interesting problem of the genesis of the religious a priori; but Troeltsch is too much of a Kantian, of course, to admit the legitimacy of such an investigation.

² "Wesen der Religion," *Kultur der Gegenwart*, T. I, Abt. IV, p. 476.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 486. This is significant in connection with Windelband's definition of holiness, or religious value, as made up of the true, the beautiful, and the good. Does Troeltsch mean that we may gather, from the nature of religion as a state not only of aspiration after the supreme ideals but of dependence upon an ideal reality, that the category of substantiality belongs to the religious a priori?

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 476.

⁵ "Rückblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert der theologischen Wissenschaft," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 224-25.

⁶ "Geschichte und Metaphysik," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, VIII (1898), 46.

metaphysics. In Troeltsch's opinion the Ritschlian value-judgment theory, by appealing to Kant and putting all emphasis upon the distinction between the theoretical and the practical reason, and by always emphasizing only the *practical* indispensableness of the values claimed for religion, loses the necessity of the object to which these values belong, and so goes in the direction of the abyss of a theology of mere wishes and illusions.¹

Troeltsch himself, however, with his ideal of a rational religion of historical, mystical revelation, comes very near, as has been intimated, to making good his escape from a dualistic and consequently agnostic theory of religious knowledge. Moreover, he proves his faith by his works and expressly provides for, and himself attempts, a metaphysical synthesis of theology with our scientific knowledge of the world. In addition to the speculative rationalism which he repudiates, and the formal rationalism upon which he chiefly depends, he would also make an auxiliary use of what he calls a "regressive rationalism," which proceeds from the facts of experience to draw inferences as to their grounds in reality.² In this way then he claims—not through deductive metaphysics but through an elaboration and unification of experience in ultimate concepts—a philosophical treatment of the idea of God is made possible.³ This metaphysic of religion will not be a mere apologetic but a re-working of the God-idea and a fitting of it into the modern scientific view of the world, which view, by the way, cuts very deeply into the *traditional* notion of God.⁴ But it is the metaphysic of spirit which is most imperatively needed, Troeltsch thinks, by the theologian. The metaphysics of nature and of the Absolute must be left for those who have accurate knowledge of the natural sciences; and from such the theologian must be willing to learn.⁵ And so through religious metaphysics, with its harmony of religious and scientific knowledge, the religious starting-point can be, as against positivism, finally justified.⁶

¹ *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, pp. 27, 28.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 28.

³ "Wesen der Religion," *Kultur der Gegenwart*, T. I, Abt. IV, p. 487.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 488.

⁵ "Geschichte und Metaphysik," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, VIII (1898), 45.

⁶ "Wesen der Religion," *Kultur der Gegenwart*, T. I, Abt. IV, p. 487.

This claim, however, suggests a criticism. Troeltsch's metaphysics would undertake to be a synthesis of the selected religious world-view with the assured results of scientific investigation; but if the religious world-view which enters into this synthesis is not finally justified save by the fact that it can be thus synthesized, are we sure that it is finally justified at all? It may figure as a permissible belief, but scarcely as assured knowledge. For might not different religious world-views conceivably agree equally well with our present scientific knowledge of the world? Troeltsch elsewhere recognizes the difficulty, admitting that the metaphysics of the relation of nature to the spiritual life is difficult and can arrive only at results which are highly hypothetical and at best only approximately true.¹ And yet in an earlier article he had already admitted that without certainty of the mutual agreement of the Christian world-view on the one hand and the facts and their scientific elaboration on the other hand Christian experience would not be able permanently to maintain its vital efficiency.²

This leads us to mention a criticism which has been made against Troeltsch from the point of view of religion itself. It is connected with what must be fairly evident from what has just been said, that Troeltsch fails to provide in his method for a full recovery of religious certitude after the subjection of religious beliefs to philosophical examination. And where certainty of belief is inadequate, the content believed in is of course imperiled. Criticism in the name of religion then has been urged against Troeltsch by a great many conservatives and conservative liberals. Kattenbusch thinks of him in his relation to the older Ritschlianism as comparable to Erasmus in his relation to Luther,³ and with awkward frankness raises the question whether Christianity will stand being handled as scientifically as Troeltsch recommends, or rather, categorically demands.⁴ Ecke also speaks for many when he says that Troeltsch brings the Christian faith into an almost too

¹ "Geschichte und Metaphysik," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, VIII (1898), 44.

² "Die christliche Weltanschauung und die wissenschaftlichen Gegenströmungen," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, III (1893), 495.

³ *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, p. 80.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

dangerous dependence upon *Welterkennen*;¹ and among those who "view with alarm the exodus of young men after the religious *a priori*" Troeltsch mentions E. W. Mayer, Häring, Julius Kaftan, Herrmann, F. Traub, and Wobbermin.²

It is perhaps by the last mentioned that the directly religious criticism of Troeltsch's method has been most fairly expressed—a fact due in large part, no doubt, to the twofold circumstance that Wobbermin is not only interested, like Troeltsch, in the transition from the psychology to the epistemology of religion, but also advocates, like Troeltsch again, the introduction of metaphysics into theology. He is thus a not wholly unsympathetic critic. He offers as an objection, however, to the method by which Troeltsch seeks to reach the required religious epistemology, that it is too rationalistic. It rests upon the assumption that fundamental to religion there is an element of rational necessity, which is to be set forth ever more purely and completely. To this Wobbermin objects in the first place that it leads to a "rationalizing of religion," in keeping with which in the last analysis the only ultimately valuable element in religion would be its rationally necessary and universally valid content, all other experiential value being discounted as comparatively unimportant. But vital religious experience, Wobbermin insists, appeals to *revelation* as its peculiar foundation and cannot recognize the rational and universally valid as a decisive norm for passing judgment upon its claims to validity, least of all with reference to its most central and essential content. Wobbermin's second objection to Troeltsch's epistemological program is closely related to the first. The rationalistic epistemology, following upon the empirical psychology, minimizes, he claims, if it does not entirely remove, the significance of the religious experience itself; reason tends to be made a substitute for religious experience instead of occupying the merely supplementary position to which it is entitled.³

¹ *Die theologische Schule Albrecht Ritschls und die Kirche der Gegenwart*, I (1897), 124.

² "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 757, note.

³ "Psychologie und Erkenntniskritik der religiösen Erfahrung," *Weltanschauung* (1911), pp. 353-55.

This important difference between Troeltsch and Wobbermin goes back to the fact that while religion has indeed its own inner basis of certainty, the doctrinal contents with reference to which claims of certainty are put forth are immensely varied and mutually contradictory, especially when different religions are compared. Troeltsch regards the essentially Ritschlian position which Wobbermin here represents as being altogether too narrow and dogmatic, and feels the need of some universally acceptable standard for the measurement of religious beliefs. Wobbermin, on the other hand, fears that the rationalistic norm adopted by Troeltsch may do violence to the really valid content and certainty of Christian faith. If the problem were simply to find some intermediate ground such as ought to prove acceptable to both sides, one might suggest a critical religious pragmatism, according to which practical and especially ethical value, and not mere intellectual reasonableness, would be imposed as a test of truth. This would be universal enough in its procedure to avoid much of the narrow dogmatism of which Troeltsch complains. At the same time it would be conservative enough of what is religiously vital to give promise of retaining, as demanded by Wobbermin, the essentials of Christian belief. Moreover, there is already a strongly pragmatic undercurrent in the thought of both thinkers. Every metaphysic, according to Troeltsch, must find its roots in practical life,¹ while Wobbermin agrees that the metaphysics of faith must satisfy the practical-ethical test.² It is a further question, however, whether this method of religious pragmatism would suffice to guard the position against agnosticism. In abandoning dogmatic religious certitude, as Troeltsch proposes to do, and in repudiating a rationalistic philosophical certainty, as Wobbermin does, it is quite conceivable that one should lose religious certainty altogether, falling a prey to an agnosticism which refuses to give way to any merely pragmatic considerations.

The point, however, which is of chief interest for our present purpose is not the question whether Troeltsch sufficiently guarantees religious certainty by means of metaphysics, or could do so

¹ *Protestantism and Progress* (1912), p. ix.

² "Psychologie und Erkenntniskritik," etc., *Weltanschauung*, p. 363.

by way of pragmatism; it lies rather in the question whether or not he succeeds in vindicating a place for religious knowledge by means of his formal rationalism. He is not to be interpreted as carrying the neo-Kantian rejection of the *Ding-an-sich* into the religious realm, for then he would have to confine himself, like the "Marburg school" of philosophers, to "religion within the limits of mere humanity"; he could recognize the divine only in the realm of the ideal, and not in the realm of actual being, or as an Object of dependence. Rather is he to be interpreted as the follower of his dualistic Kantian teachers, Dilthey and Kaftan, and of the Ritschlian school in general. It is from this point of view, it would seem, that we must interpret his appeal to an absolutely a priori element in religious experience. If the object of experience has intelligible form and even its existence as object only by virtue of the constructive activity of the knowing subject with its a priori rational forms, how then is the religious subject to *know* the religious Object as that ultimate Reality upon which all religious subjects are believed to depend? Troeltsch seems to feel that there is here an insuperable difficulty in the way of bona fide religious knowledge, and so, instead of trying to rationalize religion by getting scientific knowledge of the religious *Object*, he seeks simply to determine as rationally as possible the religious *subject*. The religious Object, or better, the religious *Ding-an-sich*, being assumed to be really inaccessible to immediate experience, cannot be *known* to be truly represented by even the most rational thought; it can only be *believed* to be thus represented. Hence the rational determination of the subject would simply mean acting as reasonably as possible when real knowledge is impossible. And so Troeltsch, logically led to reject the idea of the possibility of any theology as a science of the religious Object,¹ has in the end to admit

¹ See "The Dogmatics of the 'Religionsgeschichtliche Schule,'" *American Journal of Theology*, XVII (1913), 16 = *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 514-15. Cf. "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 755-56: "The general life-question of the present is not the need to attach systematic theology to the methods of science and to make it of equal dignity with the other faculties. The systematic theology of today is too closely bound up with great ecclesiastical corporations and political powers, and with the instinctive life of the great masses of the populace, for it to need to ask for scientific methods and attachments to universal thought. . . . Moreover, attachment to 'science' is very precarious, for the reason that there is here no common methodological procedure, and to win an attachment to the one group would necessarily mean to lose connection with the other."

a fundamental agnosticism, in spite of his appeal to the religious a priori and his recourse to metaphysics. The agnostic and but limited character of dogmatics comes, he says, from the agnostic character of all religious knowledge in general, which everywhere consists in a cautious modifying of already formulated symbols and adapting them to the growing whole of human knowledge.¹

Troeltsch's ideal of a rational empirical religion is, in its broad outlines, undoubtedly valid; but its realization would be greatly facilitated by one or two fundamental modifications of his philosophical presuppositions. In the first place, let us substitute for the Kantian absolute dualism of content of experience on the one hand and independent reality on the other what we may call a critical intuitionism. This would recognize not only as possibility but as fact the presenting to the human knowing subject (in complexes of empirical elements) of various independent realities, one of which is a factor, not identifiable in religious intuition with our empirical selves, but a factor which makes for righteousness in and through us, according as we relate ourselves thereto in a certain discoverable way. In the second place, let us substitute for the dogmatic absolute apriorism an empirical relative apriorism, such as would recognize the "religious a priori" as but relatively a priori, and the product, ultimately, of the activity of the human psychical subject in experimental relations with the religious Object. Then there would appear the possibility of formulating, in place of Troeltsch's still essentially eclectic dogmatics, a scientific empirical theology on the basis of successful experimental religion with its experienced revelation of the divine reality.

¹ "Rückblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert der theologischen Wissenschaft," *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 224.

THE CONSERVATISM OF EARLY PROPHECY

J. M. POWIS SMITH
University of Chicago

The prophets of Israel are quite generally looked upon as a group of radical reformers who sought to introduce new and revolutionary principles into the Hebrew social order. This is in large part due on the one hand to the fact that their utterances called forth the serious opposition of the leaders of the established order in their own day, and on the other to the wonderful timeliness of the prophetic teachings in relation to the conditions of our times. Nevertheless, the thesis of this paper is that the early Hebrew prophets were not consciously innovators but rather conceived of themselves as standing for full and faithful adherence to the old paths.

There can be little question as to the truth of this proposition for the period prior to Amos. The religion of Yahweh was a late-comer into Canaan. It represented the standards of practice and the ways of thinking current among nomads or seminomads. It was the religion of the desert. Upon entering Canaan it came at once into contact and conflict with a civilization of very high order. Yahwism was face to face with a new world. But religion always and everywhere has been afraid of advancing knowledge. It naturally shrinks and shivers in discomfort and dread when the cold air of progressive science puts to flight its odor of sanctity and the searchlight of truth flashes upon the gloom of its dim religious light. Yahwism was in such a defensive position; but its prophets fully realized the truth of the now familiar adage, "The best defence is an attack."

The civilization of Canaan was inextricably intermingled with Baalism. Religion is a function of culture, and the culture of Canaan was Baalistic. To learn the culture of Canaan was the first necessity for the incoming Hebrew. He could not conduct himself in the midst of civilization precisely as he had done in the

wilds of the steppe country. He must become a farmer, a vine-grower, a merchant. But he must learn the new arts from those who practiced them, viz., his Canaanite neighbors, and they were worshipers of the Baalim. Their Baalism was part and parcel of their day's work. The fruits of the earth were for them the gifts of the Baalim, and their whole agricultural life was dominated and shot through by that conception. When they sowed their fields, they did it to the accompaniment of Baalistic rites; when they reaped their harvests, they celebrated the occasion in Baalistic feasts. The newly arrived immigrant would inevitably sooner or later assume the same attitude. If his crop failed or were less abundant than that of his Baalistic neighbors, any dereliction of duty toward the Baalim would furnish an explanation satisfactory not only to his neighbors, but also to himself. This was a sphere of industry in which Yahweh was not at home. He had had no experience in or associations with vine culture and the like. Herein lay great peril for Yahwism. If the Hebrew farmer must look to the Baalim for the success of his season's work, and if Yahweh is to be confined to those interests which had come over from the desert life, it was a foregone conclusion that the Baalim would become the *real* gods of Israel, and Yahweh would subside more and more into innocuous desuetude.

The prophets were not slow to realize this peril or to set themselves the task of counteracting it. One direct, but utterly futile, method was that of turning the hands of the clock backward. They sought to oppose and obstruct the inevitable progress toward civilization by attacking civilization and branding it as the source of all evil. This hostility to culture appears unmistakably at various points in the prophetic literature. The story of the Fall in its present form, whatever may have been its original motifs,¹ is an example of this hostility. The acquisition of *knowledge* by the eating of the forbidden fruit is the cause of all human toil and trouble. The ideal condition of man is that represented by our first parents in their uncorrupted state—a state of innocence and ignorance; with the quest for knowledge woe begins. The same polemic against culture appears in the story of Cain and

¹ See, e.g., J. G. Frazer, *The Folk-Lore of the Old Testament*, I (1918), 45-52.

Abel. Abel brings an offering of the increase of his flocks and it is accepted; Cain's offering of the products of his toil is rejected. Cain represents the newer agricultural life; Abel stands for the old nomadic cultus. In like manner the prophetic bias against the luxury and vice of the newer civilization is voiced in the story of Noah. "Noah began to be a husbandman and planted a vineyard; and he drank of the wine and became drunken," and in that state he not unnaturally violated the conventionalities. Canaan saw the condition of the old patriarch and was unduly interested therein or amused thereby, with the result that all his descendants were put under a curse. The building of the first city is frustrated by Yahweh's intervention on the ground that it is an impious attempt to rival the power of the gods themselves. A similar anti-Canaanite attitude is revealed in the story of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, those indescribably wicked cities of Canaan. It is expressed again in Abram's solicitous arrangements that his son Isaac shall not marry a daughter of Canaan but shall return to the land of Abram's kinsfolk to look for a wife. The same spirit is seen in the story of Dinah and the treacherous slaughter of the disabled Shechemites. E's law of the altar (Exod. 20:24-26) emphatically declares the more primitive ways of the nomad cultus to be the ideal and forbids indulgence in the luxurious ritual of Canaan. The law regarding the release of the Hebrew slave incorporated in E's Covenant Code (Exod. 21:2 ff.) likewise reveals a conservative attitude. The Hebrew code calls for a service of six years on the part of the serf; the Canaanite practice probably let the slave off at the end of three years (cf. Deut. 15:18, and the Code of Hammurabi, § 117.)

Another indication of the tendency in these prophetic narratives to glorify the nomadic period as that in which ideal religion prevailed is the story of Moses at the burning bush. Whether or not the Kenite hypothesis of the origin of Yahwism be the correct explanation, it is clear that the prophetic traditions ascribe to Moses a new revelation of Yahweh during his shepherd life in the desert. The God of the deliverance from Egypt was a desert-god, and he prepared his people for the trying experiences of

Canaan by a long period of training under the tuition of Yahweh in the school of the wilderness. The "tent of meeting" kept alive this aspect of Israel's thought of Yahweh long after the entry into Canaan.

The foregoing illustrations of the anticulture attitude of early prophecy have been furnished by the J and E documents. The larger part of them come from J. This makes it difficult to justify the judgment of a recent writer when he says, "J's friendliness to civilization and the arts is entirely missing in E."¹ If this is friendliness we may well say, "The Lord preserve us from our friends." We now leave the anonymous prophets represented in these prophetic narratives and turn to two men whose names have been preserved for us.

About the middle of the ninth century B.C. there came forward in Israel a new prophet, Elijah the Tishbite. To appreciate the point of view of Elijah and the nature of his task, we must get clearly in mind the situation in northern Israel at this time. King Ahab was on the throne of Samaria. Ahab was heir to a long, agonizing struggle with Damascus, which was sapping the strength of his kingdom. But Ahab was a large-minded, far-seeing statesman. He saw the shadow of an Assyrian conquest looming large upon the horizon. He realized that such a foe could be successfully met only by the united armies of Western Asia. He began to prepare for the coming struggle. He contracted alliances with Judah, Sidon (by marrying Jezebel, daughter of its priest-king), and Damascus, as we learn from the Books of Kings. This neighborliness with Damascus is in striking contrast with the relations between the two states for some decades previous, and that it did not meet with the approbation of the prophets is shown by the prophetic narrative in I Kings, chap. 20. But Ahab adhered to his policy of co-operation and consolidation for purposes of mutual defense, as we learn from the records of Shalmaneser. In 854 we find him at Karkar fighting the Assyrian, who tells us that he overthrew there a coalition of twelve kings, including among others Ahab's forces, troops of Damascus, Hamath, Egypt, the Irqanations, Arvad, the Arabians, and the Ammonites—in all

¹ Brightman, *The Sources of the Hexateuch* (1918), p.117.

a total of fourteen kings. Shalmaneser claims to have inflicted a severe defeat upon his adversaries; but this claim is open to doubt. At any rate, he did not follow up his so-called victory as one would naturally expect, but found it advisable to return home at once. Still further, it is very significant that Shalmaneser found it incumbent upon him to face this same coalition again in 850, 849, and 846. Shalmaneser seems to have made slow progress as long as this group of allies held together. Ahab was a by no means insignificant member of the alliance. The numbers of the units making up his contingent of the allied forces show that he was one of the most influential and weighty members of the entente.¹

It is into such a situation as this that Elijah thrusts himself. The king and his counselors are busy with international and military problems and are straining every nerve in a mighty struggle, upon the outcome of which depends the future liberty not only of Samaria but of all the peoples of the coast lands at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Elijah appears as a critic at every step; Ahab can do nothing that is right in his eyes. No wonder that Ahab is reported as having greeted Elijah on one occasion with these words, "Art thou he that troubleth Israel?" As a matter of fact, we know practically nothing as to Elijah's attitude toward the international policy of Ahab; but there are some items of knowledge bearing upon the question that make

¹ Some interpreters would make Ahab's presence at Karkar an evidence that he was there as a vassal of Damascus (so e.g., I. Benginzer and W. E. Barnes, *ad loc.*, and H. Gressmann, *Die Schriften des A. T.*, II, 277). But per contra, see H. P. Smith, *Old Testament History*, p. 195. Kittel (*Geschichte des Volkes Israel* [2d ed., 1909], pp. 359-61) would regard the naming of Ahab in Shalmaneser's inscription as due to an error, and substitute Joram in Ahab's place. But the chronology of the Books of Kings is not a very substantial basis for any hypothesis, and while the Assyrian did err in making Jehu the son of Omri, that is altogether insufficient reason for supposing that Shalmaneser did not know the name of one of his chief antagonists. A noncommittal attitude as to the character of Ahab's relation to Damascus is taken by Stade, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, I, 528; J. Skinner, *ad loc.*, and others. C. F. Burney in his recently published commentary on Judges (p. liii), which is an altogether admirable piece of work, proposes to put the battle of Karkar in Ahab's last year, and so to regard it as belonging to the three-year period of friendly alliance between Damascus and Israel which is spoken of in I Kings 22:1.

an inference fairly safe. In the first place, there is the indisputable fact that Ahab regarded Elijah as his enemy. Now it is quite clear that the larger part of Ahab's interest and energy was devoted for a considerable period of years to plans and preparations for the conduct of the struggle against Assyria. A prophet could not have been in sympathy with this feature of Ahab's policy and an active supporter of the same, and have left an impression upon Ahab's mind of unmitigated hostility such as the documents reflect. Upon a question of this sort only one of two attitudes was possible, viz., support or opposition. For a prophet in those days to have been neutral or noncommittal would have been tantamount to downright opposition. In the second place, the records of Ahab's reign, which are of prophetic origin, make not the slightest reference to the battle of Karkar and the Assyrian danger. Were it not for Shalmaneser we should have known nothing of this the most important aspect of Ahab's reign. We may not press the silence of the Books of Kings upon this matter too far; but some silences need explanation. Silence here might conceivably mean indifference to these great movements on the part of the later editorial collectors and revisers of the old historical narratives. But it seems to me more likely that the explanation lies in the attitude of Elijah and his prophetic contemporaries toward this policy of Ahab. If that attitude was hostile, as seems probable, it is not unreasonable to suppose that in the course of time the prophetic literary men realized that this was a chapter of prophetic history that had better be omitted. It certainly reflected little credit upon prophecy that it should be found on record in an attitude of disloyal criticism and opposition to the only policy that stood any chance of turning back the Assyrian flood, and that, too, early in the development of the situation, before Assyria had got so far into Western Asia as to be beyond the possibility of dislodgment by the local forces.

In the third place there is the actual concrete evidence of the opposition of the prophetic party to a policy of coalition contained in the story of the prophetic incident given in I Kings, chap. 20. The shortsightedness of the prophet here compares

very unfavorably with the broad vision of Ahab, the international statesman. The attitude attributed to Elisha in II Kings 6:20 ff. is in striking contrast with I Kings, chap. 20.

In the fourth place there is the well-known hostility of later prophets to alliances with non-Israelitish powers. Hosea and Isaiah are the two outstanding representatives of this attitude (see Hos. 5:13; 7:11; 8:8-10; 12:2; Isa. 18:1 f.; 20:1-6; 30:1-5). This was in part, to be sure, due to the realization on the part of these two prophets that such co-operation in conspiracy against Assyria was foolish and suicidal from a political and military point of view; but more than that, it was a religious conviction; for the prophets in question regarded dependence upon other powers as due to distrust of Yahweh and as giving to foreign gods the confidence and recognition that belonged only to Yahweh. This jealousy of Yahweh's reputation which demanded an undivided allegiance to him was no new thing in the days of Hosea and Isaiah; it was of the very essence of Yahwism and formed the basis of much prophetic criticism of the tolerant policy of Solomon. Hence it is practically certain that the same element of undivided loyalty to Yahweh entered into the prophetic opposition to Ahab's co-operative policy that is associated with the person of Elijah.

Another line of evidence showing that Elijah's opposition to Ahab was in large part directed against his wise, statesman-like policy of co-operation with the neighboring states is furnished by the later course of events. The figure of Elisha is shrouded in the mists of legend, so that not even its main outlines can be definitely determined; but it is at least clear that tradition regarded Elisha and Jehu as having carried the policy of Elijah through to a successful issue. When we say "successful," of course, it is meant only in the sense that the ends sought by the prophetic party were at least partly achieved. From any other point of view the outcome of the Elisha-Jehu program was anything but success. That Jehu was the tool of the prophetic party that followed in the footsteps of Elijah is past all question. He was anointed king, and indeed incited to his deed of usurpation and his orgy of murder, by Elisha's prophetic emissary. Not

only so, but he had the support of the nomadic sect of the Rechabites, as appears from his encounter with Jehonadab on his way from his massacre at Jezreel to his even more bloody one at Samaria. Jehonadab puts himself specifically upon record immediately as indorsing the policy of Jehu and then shares Jehu's chariot while he proceeds to Samaria, where he sees Jehu's bloody "zeal for Yahweh." This indorsement by Jehonadab, the son of Rechab, is a fact of great importance for our contention. It makes indisputably certain the proposition that the anti-Ahab movement in Israel headed by the prophets was essentially anti-civilization propaganda. Jehonadab is referred to in Jer., chap. 35, as the founder of the sect of the Rechabites, and the program of the Rechabites as there outlined is frankly and avowedly an attempt to maintain the customs and standards of the desert life in the name of religion.

That the outcome of the Elisha-Jehu program was not at all commendable from the practical point of view is at once evident. The slaughter of so large a number of the leading men of the nation, men of military skill and political experience, could not but weaken the power of the nation, and that at a time when all her strength was needed. The abandonment of the older policy of co-operation was a fatal step. The results of these two things became speedily apparent. We are told in II Kings 10:32 f. that "in those days (viz., the days of Jehu) Yahweh began to cut off from Israel, and Hazael smote them in all the borders of Israel; from the Jordan eastward, all the land of Gilead, the Gadites, Reubenites, and the Manassites, from Aroer, which is by the valley of Arnon, even Gilead and Bashan." In II Kings 13:7 we read that in the days of Jehu's son and successor Jehoahaz "he left not to Jehoahaz of the people save fifty horsemen and ten chariots and ten thousand footmen; for the king of Syria destroyed them and made them like the dust in threshing." This is in sad contrast with the figures furnished by Shalmaneser for the expeditionary force of Ahab at Karkar, which he reckons as comprising "2,000 chariots, 10,000 men." It should be noted also that in 842 B.C. Jehu paid tribute to Shalmaneser. Thus we have the significant fact that precisely during the period in which the

prophetic party was in practical control of affairs in northern Israel that kingdom was reduced to its lowest terms. The early prophets, prior to Amos, were wedded to a policy that proved a failure. We may go even farther, I think, and say that the policy of these prophets, if it had been permanently and completely successful in commanding the adherence of the nation and its rulers, would have spelled ruin for the religion of Yahweh itself, to which the prophets were devoted with such fanatical enthusiasm. These prophets were hostile to the advance of civilization. They identified civilization with Baalism and thus could think of it only as anti-Yahwistic. They sought to carry over into the life of Canaan and to make regnant there the customs and ideals of the steppe. They did not realize that "new occasions teach new duties." They failed to reckon with the fact that life is a unit, and that therefore any change in one of its aspects involves inevitably corresponding change and adjustment in all other aspects. If the economic basis of life be revolutionized and the social customs be completely reorganized, as is necessarily the case in such a transition from nomadic or seminomadic life to a settled agricultural status as Israel experienced in taking up her station in Canaan, it is impossible that the religious interpretation of life shall not be vitally affected. Had the prophets been able to keep Yahweh within the limits of a nomadic interpretation of the universe, it goes without saying that Yahweh could never have become the sole God of the civilized world.

This discussion has thus far covered but one stage of a larger subject. I may only suggest its nature now. The policy of hostility to civilization did not win. Was this failure in spite of the best efforts of the later prophets from Amos on to champion it and carry it through to triumphant dominance? If so, what influences of a contrary sort came in of such a powerful character as to render the efforts of the prophets futile? Or did Amos and his successors represent a radical change in this respect in that they abandoned the policy of opposition to culture and set themselves deliberately to the task of making Yahweh, the desert God, recognized as the lord of all the ways of civilized man? Are those scholars therefore to be acknowledged right who speak of Amos as "the founder of

a new phase of prophecy,"¹ or "the pioneer of a process of evolution from which a new epoch of humanity dates,"² or "the beginner of the new prophecy"?³ Whatever may be the answer to these questions, we are left with a further problem, viz., what new influences operated, either in co-operation with prophecy or in opposition thereto, to bring about in Israel, in and after the eighth century B.C., a broadening of the conception of Yahweh and a thoroughgoing moralization of the Yahweh religion? What candidates are there in the field for this honor? Is it to be assigned to the credit of the Assyrian armies,⁴ or to a powerful stream of Egyptian cultural influence that may have made itself felt at this time, or to the unassisted growth of the native Hebrew spirit? The discussion of these questions must be deferred.

¹ Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, p. 472.

² Cornill, *Prophets of Israel*, p. 46.

³ Smend, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 2d ed., p. 184.

⁴ See G. Adam Smith's fine chapter on "The Influence of Assyria upon Prophecy" in *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*, Vol. I.

A COMPARISON OF THE SYNOPTIC, PAULINE, AND JOHANNINE CONCEPTIONS OF JESUS

FREDERIC PALMER
Harvard University

We often have a tendency, in the complex life of the present, to regret the apparently simpler life of the past; to long for the care-free irresponsibility of childhood, or for the unconventional habits of an earlier society, or for the glow and enthusiasm of our former Christian faith. The attempt at recall is of course always futile, and the picture of past conditions as we reconstruct it is almost always erroneous. The Golden Age is not behind but before. Similarly there is a tendency in the student of the life of Christ to regret the days when there was one authoritative portrait of Jesus, and when a harmony of the Gospels, arranging all, or nearly all, their incidents into a consistent whole, seemed entirely possible. But those days are, for the student of the New Testament, irrevocably gone. Here, as elsewhere, he will, if he is wise, recognize present conditions as steps in development and, with hopeful confidence, labor to discover the wealthier knowledge to which they lead.

That the New Testament contains not one portrait of Jesus but several, and that these differ from one another in important respects, this is the starting-point of our problem, which is to describe the three different views—for they all belong to three main types—and to consider the relation of these to one another. In doing so I shall take the Gospels and Epistles, in the main, as they stand, without attempting textual criticism, and shall use for convenience the names appended to them as those of the authors, without questioning their historicity.

In the Synoptic Gospels we find the first conception of Jesus, the first in time and therefore the first in christological development. It can be seen most characteristically in the Gospel of Mark. It is comparatively simple of thought, not analytic, not

theologic. There is an atmosphere about it which is fresh, glad, young. We can see the blue lake sparkling in the morning sunshine, and the golden fields of Galilee, rich with lilies and vocal with birds. It is concerned with facts ungarnished, unrelated to any scheme of thought. The utterances of Jesus in it are significant and profound, but there is in them no touch of mystery; they say little about his nature or his relation to man or God. The bond between the disciples and their Master is one of personal devotion, in part an almost childish dependence, and in part the reverent loyalty of a religious enthusiast for his prophet. They turn to him for the solution of their practical questions: how to get a withheld inheritance or a desired office, how to pray, and—most difficult of problems!—how to forgive. They were, and they remained, devout Jews; only to the current Judaism they added a recognition of Jesus as the Messiah, the observance of his precepts, and the expectation of his second coming to establish that Kingdom of God for which both Judaism and Christianity were waiting. During the lifetime of Jesus it all centered around the content of the message which he caught from the lips of his predecessor and with which he began his own work, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." His disciples were occupied with the Lord's parables and rules of conduct, with discovering surprising fulfilments of prophecy, and with discussing perplexing questions of apologetic which their new position forced upon them. Jesus had pointed to a spiritual essence in the Law underlying its ritual demands, and to a righteousness which exceeded that of the scribes and Pharisees; but their relation to the Law seems never to have been considered by his immediate disciples; it had to wait for its development in the next age by the great thinker of Christianity. As their faith grew after the crucifixion into primitive Christianity, the puzzle of their Master's death almost absorbed their grief for it, while the expectation of the Parousia became more vivid and exigent. When and how it would occur they knew not, only it would be soon, in their lifetime.

The synoptic conception, we may say then, is of Jesus of Nazareth, a historic being, whom the authors or others had seen and walked with in Galilee or Judea, whose words and deeds had

become of central importance, a man of such attractiveness that loyalty to him became a dominant power in those who drew near to him. They felt in him the authority of one who knew God and man at first hand and who dwelt with eternal things. Therefore he had originality; therefore he spoke boldly, and his word was with power. His confidence in his vision of God and in his success based on it were invincible; but together with this inflexibility of moral attitude there was a large loving-kindness which went out toward men, women, and little children, and all wondered at the gracious words which proceeded out of his mouth.

I said that in the Second Gospel there is no touch of mystery; but that is not the case with the other two Synoptic Gospels. While they share in the main the comparatively incomplex view of Jesus, touches of mystery cannot be kept from creeping in. Apart from the mystery connected with a few of the miracles attributed to him, there are one or two utterances ascribed to him by Matthew and Luke which are widely different in tone from those practical directions for conduct and those deepened interpretations of duty and God which form the greater part of his recorded discourses. Notably there is Matt. 11:27, repeated in Luke 10:22: "All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son but the Father, neither knoweth any man the Father but the Son, and he to whom the Son willeth to reveal him." That might have come not from the synoptists but from the Fourth Gospel, its tone is so like that profound underlying keynote of the Johannine writings, "I and my Father are one." In its distinct expression of the relation of Jesus to God this utterance stands almost alone in the synoptists; though we hear a somewhat similar note in the words ascribed by Matthew to Jesus in his final charge to his disciples, "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth," and again in the passages, different in tone but tending in this direction, in which Jesus is described as the final judge of the world. In the picture of Jesus drawn by the synoptists, says Professor Ropes, "a certain mystery is an integral and essential element, which cannot be separated out as having been added by a legendary accretion."¹

¹ *The Apostolic Age*, p. 237.

There is another possible indication that this tone of mysticism was in the original words of Jesus and was not added by later writers. The Fourth Gospel declares that Jesus said, "I am the Way."¹ If that was in fact an utterance of his, it would be an exhibition of the spiritual Christ rather than the historic Jesus. Now this phrase, "the Way," came to be, in the apostolic age, according to the Book of the Acts, the common term for the Christian movement. Saul went to Damascus to see if he could arrest any belonging to "the Way."² "The Way" was opposed by the Jews in Ephesus.³ The procurator Felix was well posted with regard to "the Way."⁴ We find then the word with this signification in common use about the middle of the first century; but this usage seems to have disappeared, for we do not meet it afterward, and a half-century later "the Way" has come to be applied to Jesus himself as being the means of communication between man and God. This appears contrary to the regular order of logical development. We should expect that the use of the phrase as a name for Jesus would come first, and then it might naturally be applied to the movement inaugurated by him. The reverse process seems illogical—to take the name of a society and apply it to its founder. But if Jesus in fact uttered the words, the usage would be explained: the name which he gave himself came naturally to be used as that of his society. Either the Johannine usage was the first and that of the Acts second, which would be presumable, or that of the Acts was first and the Johannine second, which would be strange. It seems likely, therefore, that the Fourth Gospel is correct in attributing these words, "I am the Way," with their transcendent tone to Jesus.

This synoptic conception of Jesus, simple, though with threads of mystery interwoven in it, could not be adequate to meet the demands of inquiring intelligence or an expanding world. It must itself expand; and this, Jesus said, could be only through his departure. Then his followers would be compelled to think and act for themselves on the foundation he had built for them.

Shortly after his death there came an event, according to the Book of the Acts, which definitely changed the relation of the

¹ John 14:6.

² Acts 19:9.

³ Acts 9:2.

⁴ Acts 24:22.

disciples to their Master. On the day of Pentecost, somehow, in some way, they were seized with the conviction that he was not dead but alive. For some of them, no doubt, this implied merely the transference in imagination of his former material existence to a different, a heavenly sphere; but to those of deeper insight it was the discovery of what is meant by spiritual presence. Loving souls of all time have felt that when their minds are filled with a dear one who has gone, when they are living in the ways in which he lived, thinking his thoughts, holding his ideas, pressing heart to heart, they are thus communing not merely with the memory of him but with his spiritual presence; not with him as a ghostly *revenant*, but with those currents of his spiritual being which were of the essence of his true life. While this is not his corporeal presence, it is as truly, even more truly, his real presence. This conviction came to the disciples of Jesus on the day of Pentecost, and it changed the sphere in which their Master was present with them from an external to an internal one. It formed thus the transition from the synoptic conception of Jesus to that which was at the basis of the Pauline and Johannine conceptions.

Yet Paul seems to have received his conception of Jesus not from that of the synoptists but in another way. He has few sentences showing an influence of Jesus' language as reported in the Gospels. He says that he had formerly known Christ "after the flesh." It is possible for this to mean merely that he had seen Jesus and was acquainted with his history. This was probably the case; for it would have been strange for one who had been a student in Jerusalem, as Paul was at the time when the authorities were in conflict with Jesus, not to have seen him and known of the affair. But the phrase probably means that his conception of Jesus had been a superficial one, occupied with historic events and unaware of their profound bearing on the relations between man and God. Certainly he shows in his Epistles little interest in the history of Jesus before his redemptive death.¹ He insists

¹ The only events previous to the Last Supper to which he refers are the Davidic descent of Jesus (Rom. 1:3; 9:5; 15:12), his lowly condition and poverty (Phil. 2:7; II Cor. 8:9), his unselfishness (Rom. 15:3), possibly a part of the first charge to the twelve apostles (cf. I Cor. 9:14 with Matt. 10:10), and, if he is correctly reported by the author of the Acts, the preparatory ministry of John (Acts 13:24, 25), and one of Jesus' remarks not elsewhere preserved (Acts 20:35).

strongly that he borrowed his idea of Jesus from no one, but that it was wholly original: "I certify you, brethren, that the gospel which was preached of me is not after man. For I neither received it of man nor was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ."¹ It must, of course, have had some basis in historic events, but it seems to have diverged from the synoptic contemplation of the ministrations of Jesus to men and to have followed out rather the thought of his relation to God in redemption.

It is that word "redemption" which is the key to Paul's theology. When we try to trace the steps of his thought and assess them as rational, we are confronted by ideas which seem irrational and un-Christian. This is partly because he had still in mind conceptions belonging to Saul the Jew which Paul the Christian had not outgrown, and partly because we are enjoying the fruitage of larger Christian conceptions, of which he was sowing the seeds unawares; but his view of the process of redemption, however explained, we shall find based on the great fundamental laws of man's spiritual life which are as true for us as they have been in all time.

The most earnest endeavor of Saul, the young Pharisee, was to be right—"justified" he called it—in the sight of God, and this of course could be only by keeping the Law. The more he tried, however, the more impossible it became. Suddenly it flashed upon him, What if this infinity of minute demands did not exist? What if they were to be met in another way? What if they had been met? If they had, then he was free from them. In the same instantaneous flash came the conviction that Jesus, whom he had fought against, was the Messiah. But he, the anointed one, God's own Son, was of course above the Law and free from it, though he had gained this freedom while experiencing human conditions. Paul puts in a single word the key to Christ's exaltation and hangs it up on a "Wherefore"; for after enumerating the lowly conditions through which Jesus triumphantly passed he says, "*Wherefore* God hath highly exalted him."² Now if he, Paul, should pass through the same experiences, he would attain

¹ Gal. 1:11, 12, 16, 22.

² Phil. 2:9.

the same blessed result; and this, if Jesus became his Master, he could do, for then, following the steps of his Lord with loving devotion, he would become one with him; he too would be baptized with consecration to God, he would die to sin, and this would mean that he too would ascend and rise into newness of life. Becoming thus joined to Christ by passing through his experiences, he would share his fortunes hereafter. Again he puts his keynote into a word or two. If God commended his love to us through the death of Christ while we were sinners, much more shall we be saved now that we are justified; if the death of Christ brought us near to God, much more shall we be saved by his life. There is many a trembling soul that has laid itself down with Paul in confidence upon his "much more."

There was, however, another side to the transaction. How could he, how could even Christ, obtain freedom from demands which were just? How was it possible for God to lay aside these demands? The debt incurred through sin must be paid. How could God with justice give free way to his forgiving love? But again Paul's answer came: It was through the death of Christ. He nowhere traces completely the connection which he finds between Christ's death and the possibility of God's forgiveness, but he assumes and reiterates it. The Cross was an offering on the part of Christ, on the part of humanity which he represented, which made free forgiveness possible.

Here many a thoughtful Christian has stumbled and parted company with Paul; for the conception which seems to underlie the apostle's thought, of sin as a debt for which a vindictive God must exact the uttermost farthing of payment, is abhorrent to him and contrary, as he must believe, to the conception of God as set forth by Jesus Christ. Viewing Paul's thought thus, we may see in it only a remnant of Judaism and even of paganism—a savage deity refusing to be appeased except by a bloody sacrifice. Yet we may pierce deeper, and, without asserting that our explanation is precisely that of Paul, we may trace the law of redemption until it leads us to the Cross of Christ; for redemption inevitably involves suffering, and it was foreseen long before the Christian Era that suffering for righteousness has a saving power

not only for the sufferer but for all who come within the range of its influence. The Prophet of the Exile had declared of the servant of the Lord, "Surely he hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows. The chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed."¹ Of the Maccabean martyrs it was said, "They became, as it were, a vicarious expiation for the sins of the nation, and through the blood of those godly men and their atoning death Divine Providence saved afflicted Israel."² We do not have to turn to the Scripture for evidence of the vicarious and redeeming power of suffering, for it is intelligible to everyone who has tried to rescue from sin one whom he loves. He has found himself plunged by love into all the fortunes of the sinner; himself, though innocent, suffering punishment with and for the guilty. He knows that this fellow-suffering constitutes the most potent appeal and the ultimate agency for the salvation of the sinner, and he gladly pours out his life-force, his life-blood, as a ransom.

The power which uplifts the world is will for righteousness. This may be viewed as a great fund supplied not only by the will of God but by contributions from the wills of individual men. The more of such contributions there are, the greater is the power in the hands of God available for the establishment of the kingdom of righteousness. So too, we may believe, there is a fund of suffering necessary for the world's redemption. Every act of suffering in a good cause, insignificant though it may seem, is not lost but goes to swell that fund, making it more potent for the world's redemption. The existence of such a fund is not demonstrable, but belief in it is an imperative demand of the soul, and evidence for it is eagerly and hopefully sought by every sufferer, who would endure with proud satisfaction if only his agonized question could be convincingly answered, "What profit is there in my blood if I go down into the pit?"

The conception of such a fund, potent for redemption, may throw light on the position Paul assigns to the Cross of Christ as being at once the means of drawing the sinner to God and therefore of making it possible for God to come close to the sinner.

¹ Isa. 53:4, 5.

² IV Macc. 17:22.

Salvation, to be complete, must secure deliverance from the guilt of sin and from its power. The guilt of sin, its opposition to God's law, ceases when the opposition ceases, though even then the punitive consequences of past sins may remain. The power of sin is broken and the man kept from falling when he is uplifted through shame and love into fellowship with the redeeming agency. Being cleansed thus from the guilt of sin and from its power, he becomes at one with God.

We are inclined to suppose that the work of Christ in establishing an atonement has its effect wholly upon men. What need is there, we ask, of propitiating God, of urging him to be willing to pardon and receive sinners? He is more than willing already. It is not God who needs to be reconciled to men, but men to be reconciled to God; the work of Christ can have effect upon men only. Yet rather, we should say, upon men primarily; for while it is true that God stands ready to welcome and receive every sinner who repents, yet he is kept at a distance by an unrepentant and opposing will, and is able then to impart not so much himself as certain of his benefactions only—such sun and rain as just and unjust can receive alike. When, however, the sinner's attitude is changed, by that fact God's attitude too is changed, and it becomes possible for his love to flow out unhampered by human barriers. Christ's work then, while having its primary result in bringing men to God, has as a secondary result the bringing of God to men. What it changes is not the nature of God's heart but the conditions under which alone that loving heart can manifest its nature; for no righteous will can act or feel toward an evil will in the same way as toward a good one. There is more than a figure of speech in Paul's term "wrath," taken from the Old Testament, for the attitude of God to sin. Until one repents, forgiveness must be incomplete. It is only when forgiveness meets repentance that it can have its longed-for completeness; only then that the sinner can be free from "wrath" and be—in Paul's phraseology—"justified"; and such change is possible only through that firm hold on eternal realities which Paul calls faith; through the recognition of Jesus as the representative of God and a passionate loyalty to Christ, who now becomes the motive power of the soul.

The transformation of the believer's moral nature alters not only the status of the soul in its relation to God but the relation of God to the soul.

This may help to an understanding of those phrases which are likely to give offense to modern readers of the Pauline theology, phrases such as "propitiation," Christ a "sacrifice to God," "being made a curse for us," "redemption through the blood of Christ." Such expressions seem to point not only to a change in the attitude of God to men but to unworthy motives for the change. Undoubtedly such phrases take their form more naturally in a mind brought up, as was that of Paul, in a system in which bloody sacrifices formed an essential part; but these expressions are only the casual clothing of his profound thought, and even with him such figures of speech are much less frequent than we are inclined to suppose, while his main emphasis is on the effect of Christ's redeeming work upon men.

The Renaissance of the fifteenth century was grounded upon the assertion of the rights and the worth of the individual. Paul may be said to be in this respect the prophet of the Renaissance; for in his view religion is not involved with membership in a nation, much less in a church, nor in case of the individual is it a product of heredity and education, but it is essentially a response of the soul to God. Luther called attention to the pronouns of the Bible. It is not "God will save men" but "I will save thee." This feeling of a direct and intimate relation between God and man turns Paul's gaze within and fixes his eyes upon the processes of development going on in the individual soul; and it is this that colors his use of the term "Christ." I said that he shows little interest in the events of the life of Jesus; but his pages are studded with the name "Christ"; it flashes upon us, directly or indirectly, from almost every thought. It has passed with him, however, from a title of Jesus of Nazareth to a designation of the ideal man, the embodiment of all that is best in humanity, the expression of the possibilities of the soul of the individual and of the race. "Christ" stands with him for the human side of God and therefore for the divine side of humanity. He uses the phrase "Son of God" infrequently and "Son of Man" not at all; but they

are both combined for him in the word "Christ." For example, he says that God's dear Son is "the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature."¹ Again, he longs to attain the resurrection of the dead, which, he says, he has not already attained—a remark which would be superfluous if resurrection meant to him a re-endowment of life in a future state. But he will attain this, or, as he more fully defines it, he will become perfect, if he may "know Christ"; not merely the facts of his sufferings, death, and resurrection, which he already knew, but the power of his resurrection and the fellowship of his sufferings and the likeness of his death. If these same processes take place in him—and of course he thinks of himself as a type of every man—they will constitute in him the ideal for which he is apprehended. He will then be "in Christ."²

The Christian idea of God is adjusted to two foci, his transcendence and his immanence, and it fails in reality and power wherever either of these is feeble. Paul carries on this thought and points out as a corollary of this spiritual ellipse the transcendence of Christ and his immanence in the soul; for in saying that Paul had little interest in Jesus as a historic being, but that "Christ" was to him the expression of the divine side of humanity and of the human side of God, I am by no means implying that he was not also to Paul a real person of history. Passages constantly occur in which the word "Christ" has a direct reference to events in Jesus' life. Now one and now another of the great conceptions which go to make up his idea of Christ is prominent and gives accent to the special thought in hand. Christ is made of the seed of David and is also the shining image of God.³ Now it is that Jesus who was the complete embodiment of God under human conditions, now it is the spiritual processes in himself, in every man, which produce and constitute the lofty ideal of humanity; now Christ is external to the soul, the giver of all its true life, now he is within the soul, its very life and essence. From one to another of these great conceptions his expression hurries, as it is now this, now that aspect that he has mainly in view, though he never quite forgets any one of them. They tangle

¹ Col. 1:15.

² Phil. 3:10-13.

³ Col. 1:15.

his thought into inextricable sentences. They reveal to us conceptions which are widely illuminative, those ordinary-seeming phrases—"in Christ," "to whom coming," "Christ in you"—conceptions as to the inclusiveness of personality. The mystery of the mingling of human and divine in the soul and in the race so overcomes him that he bursts out into poetry and a torrent of prepositions: "For of him and through him and to him are all things; to whom be glory forever. Amen."

When we turn to the Johannine conception of Christ the date of the Fourth Gospel becomes of interest. It is not, however, necessary for us to attempt to fix this exactly, for what we desire to consider is not the genuineness of the Gospel but the authenticity of its conception of Christ and the relation of this to the synoptic and Pauline conceptions. It is enough for this purpose to have permission from scholars to place the date of the Gospel a half-century at least after the last of the Pauline Epistles. During this time the church had been obeying the prophet's injunction to lengthen its cords and strengthen its stakes, and consequently, as the prophet had foretold, it was inheriting the Gentiles. Especially had it strengthened its hold on Asia Minor. The churches which Paul had founded there in his journeyings had been keeping alive the light of his gospel, so that a quarter or a half-century after their foundation a writer could speak of them as seven golden candlesticks, which were the dwelling-place of Christ.¹ It is a tradition which has strong evidence for its genuineness that the apostle John lived until near the end of the century in Ephesus, and that he was the author of the Fourth Gospel and of the First Epistle of John. Whether this was the case or not, it is unquestionable that there lived in that part of the world in the last quarter of the century a writer of spiritual insight and imagination who had himself known Jesus, or had been well acquainted with one who had such intimate personal knowledge, who also was indebted to Paul's gospel, as he came on it in Asia Minor, but whose view of Christ was a direct development neither of that of Paul nor of that of the synoptists. We may for convenience refer to this writer as "John," without assuming that he was in fact the apostle.

¹ Rev. 1:12, 13.

The synoptic conception of Christ has already been described as simple of thought, not analytic, not theologic. On the other hand, the tone of the Fourth Gospel is mature, meditative, mystical. The life it reflects is subtle and complex. It is full of theology. Its gaze is dreamy, far distant, so far that on its horizon the line between earth and heaven is indistinguishable. The Synoptic Gospels are full of brief, epigrammatic sayings of Jesus, and of stories of his illustrating the Kingdom of God. The Fourth Gospel, with one possible exception, contains no parable, and the discourses of Jesus in it are involved in style and are occupied with setting forth the relations of men to him and his relations to his Father. The synoptists represent the bread and wine of the Last Supper as symbolic of Jesus' body and blood. The Fourth Gospel knows nothing of this sacrament. The synoptists and the Fourth Gospel are not merely different but are in some respects contradictory. In the latter there is no development in the history of Jesus' public ministry. His messiahship is at once announced by John the Baptist, recognized by the disciples, and exhibited to the multitudes assembled at Jerusalem. On the other hand, in the Synoptic Gospels his messianic character is unfolded only gradually. Those who discover it are bidden to keep it concealed. His closest disciples are slow to recognize it, and it is openly announced only at the close of his career. Again, the character of the life is different which the followers of Christ will share through their connection with him. In the first three Gospels it is a blessed existence in some distant sphere in the future. The present is only preparatory to it, for this life will pass away before the Kingdom of Heaven will begin. In the Fourth Gospel the reward of the followers of Christ is eternal life; and this is conceived not so much as waiting upon a future day as a matter of here and now, for it consists in union of spirit with him. The Christ of Luke places the resurrection and the moral assessment of life far distant at the world's end. John makes the Christ repudiate this view and declare that he is himself the resurrection and the life, and that belief in him carries life with it immediately.

Such differences and contrarieties must spring from a difference of view in the writers. They must have regarded Jesus differently

and have had different aims in writing. In the case of the author of the Fourth Gospel we cannot but suspect before we reach the end of his book that he has a special purpose; and when we reach the last chapter but one we find it definitely stated: "These things are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through his name."¹ The author's work then is not a biography of Jesus, not a history of the events of his time, but aims to demonstrate that Jesus was the Messiah and the Son of God, and this not so much for intellectual conviction as for spiritual edification. He alone speculates on the relation of Jesus to the Almighty Creator. He alone sees in him the representative in human conditions of a side of God's nature which forever existed. The synoptists exhibit Jesus as preaching the truth; the fourth evangelist regards Jesus as being himself the Truth, the eternal Thought and Reasonableness of God. It is not merely the case with him, as with the others, that following Christ's precepts will result in a life which exemplifies that of Jesus; but with him Jesus is life itself, all that gives wealth, joy, and worth to existence. Christ is not only an objective, historic being who once lived and died, but he is the subjective principle of life within the soul. The first and third evangelists give traditions of the birth of Jesus, though even they ignore them afterward and sometimes contradict them. The second evangelist hears the beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ in the voice of John the Baptist. But the fourth evangelist could have nothing to do with traditions of the birth of Jesus, for to him the history of Christ went back through the ages and began in the beginning with God.

When we have apprehended how widely different is the portrait of Jesus which is given in the Fourth Gospel from that of the other three, we hastily turn and ask, "Is it authentic? How far does it represent the real Jesus of Nazareth, or how far is it owing to the peculiarities of the author, whoever he was?" The brief, pithy sentences and vital metaphors which the earlier Gospels ascribe to Jesus all bear one sharp and individual stamp; but these are

¹ John 20:31.

widely different from the close involutions of argument of the Fourth Gospel and the intricacies of metaphysical thought underlying them. What is true of historic data and of style may be also true in some respects of the underlying theology, for it is partly conditioned by them. Was this theologic view of Jesus a peculiarity of the author, or was Jesus in reality the mystic being here portrayed? This special tinge which the Fourth Gospel has throughout, is that the artist's coloring, or is the portrait trustworthy?

Portrait—that is the word we must keep in mind in considering this Gospel. It is not a photograph of Jesus. How do a portrait and a photograph differ? The one gives the fact of the moment and from one point of view. Place yourself at the camera and put your sitter in position, and the photograph is precisely what you see. It is the scientifically correct record of these particular conditions; but as a complete report of a man it may be gravely inaccurate. "He never takes well," we say of this or that person, "his face has so much expression." Where a subject is complex the photograph, by recording only one aspect, may convey an absolutely false impression; but the portrait-painter endeavors to show the full, the real man. The greatness of a Rembrandt or a Watts portrait does not lie in the fact that it tells us of what color the subject's eyes were or what kind of a coat he wore. We care little whether the artist was historically accurate in these details or not; but we stand in amazement at seeing a human soul gazing at us from the canvas—a soul calm or frivolous, humorous, vain, or profound. It is the man himself that we see; not his clothes, not his appearance at one time or under special circumstances, but the composite, complete man. Before the artist can create his likeness he must create *him*. The sitter presents himself before the artist's judgment seat, and the artist gives sentence upon him with every stroke of his brush: "Your character is thus and so. You are a coward here, a hero there. Thus I strip off all accidentals of time and circumstances, and behold, your real self stands revealed." It must require much confidence to have one's portrait painted by a great artist.

It is such a likeness of Christ that the Fourth Gospel gives us. Mark, with his loving eye for details, records this and that circumstance which we welcome as furnishing the fact-basis for our conception of Jesus; and then comes John, and upon this background he paints so that we behold the light of the knowledge of the glory of God beaming forth in the face of Jesus Christ. It is a presumption in behalf of the accuracy of his portrait that it is not a summary of facts but the impression which Christ made as a whole upon an artist of constructive imagination and profound spiritual insight. If we had possessed no more than the first three Gospels we should have had a wonderful Jesus, an example and an inspiration; but he would have been a historic being only; we should have had no warrant for identifying him with the divine life of our souls, dwelling with us and abiding in us. The Christ of the Fourth Gospel, however, is the connecting link between the outward and the inward, between the historic and the spiritual. He is the representative in bodily conditions, in terms of time and space, of that human side which existed forever in the nature of God. The life of Jesus was in time; but the divine sonship, the existence in God of a human side, was independent of time and humanity, being eternal. This was authentically exhibited in Jesus of Nazareth. Not that he is himself the Almighty; for neither in this Gospel nor elsewhere in the New Testament is it asserted as a theological proposition that Jesus is God. The Christians of the first two centuries considered that they might call Jesus *κύριος*, and let their feelings go out toward him as toward God, without being driven to justify their feeling by making the advance in thought regarded as necessary by the Christians of the fourth century. To the Christians of the apostolic age Jesus was the authentic representative of God. If God had lived, a man on earth, he would have done just as Jesus did. Jesus showed thought and love and goodness as existing forever in the bosom of the Father and constituting in him the ground of connection with humanity; and, on the other hand, he showed this same goodness and thought and love as the true nature of men and constituting in them the ground of union with God. He brought God down to men, and raised men up to God;

and as he is God's representative, so whatsoever things are true, pure, just, lovely, these are his representatives. The soul of the world, all the calls to noble desire, all that makes life worth living, this is the presence of the spirit of Christ. It is such a conception of Jesus as this that is the characteristic gift to us of the Fourth Gospel.

When we compare the Johannine conception of Jesus with that of Paul we note two striking resemblances: the pre-existence of Christ is strongly emphasized by both, and the real and actual oneness of the believer with Christ. In the synoptists these conceptions are lacking, though there are a few utterances ascribed to Jesus which may be regarded as germs of the thought which later developed into the idea that the spiritual life of the believer is the life of God in the soul.¹ The Fourth Gospel and the First Epistle of John undoubtedly originated in Asia and have an Asiatic background. It seems probable, however, that this background was not a direct borrowing or development of Paul's theology but was in part an original and parallel system of thought and in part an indirect inheritance of Paulinism; for while the two systems contain, as has been pointed out, striking resemblances, they also contain marked differences.

For example, Paul's chief interest is in the death and resurrection of Jesus, and in these as securing the redemption of the believer through his oneness with Christ; but to John the death of Christ is not so much a ransom from sin as a manifestation of the love of God drawing men to him. That escape from under the power of sin which filled so large a part in Paul's thought has with John passed over into the conviction that to know God is the highest good. What redemption was in Paul's system, revelation is in John's. For Paul, at least in his middle period of thought, Christ's resurrection consisted in his dying unto the flesh and rising again in the spirit; John regards Christ's resurrection as having been in the flesh, for after it the prints of his wounds still remain, and he eats with his disciples. Strangely enough, however, the resurrection of the believer is for John a spiritual one, or rather it is not so much a resurrection as the

¹ Matt. 10:20; 13:11; 16:17; 19:26, and parallel passages.

possession of eternal life here and now. Belief in Christ, the knowledge of God, these constitute life eternal and therefore carry the believer through death. The saving power which Paul ascribed to Jesus in his exalted post-resurrection existence only, John gives to Jesus during his lifetime on earth; and this is not a mere difference with regard to time, but marks a different view as to the relation of the Christian to his Lord. Such an insistence on the life-giving power of the historic Jesus could hardly have come except from one who had had personal knowledge of him or had learned of him from one of his own disciples. In spite of the victory which Paul had gained in combating the view that Jewish religion consisted in doing the works of the Law, there still remained stamped on Christianity a certain legal form; and this appears in John's assertion that the Christian life consists in keeping Christ's commandments. This is somewhat inconsistent with his profound conviction that it is the indwelling Christ who makes life divine. Both these stages are of course needful to the Christian; but while the former is, as it were, the body of Christianity, the latter is the very spirit and soul of it.

In both the Pauline and the Johannine conceptions of Christ I have pointed out a certain mystical element—the immanence of Christ in the soul and the dwelling of the soul in him. And we have seen that while this is absent from the synoptic conception in any direct form, there are utterances there ascribed to Jesus which may be regarded as the germs of this profound thought; but it is not upon these only that the evidence rests for the authenticity of the later conception, for the picture we gain of Jesus Christ in the Gospel of John is in its most important elements similar to that which we have in the Synoptic Gospels. That he was to both John and Paul a spiritual being renders it none the less true that he was to them, as to the synoptists, a historic being; and the appearance in different minds in widely different localities of this mystical element in the figure of Christ makes it probable that it had a basis in Jesus himself. The fact that John does not hesitate to assign to Jesus human limitations and weaknesses shows that in ascribing divinity to him he must have had authoritative warrant in his words or character; for otherwise he would

not have ventured to include in his portrait features which might seem inconsistent with its main aim.¹ In the fragments of a lost Gospel discovered at Oxyrhynchus in 1897 this mystical tone is found in the words Jesus is said to have uttered: "Jesus saith, Wherever there are two, they are not without God, and wherever there is one alone, I say, I am with him. Raise the stone, and there thou shalt find me; cleave the wood, and there am I." The fact that this tone is found in localities so widely separated as Egypt and Ephesus makes it probable that it was not invented by post-apostolic writers but was part of the original tradition and had a historic basis.

Belief in God depends more upon moral than upon intellectual grounds. It is founded upon the insistence of the soul that the highest intellectual and moral ideal shall be real. The cogency of this demand will therefore be in proportion to the urgency with which the moral pressure is felt; so belief in the authenticity of the idea of Christ as immanent in the soul, which underlies both the Pauline and the Johannine conceptions, will depend largely upon whether such an idea is demanded by one's spiritual nature. To some the figure which appears in the synoptists may be a sufficient explanation of the person of Christ and of the way of their own approach to God. Others, to whom it seems that there must of necessity have been from all eternity a human side in God, that this must of necessity have become at some time embodied as completely as is possible under human conditions, that this ideal must stand in vital connection with the life of their own souls today—such will recognize in the portrait of Christ drawn by Paul and John with the purpose of presenting to the soul its Master, features intrinsically probable as those of the historic Jesus of Nazareth and essential to the Savior of the world.

¹ Cf. John 4:6; 5:19, 30; 7:1; 11:33 ff.; 12:27, 49.

THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO INSTINCT

A. S. WOODBURN
Camp Dodge, Iowa

There is a general recognition today that the elements common to the religions and those common to the sciences are psychological. The facts of religious experience and the facts of scientific experience are so multiform that the only place to discover a common basis is in the attitudes of consciousness giving rise to the variant concrete expressions. Furthermore, there is a general recognition among psychologists that the genesis of the religious and scientific attitudes is localizable in the instinctive behavior of the psycho-physical organism. This has led some scholars to posit the existence of a specific religious instinct and of a specific scientific instinct. Others again have endeavored to account for the rise of religion and science by reference to specific instincts with which they are identified. The criticism of such hypotheses is that they proceed too frequently on the basis of a definition of instinct that is biologically unsound. Biologically speaking, an instinct is a congenital co-ordination of reflexes, neurally integrated, and effecting an organic response, characteristic of and serviceable to the species, and in some manner capable of subsequent modification. It is a term descriptive of certain types of reactions, and is more correctly used in its adjectival than its substantive form.

The great truth which lies behind the theories that we have noted is that the religious and scientific attitudes have their genesis in the innate and instinctive dispositions and behavior of the race. The thesis which I propose is that the origin of both religion and science, while instinctive, is multiple. We must bear in mind that there are no such things as religion and science, in the sense of species. Both are generic terms. There are religions and sciences. We may say of both what William James said of religion, viz., that they are "collective names like government."¹

¹ William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 26.

The various species of these two genera are so multiform that it has been difficult to get a definition of religion. Most definitions have been in terms of the species in which the author was especially interested. The common element in all religions, as Dr. Watson has pointed out, is "the social attitude toward the non-human environment," and the common element in the sciences is the "mechanical attitude toward the non-human environment."¹

Therefore we are concerned with a variety of phenomena that are connected with the rise of these attitudes. The history of religions furnishes us with a heterogeneity of data, representing interests as varied as life itself. Whatever may be one's theory of man's origination of an extra-human environment, it must be evident to the student of history that he has associated almost all of the interests of life at some time with that environment in his struggle for existence. So too the history of the sciences furnishes evidence of a progressive attempt to gain dominion by mechanical means over the forces by which he was environed. Man, in his achievement of religion and science, was not dealing with phenomena which he was able to differentiate under these two captions. They are both of them human products, arising in a human environment by the effort of man as he attempted to gain control in the great struggle for existence. They represent variant attitudes toward the extra-human environment in accordance with whether that environment was conceived to be amenable to social relationships or to be wholly under mechanistic law. So that they involved, to a considerable extent, the same human interests, and arose as differentiable techniques in the struggles and conflicts of life which was characterized by a unified type of instinctive behavior.

This thesis may be illustrated by reference to different types of instinctive behavior, and I shall attempt to illustrate it by a brief treatment of the instinctive reactions connected with (1) the obtaining of food, (2) mating and procreating, (3) self-preservation, (4) contact with the strange and unusual, and (5) gregariousness.

¹ A. C. Watson, "The Logic of Religion," *American Journal of Theology*, XX, 98.

I. THE INSTINCTIVE REACTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE SECURING OF FOOD

The importance of the supply of food is apparent, for with that is tied up the existence of the individuals of the group. The necessity of food underlies the total economic life, and it is to the ordinary man the all absorbing interest. Anthropologists conclude that in prehistoric times primitive man inhabited the equatorial regions where his wants were simple, and nature offered an ample supply to him of those things which were necessary to his existence. But as time passed, there came about critical situations in this phase of the struggle for existence. We have observed that the reflective process was a product of a conflict of instincts or of conflicting ways of securing satisfaction for those instincts. When the natural supply of food failed, or became limited, and man had to go into unexplored regions to supply his needs, he faced crises which induced reflection. When a choice was presented to him, because of the luxuriance of the available supply, he was compelled to call into being a selective process, and so the conflict realm induced reflection. The latter situation was not one in which he needed to seek for any outside assistance, for it was simply a matter of gratifying his particular taste. But the former situation constituted a crisis and demanded action. It called for the creation of some technique to help him over such critical experiences.

If we go into the accounts of the ways in which primitive peoples actually met such situations, we find a considerable degree of uniformity in the techniques which they worked out. The first of the techniques to be mentioned is *magic*. Magic is an attempt to get satisfaction for a desired end by reference to some occult powers. It is an attempt at coercion, and is based upon the belief that if one knows the proper occult means the securing of the desired end is inevitable. Hence magical behavior is intended to coerce the occult powers to do the thing needed. It is not necessary for our purposes to go into an extended discussion of magic, the attempted classifications, etc. The point of importance for us to note is that it arose as a technique to help man over critical situations, many of which arose in connection with the supply of food. How was a good crop of grain or fruit, or a good catch of

fish, or a plentiful supply of rain to be secured? Magic was one solution. The system was completely wired so that, if you knew how to turn on the switch, the circuit was complete and the result inevitable.

The question that concerns us is the question as to the connection of magic with religion and science. Magical practices arose in an age prior to the differentiation of the various attitudes. It was a pre-psychological period. We are not compelled to try to identify magic with one human attitude to the exclusion of the others. On the one hand, if the conception of religion as a social attitude toward the extra-human environment be correct, magic has elements that are decidedly religious. If the definition used the phrase *superhuman* instead of *extra-human*, magic would have to be excluded in the majority of cases. Magical practices are sometimes directed to the object directly; sometimes to a spirit or god, when it was tied to animism. The very recognition of an occult power which man is endeavoring to coerce implies a socializing tendency which is at least on the way to religion.

On the other hand, magic is also prescientific. It was man's endeavor to get over the critical situation by the use of a mechanical means. In many instances the social element was absent, especially in private magical ceremonies and formulas, and indeed in many instances of public magic. If the performance of a ceremony or recitation of a formula was regarded as productive of the desired end, we have here primitive man's first conception of cause and result. It was by no means a regular and orderly form of the causal category, but it was a beginning, and in that sense it was a precursor of a scientific explanation.

The use of magical practices for the securing of an abundant supply of food may be illustrated from scores of sources. We need only refer to the rain-making ceremonies which are practiced in Central Africa among the Agoni people, in India, in Russia, and in Australia.¹ Similarly the Indians of British Columbia resort to magical practices to insure the supply of salmon.² In Central

¹ Cf. J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, Part I, Vol. I, pp. 249, 250, and D. G. Brinton, *Religions of Primitive People*, pp. 173, 174, for accounts of rain-making ceremonies.

² Frazer, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

Australia sympathetic magic is systematically used to insure the supply of the totem animal or plant, which is, in the majority of cases, the chief article of diet.¹ Frazer has some interesting accounts of ceremonial dances and other practices observed in certain parts of Europe—Transylvania, Baden, and Macedonia—to make the crops grow high.²

The connection between the food interest and religion is further observable in a multiplicity of ceremonials connected with various primitive peoples. With the evolution of a supramundane world, peopled with spirits, some benignant and some malignant, the human task was to relate one's self in such a way to that world as to avoid the displeasure and to procure the aid of these spirits in securing the satisfaction for felt needs. Hence the cult arose as a technique for operating on the wills of such spirits so as to enlist their sympathy and procure their assistance. In their elemental forms the ceremonials connected with the cult were designed to secure satisfaction for those needs which grew out of instinctive behavior. Illustrations are available in abundance. Ceremonials connected with the mother-goddess associated her with the idea of fertility. Oases were the sacred spots to the Arabs. Sacrificial rites were connected with edible animals. The images and objects of worship are in numerous instances the characteristic food objects for the geographically defined region where the worship prevails. Totem objects are in the majority of cases the most staple food objects of the totem clans. Spencer and Gillen give a list of tribes in Central Australia with their respective food objects. The totem of the Ainus was a bear; of the Hopi Indians, maize; of the Arabs, the date palm; of certain Babylonian people on the Persian Gulf, the fish.

We may here mention the suggestion by Professor Ames that science illustrates "the insight and mastery worked out in connection with the food process,"³ and to a similar position taken by Professor Thomas. There seems to me to be no doubt of the correctness of this theory. With the development of the observational processes, man would note that certain fruits and certain

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 137-39.

³ *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 416, note.

grains came only at certain seasons, and that during the remainder of the year there was no supply. Fisher folk would observe that certain meteorological conditions were favorable and others unfavorable to a good catch. Hunting people would find climatic and other conditions affecting the supply of game. Thus a sense of regularity, of conditionality, and hence of causality gradually evolved in connection with the food supply. The occurrence of critical situations, as the natural supply became insufficient and man had to evolve mental powers to help him over the crises, would only serve to make his observation keener as to conditionality and causality. With the progress of time this led to practical reactions in the evolution of primitive agriculture and horticulture as techniques by which man might gain control over the food supply. So that the reactions of the food instinct led in this way to the beginnings of a scientific attitude.

II. INSTINCTIVE REACTIONS CONNECTED WITH MATING AND PROCREATING

The other dominant life-interest is that of reproduction. If food is essential to the existence of individuals, mating and procreating are necessary to the preservation of the species. It was to be expected that man, in his desire to obtain control over the forces by which he was environed, should so organize his techniques as to obtain help in matters relative to these two primal life-interests. We have seen how that worked out in regard to the food interest. It may be shown in an analogous way that he used both the social and the mechanical processes in attaining control of the sexual interests.

The argument has been presented for an understanding of magic which involves both the pre-religious and the prescientific elements. The theory which was applied to magical practices in connection with the food process applies in precisely the same way in respect to magical practices connected with the reproductive process. Frazer has recounted various instances where the resort has been to sympathetic magic to secure the ends served by the procreative instinct. In Sumatra a make-believe child is used for a barren woman who desires children. In Greece, Bulgaria, and

Bosnia there is a make-believe ceremony of restoring dead persons to life. There is also an Indian practice of shooting darts at a clay image in order to win the love of a woman.¹

In some instances the magical practices involve both the food and the reproductive interests. It is a carrying over of the idea of fertility from the region of the sexual life to those activities connected with the food supply. "The Greeks and Romans sacrificed pregnant victims to the goddesses of corn and of the earth, doubtless in order that the earth might teem, and corn swell in the ear."² Analogously the magical value of pregnant women to communicate fertility was a widespread belief. Austrian and Bavarian peasants gave the first fruit to a pregnant woman to make the tree bear abundantly. Nicobar Islanders have pregnant women and their husbands, and Orinoco Indians have pregnant women, sow the seed to insure a good crop. In some tribes the blood shed at the circumcision and subincision of boys and also the foreskin are regarded as possessing fertilizing value, and so are buried in proximity to the crop which it is desired to cultivate.³ In other cases circumcision is regarded as in the nature of a sacrifice to the goddess of fertility, securing the protection of the goddess for the child, and putting the child's reproductive powers at the command of the deity.⁴

In this connection reference may be made to "taboo," which has been rightly described as "negative magic."⁵ Taboo has its origin in the social structure, and its origin is purely human. But in animism it came to be associated with the rights of gods and demons which were not to be infringed upon, without the transgressor endangering himself by the infringement. It has been associated with food objects, with sexual functions, and with dead bodies. The uncleanness that rests with all sexual functions is most marked. Marriage, a woman in her courses, a man with an issue, and the birth of a child are all curiously tabooed. "This is because birth and everything connected with the propagation of

¹ Frazer, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-77.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 95 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁴ Barton, *Semitic Origins*, p. 100.

⁵ Ames, *op. cit.*, p. 88; N. W. Thomas, "Taboo," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (11th ed.), XXVI, 337 ff.

the species . . . seem to him to involve the action of superhuman agencies of a dangerous kind."¹ Thompson gives a number of instances of sexual taboo, as (a) menstruation taboos, (b) cohabitation taboos, (c) childbirth taboos, (d) girls of irregular menstruation supposed to be possessed of supernatural power, and (e) men fearful of interfering with the harem rights of gods and goddesses.² Here we have, as in positive magic, the social attitude toward powers considered to be extramundane, and also a primitive approximation toward a causal explanation of certain mysterious phenomena.

The ceremonies connected with the attainment of puberty afford another example of the connection between sex and religion. The phenomena in connection with puberty were mysterious and seemed to involve the coming to birth of an ability to perform certain instinctive reactions, hitherto impossible. It is the period when the boy or the girl sees the dawn of the adult life, and involves the birth of the youth's appreciation of his or her part in the group life. Consequently it has been a custom, widespread both chronologically and geographically, to mark the transition by certain sacred rites, almost invariably attended with an element of mystery.³

Another example of the connection between religion and sex is phallicism. Examples of phallic worship, or worship of the generative power of nature as symbolized in the phallus, may be seen in the history of the religions of Greece, Phoenicia, Rome, Mexico, Peru, India, and Japan.⁴

Still another group of phenomena may be cited as illustrating the bond of connection between religion and sex. I refer to the conversion phenomena in connection with the Christian religion. Those who have made thorough investigations in this field have

¹ Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, pp. 113, 114.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 131-33.

³ Examples of ceremonials connected with puberty and initiation abound. Cf. Brinton, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-200; Jane Harrison, *Ancient Art and Ritual*, pp. 106-13; Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, copious references.

⁴ See art. "Phallicism," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (11th ed.), XXI, 345, and art. "Phallism" in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, IX, 815 ff., by Hartland.

come to the conclusion that conversion is a distinctly adolescent phenomenon. From the biological standpoint we have noted that the adolescent period is the time when the procreative instincts are awakened. It is also a well-known fact that adolescence is the period of life in which the majority of conversions take place. The philosophy of the situation has been treated in the works of Starbuck, Stanley Hall, Coe, Ames, Leuba, and others, and need not concern us here. But the fundamental connection between the religious awakening and the birth of the sexual instinct seems to be proven by their synchronous appearance.

• It is interesting to note that man, in picturing to himself the world of the gods, has carried over the elements which were of paramount interest in human life. Surely the gods must be like men, possessed of like interests and desires. In Assyrian mythology the goddess Ishtar is pictured as conducting amorous relationships with men. In Indian literature, Krishna is portrayed as sporting with shepherd girls. The Mohammedan idea of heaven is a carrying over into the other world of the degradation of womanhood in sensuous pictures.

The association between activity connected with behavior induced by the sexual instinct and religion is established by an abundance of historical evidence. There is not so much data to show the connection between the beginnings of science and procreative activity. At the same time there is evidence that cannot be overlooked. From the point of view of magic and taboo the material is abundant to show the connection with the reproductive life. We have already observed that magic implies a mechanical technique for avoiding dangers and overcoming crises, so that in magical practices we have the prescientific view of man toward the sexual life. The progress of more exact conceptions broke down magical causality and paved the way for a scientific causality.

Barton gives it as his opinion that among the Semites "the beginnings of intelligent life, the knowledge of clothing, agriculture, and the arts of civilization"¹ were attributed to the sexual relation. Thomas attributes the development of mental impressionability to the strain on the attention in connection with food and

¹ Barton, *op. cit.*, pp. 101, 102.

reproduction.¹ From the sexual instinct arises a susceptibility to the opinions of others, resulting in the mental activity of comparison and selection.

One of the best evidences for the theory proposed is the growth of the primitive conception of paternity.² Anthropologists find that in primitivity the birth of children was a mystery. In the beginning the father of the child did not understand that he had a part in the reproductive process, owing to ignorance concerning the nature of physiological processes. But as the understanding came, it meant the birth of a primitive conception of causality in respect to the procreative process. The first discovery of the part played by the father in the reproductive process led to the strange "couvade" ceremony among certain primitive peoples, an illustration of the crudity with which they formed their first mental tools. Nevertheless, it marks the beginning of the displacement of mythological knowledge by scientific knowledge in regard to the sexual processes and relationships.

III. THE INSTINCTIVE REACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH SELF-PRESERVATION

Some psychologists would include self-preservation under the instinctive behavior connected with the obtaining of food. If they are to be considered together, I would prefer to include the food-getting instinct under self-preservation, because the latter is the more generic term and might be taken to include a larger scope. It is even possible to use the term "self-preservation" in a sense wide enough to include all instinctive behavior. But in this instance I propose to use it in a narrower connotation as applying to two types of reaction, the aim of which is to avoid dangers and to overcome opposition to the normal operation of the life-processes. These are flight or the defensive reaction with its accompanying emotional tone of fear, and pugnacity or the offensive reaction with its concomitant emotion of anger. These two types of behavior are the characteristic expressions of the instinctive tendency toward

¹ Thomas, *Sex and Society*, pp. 118, 119.

² A thorough elaboration may be consulted in the work of E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, 2 vols., London, 1909.

self-preservation. We might say that they are the organism's way of expressing the will to live in the face of circumstances ready to crush it. To be sure, we may include the instinctive disposition to procure food for the satisfaction of the felt needs in this organic will to live. Indeed the instinctive behavior of self-preservation may be associated with many other circumstances and types of behavior. Circumstances connected with the securing of food, with mating, with procreation, with curiosity, and with gregariousness may be the stimuli calling forth flight or pugnacity, with their emotional tones of fear or anger.

Starbuck sees in religion a response to the instinct of self-preservation and the desire for the fulness of life on the physiological plane.¹ Hocking identifies the two instincts.² Herter finds in religion, as well as in music, painting, and literature, a human product which represents "the fusion of self-preservation and the sexual instincts."³

There is no doubt that much of the ceremonial originated by primitive people was designed to help them in thus determining to persevere in life, in the struggle for existence. That fact may be illustrated from almost any ceremonial. Moreover, the struggle for existence lies behind the evolution of both the religious and the scientific techniques. Socially and mechanically they are designed to help man satisfy the felt needs of life in the struggle against the opposing forces. Primitive man's ceremonial was indicative of a fear lest he should lose out in the struggle for existence. The ritual was an expression of the felt emotion, often by a mimetic representation of the desired result which enhanced the desired end or object. This factor in the process, whereby that which, it was felt, would satisfy the need was mimetically enacted beforehand, illustrates the indistinguishable beginnings from which art and religion originate. Jane Harrison has presented the matter in *Ancient Art and Ritual* with typical illustrations.⁴ Thus also

¹ Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 403.

² Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 106.

³ Herter, *The Biological Aspect of Human Problems*, p. 285.

⁴ See pp. 24-27, where she refers to the prayer-disks of the Huichol Indians, which as prayers may be classified as ritual, and as decorated surfaces are specimens of primitive art.

many of the dramatic representations which enter into religious ceremonial are illustrative of the emotion of fear lest they should not pass the crisis in safety. Miss Harrison presents an account of a traveler in Euboea during Holy Week who was

struck by the genuine grief shown at the Good Friday services. On Easter eve there was the same gloom and despondency, and he asked an old woman why it was. She answered: "Of course I am anxious; for if Christ does not rise tomorrow, we shall have no corn this year." The old woman's state of mind is fairly clear. Her emotion is the old emotion . . . fear, imminent fear for the failure of food. The Christ again is not the historical Christ of Judaea, still less the incarnation of the Godhead, proceeding from the Father; he is the actual figure fashioned by his village chorus and laid by the priests, the leaders of that chorus, in the sepulchre.¹

Farther down in the scale of civilization the fear element is to be seen operative in many ways. It is tied up with animism in the majority of cases. So prevalent is this element of fear in the primitive forms of religion that many have seen in it the origin of religion. Lucretius said: "It is fear that engenders the gods." Thomas Hobbes said: "The feare of things invisible is the natural seede of religion."² David Hume said: "The first ideas of religion arose from a common concern with regard to the events of life and fears which actuate the mind."³ Ribot finds the emotion of fear in varying degrees in all religions, "from profound terror to vague uneasiness, due to the faith in an unknown, mysterious, impalpable Power, able to render great services, and, more especially, to inflict great injuries."⁴

The source books furnish us abundant illustrations of the fear motive in religion and in other social customs. Mary H. Kingsley cites examples of the influence of fear among the people of Guinea. She describes it thus:

I have often seen on market roads in many districts but always well away from Europeanized settlements, a little space cleared by the wayside, and neatly laid with plantain leaves, whereon were very tidily arranged various little articles for sale. . . . Against each class of articles so many cowrie

¹ *Ancient Art and Ritual*, pp. 73, 74.

² Cf. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 73.

³ Quoted by Leuba, *The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion*, p. 81.

⁴ Ribot, *Psychologie des sentiments*, 4th ed., 1913, p. 309.

shells or beans are placed, and always hanging from a branch above, or sedately sitting in the middle of the shop, a little fetish. The number of cowrie shells or beans indicates the price of the individual articles in the various heaps, and the little fetish is there to see that any one who does not place in the stead of the articles removed their proper price, or who meddles with the till, shall swell up and burst.¹

The element of fear led not only to a socializing attitude toward the extra-human environment, but the mechanical attitude also was developed in the struggle of life to dominate in the face of dangers and crises. This is exemplified in the use of magic, counter-magic, and sorcery as techniques which were thought to furnish the individual with a mechanism for controlling those environmental forces which were otherwise able to work him ill. The formula of the magician or sorcerer as a mechanism of this type is illustrated in the life of the Todas of South India, whose whole social fabric is bound up with the life of the buffaloes. An example of the sorcerer's formula is as follows:

For the sake of Pithiotea, Ōm, Teikirji and Tirshti, by the power of the gods, if there be power; by the gods' country, if there be a country; may his calves perish; as birds fly away, may his buffaloes go when the calves come to suck; as I drink water, may he have nothing but water to drink; as I am thirsty, may he always be thirsty; as I am hungry, may he also be hungry; as my children cry, so may his children cry; as my wife wears only a ragged cloth, so may his wife wear only a ragged cloth.²

When the sorcerer is uttering this incantation he holds in his hand five small stones tied together by a hair and all tied in a cloth. Then they are hidden in the thatch of the house of the man on whom he desires the misfortunes to fall. Thus satisfaction for the instinct for self-preservation is sought by a mechanical means which is supposed to operate in removing the danger which the individual fears is imminent. As we have observed in analogous circumstances, the breakdown of the magical conception of causality was what led to the search for a scientific explanation and a scientific technique.

¹ Mary H. Kingsley, *West African Studies*, pp. 248, 249. Other illustrations may be found in Frazer, *The Golden Bough*; Tylor, *Primitive Culture*; Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*.

² W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, pp. 256-58.

The instinct of self-preservation reacts at other times in pugnacity, and this is the activity which is basal to war. Sometimes fear enters and may serve either to stimulate the anger and fighting power or at other times to inhibit it. Professor Ames has rightly emphasized war as one of the occasions giving rise to the ceremonial. "In carrying out any interest savage tribes usually find innumerable occasions for war. The war ceremonies are therefore much in evidence. They consist of councils, assemblages, decorations, fasts, parades, manoeuvres, dances, triumphal processions, feasts."¹

Tylor points out how these savage races create divinities for special functions, including war. One of the numerous illustrations which he records is cited: "Areskove, the Iroquois War-god, seems to be himself the great celestial deity; for his pleasant food they slaughtered human victims, that he might give them victory over their enemies; as a pleasant sight for him, they tortured the war-captives; on him the war-chief called in solemn council, and the warriors, shouting his name, rushed into the battle he was surveying from on high."²

But man did not depend exclusively on the spirit world to help him to win his battles. His need for self-preservation urged him to seek mechanical means also. At first he found his implements and tools and utensils and weapons in nature. Nature provided him with the grubbing-stick to enable him to handle the soil, with a round stone to serve as a hammer, with a cave or a thickly befoliated tree for a shelter, with a rough stick for a club, and with a sharp stone for a knife or a spearhead. The critical situations with which he was surrounded led to the birth of intelligence and selection. These tools and weapons were improved and his mechanistic technique made increasingly efficient. In proportion to his advancement in this direction, he approached in the direction of a scientific conception of causality.

IV. THE INSTINCTIVE REACTIONS STIMULATED BY CONTACT WITH THE STRANGE AND THE UNUSUAL

It will not be necessary for my purpose to go into an elaborate discussion concerning the problem as to whether curiosity is an

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

² Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, II, 306, 307.

instinct or not. Some psychologists deny that it is. Many claim that it is, among whom some classify it as a compound or secondary instinct. Biologists are agreed that there are in man and in many of the lower animals tendencies to distinctive reactions in the presence of the strange and the unusual. The behavior of dogs, of water snakes, and especially of monkeys is illustrative. The same disposition is apparent in little children. I do not know of any word which my daughter has used more frequently during her fourth and fifth years than "Why?" For this type of behavior, whereby there is a disposition to pry into the strange and the unknown and which is indeed complex, we may apply the name "curiosity" in a generic sense. Very suggestive discussions concerned with the reference of science to a specific instinct have been made by Shand and Ribot. The analysis of Mr. Shand seems to me to be keen. His position, it may be observed, is close to that of Mr. McDougall, whose discussion of curiosity¹ is good. The point which has interest in this connection is that both of these psychologists find curiosity as one of the roots appearing both in religion and in science. Men of the greatest intellectual and spiritual vigor are men in whom the disposition to inquiry is most marked. To the impulse of curiosity we surely "owe most of the disinterested labors of the highest types of intellect. It must be regarded as one of the principal roots of both science and religion."² Mr. Shand's theory, by which he traces elements of both religion and science to curiosity, has already been referred to.

The result of this prying into the unusual and the unknown, like other instinctive behavior to which we have given our attention, has been the development of two distinctive attitudes. One is the attempt to establish a personal relationship with the power which the mind of man has posited as an *animus* in the unknown. This is a religious conception because it is a socializing concept and man tries to establish communion with this power. It is a prescientific concept because it is an effort to explain the inexplicable by reference to a First Cause. Such an idea finds expression among many

¹ *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (10th ed.; Boston, 1916), pp. 57-59, 315-20

² *Op. cit.*, p. 59.

primitives, such as the Dakota Indians' *wakan*, the Polynesian *mana*, and the Algonquins' *manitou*. We have an expression of the same attitude in a more sophisticated environment in the concept of an *Unknowable* presented by Herbert Spencer. The desire to pry into the sphere beyond experience, the meta-empirical or meta-physical, is accompanied by the effort to establish social relationship therewith, or an element of mysticism.

The other attitude is evidenced in the insatiable desire to add to the stock of human knowledge by the paths of investigation and experimentation. It is the basis of many of the most brilliant achievements of the human race. It has led to our scientific conception of causation and mechanical control through its accompanying technique. It has retired much that is magical and many animistic conceptions through the splendid discoveries which it has made possible.

In this connection it is of interest to note that the mystical temperament is more characteristic of people in tropical climates than of those in the temperate zones, whereas the scientific temperament has had a richer development in the temperate climes. It leads to the conclusion that among the stimuli which affect the reactions of the organism the climatic forces play an active rôle. The warmer the climate, the greater the *ennui*, and *ennui* is no friend to science. At the same time, the warmer climates have given birth to more mystical types of religion, as witness Hinayana Buddhism, the *bhakti* development of Hinduism, the Sufi sect of the Mohammedans, and the ascetic ideal of Christianity developing on Egyptian soil. Theologies or scientific treatments of religious development have largely originated in the temperate climes where the climatic conditions seem to favor the development of a colder, more objective type of intellectual acumen. So also the larger developments of the other sciences have had their history in the temperate zone, and particularly in the north temperate zone.

V. THE INSTINCTIVE REACTIONS CONNECTED WITH GREGARIOUSNESS

Psychologists are not in perfect unanimity as to whether gregariousness is an instinct or not. Sometimes it is interpreted as intelligent behavior growing out of the needs created by the hunger

and sex instincts.¹ Those who argue for the instinctive character of gregariousness refer to such phenomena in the lower animals as the swarming of bees, migrations of birds, colonies of ants, packs of wolves, herds of deer, flocks of sheep, droves of cattle, shoals of fishes, and the like. Among primitives the characteristic form of life is the group life of a clan or a tribe. In many cases the unity of the group is preserved by means of a totem animal with which the life of the group is identified. Among children the disposition to form cliques and gangs is further evidence of this tendency. The disposition for large numbers of people to herd in towns and cities is another link in the chain of evidence.

From the biological point of view the evidence points to the belief that there are certain co-ordinations of reflexes which have been neurally integrated in such a way that the behavior is serviceable in helping not only the individual but the group in the struggle for existence, i.e., serviceable for co-operation. Professor Brooks has shown convincingly that a study of the adaptations that are developed in the various species leads to the conclusion that such adaptations are "for the good of the species and not for the individual" as such. Moreover, he argues that "the law is universal, but since the welfare of the species is usually identified with that of the constituent individuals it is not obvious unless the good of the species demands the sacrifice of the individuals." The general law of nature which refers the properties of all living things to a social, utilitarian basis affords an explanation, he claims, for such varied gregarious activities as the migrations of salmon and the altruistic moral sense of man.²

The question at issue is as to which is the dominant principle in biological evolution, struggle or co-operation. Does the struggle for existence mean a ruthless struggle in which only the fittest individuals survive, and the less fortunate are destroyed by cruel competition? There are some phenomena in nature, such as the struggle between different species of ants for mutual extermination, which afford evidence that certain biologists consider to be sufficient

¹ Ames and Thomas find the origin of the social bond in the sexual life. See Ames, *op. cit.*, p. 37; Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

² W. G. Brooks, *The Foundations of Zoölogy*, pp. 117-19.

for the adoption of mutual struggle as a principle of biological evolution.¹ But the evidence seems to point more conclusively in the direction of the principle of mutual aid. There is more of co-operation than of cruel competition among the lower animals as well as in human society, and the biological justification for making sociability a law of nature is quite as sound as the argument for mutual struggle. The struggle for existence is not to be interpreted as a struggle to exterminate the unfit, but as a collective struggle. Gregariousness is the rule in animal behavior, and not the exception. Association is to be seen in every stage of the evolutionary process. Decay and extermination are phenomena much more characteristic of unsociable than of gregarious animals. "Students of animals under domestication have shown us how the habits of a gregarious animal, taken away from his kind, are shaped in a thousand details by reference to the lost pack which is no longer there. . . . It is a strange thing, this eternal hunger of the gregarious animal for the herd of, friends who are not there."² There is good reason to believe that the non-social animal is a decadent type, the gregarious animal being antecedent and truer to type.

The collective activities of the lower animals are almost as varied as in the case of primitive man. The animals co-operate with others of the same species for warding off inclement weather, guarding against danger, fighting, playing, dancing, singing, obtaining nutriment, migrating, procreating, and for the elimination of competition. So, too, primitive man lives an associated life. He is never characterized by individualism, but frequently by communism. The most primitive people observable, such as the Todas of South India, the Bushmen of South Africa, and the aborigines of Australia, show a well-developed tendency to sociality.

The higher up we proceed in the scale of culture and sophistication, the more evidence do we see of man's social nature and the more complex become the co-ordinations of men. Among mam-

¹ Cf. the argument of the German biologist in "Headquarters Nights" by Vernon Kellogg in the *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1917. Also Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, a Factor in Evolution*, chap. i.

² From Gilbert Murray's lecture on "Stoicism," quoted by H. G. Wells in *God the Invisible King*, pp. 88, 89.

mals, the nearest akin biologically to man, association is present, but the organizations are developed very meagerly in comparison with man. Where the gregarious tendencies are most highly cultivated, there appears a better foundation for happiness and morality. Duty, morality, culture, happiness, love, sacrifice, service, truth, religion—these are all terms meaningless apart from social relations.

We have, therefore, a biological justification for using the word “gregariousness” as a generic term for all the instinctive reactions which are serviceable to the group in the struggle for existence. Gregariousness has not always been regarded as an instinct, because in the case of “mammals at any rate the appearance of gregariousness has not been accompanied by any gross physical changes which are obviously associated with it.”¹ On the other hand the cumulative results of gregariousness are so great as to really overbalance the most pronounced structural variations, so that, as Trotter points out, we find a state, frequently thought of as an acquired rather than as a congenital mode of behavior, “capable of enabling the insect nervous system to compete in the complexity of its powers with that of the higher vertebrates.”² One might say that the whole structure is such that its functions and adaptations are quite as serviceable to the species as to the individual, and that includes the co-ordination and integration by the nervous system of reflexes; so that we are justified in urging that gregarious behavior is instinctive to the human organism as well as to the lower animals.

The psychologist today is emphasizing as never heretofore the significance of gregariousness. Since man is a social animal, all psychology is, of necessity, the psychology of a social animal. There is no human psychology of an unadulterated individualism, since man as a solitary animal does not exist. On that account Professor Cooley is inclined to believe that all the instincts are social and holds that “social or moral progress consists less in the aggrandisement of particular faculties or instincts and the suppression of others, than in the discipline of all with reference to the

¹ W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, p. 19.

² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

progressive organization of life."¹ He believes, however, that social behavior is of such a nature that it may be classified as instinctive. He says:

I take it that the child has by heredity a generous capacity and need for social feeling, rather too vague and plastic to be given any specific name like love. It is not so much any particular emotion or sentiment as the undifferentiated material of many, perhaps sociability is as good a name for it as any. And this material, like all other instinct, allies itself with social experience to form, as time goes on, a diversifying body of personal thought in which the phases of social feeling developed correspond, in some measure, to the complexity of life itself.²

The reference of religion to gregariousness may be substantiated by an abundance of material. It has been noted already that in primitivity human life is a group life, so that human interests and human needs are all tinged with a social element. Men went in groups to hunt and fish. Women went in groups to gather fruits. Men carried on war as groups. The group camped together, lived together, worked together, played together, fought together, and together they carried out their mimetic dances and other ceremonials. There would never have arisen a ceremonial or a cult had life been always and only individualistic. The struggle for existence was a social struggle, calling for co-operation on all sides. The connection between the gregarious tendency and the social life is so close that, as we have seen, some psychologists and sociologists find its origin there. Thus the need for food, the business of mating and procreating, the urge toward self-protection and preservation by means of war, and the search for a larger life by prying into the strange—all these interests have contributed to the understanding of human life as essentially, indeed as instinctively, gregarious.

Among the evidences of the connection between religion and gregariousness we need only remind ourselves of a few, such as totemism and its concomitant ceremonial, animism and its extension of the social bonds beyond the mundane, group magic, ancestor worship, mimetic dances and ceremonials connected with war, mimetic ceremonials and sacrificial rites connected with the supply

¹ Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 50, 51.

of food, and ceremonies connected with the normal occupation of the group, such as the Toda dairy rites. Among the more sophisticated races the connection is no less apparent, as witness the caste system and Hinduism, monasticism in various religions, religious festivals, churches and church services, revival meetings, sacred meals in the Greek and Christian religions, and social and missionary propagandism.

But in another sense still, religion may be considered as an "irradiation," to borrow Starbuck's word, of the social instinct. The reference of religion to the limits of the human group is too narrow. The cult did not arise solely as a mimetic expression of group activities. It conveyed also the yearning of the group to enlist the aid of the extra-human power or powers in whose existence it believed. It was the *mutual aid* principle carried into the life of a people which did not believe that it was bounded by the ordinary human group limits. It was the attempt of the group to make vocal its groping for the power or powers with which it would fraternize and co-operate. The prayer of the religious man is characteristic, like the call of the bird that has lost its mate or the lonely animal that has strayed from the herd, of a gregarious nature.¹ Religion is the socializing of man, the social animal, with that which is beyond human society.

On the other hand the evolution of a technique for mechanical adjustment and control has been within the social group. Human needs and human struggles are social because they are human. Thus the urge for the organization of a technique of a mechanistic type as well as of a technique of a socializing character is the urge which man, the social animal, has experienced as he, an individual within a group, struggled for existence. The advance of the sciences, progress of any kind of knowledge, depends upon the social structure. We may interpret co-operation as a big historical sweep by which the various members of the race in different groups and in different periods of history have entered into one another's labors for the great good of the social whole. The heritage of a

¹ The parables of Jesus in Luke, chap. 15, are illustrative. Here religious need and religious longing are compared to the needs and longings of the sheep which had strayed from the flock, and the prodigal who had abandoned the privileges of home.

scientific past is a conservation of energy, releasing the power of the present for new tasks, fresh achievements. Progress is a child of gregariousness.

The foregoing discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of instinctive behavior. I think, however, that the principal types have been treated. The investigation has led to two conclusions, the first concerning the complexity of instinctive behavior, and the second showing that the origins of religion and science are traceable to a multiple causality.

1. In dealing with the five types of instinctive reactions with which we were concerned, it was impossible to deal with any one of them without finding one's self in contact with behavior which belonged to one or more of the other types. In the reactions resulting from the efforts to obtain food, ceremonials arose which involved gregarious activity. Crises in regard to the supply of food sometimes called forth flight; sometimes pugnacity. Necessity of providing for women and children developed a social disposition. The sexual life with its mating and procreating activities involved gregariousness, the provision of food, curiosity as to the reproductive process, and flight or pugnacity in the interests of preservation. Self-preservation involved a demand for food, a satisfaction for the normal sexual desires, a search into the strange and unknown, and co-operation. Curiosity might arise as to whether a fruit were food or poison, or over the behavior of animals, and be akin to fear. It also called forth a group co-operation to procure satisfaction for its needs. Gregariousness involved a group need for food, the mating and parental relationships, a social demand for preservation, and a common desire to satisfy the human craving to increase the stock of knowledge by investigation and experimentation. Thus we come back to the conclusion that the organism is a unity and that the dominating urge is its struggle for existence. The end of each type of instinctive behavior appears to be a co-operation with the other types in the human struggle.

2. Furthermore it is the struggle for existence to which the instinctive behavior is constantly contributing which has urged

man to the formation of the two techniques of control which we call religion and science. By religion he seeks to establish social adjustments and relationships with the extra-human environment, and by science he endeavors to create mechanical adjustments and relationships to that environment. The purpose of both is the same—that he may “have dominion.”¹

It remains for us to observe of what significance it is for theology that we have established the genesis and functions of religion and science in the psycho-physical organism and its modes of behavior. For it must be evident that the significance is far-reaching.

1. We have seen that it is possible to trace the origin of science and religion to certain typical methods of instinctive reaction to external stimuli. We are able also to trace with some degree of clarity the development of the attitudes from the instincts. Thus we have a genetic account of both religion and science as *human* attitudes. In that way the inductive approach has made it apparent that the differentiation is not between science, the human creation, and religion, the heavenly donation. Both are of human origin and both of them function to human needs. Hence both are developmental. We look for the beginnings of religion as well as of science in the behavior of primitive peoples where life is least complex, and not in an ecclesiastical Adam. We find that their function is to meet the insistent needs of man for control by the social and mechanical techniques which men have evolved in the religions and sciences. The whole conflict which raged so long between science and theology was due to the ecclesiastical self-assurance that theology possessed all the weight of divine authority behind it, whereas science was an impostor of human invention. If the conclusions of this investigation be correct, it means that the question of authority must be interpreted, not in the sense of conformity to ecclesiastical standards, but with reference to efficiency and ability in satisfying the needs of a progressing humanity.

2. The ecclesiasticizing of religion, which was the work of the Middle Ages, and the rationalizing of religion, which was attempted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were both of them of a piece with deductive science. The presupposition was that truth was ready-made and unalterable. The laws of science and the

¹ Gen. 1:28.

dogmas of religion were alike everlasting. Man's task was one of discovery. What becomes of that conception as we historically and psychologically observe man in his struggle for existence and dominion actually participating in the making of truth? It means that the task of theology is not simply the discovery and classification of never-to-be-altered dogmas, but is creative and serviceable. It too must accept the universal challenge to prove its worth by its ability to minister to man's religious needs.

In the examination of the instincts it was observed that the findings of biology include the modifiability and adaptability of the instincts. But in the instinctive reactions we have the simplest, least complex type of human behavior. If even the instincts are modifiable and adaptable, surely the life processes *in toto* must be likewise. It ought to be apparent that a static theology cannot hope to satisfy a kinetic world in which human nature itself is always in process of change. The future of theology is tied up with the recognition of its creative task as a ministrant to an evolving life.

Theology is an interpreter of religion. Its purpose is instrumental and functional rather than dictatorial and dogmatic. The only adequate criterion for testing and revising theology must be an appreciation of religion as we study it in actual social experience. The theology of the experience of an age of feudalism cannot do justice to the experiences of an age of democracy. It was out of the question that Anselm and Aquinas should write a theology for all time. Theology is always in the making even as religion itself is always in the making, or, still more fundamentally, as human life is conceived in terms of process. The theological task is never complete; so that a study of the religious life as evolving from the instinctive life constitutes a challenge for theology to face the situation in a time when experimental science, democracy, war, industrial expansion, and rapid transportation have created a new world with social, ethical, and religious problems demanding the creative efforts of serious-minded men.

3. The biocentric theory of the genesis and function of religion and science involves important consequences for the student of theological method. If the criterion be biocentric, then the demand

is for co-operation between the two disciplines in the interests of the highest good for life. That means that theology becomes more ethical in proportion as it becomes scientific. Ritschl tried to protect religion by saying that it is independent of science, and he argued that collisions occur only when a law of science, which obtains in the narrower field of nature, is erected into a world-law. His faculty psychology and dualism worked hand in hand. But the development of the organism as a unity suggests the impossibility of making such sharp lines of demarkation between the religious and scientific interests that the one can develop regardless of the other. In that way theology may be protected against the danger of making statements which would be annulled by the known findings of science. The purpose of the theological doctrine is as truly functional as the scientific theorem. The needs of life demand of each of them a regard for the other.

4. The apologetic possibilities of theology are immensely increased by the conclusions of this study. Some attention was given to the positivistic movement in its leading representative, Auguste Comte. It was Comte's contention that the history of man begins with a mythological stage, passes through a metaphysical stage, and is entering upon a positive stage. At the bottom we have cultureless religion, and at the top we shall have religionless culture. So also M. Guyau in his *Non-Religion of the Future* argued that civilization was moving toward a higher plane where it would be independent of religion. Thus these positivistic writers argued for the ultimate disintegration of religion. But if religion be a social attitude toward the extra-human environment having its roots in the instinctive life, as we have shown, we have an argument for its ineradicability and against any liability of corrosion. There will have to be a much greater modification in man's way of functioning than has yet taken place before religion is in danger of passing away.

The evolutionistic monism of Haeckel and Ostwald was another effort to deny to religion any legitimate sphere. Their attempt was to work out a monistic system on the basis of science which should do everything for life that religion has done in the past. Their work was based on the fundamental misconception that

religion deals only with the supernatural, and is therefore retired when scientific causality upsets miracle. But the work that was done by Höfding is the best defense against such an attack. He showed that the whole question of miracle was due to a confusion of the religious and scientific tasks. When we conceive of religion as an evaluatory attitude as against the explanatory attitude of science, we see at once that the relegation of the question of miracle to the domain of the scientist is the most scientific procedure, since science deals with causes, while it emancipates religion for its real task of evaluating and interpreting the phenomena of experience in terms of our cosmic relationships.

Naturalism has sometimes attacked religion on the ground that it is too metaphysical. All the truth of which we can be sure, says the naturalist, is that which we can prove in the laboratory. Thus the differentiation is made: religion deals with the metaphysical and hypothetical whereas science deals with the physical and demonstrable. This is made the basis for a scientific agnosticism as to the questions of God, freedom, and immortality. Religion has at least the *argumentum ad hominem* that science too has its metaphysics in the aeons, electrons, atoms, and molecules of the scientist. When scientists attempt to furnish a philosophy of life which shall take the place of and function for us as religion has done in the past, they become every whit as metaphysical and hypothetical as any religionist. The naturalistic theories are all of them capable of criticism at this point, as Professor Ward has shown in his epoch-making critique of *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. Moreover, the new emphasis in religion on function as against ontology means that the force of this attack is largely spent on a phantom enemy.

The persistence of religion, the truth of religion, the adequacy of doctrinal statements, and the uniqueness of Christianity—these are all of them questions with which we deal functionally today. Our defense is in terms of their serviceableness to life rather than their superior origin. The imperishable values are the achieved values rather than the donated. Against such an epistemology science has no case, and let us hope for her own sake that she desires none.

PURITAN EFFORTS AND STRUGGLES, 1550-1603

A BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL STUDY. I

WILLIAM MUSS-ARNOLT

Boston Public Library, Boston, Massachusetts

The First Act of Uniformity (2 and 3 Edward VI, c. 1) authorizing the first prayer book of the Church of England passed both houses of Parliament on January 21, 1549. It was this act, aiming at uniformity in public worship and the establishment of a truly national church, which from the very beginning of the English Reformation has divided the Church of England into the two parties, prelatie and Puritan, that have ever since contended within her on questions touching doctrine and ceremonial law.

Shortly after the publication of the first Edwardine liturgy, the young king and his chief advisers desired the opinion of representative foreign theologians residing in England, as to the merits of the liturgy just promulgated. Chief among these foreign reformers were Martin Bucer (1491-1551), Peter Martyr (Pietro Martire Vermigli, 1500-1562), John à Lasco, and Valérand Poullain. Since none of them possessed sufficient knowledge of English, Archbishop Cranmer had caused the liturgy to be translated into Latin by Alexander Alane (1500-1565), better known by his assumed name Alesius, shortened into Aless. The translation was by no means accurate and differed in many and vital points from the wording of the English original.¹

Inasmuch as the foreign divines had to rely for their knowledge on this defective Latin translation, it is small wonder that they expressed disapproval and urged a further revision, which issued in the second liturgy of Edward VI, in 1552. While the learned Peter Heylyn (1600-1662) may be correct in maintaining that the revisers of the second liturgy were the same who had first formulated it, it is equally true that the second Prayer Book was not the offspring

¹ Muss-Arnolt, *The Book of Common Prayer among the Nations of the World* (1914), pp. 29-30; 39, n. 3.

of the Church of England. Its parentage was foreign. As the influence of Luther's service book and the Brandenburg-Nuremberg *Kirchen Ordnung* had colored, to some extent, the first liturgy of 1549, so the influence of the four men just mentioned may be traced in the liturgy of 1552. The English church had no opportunity of revising it, or expressing an opinion upon it (Malcolm MacColl). Even Cranmer expressed doubt as to the legality of the book after it had been altered without the authority of Parliament.¹ The Prayer Book which the second act of uniformity (5 and 6 Edward VI, c. 1) sanctioned was, in fact, withdrawn from publication before All Souls' Day, 1552, the day on which it was to have come into use. It never had even a trial, except in London and its neighborhood.

It was in consequence of the criticism of the foreign reformers, ably supported by the efforts of John Knox and John Hooper, the puritan bishop of Gloucester and Worcester, that the vestments, the alb and the cope, presented in the first book were now prohibited, rochet and surplice only to be used; that the word "table" was substituted for "altar" and that the table was directed to be placed "tablewise" "in the body of the Church, or in the chauncell." Another cogent reason for these changes was the fact that shortly after the passage of the first act of uniformity the altars had been lawlessly destroyed in many churches by the reform party. This necessitated a change of the former instructions concerning the vestments.

Most important of all the changes in the second Edwardine liturgy, brought about by the efforts of the puritan element in the Church of England, was the alteration of the words appointed to be said in the delivery of the elements to the communicant. The second clause of the present formula of the sacramental distribution was substituted for the first, the two being subsequently combined in 1559. The belief in transubstantiation, still held in the first Edwardine liturgy, had been abandoned, and its place was taken by the "Remembrance Supper." From a liturgical point of view the changes in the Communion service have brought about a very

¹ Cranmer's letter was addressed to the Privy Council and dated "At Lambeth this viith of October, 1552." See, also, State Papers of Edward VI. Domestic, XV, no. 15; often printed, e.g., in Henry Gee, *The Elizabethan Prayer-Book & Ornaments* (1902), pp. 224-28.

remarkable result, perhaps not contemplated by the revisers of 1552. The Communion service of 1549 was, as a whole, a revised Sarum Use: it belonged to the Roman family of liturgies. This can hardly be said of the present English liturgy. While it makes large use of the Sarum and other ancient materials, it follows in its structure an order peculiar to itself: it heads a new liturgical family.¹

Another peculiarity of the second liturgy was the rubric, or, rather, the explanatory note, which had been added to the Communion service by King Edward and Cranmer on their own authority, after the publication of the first issue of the revised service book, stating that, "Whereas it is ordeyned in the Booke of Common Prayer, in the administracion of the Lordes Supper, that the Communicantes kneelyng should receiue the Holye Communion; whiche thyng beyng well mente for a sygnificacyon of the humble and gratefull acknowledgeynge of the benefites of Christe, given unto the woorthye receyuer, and to auoyde the prophanacion and dysordre whiche about the Holye Communion myghte elles ensue. Lest yet the same kneelyng might be thought, or taken otherwyse, we dooe declare that it is not mente thereby, that any adoracion is doene, or ought to bee doene, eyther unto the Sacramentall bread or wyne there bodelye receyued, or unto any *reall* and *essenciall* presence there beeyng of Chrystes *naturall* fleshe and bloude." This is the so-called "Black Rubric." The second liturgy was approved by Parliament in April, 1552, and printing was at once commenced. The book prescribed kneeling at the reception of the communion. This prescription is generally known as the "Kneeling Rubric." It was a new feature. The first liturgy had given no special directions upon the subject. This omission must have given rise to disorder and confusion, some congregations retaining the traditional custom of kneeling at the communion; the puritan element flatly rejecting it. Before the printed book of 1552 was ready for delivery mighty efforts were made to alter the kneeling

¹ According to Darwell Stone, *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist* (1909), II, 249, "A receptionist or virtualistic doctrine is suggested by some features in the Second Prayer-Book of Edward VI, by the draft *Forty-five Articles* of 1553, by Poyntet's *Catechism* of 1553, and by the writings of Ridley, Cranmer and Latimer."

rubric. Cranmer, however, resisted a change in the rubric.¹ But, in order to conciliate the dreaded puritan element, led by John Hooper, John à Lasco, and John Knox, the celebrated declaration concerning kneeling was composed. Thus the kneeling rubric, introduced in 1552, was preserved, along with the explanation added in this black rubric. This latter was called thus in later years from the fact that it was always printed in black, instead of red, in which color all other rubrics in editions of the Book of Common Prayer were then wont to be printed.² Red, in books of that period and of earlier days, corresponds to the use of *italics* in our modern books. While Cranmer was the chief agent, it was the Privy Council which directed, October 27, 1552, the insertion of the explanatory declaration, as their published acts attest.³ That its insertion in the revision of 1552 was an afterthought is clearly shown from the fact that the earliest edition, printed by Whitchurch, does not contain it at all and the second only as a cancel leaf. It does appear as part of the regular text in one of the two editions printed by Grafton in August, 1552.⁴ It was dropped in the revision of

¹ Letter to the Privy Council, October 6, 1552. See J. R. Blunt, *The Reformation of the Church of England*, II (1896), 169.

² The expression "Black Rubric" has become such a commonplace and well-known term that not one of the many writers on the history of the liturgy of the Church of England or on the rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer seems to know its origin. The great Oxford dictionary of the English language has not a reference to nor quotation of an early or late passage using this term. Professor Craigie, the present editor of the dictionary, to whose attention I called this fact, wrote me some months ago that among the great mass of supplementary material furnished him by hundreds of contributors not one had any reference to the expression, neither under "black" nor under "rubric." An inquiry sent to *The Guardian*, and printed in its issue of December 26, 1918, has as yet elicited no answer from the English authorities on the Book of Common Prayer. Who coined the term? for what purpose? and at what time?

³ The Black Rubric of the Book of 1552 has been discovered in the Close Rolls of that year, and its exact date, October 27, 1552, in the Register of Signed Bills. For recent literature on the Kneeling Rubric see T. W. Perry, *Some Historical Considerations Relating to the Declaration on Kneeling* . . . (1863); W. E. Scudamore, *Notitia Eucharistica* (1872), pp. 823-26; (1876), pp. 946-97; D. Stone, *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, II, 141-42; J. T. Tomlinson, *The Prayer Book, Articles and Homilies* (1897), pp. 254-68; A. T. Wirgman, *Foreign Protestantism within the Church of England* (1911), pp. 132-34, 139.

⁴ See, further, Ed. Cardwell, *A History of Conferences and Other Proceedings Connected with the Revision of the Book of Common Prayer* . . . (1849), p. 34; J. Ketley, *The Two Liturgies, A.D. 1549 and A.D. 1552* . . . (1844), p. 283.

1559 at the demand, undoubtedly, of the young queen, Elizabeth, a High Church woman of the extreme kind. It was restored in the last revision in 1661-62, the last clause being made to read: "or unto any corporal presence of Christ's natural flesh and blood," a change suggested by Bishop John Gauden and made by Dr. Peter Gunning.¹ The black rubric as originally framed denied the real presence in the Eucharist in terms which might be taken as a denial of the primitive doctrine as well as that of transubstantiation. Its reinsertion into the Book of 1662 as a substantial part of the liturgy was probably intended as a companion declaration to that on the use of the sign of the cross in baptism, in view of the strenuous Presbyterian demands.

It has not been shown that the second Edwardine liturgy ever received the sanction of convocation, and it never came into general use. The book marks the farthest point in the Puritan direction that was ever reached by the official liturgy of the Church of England.

Of independent Puritan efforts we mention that early in the year 1550 there was printed in London: The forme of common praiers vsed in the churches of Geneua: The mynystracion of the sacramentes, of Baptisme and the Lordes supper: The vysitacion of the syck: And the Cathechisme of Geneua, made by master John Caluyne. In the ende are certaine other Godly prayers priuately to be vsed: translated out of frenche. By William Huycke. Certaine graces be added in the ende, to the prayse of God, to be sayde before or after meales. The colophon reads: "By Edward Whitchurch, the vii day of June, 1550." 210 leaves. 8vo. It was one of the first broadsides fired by the Puritan friends of Calvin against the first Edwardine Prayer Book. According to some the tract may have been identical with the form proposed at Frankfort-on-the-Main in December, 1554.² Whitchurch had printed the first Edwardine liturgy; and the translation now published, with a preface by Thomas Broke, chief clerk of exchequer and customer of Calais, seemed to indicate an early desire that changes be made in

¹ G. Burnet, *History of the Reformation* (1715), III, v-vi; and the same author's *History of His Own Time* (1724), I, 183; (1897), I, 324.

² Whittingham, *A Brieff Discours*, etc., p. xxvii.

the Prayer Book, so as to bring it nearer to the practices of the Calvinistic congregations abroad.

The year following, 1551, another attempt was made in the same direction. One of the four foreign divines, mentioned above, was Valérand Poullain (Vallerandus Pollanus, also called Pollanus Flandrus). He was born at Lille about 1515 and died at Frankfort in 1559 (or 1560?). He succeeded Calvin in 1541 as minister of the French Reformed refugee congregation at St. Nicolas in Strassburg and took refuge with his congregation in England, in 1549, when the religious compromise known as the Augsburg Interim drove him and many others from Germany to England. He and his French-Walloon congregation were settled by Cranmer at the old abbey of Glastonbury. Here he translated into Latin Calvin's liturgy for Geneva, as published in Strassburg in 1545, and had it printed in London in 1551, with the title: *Liturgia sacra sev ritus Ministerii in Ecclesia peregrinorum profugorum propter evangelium Christi Argentinae*. Adjuncta est ad finem brevis apologia pro hac Liturgia, per Vallerandum Pollanum Flandrum. Londini, per Steph. Mierdmannum. 1551. 8vo. The book, it is generally assumed, furnished hints to the English revisers for some additions that were made in 1552 to the ancient services.¹

Poullain's dedication of the book to King Edward is couched in terms which make it evident that he hoped its publication might influence future liturgical revision, being itself a revision of Calvin and Farel's *Services*, "modified and supplemented." The translation helped to make Calvin's liturgy well known in England. Its influence upon the Prayer Book in 1552 may possibly be traced in the introductory portion of the morning and evening prayer, and in the insertion of the ten commandments in the Communion office.²

According to H. J. Wotherspoon (*The Second Prayer Book of King Edward the Sixth* [1905], p. 19) Poullain's "draft thus prepared was privately printed in 1554, and a few copies circulated among the Frankfort exiles with a view to consideration and adoption, and it possibly reappears later as the Order of Geneva (as distinguished

¹ *Biographie nationale . . . de Belgique*, tome 18 (Bruxelles, 1905), pp. 110-12; Schickler, *Les églises du refuge en Angleterre* (1892), I, 59-67; III, 7-12.

² F. E. Brightman, *The English Rite*, pp. cxlvi-cxlix. A copy of this now rare book is in the J. P. Morgan library, New York City.

from the Genevan Order of Calvin), which in revised and extended form became the Book of Common Order introduced into Scotland in 1563-64" (see also, *ibid.*, pp. 59-61). George Washington Sprott (*The Book of Common Order* [1901], p. 198) states that "A second edition of the Liturgy of Pollanus was published at Frankfort, 1554." The confession of faith, at the end of the book, is signed by the representatives of both the French and English refugee congregations. In addition to the Genevan prayers it provides sentences of absolution; at marriages Psalm 128 is to be sung on entering the church. Directions are given for private communion; and at funerals the pastor is to go at the head of the mourners' procession and give an exhortation and prayer at the grave. A somewhat frequent rubric is: "the minister to use this form, unless he can do better of his own accord." A modern reprint of small portions of this liturgy may be found in Daniel's *Codex liturgicus*, III, (1851), 63-65.

The unexpected death of Edward VI and the accession of his sister Mary brought to a sudden halt the further growth of the Reformation in England and the use of the Book of Common Prayer. By one of her first acts (1 Mary sess. 2, c. 2), October, 1553, the Latin mass and missal were restored and the two acts of uniformity of Edward VI repealed. The use of the Book of Common Prayer became illegal on and after December 20, 1553. All Reformed service books were to be given up to the ecclesiastical authorities within fifteen days to be burned. This explains why copies of the liturgical books of Edward's reign are now exceedingly rare. The act of Queen Mary was simply the Catholic counter-stroke to the acts 2 and 3 Edward VI, c. 1 (January 21, 1549) and 3 and 4 Edward VI, c. 10 (December 25, 1550), according to which the old Latin service books were to be given the *coup de grâce*.

For the brief period of Queen Mary's reign the history of the English reformation, prelatie and Puritan, and of its liturgy, leads to Emden, Strassburg, Geneva, Zurich, and especially to Frankfort-on-the-Main. Hither the small French-Walloon congregation of twenty-four members and their leader Poullain fled in 1553 from Glastonbury. Upon the recommendation of Johann von Glauburg, one of the city magistrates and a leader of the Calvinistic party, the

refugees were given by the authorities, on March 18, 1554, the use of the Weissfrauenkirche, "the church of the White ladies or Cistercian nuns." The conditions upon which the use of the church was granted to the exiles from England are given by A. F. Mitchell in his valuable history of *The Scottish Reformation* (1900), page 294, copied from Withof's *Vertheidigung*, mentioned below in note 29. During the summer of the same year, 1554, parties of English exiles arrived under the leadership of Edmond Sutton, William Williams, William Whittingham, and Thomas Wood. They were heartily welcomed on June 27, 1554, by the French-Walloon congregation and soon obtained permission to worship in the same church as the Walloons, but at a different hour. They established a congregation of which John Knox, who arrived in Frankfort during November, 1554, and Thomas Lever (1521-1577) were chosen ministers, the former representing the Calvinistic majority, the latter the Anglican minority. Here, at Frankfort, the second Edwardine liturgy was used, but with modifications and alterations, adapting it in many ways to the views of Calvin, to whose judgment it had been referred. It was agreed to drop the litany and the responses, the use of surplice, and other ceremonies prescribed by the Book of Common Prayer. The modified services were based to some extent upon those contained in Poullain's *Liturgia sacra*. After the arrival of Knox another service book was drawn up, known as "the Liturgy of Compromise." It was the joint work of Knox, Whittingham, Henry Parry, and Thomas Lever. It was approved by the congregation and was to have a fair trial for at least three months. It was put into practice experimentally on February 6, 1555. Only half of the allotted time had expired when on March 13, 1555, a fresh party of exiles direct from England arrived, led by Richard Cox (1500-1581), a man of moderate views but of a strong will and the habit of domination. He soon won over Lever and Parry, who personally had always favored the use of the Edwardine Prayer Book without alterations or modifications. Cox and his party changed the Anglican minority into a majority. Soon serious dispute and bitter strife arose between Cox and Knox and their adherents. The Coxians supplemented in the public services the form in use by making audible responses where these occurred in the

Book of Common Prayer; and on Sundays one of them took possession of the pulpit and read the Litany, the rest of the party answering aloud. The strife over the vestment rubric, which began with the liturgy of 1549 and has ever since existed, even though its outward form and method of expression have sometimes varied, was revived and intensified, distracting the unhappy church which had taken refuge at Frankfort. Upon the accession of Queen Elizabeth the bitter quarrel was brought back to England by Knox, Goodman, Whittingham, and others.

Knox was soon forbidden by the Anglican majority to preach or meddle at all any longer in the congregation. Not able to persuade him to leave Frankfort quietly, Parry and another friend of Cox charged Knox before the city authorities with treason, founded on some passages in his pamphlet *Admonition of Christians concerning the Present Troubles in England* (1554), whereupon the Frankfort city magistrates banished him, compelling him to leave, March 26, 1555.

The Liturgy of Compromise was probably used only in manuscript form, no printed copy having ever been found or even mentioned. A manuscript copy, found in 1871, is considered by Dr. Sprott to be a transcript of the original manuscript of the liturgy used from February 6 until March 13, 1555, with the exception of the preface and the reference to the martyred bishops. The liturgy is published by Dr. Sprott on pages 231-56 of *The Second Prayer Book of King Edward the Sixth . . .* by H. J. Wotherspoon (1905). The publication shows "that Knox used large portions of the English Prayer Book before he was embittered by his expulsion from Frankfort through the machinations of his opponents and forbidden, later on, to enter England on his return from Exile."¹

The Liturgy of Compromise, in manuscript, was carried by Knox and Whittingham to Geneva, where a congregation of Puritan exiles was formed in November, 1555. The liturgy soon became known as the Book of Geneva. It was not identical with Calvin's Genevan Order of 1549, but it resembled it closely. The name

¹ The views of Knox on the Second Edwardine Prayer Book are contained, e.g., in his letter to Mrs. Anna Lock, April 6, 1559, printed in B. J. Kidd, *Documents Illustrative of the Continental Reformation* (1911), pp. 691-92, No. 339.

"The Book (or Order) of Geneva" was derived from the fact that upon the return of Knox to Geneva it was printed and used by the English Kirk there, of which Knox was one of the ministers. Its title reads: The forme of pray-|ers and ministra-|tion of the Sacraments, &c. vsed in the | Englishe congregation at Geneua: and approued, by the famous and godly lear-|ned man, John Caluyn.| [Device, and a quotation from Scripture] Imprinted At Geneva By| John Crespin. M. D. LVI. Roman letter; 93 pp., with a break in folios between 24 and 33, the end of the prefatory matter and the beginning of the text proper. "Probably the prefatory matter was printed after the rest of the volume, and did not occupy as much space as was expected."¹ It collates Signature A eight leaves, B four (=pp. 3-24, preface; title, p. 1; reverse, contents); text, C1 to F7 in eights (pp. 33-93); F7, reverse, containing quotations. Follow the Psalms, 159 pp., with special title-page, printed on F8, obverse. Part 3, the catechism, 160 pp., likewise with a special title-page. The title of the Psalms reads: One and | fiftie Psalmes of David in Engli-|she metre whereof .xxxvii. were made by | Thomas Sterneholde: ad the rest by o-|thers. Coferrd with the hebreue, and | in certeyn places corrected as the text, | and sens of the Prophete required. | [Device and quotation] |. Sig. F8, A1-K8 in eights; F8, obverse, title, reverse blank; text, A1, obv., -K8, obv.; K8, rev.: "The fautes which chanced in printing." The "conferring with the Hebrew" was probably done by Whittingham, a good Hebraist. To the thirty-seven psalms of Sternhold and Hopkins (of the editions of 1549-53) were added seven more by Sternhold, but considerably altered, and another seven were furnished by Whittingham himself. Fifty-two tunes to which to sing the psalms are here supplied for the first time and are all different. Nothing definite is known as to the origin of these tunes nor as to who was responsible for the selection and arrangement of the music in the volume. In later editions, notably that of 1561, a number of tunes were taken from the French Protestant Psalter.

The title of Part III reads: The Catechisme Or Manner to teach children the Christian religion, wherin the Minister demand-

¹ W. Cowan, *A Bibliography of the Book of Common Order and Psalm Book of the Church of Scotland: 1556-1644* (Edinburgh, 1913), p. 19, No. 1.

eth the question, and the child maketh answer. Made by the excellent Doctor and Pastor in Christes Church, Iohn Calvin. [Device and quotation]. By John Crespin. M. D. LVI. Sig. A-K in eights, L four leaves. A1, title, reverse blank; A2, obv.,-K6, obv., the catechism; K6, rev.,-L4, obv., prayers; L4, rev., quotation (1 Cor. 3), device and colophon: Imprinted at Geneua, by John | Crespin. Anno D. M. D. LVI | the tenth of february.

The exact date, whether according to English custom it meant February 10, 1557, or really 1556, is hard to decide. Neil Livingston (*The Scottish Metrical Psalter*, p. 63, col. 1) maintains that at Geneva the year began, at that time, with January 1, and that, therefore, Knox arrived in Geneva eight months subsequent to the publication of this *editio princeps* of the Order of Geneva. If this is correct Whittingham must have been the guiding spirit in its publication. Additional weight is given to Dr. Livingston's contention by the fact that Knox visited Scotland in 1555-56. It was Whittingham also rather than John Knox who wrote part and edited the whole of the famous treatise: A Brieff discours off the troubles begonne at Franckford in Germany, Anno Domini 1554. Abowte the Booke off off [*sic*] common prayer . . . [Zurich?] M. D. LXXV.

The Book of Geneva is a puritan, Calvinistic, counterpart to the Book of Common Prayer. While Whittingham's was the guiding hand in carrying the book through the press, it is known to have been really the joint work of Knox, Whittingham, Anthony Gilby (died 1585), John Fox(e), the martyrologist (1516-87), and Thomas Cole (died 1571). Few copies are likely to have found their way into Scotland at any time, and fewer still into England. An early reprint of Part I is contained in the *Phenix* (London, 1708), II, 204-59. *Ibid.*, Preface, p. viii, the work is characterized as "A grave demure Piece, without either Responses, or Psalms, or Hymns, without Fringe or Philactery; but terribly fortify'd and pallisado'd, with Texts of Scripture, which we suppose to be all right and *secundum Artem*." Part I is also reprinted by Dr. David Laing in his edition of *The Works of John Knox*, IV, 141-214.

A Latin translation of Part I of this English Genevan Book was published by Knox through Crespin in 1556, entitled: Ratio | et Forma | pvblice orandi De-|vm, atque administran-|di Sacramenta,

|et cæ. | In Anglorvm Eccle-|siam, quæ Geneuæ colligitur, recepta: cum iu-|dicio & comprobatione D.| Iohannis Caluini. [Printer's device: anchor and serpent]¹ Genevæ. | Apvd Ioannem Crispinvm. |M. D. LVI. 80 pages, including title. Sig. A-E in eights. A1, title, reverse contents; text, A2, obv.,—E8 rev. Small 8vo. David Laing (1793-1878), the great Scottish antiquary, maintains in his edition of Knox's works that the Scottish reformer had a share in preparing the translation. Its Preface, however, is usually ascribed to Whittingham, that intrepid leader of English Puritans at Frankfort and at Geneva. The late Professor Mitchell (in *The Scottish Reformation*, p. 127, n. 1) is accredited by the editor of his book with the strong conviction that the words and matter of this Latin service book were derived directly from the *Liturgia sacra* of Valérand Poullain, which in turn, as stated, is a Latin translation of Calvin's liturgy for Geneva, 1545. Against this assumption argues Wotherspoon (*The Second Prayer Book of King Edward the Sixth*, p. 61).

A second, enlarged edition of the English text appeared in 1558, printed at Geneva, by James Poullain and Antonie Rebul. The main title reads: The Forme of Prayers And Ministration of the Sacramentes, &c. used in the Englishe Congregation at Geneva: and approved, by the famous and Godly learned man, Iohn Calvin. 1 Cor. III Printed at Geneva, by Iames Poullain and Antonie Rebul. M. D. LVIII. Signatures for Part I, A-F in eights. Part II, the Psalter, has the title: Psalmes Of David In Englishe Metre by Thomas Sterneholde and others: conferred with the Ebrue, and in certain places corrected, as the sense of the Prophet required: And, In This Second Edition are added eleven mo, newly composed. James V: 1558. Sig. A-P2, rev., in eights. A1, title, reverse blank; A2, obv.,—P2, rev., Psalms and Table: There are 62 psalms and 39 tunes. Of the eleven new psalm translations nine were by Whittingham and two by John Pullain (Pulleyne).¹ Follows Part III on sig. P3, obv., —Z8 in

¹ John Pullain (Poullain, Pulleyne) was a Yorkshireman. He was one of the Genevan exiles in company with Whittingham and Kethe. Upon his return to England he became archdeacon of Colchester, where he died in 1565. The English psalter of 1562 contains of him only the metrical translation of Psalm 148; the Scottish, this and Psalm 149.

eights, Aa-Cc8 in eights. Additions in this part are four "Thanksgivings before and after meat," and two prayers. Only one copy of this edition is known to exist at the present time, belonging to T. E. Aylward, Esq., Cardiff, Wales. It is described in the *Times* (London), September 19, 1902, and by Cowan (p. 20, No. 3).

Another edition, printed at Geneva, by Zacharie Durand, appeared in 1561. Only one perfect copy is known, namely that in the library of St. Paul's Cathedral, London, England. Its title reads: *The forme Of Prayers And Ministration Of The Sacraments, &c. sed in the English Church at Geneva, & approved by the famous & godlie learned man, Iohn Calvin.* Whereunto are also added the prayers which thei use there in the French Church. With the Cōfession of Faith which al they make that are received into the Universitie of Geneva. The contents of this boke are contained in the page following. 1 Corinth. iii. No man can laye any other foundation then that which is laid, even Christ Iesus. Printed at Geneva By Zacharie Durand. M. D. LXI. 16mo (3×4½ inches). Sig. A-F in eights, G two leaves, A-Y and A-N7 in eights. Part II reads: *Four Score and Seven Psalmes Of David In English Mitre by Thomas sterneholde and others; conferred with the Hebrewes, and in certeine places corrected, as the sense of the Prophet requireth, whereunto are added the Songe of Simeon, the then Commandements and the Lords Prayer. Iames v. If any be afflicted, let him pray: and if any be merrie, let him sing Psalmes.* M. D. LXI. Part III: *The Catechisme Of [sic!] Maner To Teache Children The Christian religion: wherein the Minister demaundeth the question, and the Childe maketh answer: made by the excellent Doctor and Pastor in Christs Church, Iohn Calvin. Ephes. 2 By Zacharie Durand.* M. D. LXI.¹

The Psalter in this edition contained twenty-five additional translations, of which twenty-four are assigned to William Kethe,²

¹ *St. Paul's Cathedral Library. A catalogue. . . .* By W. Sparrow Simpson (1893), p. 41; Cowan, *Bibliography*, p. 21, No. 4.

² William Kethe is said to have been a Scotsman who fled with the English refugees to Frankfort. From there he went, in September, 1555, to Geneva with Whittingham and others. He was one of the translators of the Genevan Bible. He is said to have been rector of Okeford Superior in the parish of Childe Okeford, near Blandford, Dorset, from 1561 until 1593, when his connection appears to have ceased by death or

the editor of the book, Knox having returned to Scotland in the spring of 1559, and Whittingham to England "in the second year of Elizabeth." "The remaining psalm, the well-known one hundredeth ("All people," etc.) is credited to Sternhold, but it is almost certain that this is an error and that Kethe is the author of this psalm also."¹ Sixty-six tunes are printed to which the psalms are sung. These would be introduced into Scotland with all copies of the book. The psalter is a continuation of the 1558 recension, not of that of 1560. Very few tunes of the 1556 edition survived the two revisions of 1558 and 1561, in which latter the influence of Marot and Beza's French version is most perceptible.

The only additions actually made to the prayers are two new ones in Part III, following the Catechism. Both are private prayers. The Catechism is reprinted in *Catechisms of the Scottish Reformation*, edited by Horatius Bonar, 1886. Calvin's catechism, it will be remembered, was first published in French in 1533, and translated into Latin in 1538. The catechism of this 1561 edition is from the Latin of 1545.²

There is another edition of Parts I and III, printed in 1561, without place or printer's name. It may have been printed in

otherwise. Twenty-five psalm versions by Kethe are included in the Anglo-Genevan psalter of 1561, all of which also passed into the Scottish psalter of 1564-65. Nine of his psalm versions were included in the English psalter of 1562; a tenth, the present version of Psalm 100, was added in the appendix of the English edition of 1562 and admitted into the text of the issue of 1565. It is, likewise, the only psalm transferred from the English editions to the Scottish psalter of 1650. His imitation of French meters is even more conspicuous than in the case of Whittingham and others.

¹ The "Old Hundreth" psalm is attributed to Sternhold in the Anglo-Genevan psalter of 1561, and in Day's psalter of 1587. Thomas Warton (*History of English Poetry*, III, 168) assigned it to Whittingham. Many early editions of the psalms in meter do not indicate the name of translator of this psalm. The tune, according to W. H. Havergal, *A History of the Old Hundreth Psalm Tune* (1854), was composed by Guillaume Franc. Late researches, however, have proved that Louis Bourgeois, the editor of the French-Genevan psalter of 1551, composed it. This tune is the only one of all the early psalm tunes which is now still known. From the days of the Reformation to the end of the seventeenth century it was commonly called "The Hundreth Psalm Tune"; but upon the publication of Tate and Brady's new version its present title came into use.

² On this 1545 edition see, e.g., Ernst Friedrich Karl Müller, *Die Bekenntnisschriften der reformierten Kirche* (1903), pp. xxviii and 117-53.

London. According to Cowan (*Bibliography*, p. 20, No. 4) "most probably at Geneva." A copy in the Benton collection¹ bequeathed to the Boston Public Library reads: The | Forme of | Prayers And Minистра- | tion Of The Sacramentes, | &c. vsed in the Englishe | Congregation at Ge- | neua: and appro- | ued, by the fa- | mous and Godly learned | man M. Iohn | Caluin. | 1 Corinth. iii. | No man laye | any other foundation, then | that whiche is sayde [sic!] | euen Christ Iesus. | 1561. Part II (i.e., the regular part III): The | Catechis- | me Of [sic!] Maner. to | Teache Chyldren the | Christian Religion. | Wherein the Miny- | ster demaundeth | the Questyon, | and the | Chylde maketh Aunsvverre. | made by the ex- | cellent Doctor | and Pastor in | Christes. | Ephes. ii. | The Doctrine of the Apostles and Prophetes, | is the foundation of Christes Church. | 1561. | Black-letter, without pagination. Page of type, $2\frac{7}{8} \times 4\frac{3}{4}$; paper, $3\frac{7}{8} \times 5\frac{5}{8}$ inches. Sig. a-k in eights, l four leaves; m-aa in eights. The last page of Parts I (e 3, rev.) and II (aa8, rev.) blank. "The table of contents on the back of the title page includes: Psalms of David in metre, but the psalms do not appear ever to have formed part of the volume. At the end, the Confession and the Prayer for the whole state of Christ's church . . . are repeated, although they appear in their usual places in the earlier part of the volume" (Cowan, *Bibliography*, p. 20, No. 4). The misprints in the titles "sayde" and "Of" are mentioned before; the last words of the second title: "Church, Iohn Calvin'," are omitted.

The same year also Part II, The Psalms in metre, were printed likewise without name of printer or place of printing. The title reads: Fovre | score and se- | ven Psalmes of Da- | vid in English mitre | by Thomas sterneholde and others: | conferred with the Hebrewe: ād | in certeine places corrected, as | the sēse of the Prophet requireth. | whereunto are added the Songe of Si- | meon. the ten Commandements and | the Lords Prayer. | Iames v . . . | M. D. LXI. Same size as Parts I and III, just described. Sig. a-z in eights, last page blank. It appears to be a reprint of the

¹ *The Book of Common Prayer and Books Connected with Its Origin and Growth.* Catalogue of the collection of Josiah Henry Benton, LL.D. Prepared by William Muss-Arnolt (2d ed.; Boston, 1914), p. 114, No. 621.

"Psalms" portion of the edition of Durand, Geneva, of the same date. Some misprints found in the latter are, however, corrected, and Psalm 100 is ascribed to Kethe instead of to Sternhold. Only one copy is known, that at Britwell Court (Cowan, *Bibliography*, p. 21, No. 6).

It is by no means impossible that these two publications were printed in London for the use of the returned Puritan exiles in their private gatherings and conventicles, strictly forbidden by law. For this purpose the separate issue of the metrical psalter, used undoubtedly more often than the other two parts, could well be explained. This would also account for the omission of the name of printer or the place of issue. In view of the repressive methods of the English censor, the work had to be done secretly and probably by unskilled workmen. Hence also the repetition of mistakes and omission on the title-pages. If the book had been intended for the use of the Scottish people, printer and place of issue would have been given on the title-pages, as was done a year later in the Edinburgh reprint of the Genevan book by Robert Lekprevik,¹ the title-page of which is an exact copy of that of the Genevan edition of 1561. It contains some prayers not found in the Genevan editions. It is a small black-letter octavo of seventy leaves, sig. A-H in eights, I six leaves. See further, Cowan, *Bibliography*, p. 22, No. 7.

The troubles at Frankfort about the liturgy and ceremonies, the surplice, ring, and cross in baptism, are not only the type, but the true original source and cause of all the dissensions which have ever since shaken the foundation of the peace of the Church of England. "Not only all the unhappy distinctions of Prelatist and Puritan, Cavalier and Roundhead, Whig and Tory, High Church and Low Church, and all the feuds and animosities consequent on them, but all the struggle and strife of parties, all their plots and counterplots to oppress, discredit and defame each other; all torts and penal laws, sequestrations, proscriptions, attainders and occasional bills; all the ravage, in short, and desolation ever

¹ On Lekprevik see Dickson and Edmond, *Annals of Scottish Printing* (1890), chaps. xviii-xx, pp. 198-272.

since committed; all the blood spilled in peace and war, has been only a continuation of these *Troubles at Frankfort*."¹

In Frankfort Poullain reprinted the liturgy which he had first published in 1551 at London,² adding to it a confession of faith. The title of this revised liturgy reads: "Liturgia sacra, sev' Ritus Ministerij in Ecclesia peregrinorum Francofordiae ad Moenum. Addita est summa doctrinae seu fidei professio eiusdem Ecclesiae. Francofordiae. 1554." Colophon: Impressum Francofordiae apud Petrum Brubachium (Peter Br[a]ubach). 1554. 94 pp., including a leaf of subscription, not paged. Sm. 8vo. The book was published at that time in answer to attacks by Hartmann Beyer (1516-1577), a Lutheran minister at Frankfort, and by Joachim Westphal (1510-1574), Lutheran minister at Hamburg and staunch champion of Lutheranism against Calvinism.

A few months after Knox's forced departure from Frankfort, John à Lasco arrived there, on his way home to Poland. Jan Lascki (Laski), usually called John à Lasco, was born in 1499 and died in 1560. He was a Polish reformer of noble birth, who fled to England and was made by Cranmer superintendent of the four foreign Protestant congregations in London. While there he published in 1552 his *Brevis et dilvvida de Sacramentis ecclesiae Christi tractatio, in qua & fons ipse, & ratio, totius sacramentariae nostri temporis cōtrouersiae paucis exponitur* (Consensio mutua in re Sacramentaria Ministrorum Tigurinae Ecclesiae, & D. J. Calvini ab ipsis autoribus editi edita). Londoniper Stephanum Myerdamannum. An. 1552. (25), 141, 11 leaves. 12mo.³ The work was dedicated to King Edward and was consulted by the revisers of the English liturgy. It was written principally for the use of the Netherland congregation at London and was based on the liturgy of Poullain of 1551. It gives the

¹ *The Phenix* (London, 1708), II, vii-viii.

² E. F. K. Müller, *Die Bekenntnisschriften* , pp. ii and 656-66; H. J. Witherspoon, *The Second Prayer Book of King Edward the Sixth*, pp. 59-61; *Prayer-Book Dictionary* (1912), p. 553, col. 1.

³ The best biographies of the Polish reformer are those of Petrus Bartels, *Johannes à Lasco*. Elberfeld, 1860. iv+72 pp. 8vo; Hermann Dalton, *Johannes à Lasco*. Gotha, 1881, 578 pp. 8vo; and the same scholar's article in *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, 3te Auflage, Band 11 (1902), pp. 292-96.

Calvinistic forms with additions and dissertations resembling the scheme of doctrine and worship put out by Hermann von Wied, the aged archbishop of Cologne.

À Lasco brought with him to Frankfort the remnant of the Dutch and German refugees whose superintendent he had been in London. As was to be expected he sided with the more simple Walloon liturgy against the services of the Book of Common Prayer and thereby widened still more the breach between the two factions, the victorious Coxians and the remnant of the Knoxians and their followers. Here, in Frankfort à Lasco had published in 1555, or early in 1556, a liturgy which he had begun during his sojourn in England and for which King Edward's permission had been given "at Leigh, the 24th of June in the fourth year of our reign." Its title reads: "Forma ac ratio tota ecclesiastici ministerii in Peregrinorum potissimum vero Germanorum ecclesia, instituta Londini in Anglia per pientissimum principem Angliae regem Eduardum VI., anno 1550, autore Joanne à Lasco, Poloniae barone: Francofordiae, 1555. 8vo." A French translation appeared in 1556, a Dutch in 1563, and a German in 1565 at Heidelberg.¹ As was the case with Poullain's *Liturgia sacra*, of 1554, so also was à Lasco's book printed as a defense against the violent attacks of Joachim Westphal, who endeavored to bring about the expulsion of the foreign Reformed congregations from Frankfort. À Lasco and Martin Micronius (Latinized from de Cleyne) had fled, in 1553, with three hundred refugees from England to Denmark, and thence to Wismar, Lübeck, and Hamburg. At every place they were denied refuge by the narrow-minded Lutherans in power. At Hamburg both leaders came into conflict with Westphal and their controversy was carried on for years until the death of Micronius in 1559 and that of à Lasco. Micronius settled at Emden, while à Lasco went on to Frankfort.

In his bitter warfare against the refugees at Frankfort, Westphal almost succeeded, with Beyer's assistance; for, on October 21, 1556, the city authorities decided that all the strangers without

¹ On à Lasco's liturgy and its far-reaching influence see, e.g., A. L. Richter, *Geschichte der evangelischen Kirchenverfassung* (Leipzig, 1851), pp. 175 ff.; Johann Viktor Lechler, *Geschichte der Presbyterial- und Synodal-Verfassung seit der Reformation*. Stuttgart, 1854.

exception should leave the town. At the same time the city authorities asked Melanchthon's opinion in this matter. He advised the senate, July 13, 1557, not to disturb or expel the "Ecclesia Gallica" and "Ecclesia Anglica"; whereupon the decision was revoked and the refugees were allowed to remain for the time being.

In the Preface (dated March, 1556) of his tract: *J. Westphali justa defensio adversus insignia mendacia Ioh. à Lasco quę in epistola ad Polonię Regem, &c. contra Saxonicas ecclesias sparsit, cujus exemplar adiecimus* (Argentorati, 1557, 8vo), Westphal warned the Frankfort authorities against the refugees from the Low Countries and from England. Poullain, as chief spokesman of the foreign congregations at Frankfort, answered the warning in: "*Antidotum adversus Joachimi Westphali nomine pestilens consilium, nuper scriptum ad Senatum civitatis Francofordię* (n. pl.; 1557; 8vo). Westphal replied in: "*Apologia adversus venenatum antidotum V. Pollani sacramentarii Ursellis. 8vo.*" The acrimonious literary controversy came to an end only by the death of Poullain in 1559 (or 1560?). At the same time the dispute and strife over the liturgy, Episcopalian or Puritan, continued in Frankfort unabated, even after the chief leaders and many of their followers had returned to England upon the accession of Queen Elizabeth. As a result of the continuous disputes the services of the Reformed congregation were discontinued by a decree of the city authorities, April 22, 1561.

Some twenty years after the beginning of these troubles at Frankfort an anonymous tract was published giving a vivid, but of course partisan, description of these happenings. The title reads: "A brieff discours | off the troubles begonne at Franck | ford in Germany Anno Domini 1554. Abowte | the Booke off off [*sic.*] common prayer and Ceremonies, and conti- | nued by the Englishemen theyre, to thende off Q. Maries | Raigne; in the which discours, the gentle reader shall see | the very originall and beginninge off all the | contention that hathe byn, and what was | the cause off the same M.D. LXXV." Black-letter. (1), ccxv, (1) pp. Sm. 4to. The first four pages print (sig. Aij, Aiiij) contain the author's preface. Then follows "The historie."

Upon page cv follows immediately folio cx, without, however, the slightest break in the text. The book bears neither name of printer nor place of issue, but it is printed in the "Zürich" type of Christopher Froschauer.¹ It is commonly assumed that Whittingham² was the author. It contains the only full account of the

¹ This, of course, is only a surmise, based on the similarity of type used in this book to the type used by the Froschauer press. The publication is not mentioned in the list of Froschauer publications, compiled by E. C. Rudolphi in *Die Buchdruckerfamilie Froschauer in Zürich, 1521-1595*. Zürich, 1869.

² William Whittingham (1524-1579) was a man of much greater learning than Sternhold or Hopkins, the authors of the early parts of the English metrical psalter. He was a good Hebraist and thus able to correct his predecessors' translations. Among the metrical hymns translated by Whittingham is Psalm 119, which, with its more than seven hundred lines, counts for some twenty ordinary psalms. During Queen Mary's reign he resided first at Frankfort, where his extreme Puritan views made him the champion of John Knox. From Frankfort he went to Geneva, arriving October 13, 1555, and became there a great favorite of Jean Calvin, from whom he received ordination in 1559. Having completed his work on the new translation of the Bible, printed in 1560 and known as the Genevan version or the Breeches Bible, he returned to England in 1560, but left the country again for several years as chaplain to the earls of Bedford and Warwick. He was made dean of Durham in 1563, without in the least renouncing his extreme Puritan views, but steadfastly retaining them until his death in 1579. His influence on the metrical psalter was, in the first place, that of scholarly revision of the work of Sternhold and Hopkins, and, secondly, in the imitation of French meters. He versified the Decalogue, the prayer following immediately after it, and, most probably, the Lord's Prayer in two versions, now only to be found in the edition of 1561, which also contained four more psalm translations not found in the English edition of 1562. He, likewise, versified the Creed and the hymn *Veni Creator*, all of which follow upon the singing psalms. His name as a contributor is mentioned on the title-page, between that of Sternhold and Hopkins, in only four sixteenth-century English editions, viz., those of 1575, 1585, 1597 (see R. R. Steele, *The Earliest English Music Printing* [London, 1903], Nos. 64, 98a, 163a), and that of 1598. The Genevan Bible version was prepared by Whittingham, Thomas Sampson, Anthony Gilby, assisted by William Cole, Christopher Goodman, Myles Coverdale, and others, who, like Paul in the Roman prison, and Luther at the Wartburg, turned their enforced leisure to good account. It was printed by Rowland (Rouland) Hall, one of the English refugee printers, in quarto, at the expense of the English congregation at Geneva. The translation "breeches" instead of "aprons" in Gen. 3:7, the source of the vulgar nickname for the Genevan version, was undoubtedly borrowed from Tyndale's translation, where it is first met with.

The most notable changes made in the Genevan version of convenient portable size were the adoption of roman type instead of the black-letter and the division of the chapters into verses. It became very popular, more than one hundred and thirty editions having been published, the last in 1644. The first Bible printed in Scotland (1579), by Thomas Bassandyne, is an exact reprint of the Genevan of 1561. See W. T. Dobson, *History of the Bassandyne Bible*. Edinburgh, 1887.

struggle now extant; but its value is impaired by its polemical character. The book was reprinted at London in 1642, for controversial purposes, and "Humbly presented to the view and consideration of the most Honourable and High Court of Parliament." Later reprints were published in 1708 (*Phenix*, II, 44-203 [London]); and in 1846 by John Petheram, "A brief discourse on the troubles begun at Frankfort in the year 1554. . . . With an introduction. London." xiv (1), ccxv pp. 8vo. The latest reprint is that by Professor Edward Arber, published as Vol. 1 of "A Christian Library," London. 1908. Copies of the original edition and of all the reprints here mentioned are in the Boston Public Library.¹

For almost two hundred years after the expulsion of the Reformed Church, its adherents remained rigidly excluded from the right to hold services in the city of Frankfort. In 1751 descendants of the original members of the Reformed Church petitioned the city authorities for the privilege of erecting church buildings and worshipping according to their conviction. To assist them in this endeavor they had reprinted a biographical sketch of Valérand Poullain by Johann Hildebrand Withof (1694-1769), professor at Duisburg, Germany. The president of the Lutheran consistory of Frankfort, Johann Philipp Fresenius (1705-1761), a strong Lutheran partisan, at once answered Withof and opposed the admission of Reformed Churches, for reasons which were social and economic rather than religious and denominational. Withof replied, defending himself and the petitioners, adding to a new brochure the Confession of Faith and the liturgy of the former refugee congregation. To this Fresenius also replied, whereupon Withof and his Reformed brethren withdrew their petition.²

¹ A good account of *A Brieff Discours*, etc., is given by A. B. Hinds in *The Making of the England of Elizabeth* (1895), pp. 6-67. See, also, David Laing, *The Works of John Knox*, IV (1855), 1-50.

² Withof's two tracts read: *Zuverlässige, mit authentiken Stücken und Urkunden erwiesene Nachricht*, wie es mit Valerando Polano, erstem reformirten Prediger zu Frankfort am Mayn, und dessen Aufnahme daselbst wahrhaftig zugegangen Duisburg, 1751; and *Vertheidigung der zuverlässigen Nachricht*. . . . Duisburg, 1753. *Wahrhafte Liturgie und Bekenntniss des Glaubens*, wie solche von den zu Frankfurt am Mayn angekommenen Reformirten vor 200 Jahren überreicht worden

. . . . 1754. The answers of Fresenius are these: *Abwiegung der Gründe, welche theils widerrathen, theils anrathen*, dass man den Reformirten eine Kirche in der Stadt Frankfurt erlauben solle. . . . Frankfurt, 1750; *Aktenmässige Anmerk. über Joh. Hildebr. Witthof's* *ungegründete Nachricht*, wie es mit Valerando Polano, ersten reformirten Prediger zu Frankfurt, und dessen Aufnahme daselbst zugegangen. Frankfurt, 1752; and, *Beleuchtung der sogenannten Vertheidigung und Widerlegung*, welche Hr. Prof. Witthof gegen die Actenmässige Anmerkungen über seine Nachricht von Pollano herausgegeben; wobey zugleich sowohl die erste Nachricht des Hrn. Prof. Witthof's als die Actenmässige Anmerkungen von neuem abgedruckt worden. Frankfurt 1754. A recent learned monograph, relating the history of the French Reformed congregation at Frankfurt, 1554-1904, was written by Dr. Friedrich Clemens Ebrard, *Die französisch-reformierte Gemeinde in Frankfurt am Main, 1554-1904*. Frankfurt 1906. vii+166 pp. Portraits. Plates. 4to. A history of the English refugees at Frankfurt is by Rudolf Jung, *Die Englische Flüchtlings-Gemeinde in Frankfurt am Main, 1554-1559*. Frankfurt 1910. Plate [Frankfurter historische Forschungen. Heft 3.] 8vo.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

GENETIC STUDY OF HEBREW TRADITION¹

This series of Schweich Lectures suffers from the costs of war in that it lacks the excellent photographs by which the series was illustrated when originally delivered. No better lecturer could have been chosen for this subject than Dr. King, not only by reason of his unimpeachable scholarship in Babylonian and Sumerian, but also because of the fact that he had previously prepared the standard edition of the Babylonian Creation Tablets. It goes without saying that his treatment of the Babylonian and Sumerian materials will be all that such scholarship should lead us to expect.

The warrant for taking up again this much belabored subject of the relations between Hebrew traditions on the one hand and those of Babylon and Egypt on the other was found in the fact that during the last few years there have been published certain Sumerian documents which bring new material to light. These tablets are a part of the finds of the University of Pennsylvania excavators at Nippur, one of the most ancient of Babylonian cities, and they yield us the earliest known versions of the Deluge and Creation stories and some dynastic lists going back to prehistoric times.

Of the matters of interest made certain by the new materials and brought out by Dr. King in these three lectures, we mention but a few. The lists of antediluvian kings and cities given by Berossus are found to have been based upon Sumerian prototypes and not to have been the product of the free invention of later days. Furthermore these Sumerian traditions apparently did not reach Greece by way of the Hebrews, for the Greek form of the traditions shows some points of closer contact with the original Sumerian than does the Hebrew. The Hebrew traditions themselves go back to early Sumerian originals but also show the influence of the later Babylonian editions, making it clear that the Hebrews received these traditions at the hands of the Babylonians, among whom the original Sumerian forms were carefully preserved. The time of

¹ *Legends of Babylon and Egypt in Relation to Hebrew Tradition*. [The Schweich Lectures of the British Academy for 1916.] By L. W. King. London: Oxford University Press, 1918. ix+155 pages. 3s.

this borrowing Dr. King does not fix definitely, herein showing praiseworthy caution, but makes the beginning of the process contemporary with the Hebrew entrance into Canaan. The Creation myth and the Flood myth go back to ancient Sumerian originals which arose in Babylonia, the Flood story in particular resting upon a probable basis of fact, at least so far as conditions in the Euphrates Valley would occasion such a tale.

Dr. King definitely pronounces against the astrological explanations of these things so confidently propounded by German scholarship. He likewise expresses his judgment as unfavorable to the claim recently put forth by Dr. Langdon to the discovery of another new Deluge story in the Nippur tablets. Thus Sayce, Prince, Jastrow, Peters, Barton, and King all deny the Deluge character of the tablet in question, and Dr. Langdon is now said to agree with them. The same sort of confidence cannot be placed in Dr. King's refusal to make the Mosaic Law dependent at all upon the Code of Hammurabi. The points of contact between the latter and the Covenant Code are so numerous and so definite that it seems hardly possible to escape the hypothesis of dependence. These similarities are far less satisfactorily accounted for on the basis of the general likeness of all Semitic social institutions and practices. C. H. W. Johns, in a previous series of Schweich Lectures dealing with *The Relations between the Laws of Babylonia and the Laws of the Hebrew Peoples* (1914), has made it practically certain that the Hebrew lawmakers were familiar with Hammurabi's legislation and made use of it.

We lay down this series of lectures realizing that we shall come back to it again and again for the information which it so lavishly offers, and we are grateful that it keeps the Schweich Lectures upon that high level of scholarly popularization which characterized it at the start, but has not been consistently maintained.

J. M. POWIS SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A NEW ARABIC TEXTBOOK¹

This volume is one of the best, if not the best, published for the use of missionaries, officials, and business men desiring a concise but sufficiently elaborated text, and thoroughly reliable for acquiring a

¹ *Arabic Simplified*. By 'Abdul Fady (Arthur T. Upson, superintendent of the Nile Mission Press, Cairo, Egypt). Published by the author at Cairo, Egypt. 470 pages.

knowledge of usable Arabic. It consists of two hundred lessons, to be studied as a part of a correspondence course conducted by the author and his collaborator, Rev. John C. Wilcox, M.A.

The title suggests exactly what the book is. After a clear and interesting introduction to the alphabet and diacritical signs, with emphasis upon the value of the use of the Arabic characters as compared with transliteration, the student is carried from the simplest forms of the verb and noun through 150 lessons (Parts I to VIII) carefully and lucidly explained. There is a complete avoidance of that cumbersome and distracting detail which characterizes some texts. These lessons are followed by some fifty pages of reading lessons (Parts IX and X) for drill, and setting forth the syntax of the language.

The method followed is the "interrogative," such questions being proposed from the first to the last as would naturally arise between teacher and pupil in an attempt to secure a practical knowledge of modern spoken Arabic, or that of the newspapers or not too classical literature.

The make-up of the book is such as to please the eye and not leave with the student the sense of weariness which frequently results from the use of poor paper, unsuitable type, or a complicated arrangement. The index is a valuable contribution.

The author has been for over twenty years a resident in Cairo. He is familiar with the Arabic of the Azhar University, and with that of the official, the man on the street, and the "fellah," and is recognized as an authority on the subject. The study of modern Arabic ordinarily presents what seem to be impossible difficulties for the beginner; but for a profitable and not too laborious method we most thoroughly commend this recent work of Mr. Upson's.

R. S. McCLENAHAN

ASSIUT COLLEGE
ASSIUT, EGYPT

HISTORY OF RELIGION STUDIES

Of this volume,¹ 245 pages are occupied by Müller's presentation of Egyptian mythology, 112 by Scott's treatment of the myths of Burma, Siam, and Annam, and the rest by notes and bibliographies. Müller presents a sketch of the Egyptian religion. In thirteen chapters he treats the following topics: the local gods; the worship of the sun;

¹ *The Mythology of All Races*. Vol. XII, *Egyptian*, by W. Max Müller; *Indo-Chinese*, by James George Scott. Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1918. xviii+450 pages. \$6.00.

other gods connected with nature; some cosmic and cosmogonic myths; the Osirian circle; some texts referring to Osiris myths; the other principal gods; worship of animals and men; life after death; ethics and cult; magic; development and propagation of the Egyptian religion. As always, Müller is accurate, interesting, and independent. He has no illusions as to the Egyptian religion. Unlike the earlier Egyptologists, he makes no attempt to make the Egyptians appear philosophical or refined. He places their religion on an even lower plane than the Babylonian. His chapters are well illustrated from the monuments, so that from his pages one gains a graphic idea of Egyptian myths.

As to Indo-China, there is no agreement as to whether its original population was Nigrito, Malaysian, or Mongolian. This makes, however, little difference, since the aborigines are as extinct "as the Iroquois in Chicago." The present population is composed of Dravidians pushed into the country by the Aryan invasion of India, and Mundas pushed southward by the expansion of the Chinese nation. There is no general Indo-Chinese mythology, or even separate Burmese, Siamese, and Anamese mythology. In all three countries the myths are a mixture of spirit worship, which survives in the prevailing Buddhism, hero worship, and distorted history. Scott's treatment of the subject falls into four chapters, which are respectively entitled: "The Peoples and Religions of Indo-China"; "Indo-Chinese Myths and Legends"; "The Festivals of the Indo-Chinese"; and "The Thirty-Seven Nats." The Nats are spirits. This part of the book is also well illustrated. The volume is an important contribution to the history of religion.

This volume¹ is made up of lectures delivered to the public by members of the faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Pennsylvania during the season 1916-17. Dr. Speck treats "Primitive Religion"; W. Max Müller, "Egyptian Religion"; Morris Jastrow, "The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, and Mohammedanism"; J. A. Montgomery, "The Hebrew Religion"; Franklin Edgerton, "The Religion of the Veda, Buddhism, Brahmanism, and Hinduism"; Roland G. Kent, "Zoroastrianism"; Walter W. Hyde, "The Religion of Greece"; George Depue Hadzsits, "The Religion of the Romans"; Amandus Johnson, "The Religion of the Teutons"; William R. Newbold, "Early Christianity"; and Arthur C. Howland, "Mediaeval Christianity."

¹ *Religions of the Past and Present*. Edited by James A. Montgomery. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1918. 425 pages. \$2.50.

The faculty of the Graduate School contained no one who was an expert on the religions of China and Japan; consequently the religions of those countries are not embraced in the book. It accordingly lacks just that much of covering the great religions of the world.

As is inevitable in such a composite enterprise the essays are of unequal value. Those on "Primitive Religion" and "The Religion of the Teutons" seem to the reviewer the least successful. Those on "The Religion of the Hebrews" and on "The Religion of the Veda" are very good. The work of Jastrow and Müller is always good. Those on "The Religion of Greece" and "Early Christianity" excel.

The volume does great credit to the University of Pennsylvania.

GEORGE A. BARTON

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
BRYN MAWR, PA.

CELTIC MYTHOLOGY

Of the three sections composing the third volume of *The Mythology of All Races*,¹ the first (pp. 5-213), on the myths of the Celts, is the work of Dr. J. A. MacCulloch, who is already widely known to students of tradition through *The Childhood of Fiction*, *The Religion of the Ancient Celts*, and numerous special articles in the field of folklore. In *The Religion of the Ancient Celts* the author attacks the knotty problem of elucidating the documents through which glimpses are caught of the religious beliefs of the early Celtic inhabitants of Britain and Western Europe. In the present study, which is designed to supplement the earlier book, Dr. MacCulloch has set himself the scarcely less difficult task of describing "those Celtic myths which remain to us as a precious legacy from the past" (p. 5). The dissertation is liberally annotated and is accompanied by a classified bibliography. It will be useful to the specialist as well as to the general reader because of the large collections of examples of mythological motifs preserved in Celtic manuscripts and printed sources which frequently escape students of popular origins.

Dr. MacCulloch deserves credit for the firmness with which he sets his face against all interpretations of Celtic mythology which are inspired by sun-myths, esoteric druidic cults, and elaborate allegories (pp. 20 f.), but even he does not always resist the lure of theories that

¹ *The Mythology of All Races*, Vol. III, "Celtic," by John Arnott MacCulloch; "Slavic," by Jan Máchal; with a chapter on "Baltic Mythology" by the editor, Louis Herbert Gray. Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1918. x+398 pages. \$6.00.

border on the fanciful. For example, he repeats the old guess that the account of the strife between the Fomorians and the Tuatha Dé Danann "may . . . represent an old nature-dualism—the apparent paralysis of gods of sunshine and fruitfulness in the depth and cold of winter" (p. 28). Again, Gwydion's successful raid on Pryderi's pigs suggests to Dr. MacCulloch that "like Cúchulainn . . . [Gwydion] is the culture hero bringing domestic animals from the god's land to earth" (p. 98). The myth of one god imprisoned by another on an island, along with his attendants, may, as Dr. MacCulloch thinks, resemble "traditions of Arthur in Avalon . . . or of Finn or Arthur sleeping in a hollow hill" (p. 15), but neither the legend of Finn nor that of Arthur can be taken as indicating that these heroes were ever divinities. The author's leanings are also indicated by his remark that Uther, the father of Arthur, "may be a Brythonic god" (p. 185). He speaks of "Finn's divine descent" (p. 174), and he asserts that Finn and his band "are immortal because they sprang from the ideals of the folk" (p. 160). If by the latter ambiguous giving-out he means that they are immortal in the sense that Robin Hood is immortal, his statement may be accepted, but there is no respectable evidence that either Finn or Robin Hood was ever a god.

In dealing with some of the longer and more important sagas Dr. MacCulloch hardly takes enough account of the conclusions reached in Zimmer's study *Ueber den compilatorischen Character der irischen Sagentexte im sogenannten Lebor na hUidre*, although the work is listed in the bibliography. He does not sufficiently emphasize the fact that some of the more important texts summarized by him, for instance, the *Serglige Conchulainn* and the *Fled Bricrenn*, are not individual myths but more or less clumsy compilations of several versions.

Although the dates of documents used for the study of mythology are not necessarily of prime importance, the period during which a given tradition is recorded may become a factor in determining the relative age of the myth in question. The reader would have felt safer in accepting Dr. MacCulloch's reconstructed myths if the author had more often indicated which motifs are drawn from late and which from early texts. As Strachan has shown, some of the documents contained in manuscripts LU and LL, which Dr. MacCulloch properly assigns to the eleventh and twelfth centuries, were written down as early as the eighth or ninth centuries (*Trans. London Phil. Soc.* [1891-94], pp. 546 ff.; [1895-98] pp. 77 ff.), but neither the text nor the bibliography of Dr. MacCulloch's work shows acquaintance with Strachan's conclusions.

As Dr. MacCulloch observes, "It is not difficult to perceive traces of old ideas and mythical conceptions" (p. 5) in many Celtic texts, but, as he warns the reader (pp. 5, 19), the myths recorded "seldom exist as the pagan Celts knew them." It is to be feared that, even with this warning before his eyes, the author has treated as ancient, conceptions which may be modern, or has treated as simple, matters which are in reality quite the reverse. It should be said once for all that no definitive account of Celtic mythology can be written until a large number of individual problems have been examined and all the evidence carefully analyzed. The *Vorarbeit* for such an undertaking is not yet complete. The traditional view, apparently espoused by Dr. MacCulloch, that the Tuatha Dé Danann, the *stíde*, and the dwellers in the over-sea elysium were all originally gods, is open to question. Dr. MacCulloch's attempt to deal with the stories of the Irish Mythological Cycle reveals the confusion which must result when, in the present state of scholarship, an effort is made to find order in the conglomeration of Christian pseudo-history and pagan lore of which the cycle is composed. The amount of pagan mythology in the Mythological Cycle can hardly be correctly estimated until the various extant versions are analyzed and compared. Dr. MacCulloch's account makes large use of Keating, but the author says nothing of Ó Cléirigh's recension of the *Leabhar Gabhála*, which has been partly edited by Macalister and MacNeill (Dublin, n.d.).

The expository and illustrative material introduced by Dr. MacCulloch appears to be rather haphazard. The study would have been more satisfactory had the author either expounded the myths more consistently or presented them without comment. The "tabued grove near Marseilles," which, according to Lucan, even the priest feared to enter at noonday, and the Diana of Autun, "regarded as a midday demon who haunted cross-roads and forests" (p. 12), recall stories of the Slavic Noon-Lady recorded by Laistner (*Das Rätsel der Sphinx*, I, 1 ff.) as vividly as the midday demon of the Septuagint referred to by Dr. MacCulloch. The account of the ball formed by serpents and used magically (p. 14) is nothing but Pliny's version of the ancient and widespread superstition regarding the *bezoar*, or snake-stone (cf. G. F. Kunz, *The Curious Lore of Precious Stones* [Lippincott, 1913], pp. 367 ff.; *The Magic of Jewels and Charms* [Lippincott, 1915], pp. 201 ff.). Pliny's assertion that "no animal or man beside the Gallic ocean dies with a rising tide" (p. 17) is less likely to be dependent upon a hypothetical Celtic faith in an island of the dead than on the common folk-belief that souls go out on an ebb tide.

Dr. MacCulloch's account of recorded Celtic myths is admittedly incomplete. It is regrettable that the deficiency, which may have been due to limitation of space, was not supplied at least by references in the notes. A few random comments, designed to supplement Dr. MacCulloch's discussion in this and other matters, are added below. A valuable collection of myths of the *dinnshenchas* type written down in the Old Irish period is contained in the *Airne Fingean* (ed., *Anecd. from Irish Manuscripts*, II [1908], 1 ff.; trans., *Rom. Rev.*, IX [January, 1918]), but Dr. MacCulloch apparently makes no use of this document. In treating the myths relating to Balor the author overlooks the version of the *Inclusa* given from a popular source by O'Donovan (*F. M.*, I, 18, n. 5; cf. Curtin, *Hero Tales of Ireland* [London, 1894], pp. 296 ff.; *Rev. Celt.*, XXXI [1910], 456, n. 3). The account should be compared with the story of Tuag, summarized by Dr. MacCulloch on page 89 (cf. *Rev. Celt.*, XXXI, 434 f.). Fer Fidail (or Figail), the abductor of Tuag, has been identified with Fer Fí, the elf who causes trouble in the *Cath Maige Mucrimé* (*Rev. Celt.*, XVI [1895], 153, note), but the author says nothing of this fact. The summary of the adventures of Laegaire (pp. 37 f.) is taken from D'Arbois' *Cours* without mention of the edition and translation of the LL version published in *Modern Philology*, XIII (1916), 731 ff. The outline of the Mythological Cycle omits the story of the mysterious tower inhabited by beings "quasi homines." The account as given in Nennius, although incorrectly interpreted by D'Arbois (*Cours*, II, 118 f.), is as clearly mythological as anything in the cycle. To the versions of the text *Do gabail int sída* should be added that found in MS *Stowe* 992 (cf. Meyer, *Cath Finntrága*, pp. xii f.). Among the stories in which Oengus is represented as helping Dermaid and Grainne (p. 66) no mention is made of the *Uath Beinme Etair*, though the tale is given later among the documents of the Ossianic cycle (p. 179). For the *Noinden Ulad* (pp. 73 f.) the author should have used Windisch's edition of the Leinster and Harleian manuscripts (*Ber. über die Verhandl. der königl. sächs. Gesell. der Wissn.*, Phil.-Hist. Kl., XXXVI [1884], 336 ff.) instead of D'Arbois' summary, which admittedly follows neither redaction completely. He also fails to note that a similar story is told to account for the birth of Cailte in the Ossianic cycle (cf. Meyer, *Cath Finntrága*, p. x). The summary of the *Aislinge Oengusso* should have taken account of the analysis of the story in *Modern Philology*, XII [1914-15], 598, 627, n. 2). Dr. MacCulloch attempts to analyze the *Compert Conchulainn* (pp. 82 ff.) apparently without knowing Thurneysen's indispensable edition and

discussion of the tale (*Abhandl. der königl. Gesell. der Wissn. zu Göttingen*, Phil.-Hist. Kl., N. F., XIV, No. 2, 1912) or Meyer's discovery that the name of Cúchulainn's human father is the result of a linguistic corruption (*Miscellanea Hibernica* [University of Illinois, 1917], p. 9 ff.). With Dr. MacCulloch's remarks (p. 141) on the connection between Sualtam and the supernatural world, compare *Mod. Phil.*, XVI (1918), 219, which may have appeared too late for the author's consideration. For the material found in the *Acallamh na Senórach*, of which large use is made, O'Grady's poor translation of a single poorly transcribed manuscript is unaccountably used instead of the standard edition from four manuscripts by Stokes, *Irish Texts*, IV, 1 (1900). Attention is drawn to Giraldus Cambrensis' story of Elidurus and the dwarfs, but nothing is said of the bits of apparently Welsh tradition in Walter Map's book, *De nugis curialium*. To the documentation on the *Scél Muicce Maic Dá Thó* (pp. 125, 145) should be added a reference to the version printed by Meyer (*Hibernica Minora*, pp. 51 ff.). On the episode of the three Ulster champions and the "druidic beasts" from the cave of Cruachan, compare Kittredge, *Harvard Studies and Notes*, VIII, 259, n. 2, where the motif is properly identified, and a large number of parallels from Celtic tradition are collected. The list given above might be considerably lengthened if account were taken of all the recorded Celtic myths omitted or inadequately treated by Dr. MacCulloch.

Probably few students of Arthurian romance will agree with Dr. MacCulloch's conclusions regarding the amount of Celtic mythology incorporated in Arthurian documents. By the Celtophobiacs he will perhaps be charged with claiming too much for Celtic; by their opponents he will doubtless be upbraided for the omission of many romances which show as clear traces of Celtic myth as some of those included, and for failure to take into account numerous recent discussions. He mentions Zimmer, Paris, and Nutt, but he leans especially hard upon the work of Miss Weston, whose authority is cited as to the source of *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* to the exclusion of Kittredge's important treatment of the matter, although Kittredge's book is included in the bibliography. Among the recent studies which might have been used to advantage, the following come to mind at once: Brown, *Pub. Mod. Lang. Assn. of Amer.*, XX (1905), 673 ff.; *Mod. Phil.*, IX (1911), 109 ff., XVI, 385 ff.; *Rom. Rev.*, III (1912), 143 ff.; [Kittredge] *Anniversary Papers* (1913), pp. 235 ff.; Nitze, *Mod. Phil.*, XI, 445 ff.; Gertrude Schoepperle, *Tristan and Isolde*, 2 vols., 1913; Laura Hibbard,

Rom. Rev., IV, 166 ff.; Lucy A. Paton, *Rad. Coll. Mons.*, XV. Dr. MacCulloch's general conclusions should be checked up by comparison with Windisch's "Das keltische Britannien bis zu Kaiser Arthur" (*Abhn. der königl. sächs. Gesell. der Wissn.*, Phil.-Hist. Kl., XXIX, 1912). Dr. MacCulloch almost entirely disregards the question of Celtic mythology in the Breton lays and the popular ballads (cf. *Rev. Celt.*, XXXI, 413 ff.; *Mod. Phil.*, XII, 585 ff.).

In the second section of the volume under discussion (pp. 221-314) Professor Máchal gives a clear and concise account of the myths of the Slavs, with a minimum of comment. The English translation is by Professor F. Krupicka. Since the notes were added by the general editor of the series, the author cannot be held responsible for their accuracy or completeness.

The final section (pp. 316-30), on Baltic mythology, is also by the editor.

TOM PEETE CROSS

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A TREATISE ON REST DAYS

This book¹ is an enlargement and elaboration of an article published in 1911 under the same title, and, as the author himself states in the Preface, "differs from its predecessor chiefly in providing a more extensive collection of the relevant data."

The origin of the Sabbath is a much-discussed question, and Professor Webster, by gathering together data relating to seasons and days of rest or cessation of labor among various peoples in different regions and periods, endeavors to establish a certain evolutionary tendency.

A survey of the evidence to be submitted indicates that the sabbatarian regulations have arisen chiefly, if not wholly, as pure superstitions, the product of an all-too-logical intellect or of a disordered fancy. In the last analysis they are based primarily on fear. . . . They find their clearest expression in the taboos, or prohibitions, first noticed among the natives of the South Seas, but now known to exist in many other regions of the aboriginal world. It is highly probable that the origin of some of the communal regulations is to be sought in the taboos observed by persons at such great and critical seasons as birth, puberty, marriage, and death. Comparative studies have indicated how numerous are the prohibitions which attach to these times of high solemnity and significance, and it is reasonable to suppose that, with the deepening sense

¹ *Rest Days: A Study in Early Law and Morality*. By Hutton Webster. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xiv+325 pages. \$3.00.

of social solidarity, observances once confined to the individual alone, or to his immediate connections, would often pass over into rites performed by the community at large.

Following out this idea Professor Webster brings together a mass of information relating to tabooed days and rest days at critical epochs, after deaths, and on related occasions, as found among various peoples. Not only are there these occasional tabooed, or rest, days, but there are others that occur at more or less regular intervals. "The greater number of periodic rest days observed by agricultural peoples in the lower stages of culture are associated with the institution of the market," and in some places they are kept very strictly as rest days at regular intervals the year round.

Another set of rest days is dependent upon the seasons, such as planting or harvest, or upon the movement of the heavenly bodies, among which the moon is by far the most important. "There is good reason for believing that among many primitive peoples the moon, rather than the sun, the planets, or any of the constellations, first excited the imagination and aroused feelings of superstitious awe or of religious veneration." Not only were there numerous superstitions and beliefs connected with the moon, some of which are found in civilized society even at the present time, but also "among many peoples in both the lower and the higher culture the time of new moon and full moon, much less commonly of each half moon, forms a season of restriction and abstinence." After numerous illustrations of these the author discusses lunar calendars, Babylonian "evil days," and the Hebrew Sabbath.

There is considerable evidence that the Hebrew term *Shabbath* was primarily used as the designation of the day of the full moon and later came to be applied to every seventh day. Professor Webster does not regard the Hebrew Sabbath as derived from Babylonia but considers both to have come from a common Semitic antiquity. "The ancient dwellers in the Arabian wilderness, who celebrated new moon and full moon as seasons of abstinence and rest, little dreamed that in their senseless custom lay the roots of a social institution, which, on the whole, has contributed to human welfare in past ages and promises an even greater measure of benefit to humanity in all future times." After a chapter on unlucky days, the author in his conclusion points out the disadvantage of the numerous tabooed, holy, and unlucky days among many peoples, and the social benefit of the transition of these holy days to holidays.

We are much indebted to Professor Webster for bringing together this mass of material relating to rest days of various kinds, and the copious footnotes make reference to the original sources easy. To what extent he regards these different sorts as related is not clearly brought out by the author. Also in some places generalizations occur which are not proved and to which exception might readily be taken. On the whole, however, his position is perhaps best illustrated by his explanation of the widespread occurrence and similarity of tabooed days.

Within contiguous areas, for example, in Borneo and the adjoining islands, or among related peoples, such as the American and Asiatic Eskimo, it is reasonable to ascribe the uniformity of custom to long continued borrowing. . . . But where tabooed days are observed for the same reasons by unrelated peoples, who, as far as our knowledge reaches, have never been in cultural contact, the student is obliged to conclude that the beliefs underlying the custom in question have not been narrowly limited but belong to the general stock of primitive ideas. In such cases the doctrine of the fundamental unity of the human mind seems alone to be capable of explaining the astonishing similarity of its products at different times and in different parts of the world.

FIELD MUSEUM
CHICAGO, ILL.

A. B. LEWIS

BOOKS ON THE HISTORICITY OF JESUS

In two volumes¹ the indefatigable Mr. Robertson returns to the demonstration that Jesus is a myth. The first of the two is an attempt to survey the positions of various writers who believe Jesus to be a historical figure, and to show them hopelessly wrong, both in their positive assumptions and in their objections to the myth theory. The second, though it has some controversial element, is in the main a presentation of Mr. Robertson's notion of how Christianity, with no Jesus and nothing corresponding to the gospel story, got started in the world. The whole is an impressive display of the extraordinary, futile ingenuity of which a gifted but unsound mind is capable. There is no reason why this sort of thing might not be written interminably, concerning any historic phenomenon whatsoever. What the author cannot see, though it must be plain to every reader, is that the infinitely involved and indirect procedure by which he represents the second-century church and its gospels to have come into being is a thousand times more incred-

¹ *The Historical Jesus*, 1916. xxiv+221 pages. 3s. 6d. *The Jesus Problem*, 1917. vii+264 pages. 5s. By John M. Robertson. London: Watts & Co.

ible than the simple hypothesis that Christianity, like Mohammedanism, had a founder, whose mission has left a written deposit in the gospels.

Mr. Robertson's favorite word is "inferribly"; without it his books could not be written. "Demonstrably" is an adverb whose use is denied him. The following situation is given him by his powers of inference:

There was at Jerusalem, at some time in the first century, a small group of Jesuist "apostles" among whom the chief may have been named James, John and Cephas. They *may* have been members of a ritual group of twelve, who may have styled themselves Brothers of the Lord; but that group in no way answered to the Twelve of the gospels. . . . The adherents believed in a non-historic Jesus, the "Servant" of the Jewish God, somehow evolved out of the remote Jesus-God who is reduced to human status in the Old Testament as Joshua. And their central secret rite consisted in a symbolic sacrament, evolved out of an ancient sacrament of human sacrifice. . . . This rite had within living memory, if not still at the time from which we start, been accompanied by an annual popular rite in which a selected person—probably a criminal released for the purpose—was treated as a temporary king, then derided, and then either in mock show or in actual fact executed, under the name of Jesus Barabbas, "the Son of the Father." Of this ancient cult there were inferribly many scattered centres outside of Judea (*Jesus Problem*, pp. 135 f.).

Such centres were found in Samaria, in Ephesus, and elsewhere in Asia Minor, probably at Alexandria and Antioch. The Jewish promoters of the cult proceeded "to develop the Savior-God of the sacramental rite (which they may at this stage have adopted in its 'pagan' form, now taken as canonical) into a Messiah who was to 'come again,' introducing the Jewish 'Kingdom of heaven'" (*Ibid.*, p. 203). On the other hand, "the chief Gentile achievement in the matter is the development of the primitive sacrament-motive and ritual (fundamentally dramatic) into the mystery-play which is transcribed in the closing chapters of Matthew and Mark. . . . The mystery-play in its complete form was inferribly developed and played in a Gentile city; and its transcription probably coincided with its cessation as a drama" (*Ibid.*, pp. 204 f.). The transcription furnished the nucleus of the Gospels, to which was added by accretion material from the Didaché and other sources, along with much symbolic and legendary story. So grew the Synoptics.

In all these writings "we are in a world of purposive fiction." There seems to have been a propagandist among the Gentiles named Paul, but "it is plainly unnecessary to assume in his case any abnormal

sincerity." The extant "Pauline epistles" are not his work; they "represent a polemic development, perhaps on the basis of a few short Paulines," and are second-century productions. The Acts "as a whole is plainly factitious . . . a blend of tradition and fiction, much manipulated during a long period." As for the parallel elements in the accounts of Peter and of Paul, "one or more may have wrought one narrative, and a later hand or hands may have systematically interpolated the other" (p. 143).

Mr. Robertson's most striking contribution to the discussion is perhaps his inferrible mystery-play, given by the Jesuists, "which may or may not have been definitely Jewish at the outset," but was certainly manipulated into its final form by gentile hands. In this play "the apostles in general are made to play a poor part; one plays an impossible rôle of betrayer; and the legendary Judaizing apostle is made to deny his Master" (p. 205). Incidentally there is an interesting suggestion as to a detail in the Fourth Gospel (13:29), "where 'the bag' is presumptively derived from a stage accessory in the mystery-drama, Judas carrying a bag to receive his reward" (p. 217). If the development of such a mystery-play with its implication of another God alongside Jahveh seems to us improbable among first-century Jews, we are told that Judaism was not at all the unified monotheism we customarily think it, and we are given eight considerations on the other side, beginning with "the essentially dramatic character of the Song of Solomon" (p. 74). To be sure, "we have no mention of the existence of a Jesus cult of any kind in the Hebrew books. But that is of necessity the case. The Sacred Books would naturally exclude all mention of a cult which in effect meant the continued deification of Joshua," who was inferribly a primitive god (p. 82). The cult and its propaganda were well known, some at least of its rites were public and popular, though the mystery-play was performed always in secret and is never anywhere mentioned, so that Mr. Robertson's knowledge of it is purely inferrible. The "silence of Josephus" concerning Jesus and the Christians "is an insurmountable negation of the gospel story" (p. 122); one may inquire why his silence concerning the Jesuists and their worship of a hero-god Jesus does not render their existence precarious.

We have no desire, however, to question Mr. Robertson. We have let him speak for himself. The more positive account of how the Christian religion began and the Gospels were written is of greater interest than the rather barren and often petty controversy with criticism in the earlier volume. The two together constitute an astounding act of

faith; for the mind that can honestly believe that the sublimest thing in human history was thus achieved we have only speechless incomprehension. It is as if some children playing in a studio during the artist's absence had left a canvas daubed over with—the Sistine Madonna. The painting of Raphael and the gospel of Jesus were inferribly otherwise given to the world.

CLAYTON R. BOWEN

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

A REFORMER BEFORE THE REFORMATION¹

These two volumes constitute a valuable contribution to the resources available to the English reader for the twilight period of ecclesiastical history antedating the dawn of the Protestant Reformation. They were called forth by the four-hundredth anniversary of the beginning of that great movement. They furnish the first adequate biography in English of one of the most vigorous and interesting figures in the era of preparation, and the only available English translation of his principal writings. The thesis of these volumes, sustained alike in biography and translated works, is that Wessel Gansfort was in every sense of the term a precursor of the religious awakening of the sixteenth century. The first two-thirds of Volume I deals with the biography of Wessel and an estimate of the man. The remainder of Volume I, together with Volume II, is devoted to his chief works.

Many elements combined in the making of this remarkable man. From scholasticism came his love of exact definition, his passion for logical precision. From the mystic piety of an à Kempis and the schools of the Brethren of the Common Life came his deep religious enthusiasms. His humanistic interest and devotion to the sacred languages prepared the way for that interest in the Bible which characterized the Reformation age.

The decay of vital religion in the Netherlands and the corruption of the Renaissance papacy led him to deep searchings of heart and awakened in him a zeal for reform. His mind made up, he spoke it freely and forcibly, sustaining his positions by cold logic and the rapier thrusts of a keen intellect. "Master of Contradictions" he was called by his critics—a tribute indeed to his combative, argumentative spirit.

¹ *Wessel Gansfort, Life and Writings*. By Edward Waite Miller. Principal works translated by Jared Waterbury Scudder. New York: Putnam, 1917. 2 vols. xvi+333 and v+369 pages. \$4.00.

Wessel bore neither the tonsure of the priest nor the cowl of the monk. He was always the scholar, the omnivorous reader of books, the student of philosophy and theology and of the sacred Scriptures. He was a teacher as well as a scholar. The term "*Lux Mundi*" given him by his reverent disciples testifies to their high regard. Among those who came under the spell of his direct influence were Agricola and Reuchlin, both important figures in the history of German Humanism. Another of his disciples, Honius, was the first to give that interpretation of the Lord's Supper (*est=significat*) which later characterized the eucharistic teaching of the Swiss reformers in distinction from the consubstantiation doctrine of Luther. Our author calls attention to the significant fact that "in those centres where the influence of Wessel and his disciples was strong—the Netherlands, the Palatinate and the northern Swiss cities"—notwithstanding the influence of Luther's personality and doctrine, "when a permanent form of church life and doctrine was to be established, they turned from Luther to the more congenial . . . teaching . . . presented by Wessel and his disciples." The author of this biography unites with Ullmann in regarding Wessel as "one of the principal founders of the Reformed churches." He certainly influenced Œcolampadius, Bucer, and Melancthon. It is significant that most of the thousand pages of literary remains from the pen of Wessel, about one-third of which are here translated from the Latin, were written during the last decade of his career, when he lived a retired life within convent walls in Groningen. Dying in 1489, he left behind him memories and inspirations fruitful in the lives of men destined to be leaders in the revolt of the succeeding century. Open-minded, vigorous in intellect, bold in assertion, lucid in thought, untrammelled by tradition or superstition, evangelical and biblical in spirit, Wessel was at the same time a man of the deepest piety. One cannot read his writings as here presented without the conviction that Wessel was essentially a Protestant as regards both his critical and his constructive ideas. It was inevitable that Rome should look askance at him; that he should suffer petty persecution at the hands of priests and monks. It was equally inevitable that Luther should have said of him, "If I had read his works earlier, my enemies might think that Luther absorbed everything from Wessel, his spirit is so in accord with mine." In his views regarding the Scripture, justification by faith, the church, the sacraments, purgatory, his attitude of mind was kindred to that of the Reformers.

While the authors of these volumes have been confined to three copies of Wessel's Latin works found in American libraries, there is no reason

to think that wider research would modify materially the conclusions here reached as to the man and his work. Of twelve known letters of Wessel, nine are here translated, together with six others written either to or about him. The value of this correspondence is not in its contribution to our knowledge of Wessel's life, but rather in the sidelight thrown upon his teaching. Two of these letters are addressed to nuns. Others discuss the state of the dead, while still others give critical consideration to the doctrine of indulgences. The work on the Eucharist, while devotional in intent, treats of this sacrament as essentially memorial in character and inspirational in purpose. Wessel's doctrine of the Eucharist was essentially the same as that subsequently held by Carlstadt, Zwingli, and Oecolampadius. It ends, as do most of his argumentative works, with a series of propositions embodying his views. The *Farrago*, or *Miscellanies*, consists of a number of writings of Wessel on "Providence," the "Incarnation and Passion," the "Dignity and Power of the Church," "Penance," the "Communion of Saints," and "Purgatory." These works, gathered by Wessel's friends, were submitted to Luther's judgment, and upon his advocacy were published in 1521, and thereafter frequently. The views here expressed were evangelical.

The work before us also contains, in translation, biographical sketches by Hardenberg and Geldenhauer, who wrote at a time when many still lived who had known Wessel. A critical appendix calls attention to important variations in the three texts employed as a basis for this translation. The work before us is printed in large, clear type, and is unusually well indexed and generously illustrated with pictures of Wessel, scenes from ancient Groningen, and illuminated title-pages from his works.

The work as a whole is most creditable both to its authors and to the American Society of Church History, among whose *Papers* it appears as Special Volumes Nos. I and II. Students of the pre-Reformation and Reformation period will find here much that is informing and inspiring.

HENRY HAMMERSLEY WALKER

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

A STUDY ON THE PATRIMONY OF THE ROMAN CHURCH¹

The author, Mr. Edward Spearing, was killed in action, September 11, 1916, at the age of twenty-six. The material collected by him during 1912-13 in pursuit of a study on the patrimony during the first

¹ *The Patrimony of the Roman Church in the Time of Gregory the Great*. By Edward Spearing. Cambridge: University Press, 1918. xix+147 pages. \$2.00.

six centuries has been edited and published in the foregoing form by Miss Evelyn Spearing, his sister.

The essay of 146 pages comprises six chapters, an appendix (reprint of Marini Pap. No. 93), and a careful index. After giving a survey of the growth of the patrimony to the time of Gregory (following the account of Grisar Rundgang in *Zeitschr. f. kath. Theol.*, 1877) and a description of its government (in chap. ii), he discusses more extensively in chaps. iii-v its organization and its relation with the state; he follows the revenues derived from them through the channels of the papal "exchequer" to their ultimate destination (chap. vi) as expenditures for xenodochia, food relief, poor relief, etc., as maintained by the church. What Egypt had been for the public poor-relief system of the emperors, the patrimony of Sicily, with its granaries, seems to have been for that of the popes, a reserve fund for the stabilization of food supply and prices. Here, as elsewhere, the church continued the functions of its imperial predecessor. By continuing on its own account in the name of "charity" this most indispensable public-utility function of the empire, the papacy, quite naturally took its place as the public power.

The essay is of course in the main based on the letters of Gregory the Great and other contemporary sources. The author is not familiar with Mommsen's study on the same subject (*Zeitschr. f. soz. und wirtsch. Gesch.* I, 44 ff.), or with the more recent important contributions to our knowledge of the Roman domains and their administration such as the studies of Schulten and Beaudouin, or with the history of the Colonate beyond Savigny. This must seem regrettable. One feels that the author, had he but had time to familiarize himself with the legal and institutional genealogy of such terms as "conductor," "locatio," "emphyteusis," "servus," "colonus," would undoubtedly have made a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the church as commutator of Roman legal forms into terms of early modern property rights and social statuses. As it is, he has naturally been somewhat victimized by the careless terminologies of his sources. Thus while his observations on the status of colons and his definitions of leaseholds in vogue are generally accurate, perusal of Beaudouin's essays in *Nouvelle Revue hist. d. droit* (1898) would have cautioned him in the use of the term "conductor." He seems to have been at this time a fiscal agent under the rector, or at times a tax farmer, or—why not?—a lessee like the emphyteuta. The term emphyteuta was used rather indiscriminately in the letters of Gregory and may cover different types of lease-forms.

The same is true of the terms "servus" and "colonus." It does not seem that the social condition of the lower classes of tenancy of the church had become any clearer than the legal and economic status of the larger speculative entrepreneurs and promoters—neither of them seems to have been as yet dragged from the obscurity complained of by Professor Grisar.

The author shows the prevalence of the two lease-forms "locatio" and "emphyteusis." "Leases in locatio were not to be made for a longer period than thirty years or the life of the lessee, and lands were not to be let in emphyteusis for more than three successive lives." This statement should be supplemented by the reading of E. Beaudouin (*Nouvelle Revue hist. d. droit*, 1898, Nos. 344-50, 703-4, 722-25). After all only one letter of Gregory's gives the exact terms of an emphyteutic lease (thirty years), *Ep.*, ix, 96, this being in conformity with *Novella 120* and not, as the foregoing implies, with *Novella 7*, or Justinian.

Nevertheless this very elusive "emphyteusis," in the fixation in *Novella 7*, seems to have found a new lease of life, not in Italy nor indeed in France, but in England. It was in vogue there in Anglo-Saxon times and was probably introduced by Theodore of Tarsus (see Liebermann, *Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, Gloss. under Land, Boc, etc.). We might call to mind the modern analogy to the legislation of Justinian with regard to the alienation of church property, the legislation of Henry VIII and of Elizabeth (32 H. 8. c. 28; 1 Eliz. c. 19; and 13 Eliz. c. 10). The maximum term allowed for corporate estates is here three lives, or twenty-one years—but the ninety-nine year lease was then and subsequently much in vogue as the most perfect form of exploitation of real property short of complete alienation. Thus it would be possible to establish a certain continuity of development and use between the modern ninety-nine year lease, the Justinian lease for three lives, the classical Roman emphyteusis, and the Greek emphyteutic lease used by temples and municipalities as early as the fifth century B.C., which we can trace back to Egypt, where it occurs at the time of the Ptolemies in terms of exactly ninety-nine years.

H. H. MAURER

CHICAGO, ILL.

MODERN THINKING CONCERNING GOD

It is an evidence of the profound influences affecting religious thinking in our day that so much attention should be paid to the doctrine of God. The theology based on ancient metaphysics had defined God

in terms of absolutely perfect, unchangeable Being. Thus defined, the doctrine was apparently secure, no matter what changes might occur in the experience of men. Subsidiary questions might cause difficulty, such as the exact nature of revelation, or the details of the plan of salvation; but the doctrine of God needed no revision. Today, however, religious experience is calling loudly for a new conception of God. The fixed categories of ancient thinking have given way to relative and evolutionary concepts. The legal ethics of former days is too formal to do justice to the complexity of life as we know it. Particularly since the Great War men have felt that things are in the making, and that the ultimate organization of the world lies in the future rather than in the past. All these changes are registering themselves in various attempts to formulate the meaning of "God" more in accordance with the vital demands of the world in which we live. Two recent books essay to deal with this problem.¹

Professor Lyman's book is very directly related to the problems raised by the present war. The three lectures included in it deal with three questions which are constantly being asked today. As we view the tremendous wastage of human life in this war, can we believe that personality is of any value in the universe? Again, what are we to think about social progress? Is there any evidence that there is a divine factor in human history? And thirdly, what about the relation of our ethical ideals to the cosmic process? If God is good, is he finite? For the power of good in the world seems to be finite.

Professor Lyman begins by asking whether the idea of God which finds expression in the prophetic consciousness, that is, the consciousness of inner moral creativity reinforced by something spiritually compelling in the universe, can stand the test of modern criticism. In genuine pragmatic fashion he establishes the genuineness of the experience by citing notable instances in history. Moreover, the man who acts on the belief in the objective reality of the moral reinforcement is better equipped to organize his world than is the man who stops with merely human valuations. Lyman's criticism of Leuba at this point is especially acute. Leuba's difficulty lies in the fact that in statistical fashion he seeks in vain for any *object* which may be found

¹ *The Experience of God in Modern Life.* By Eugene W. Lyman. New York: Scribner, 1918. viii+154 pages. \$1.00.

The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy. By A. Seth Pringle-Pattison. (The Gifford Lectures for 1912 and 1913.) Oxford: University Press, 1917. xvi+423 pages. 12s. 6d. net.

in addition to the inner experiences of religious men. When such experiences are taken functionally, however, the test is to be found in the success with which given ideas may organize the whole of life, rather than in the discovery of an extra-experiential entity. So tested, the idea of God is valid.

In similar fashion the functional point of view is employed to meet the objection of men like Overstreet, who contend that for purposes of moral living the theological conception of God is a burdensome superfluity. Lyman shows that any idea which is treated purely as an idea and not used in organizing experience is superfluous. If instead of an idea of God which can be academically viewed we take the conception of God as indicating a cosmic reinforcement of our moral efforts, such an idea is both fruitful and defensible. In this connection Lyman shows that any form of naturalism which leaves man ultimately dependent on a non-moral universe plays into the hands of an aristocratic type of ethics; for it gives to man no ultimate fate save to submit to what is prescribed for him. On the other hand, the conception of God as an ethical reinforcement of man's best efforts is a distinct asset to democracy.

Finally Lyman discusses the difficult question of the relation of the moral God of personal and social faith to the cosmic process. He attempts to avoid the idea of a finite God by describing the life of God as a process in time. Instead of legislating *sub specie aeternitatis* for the universe, God creatively works out each stage of the evolutionary process in definite relations to the immediately preceding stage and with a purpose related to the immediately following stages. Lyman interprets the doctrine of a "finite" God to mean the distinct affirmation of some aspects of the cosmos over which God has no control. For Lyman, God is in creative relations with everything, but his activity is always conditioned by the fact that reality is in a process of evolution, so that any stage is relative to all others. As compared with the older metaphysical perfection of God, this is a kind of finiteness; but it is freed from the objections incurred by Wells's doctrine of a finite God in contrast to the ultimate "veiled Being."

The freshness of the discussion, its well-balanced analysis of the real problems of modern religious thinking, its ample learning, and its intelligent and suggestive use of the functional conception of experience are all to be highly commended. The book is an unusually valuable contribution to theological thinking.

Professor Pringle-Pattison's discussion is much more conventional, in that it starts with the problem of determining the content of the idea of God on the basis of philosophical speculation. The argument thus moves in a comparatively academic realm and covers ground quite familiar to all students of modern philosophy. At the same time his recognition of the practical interests of religion and an earnest use of biological and functional conceptions prevent his discussion from being purely intellectual.

After calling attention to the aesthetic and moral barrenness of a mere cosmic orderliness, such as characterized the religious philosophy of Hume, he turns to Kant as one who rightly emphasized values as the supreme interest of religious interpretation. But Kant, followed by men like Spencer, Comte, and the Ritschlians, left the realm of human values unconnected with the realm of cosmic order. A fatal dualism thus results. Modern biology has corrected this dualism by emphasizing the unbroken solidarity of the process by which man is through and through a product of nature. Values must therefore be justified, not by attempting to derive them from a supernatural realm, but by showing how the universe is capable of such an interpretation as to indicate that the forces at work in the cosmos are solicitous for moral values. Our entire life, with all its spiritual aspirations, is a truthful expression of cosmic reality. Values must be more than simply human valuations. They must be grounded in the ultimate reality of things.

From this point on the lectures consist largely in differentiating the author's position from the doctrines of modern idealists who, in his opinion, do not do sufficient justice to the empirical aspects of human personality. The main end of cosmic evolution is the creation of a universe of souls. The actual freedom of these souls must be guaranteed against a kind of monistic idealism which makes them mere ephemeral aspects of the total idealistic process. To affirm such real freedom without falling into pluralism or without yielding any of the divine infiniteness is a problem which receives detailed attention. Professor Pringle-Pattison feels that the pragmatist's objection to the traditional philosophical Absolute is due to the picture of an Absolute who is a neutral observer of the entire cosmic process, rather than an all-pervading sharer in and creator of the evolving universe.

The impression created by the book is that the idea of God is undergoing a transformation which makes the older metaphysics inadequate. Professor Pringle-Pattison, however, is so strongly attached to this

metaphysics that his solutions are in the nature of dialectical adjustments rather than pioneer investigations. As a record of past movements of thought the book is a valuable interpretation; but it scarcely does justice to the more radical tendencies of present thinking.

GERALD BIRNEY SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

TWO ESSAYS IN THE FUTURE HOPE¹

A recent volume by B. H. Streeter is one of many produced by the mental and spiritual exigencies of the war. Its aim is to "co-ordinate Scientific, Psychical, and Biblical research." It essays to present the unbiased results of the best thinking in the several fields by which the problem of immortality is conditioned. It is frankly apologetic in the best sense. It seems to us a valuable contribution to the literature of the subject.

The nine papers of the collaborated work are necessarily of unequal value and will appeal according to the temperament of the reader. Chapter i discusses "Presuppositions and Prejudgments," aiming at a clarification of the intellectual background and an evaluation of certain mental attitudes and prejudicial superficialities. Chapter ii treats of "Mind and the Brain," being "a discussion of immortality from the standpoint of science." The problem of the psychophysical relationship is discussed. The conclusion is that "for the present, therefore, so far as science is concerned, life after the grave is not a proved fact, but the evidence is sufficient to justify faith in it" (p. 71). Chapter iii deals with "The Resurrection of the Dead." The discussion is interesting and suggestive. As founded primarily on the biblical basis, the argument seems to the reviewer often unconvincing and weak. In chapter iv, on "The Life of the World to Come," Mr. Streeter seeks to replace the traditional picture of heaven and hell with a picture that shall correspond to our moral realities. Chapter v, on "The Bible and Hell," studies the conception of endless punishment and arrives at the conviction that a static place of torment is a picture congenial to an earlier stage but incredible to modern ethics with its evolutionary emphasis. Chapter vi, "A Dream of Heaven," is a conception of the spiritual imagination set forth with constraint and reasonableness in excellent literary form. Chapter vii, "The Good and Evil in Spiritualism," and chapter viii,

¹*Immortality. An Essay in Discovery.* By B. H. Streeter and Others. New York: Macmillan, 1917. xiv+380 pages. \$2.25.

"Reincarnation, Karma, and Theosophy," are timely discussions setting forth with ability a critical estimate of these thought-movements in their significance for the problem of immortality. Chapter ix, "The Undiscovered Country," treats of the revived interest in the future life and of the paths toward discovery—the way to the sense of reality in dealing with the unseen world.

A new book by A. W. Martin gives the substance of eight lectures on modern occultism,¹ delivered by the author before the Society of Ethical Culture. In clarity and directness of thought and in his use of unambiguous English the author shows himself a teacher of ability. The fact that the race, by various paths, has with practical unanimity arrived at belief in continued life after death is the text which Mr. Martin expounds.

Chapter i deals with "Three Minor Foundations" which are set aside as inadequate, namely, the universality of the belief, the instinctive desire for immortality, and intuition. Chapter ii briefly discusses "The Christian Foundation," namely, the belief in the bodily resurrection of Jesus. The conclusion reached is that the resurrection is not a foundation of belief for us, since we believe in the spiritual center but find it impossible to believe in a physical resurrection. Materialism is disposed of in chapter iii, as philosophically unconvincing. The ethical attitude toward modern occultism—spiritualism, psychical research, theosophy—is the theme of chapters iv to vi. Here the author's ethical sense convinces him of the insufficiency and superficiality of these fields as foundations for belief in the future. Chapter vii treats at length of "The Theosophical Belief, Reincarnation." This theme was evidently the real objective of the original eight lectures. His conclusions may be summarized in his own words (p. 43): "We conclude that, as compared with the corresponding teaching of orthodox Christianity, we infinitely prefer the theosophical view. Yet, by reason of the grave objections which we must register against the reincarnation hypothesis, we have no alternative but to reject it as fully as we do the Christian conception of Heaven and Hell." Chapter vii, "The Foundation in Moral Experience," offers a confident support for faith in the future, drawn from the implications of moral experience and moral reason. Chapter ix treats of "Misuses of the Faith in a Future Life," superficialities, crudities,

¹*Faith in a Future Life.* By Alfred W. Martin. New York: Appleton, 1916. xvii+203 pages. \$1.50.

literalisms, superstitions, and falsities that too often characterize conventional teaching. Chapter x discusses "The Moral Life in the Light of Immortality."

HERBERT A. YOUTZ

OBERLIN GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY
OBERLIN, OHIO

A CONTRIBUTION TO BIOGRAPHY¹

To a discriminating reading public Stopford Brooke is known as the author of two famous books, the life of F. W. Robertson, *Robertson of Brighton*, and the *Primer of English Literature*. The life of Robertson, published in 1865, when its author was in the early thirties, was nothing less than an event in theological circles, a portent, a calamity. It was most cordially welcomed by the Broad Church, while the "evangelical" newspapers heaped abuse impartially upon biography and biographer. It attained at once a large sale and is still a widely influential book. Of the *Primer*, published ten years later, hundreds of thousands of copies have been sold. More than once revised by its author, it has been translated into many languages and is regarded today as the clearest, the most judicious, and the most readable guide to English literature which has yet appeared. The claim of Brooke's many other books—sermons, poems, literary history, and criticism—charming as they are in style and affluent in content, was never urgent, and what vogue they once possessed is now rapidly passing. To his family and his intimate friends, however, Stopford Brooke, the maker of books and the eloquent preacher, was to the end of his life not merely an immensely interesting, but ever a surprising, personality. No one quite understood him. James Martineau once said of him enigmatically that he never grew up. Five days before his death, in his eighty-fourth year, Brooke wrote to a friend, "I love fullness and satisfaction, even though I am certain of the passing of fullness into decay. Perhaps I think I shall never live to see decay." His biographer does not profess to explain him.

Dr. Jacks refers more than once to Brooke's "multiple personality," at once Christian, pagan, mystic, artist, preacher, poet, in language which leaves the reader wondering what has been left unsaid that might possibly furnish a clue to his perplexity. In particular the chapter entitled "The Myth of the Three Springs" presents, as Dr. Jacks

¹*Life and Letters of Stopford Brooke*. By Lawrence Pearsall Jacks. Two volumes. New York: Scribner, 1917. x+350 pages; vii+368 pages. \$4.75.

confesses, "a conundrum that must be left to the psychologists to solve." We may pass by the perplexities of a "double nature" whose Christian and Greek tendencies were reconciled "by the mediating power of an impassioned love of beauty in all its forms, both natural and spiritual," to turn to plainer matters. Stopford Brooke was a descendant of preachers. There is no evidence, although his early home was "saturated with the spirit of evangelical piety" which expects religious "experiences," that there was ever a spiritual crisis, clearly marked in date and circumstance, through which he received a "call" to the ministry. He was naturally religious, and as he came to manhood he recognized and accepted his vocation clearly and confidently, a vocation, however, not merely to preach but to preach in London. After two brief curacies and a residence of eighteen months in Berlin as chaplain to the English Embassy, a period of restlessness and dissatisfaction, with a measure of compensation in the acquaintance then formed with the Crown Princess and the Princess Alice, which led later to his appointment as chaplain to Queen Victoria, he found his opportunity at last to preach in London as minister of the Proprietary Chapel of St. James. It was an independent position, which enabled him to "speak his mind" in "revolutionary sermons," if he so pleased, in courageous indifference to his chances of promotion and the attacks of the Low Church newspapers. For Brooke had been from his first appearance in the pulpit identified with the Broad Church party. It is amusing enough today to learn that London vicary shook their heads doubtfully over the would-be curate who was friend of Dean Stanley and found edification in Martineau's *Endeavors After the Christian Life* and a distinctly religious content in such mere literature as "In Memoriam" and "The Prelude."

As minister of St. James for nine years, and later at Bedford Chapel for twenty years, Brooke was known as one of the most distinguished preachers of London. His congregations were always large, and his serene and confident message peculiarly acceptable to cultivated men and women seeking a foundation upon which to build a spiritual faith, but completely indifferent to dogma and disputation. "Through all the theological storms and the inward conflicts thence resulting, which lay so heavily on many of his Mid-Victorian contemporaries," says Dr. Jacks, "Brooke went on his way radiant and rejoicing, his soul unshaken by any doubts of his destiny, undarkened by any eclipse of faith."

He had been minister of Bedford Chapel five years when in 1880 Brooke suddenly resigned his orders in the Church of England. Neither

outwardly nor inwardly did this step mark a "crisis" in his history. He lost no friends. He retained his pulpit and with few exceptions his congregation. Public interest was aroused, of course, but there was no bitter criticism, and discussion of this notable recession soon ended. There were no clergymen to follow his example. Brooke himself apparently felt no sharp pain when necessity was laid upon him, and never regretted what he had done. His brothers and sisters, however, were deeply grieved, and his father carried the sorrow to his grave. Many years later Brooke wrote in his diary, "I did regret that my father had suffered for it, But what else could I have done? A man must do what he must do."

It has been maliciously said of Stopford Brooke that "he could change his religion as another man could change his tie"; but in fact, in resigning his orders he did not change his religion. It was only that he refused any longer to give a formal assent to creeds which he had never in his heart accepted. The doctrine of the incarnation, as he understood the church to hold it, the "Eternal Punishment business and the personality of the devil," the miraculous element in Christianity—long ago these things had ceased, for him, to be really believable, and the time came inevitably when he could no longer reconcile his conscience to the continued profession of belief in them.

In leaving the Church of England, however, he did not, as was commonly thought, become a Unitarian. His resignation of orders left him for the rest of his life with no church affiliation or denominational standing whatever. He simply refused ecclesiastical classification. His purpose was in no way controversial or destructive. His heart was set rather upon "building people up in the faith in Christ." "I hope to show," he said, "that I am no less a Christian, no less a believer in Christ as the Master and Saviour of Mankind than before." Brooke preached frequently in Unitarian pulpits. He had many friends among Unitarians, and many points of agreement with them; but the worship of the Unitarian Churches left him cold. "I do not like the Non-conformist services," he said, "I can't stand the extemporary prayers, like leading articles addressed to God." He continued after his secession to employ in the worship of Bedford Chapel the ritual of the Church of England, with the not unimportant modifications demanded by his rejection of creeds. "Take all that the church has of ritual which does not conflict with the great truths," he wrote to a correspondent, "use it, modify it, add to it more and richer symbolism, and make the service of God rush like a gay river of joy."

We may as well give over the attempt to label Stopford Brooke or to "place him" among scientific thinkers. He was neither theologian nor philosopher. "He had committed himself to the way of the poets in the search for truth," says his biographer; and if his processes appeared romantic and emotional rather than logical, the result to him was profoundly satisfying. God is love. The ultimate right is union with God. The ultimate wrong is alienation from God. Upon this foundation he rested, with a settled peace and joy, to the end of his life.

The reader is told at the outset that Stopford Brooke was more than a preacher, more than a student and critic of literature — he was a poet and an artist. His nature demanded that truth should be brought into harmony with beauty, and this demand bore a large part in his revolt from the atmosphere of evangelicalism in which he was reared. His passion for art was early awakened and persistent. His biographer has much to say of his many visits to Italy, his keen delight in its galleries, his friendships with artists, his successful practice of landscape painting taken up late in life, his home in London, crowded with works of art — "there was hardly a fragment of available space that did not contain or exhibit some beautiful thing." It is all very puzzling, as one reflects upon it. It helps little to be told that one side of his nature belonged to religion, the other to art. Which was the real Stopford Brooke? What was the supreme, the controlling interest in his life? Dr. Jacks would satisfy the reader with the assurance that Brooke was a "multiple personality." But the reader turns these delightful pages, led on by a hope, in the end unsatisfied, that he will yet find some definite summing up of the significance and value of Brooke's life, his abiding influence upon men, his contribution to the religious thought of today, his peculiar service to the church of Christ. An alluring, charming narrative, no doubt; but does one really discover by its help Stopford Brooke himself?

A sentence in the brief account of his funeral is at least suggestive. "On the coffin lay a drapery of rich colors, covered with old Italian embroidery; and the whole room was filled with light and beauty."

A. K. PARKER

POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y.

BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT

AALDERS, G. C. *De Profeten des Ouden Verbonds*. Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1919. 288 pages.

This is an introduction to the study of prophecy by a Dutch scholar. The scope of his work may be seen from the titles of some of his chapters: e.g., the concept of prophecy, the fact of the divine prophetic revelation, ways and means of this revelation, the spirit of God the source of the prophetic revelation, the miracles of the prophets, the form of the prophetic preaching, the predictions of the prophets, the fulfilment of these predictions, the self-consciousness of the prophets, the attestation of prophecy, the unity of prophecy, and analogies among other peoples. The book is the work of a sober-minded scholar well acquainted with the literature of his subject. The point of view of his discussion may be indicated by the fact that he stands for the unity of the Book of Isaiah and for the exilic origin of the Book of Daniel. Anyone who seeks an antidote to such books as my *Prophet and His Problems* would do well to read this Dutch volume. There is much useful information in it, but the author has no confidence in the historical method of interpretation represented by most modern Old Testament scholars.

J. M. P. S.

COOKE, G. A., *The Book of Joshua in the Revised Version*. With Introduction and Notes. [Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.] Cambridge: University Press, 1918. xxxvi+232 pages. 2s. 6d.

This commentary is by the successor to the late Dr. Driver in the Regius professorship of Hebrew at Oxford. He carries on the tradition for cautious and conservative scholarship established by his predecessor. Joshua is a book much concerned with geographical and topographical matters, and upon these Dr. Cooke has done excellent work. The best part of the work is the commentary proper, where much information of a detailed sort is conveyed in lucid style. The introduction to the commentary deals with four topics, viz., (1) "Contents and Literary Structure," (2) "The Sources," (3) "The History Contained in the Book," (4) "The Religion of Israel in the Time of Joshua." In the third and fourth sections one feels a lack. The discussion does not come to close quarters with the problems of the history of the period. Of course in a popular and elementary commentary like the Cambridge Bible we cannot expect to find elaborate and thoroughgoing treatment of details, but the reader ought to be given the main outlines of the important historical problems raised by the literature under examination. What those problems are here may be suggested by reference to Burney's excellent treatment of the history of this period in his commentary on Judges. In the section on religion about all that is done is to draw certain inferences as to the nature of the religion of Moses, inferences that in the nature of the case must be very uncertain. The Book of Joshua does not furnish sufficient data for a statement of the religion of Israel in Joshua's time. Nor is the time of Joshua known with sufficient definiteness to make it possible for us to supplement Joshua by other sources of information. All that can be done on the basis of the Book of Joshua is to formulate the religious ideas of the various literary sources of which the book is composed and to discriminate in this formulation between old institutions and ideas

surviving in the documents and the newer points of view characteristic of the actual makers of the documents. The Book of Joshua is a hard piece of literature to interpret, but it has considerable to yield to the interpreter who handles it without gloves.

J. M. P. S.

DAVIDSON, A. B., *The Book of Job*. With Notes, Introduction, and Appendix.

Adapted to the text of the Revised Version, with some supplementary notes by H. C. O. Lanchester. [Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.] Cambridge: University Press, 1918. lxxi+344 pages. 5s.

The excellent commentary on Job by the late A. B. Davidson was well deserving of the new edition it has been given by the editors of the Cambridge Bible. Dr. Lanchester has done his work well. He very properly regarded his task not as that of re-writing Davidson's commentary but rather as that of recording the main elements of the newer knowledge that has come to light since 1884, when this commentary was first written. In the new edition the Revised Version has supplanted the Authorized, and a larger and clearer type has been used. This change of type, with the addition of some new subject-matter, has increased the size of the commentary by 55 pages. The chief modifications by the new editor are (1) the addition of a brief section in the Introduction on the text and a list of books; (2) a different treatment of the third cycle of the debate, involving a reassignment of materials there, resulting in the recovery of Zophar's speech; (3) a different explanation of the attitude of the author toward the problem of suffering which finds the significance of the book in the Prologue and not in the speeches of Yahweh; and (4) recognition in many places of the views of recent interpreters. This edition should give the commentary a new lease of life. Would it not, however, have been well to have kept Davidson pretty much unchanged and to have recorded diverging views with clear indication of their non-Davidson character?

J. M. P. S.

SKINNER, J., *The Book of the Prophet Isaiah, Chaps. xl-lxvi*. In the Revised Version, with Introduction and Notes. [Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.] Cambridge: University Press, 1917. lxxiv+289 pages. 3s. 6d.

Dr. Skinner has here brought an earlier edition up to date by substituting the Revised Version for the Authorized and by taking account of the literature of recent years. In the Introduction he canvasses the various problems and interpretations arising out of the study of the book. His own positions are well defended and persuasively presented. He accepts current views throughout, venturing upon no innovations. The book is found to consist of two main sections, viz., (1) chapters xl-lv, of which chapters xl-xlvi were written between 546 and 539 B.C. and chapters xlix-lv in the interval between the capture of Babylon by Cyrus and the issue of his decree permitting the return of the Jews to Palestine, and (2) chaps. lvi-lxvi, some of which may have come from the early part of the first century after the Exile, though the bulk of them belong to the close of that century. As to the relation of the Servant Songs to their context, Skinner holds that they were an earlier production by the author of chapters xl-lv, which he himself incorporated in his later work. In an appendix the more recent theories as to the significance of the Servant passages are carefully expounded and critically examined. For himself Dr. Skinner rejects the purely

national interpretation because it implies "an inwardness of personification which goes far beyond the mere allegorical presentation of the salient facts of a nation's history" and is thus "wanting in subjective depth and reality." In the statement of his own view Dr. Skinner is anything but clear. At one moment he seems to think of the Servant as an ideal Israel within Israel, at another he thinks of him as a pious individual, and again he seems to favor interpreting him as the personal Messiah. In any case the reader of this discussion will not delude himself with the thought that the interpretation of the Songs is a simple matter.

J. M. P. S.

CARTER, GEORGE W., *Zoroastrianism and Judaism*. Boston: Gorham Press, 1918. 116 pages. \$2.00.

This is an attempt to estimate, within the limits of a few pages, the influence of Zoroastrianism upon Judaism. An introduction by Dr. Charles Gray Shaw assures us as to the competence of Dr. Carter to speak upon things Iranian. He knows enough also about Hebrew religion and history to keep him from making glaring errors. The book will prove a useful summary in the hands of students of the Old Testament wishing to know something about Zoroastrianism and its bearing upon Hebrew religion. The author shows admirable restraint in that he does not work his theory too hard. Indeed he might well have claimed more for Persia than he has. It is certain that a period of two centuries under the Persian régime must have made a profound impression upon the Hebrew soul, which was so responsive to stimuli from without. No reference is made to the Assuan Papyri and the testimony they offer as to the attitude of the Persian government toward the Jewish people and their religion. A good bibliography extending over 7 pages would be better if it were shorter. The publishers are open to criticism at two points: the proofreading is atrocious and the price exorbitant.

J. M. P. S.

NEW TESTAMENT

CASTOR, GEORGE DEWITT. *Matthew's Sayings of Jesus: the Non-Markan Common Source of Matthew and Luke*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1918. vii+250 pages. \$1.25.

The publication of the late Professor Castor's reconstruction of the second source common to Matthew and Luke is very welcome. It emphasizes the loss felt by his large circle of friends and his students at the Pacific School of Religion in his tragic death in 1912, for it exhibits a penetration of research and clearness of reasoning such as would have rendered great service in the field of New Testament study.

Although published so recently, the work was practically completed before Harnack's *Sprüche und Reden Jesu* appeared and was little influenced by its conclusions. A decided superiority of Dr. Castor's study is that he bases less upon subjective considerations. A brief but careful investigation of the methods of Matthew and Luke in their treatment of Mark develops the principles that guide in reconstructing their second source. He finds Matthew to follow more closely the wording and thought of his documents, Luke their order. He believes both preserve Q better than Mark. The radical difference from Harnack is that Dr. Castor has allowed more weight to Luke's evidence, particularly as to order, and therefore has had to introduce

no such startling rearrangements as the former ventured. As to the sayings to be included in Q the two are in substantial agreement.

The reconstructed document exhibited in the last chapter shows a unity, completeness, and sequence which argue well for the success of Professor Castor's undertaking.

C. C. McC.

WEARING, THOMAS. *The World-View of the Fourth Gospel: A Genetic Study*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1918. 74 pages. \$0.79.

The value of the genetic method of biblical study is well illustrated in Mr. Thomas Wearing's *World-View of the Fourth Gospel*. The method demands that the student go far afield. Mr. Wearing begins modestly with "Typical Pre-Christian Hellenistic World-Views." Following mainly Caird, Eucken, and Arnold (*Roman Stoicism*), he sets forth the cosmologies of the leading philosophical schools, of astral theology, of Hellenistic Judaism, and of mysticism.

In a chapter on "The Johannine Universe: its Origin, Structure, and Destiny," and another on "Man and the Universe in the Johannine World-View," the peculiar views of the Fourth Gospel are set forth as derived from stoicism, gnosticism, and the mystery religions. The final chapter is entitled "New Testament World-Views and Their Influence." What it really describes is "their influence" upon the conception of Jesus exhibited by various New Testament writers. It very successfully traces the progressive Hellenization of the early Christian conception of the Messiah down to its culmination in the mystical, non-apocalyptic Savior of John.

For the most part Mr. Wearing's positions are well chosen and well defended. One would have expected a clearer setting forth of the nature of Christ's work as Savior of the world in order to demonstrate more conclusively the value of such a method of study. But the book is an excellent one and shows how far biblical theology has progressed out of its old isolation.

C. C. McC.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

MOORE, CLIFFORD HERSCHEL. *Pagan Ideas of Immortality during the Early Roman Empire*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918. 64 pages. \$0.85.

This volume comprises a single lecture sketching the history of belief in the immortality of the soul as entertained by the peoples of the Mediterranean world from the early days of Greek thinking down to the period when Christianity emerges as one of the recognized religions of that world. First the author epitomizes the beliefs of Orphism and Pythagoreanism, more especially as expounded by Plato. The views of the later Graeco-Roman philosophers and the content of popular faith also receive brief recognition. As a result it becomes clear that prior to the emergence of Christianity the pagan world had a very strong hope of immortality and very specific ideas regarding the state of the soul beyond the grave. In a few well-chosen sentences the author indicates the relation between the Christian hope when it came to be dominant and the earlier aspirations of its gentile predecessors.

S. J. C.

CHURCH HISTORY

PECK, W. G., *The Coming Free Catholicism*. New York: Macmillan, 1919. 160 pages. \$2.00.

This is a well-written contribution to the growing literature produced by English Free Churchmen in advocacy of a Catholic reconstruction of Christianity. The author describes himself as "still young," but he has already passed from the stage of "liberal" theology, which he criticizes sharply for its indifference to church questions. His profound sense of the poverty and confinement of sectarianism does not blind him to the defects of the churches professing to be Catholic. His view of the Reformation is that of the disillusioned historical student, but he believes with Dr. Orchard that to turn to Rome would be "a disservice to Catholicism." And while "no existing church is capable of catholicising the world," the Free Churches have a peculiar opportunity to give leadership in this direction. Untrammelled by Anglican Erastianism or papal autocracy, they are at liberty to inaugurate the "free Catholicism" which is heralded as the next stage of Christian progress. The projected program will incorporate into Christianity both the element of natural religion expressed in Catholic ritual, and the intellectual and spiritual freedom which Protestantism has asserted.

J. T. M.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

ATHEARN, WALTER SCOTT. *Religious Education and American Democracy*. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1917. xii+394 pages. \$1.50.

Intelligence and godliness as the common possessions of the whole human race are essential to the world's safety. The American public-school system is the way to the realization of intelligence among its people; the church and the home must teach religion to the people that the second essential may be attained. The author's problem is the organization of the necessary religious education for the American democracy. The underlying principles for the solution of this problem are (1) the correlation of the work of the church schools with that of the public schools; (2) community systems of religious education resting upon permanent, co-operative, religious organizations within the communities; and (3) the unification of existing agencies for religious education, such as the International Sunday School Association, the Sunday School Council of Evangelical Denominations, etc. One chapter is given to the responsibility of those colleges which are of church origin for courses in religion and for the religious growth of their students.

While this volume is not so pretentious as the title would suggest, it does do what the author advertises in the introduction, namely, it drives home the principle of the religious education of every citizen; it gives a good idea of what has been done in this direction in the various endeavors to organize systems of religious education; it gives a survey of the available literature on the subject; it gives a vigorous shove toward the goal which religious educators are seeking.

F. G. W.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

- Aalders, G. Ch. *De Profeten des Ouden Verbonds*. Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1918. 287 pages.
- Burney, C. F. *Israel's Settlement in Canaan—the Biblical Tradition and Its Historical Background*. (The Schweich Lectures, 1917.) London: Oxford University Press, 1918. xi+104 pages. 3s. 6d.
- Carter, George William. *Zoroastrianism and Judaism*. Boston: Badger, 1918. 116 pages. \$2.00.
- Clay, Albert T. *The Empire of the Amorites*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919. 192 pages.
- Cooke, G. A. *The Book of Joshua*. (The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.) Cambridge: University Press, 1918. xxxvi+232 pages. 2s. 6d.
- Davidson, A. B. *The Book of Job*. (The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.) Cambridge: University Press, 1918. lxxi+344 pages. 5s.
- Fullerton, Kemper. *Prophecy and Authority*. New York: Macmillan, 1919. xxi+214 pages. \$1.50.
- King, L. W. *Legends of Babylon and Egypt in Relation to Hebrew Tradition*. (The Schweich Lectures, 1916.) London: Oxford University Press, 1918. x+155 pages. 3s.
- Skinner, J. *The Book of the Prophet Isaiah*, Chaps. xl-lxvi. (The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.) Cambridge: University Press, 1917. lxxiv+289 pages. 3s. 6d.
- Smith, George Adam. *The Book of Deuteronomy*. (The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.) Cambridge: University Press, 1918. cxxii+396 pages. 3s. 6d.

NEW TESTAMENT

- Bacon, Benjamin Wisner. *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918. xii+544 pages.
- Campbell, James M. *The Second Coming of Christ*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1919. 136 pages. \$0.50.

- Whiting, Charles C. *The Revelation of John*. Boston: Badger, 1918. 259 pages. \$1.50.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Bartlet, J. Vernon, and Carlyle, A. J. *Christianity in History*. New York: Macmillan, 1917. xx+613 pages. \$4.00.
- Peck, W. G. *The Coming Free Catholicism*. New York: Macmillan, 1919. 160 pages. \$2.00.
- Zeiller, Jacques. *Les origines chrétiennes dans les provinces danubiennes de l'empire romain*. Paris: E. de Boccard, 1918. iv+667 pages.

DOCTRINAL

- Cunningham, W. *The Secret of Progress*. Cambridge: University Press, 1918. xii+179 pages.
- Fiske, Charles. *The Faith by Which We Live*. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1919. xii+322 pages. \$1.50.
- Holmes, Edmond. *The Secret of the Cross*. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1919. v+170 pages. \$1.50.
- Kensington, J. J. *Talking with God*. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1918. viii+49 pages. \$0.60.
- McDowall, Stewart A. *Evolution and the Doctrine of the Trinity*. New York: Putnam, 1918. xxvii+258 pages.
- Prestige, Leonard. *The Virgin Birth of Our Lord*. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1918. viii+136 pages. \$1.15.
- Rhodes, D. P. *Our Immortality*. New York: Macmillan, 1919. xxiii+310 pages. \$2.00.
- Urquhart, W. S. *Pantheism and the Value of Life*. London: J. Alfred Sharp, 1919. xii+732 pages. 12s. 6d.
- Waring, Henry F. *Christianity's Unifying Fundamental*. New York: Doran, 1919. 175 pages. \$1.25.

EDUCATION AND SOCIOLOGY RECONSTRUCTION

EDUCATIONAL sociology is attracting increasing attention and is rapidly assuming much importance. At their annual meeting in December the American Sociological Society devoted the entire session to the subject of sociology and education. The papers read and the discussions which followed represent the viewpoints of academic sociologists and of practical social workers. These papers by the members of the American Sociological Society have all been published in Volume XIII of the *Papers and Proceedings* of that Society, which is just from the press. The price is \$1.50, postpaid \$1.65.

David Snedden, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, writer and educator, has prepared a paper on "Education and Sociology: Its Provinces and Possibilities." His interpretation of the subject differs somewhat from those of other writers and supplies much new and valuable material for teachers and students of sociology.

Ranking in importance and interest with the subjects of sociology and education are the problems of reconstruction. A hitherto neglected phase of these problems is covered in two papers by Mr. F. H. Selden, Director of Mechanical Science in the State Normal School of Valley City, North Dakota. He has some novel ideas about the estimate which our civilization places upon the relative intelligence of these so-called educated classes and the classes who are supposed not to be so educated but are merely trained for technical pursuits.

Mr. Snedden's paper and the two by Mr. Selden will appear in early numbers of the *American Journal of Sociology*. The single numbers may be purchased for 50 cents each. The subscription price of the *Journal* is \$2.00 a year.

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THE THEOLOGICAL TREND OF PRAGMATISM

A. EUSTACE HAYDON
University of Chicago

Only one who shall undertake to read what has been written on pragmatism in the last two decades can appreciate what a stir the American philosophy has made. Among religious writers it has been eagerly welcomed, ridiculed, caricatured, and honestly feared. Yet there has been a tantalizing uncertainty as to just what pragmatism is. The reader becomes accustomed to certain adjectives and phrases which bristle throughout the pages. He learns that pragmatism is biological, biocentric, social, human, melioristic, empirical, evolutionistic, pluralistic, indeterministic, optimistic, voluntaristic, ethical, scientific, democratic, anti-supernatural, and in some cases anti-intellectualistic; that it abhors idealistic absolutism, monism, pantheism, naturalism, materialism, and all transcendentalism; that it is passionately devoted to faith in human power to transform reality and to control the changing flux of experience. Since so many have ventured before, we dare make another characterization and say that the significance of pragmatism for religion is that it represents the spirit of social democracy, making earnest with the doctrine of evolution and using the method and tools of modern science to clear the ground for the free play of creative intelligence in its supreme task of projecting ideal ends for man and organizing and controlling human progress. Democracy, evolution, science, creative

intelligence, the ideal—these are words of tremendous meaning for the religion of our modern age. It is at once evident that a religion which is able to make vital connection with a world-view based on the principles inherent in evolution, democracy, and science will be a new thing under the sun. Many of the old problems which tormented the theologians of the past are at once transcended by being retired as meaningless. It may be worth while to point out, for instance, that in a living, growing world of reality such as radical evolution presents, there can be no eternal, static, and perfect entities, whether ideas or forms or values, remaining unchanged apart from our world of experience. There is therefore no need to search for authoritative revelation of these eternals either by supernatural channels or by reason. The quest for absolute origins, absolute laws, and absolute finalities is frankly given up.

Furthermore, with such a world-view there can be no supernatural, noumenal world apart from the reality in which the experience of acting, striving, living beings is set. All the expensive scaffolding by which man endeavored to keep his connection with another world may therefore be torn down and discarded. Here, in the world of our experience, or nowhere, is the whole truth.

Again, the pragmatist does not think of the knower as set over against the world to be known and consequently the old epistemological problem is retired. The ghost of dualism vanishes. Since experiencing is more than knowing, and the bearer of experience is an integral part of reality, making use of the knowledge-experience to get larger control of the future; since knowing is one form of the activity of a psycho-physical organism immersed in the stream of reality and not set over against it as a spectator, the difficulties clustering around that "chronic, intellectual lock-jaw," epistemology, become meaningless.

If the epistemological ogre may be banished by pragmatism, the constantly attendant tendency to skepticism and agnosticism is also dissipated. Using the method of science, pragmatism does not deal with things-in-themselves, nor with Being-in-general, nor with knowledge *überhaupt*, but is concerned to solve specific human problems in this real world of movement and change. To be skeptical or agnostic is to be unscientific.

As a consequence of the instrumental interpretation of intelligence there is no longer any cleavage between the theoretical and the practical. When experience is unified and the will and the reason shown to be harmonious functions of the life-process, the old separations of faith and knowledge, of religion and science, which perplexed Kant and Ritschl, can no longer be maintained.

And, finally, the idealistic absolute, brought in to bridge some of the above-mentioned dualisms, is seen to be not only unnecessary but pernicious. In the words of L. P. Jacks, it is "an artificial remedy for a purely imaginary woe." An anthology of the epithets hurled by the pragmatists at the Absolute would make exciting reading. In 1882 James began his onslaught upon the Absolute of Hegel, "the absolute block whose parts have no free play, the pure plethora of necessary being with all the oxygen of possibility suffocated out of its lungs." Between the mechanism of materialistic philosophy and the mechanism of a static, timeless, all-inclusive Absolute there was no choice. In neither system could there be freedom, novelty, or movement. Evil was reduced to a mere illusion transcended in the Absolute. The pragmatic viewpoint demands the recognition of the reality of change, of time, of freedom, of the patent fact that the events of life are crude, unorganized, brute. The conceptions of absolute truth, absolute reality, absolute experience, are all of them false, futile, and full of danger. Such a universe would be quite indifferent to man; in the words of Schiller, "loyal co-operation and promethean revolt grow equally unmeaning." All the glories and tragedies of human history sink to the level of a drama played in dreams. It must be admitted that pragmatism has been apostolic in the fervor of its gospel of emancipation from this fatalistic nightmare of absolutism.

These various phases of pragmatism, applied to the interpretation of religion, must be of inestimable service to the human spirit struggling to get free from the bonds of mediaevalism and to secure a spiritual interpretation of our modern democratic life. Unfortunately the pragmatists have not yet felt the call to become prophets of religion. It is not the task of this article to write the meaning of religion within the bounds of pragmatism. Its aim is much more humble—to give a simple answer to a definite question: Living in

an age when the idea of God has become fluid, when there is an eager, pathetic searching for a workable conception, what do the various groups of pragmatic thinkers allow us to believe concerning God?

No term of common discourse is so vague and elusive in meaning as the term "God." It clamors for clarification. It may mean almost anything, according to age, environment, culture, or individual temperament. It may have a score of meanings in the thought of members of a single modern sect. Religion, on the other hand, seems to have been vaguely defined with general acceptance as a social relation or attitude toward the environing universe. But a survey of religious history shows that religion may have any number of gods of any kind or no god at all. It reveals also the fact that religion may retain its hold in spite of the destruction of gods and changing or illogical or petrified theologies. Like a living stream the flowing social development of man moves down the centuries carrying religion in its deep current. Religious forms, cults, doctrines, like political organizations, are left stranded and obsolete as the ever-growing life flows away from them. Kings and priests have been able so to shape the social life at times that religious "make-believe" keeps the old forms and dogmas standing. But it can only be temporary and at the price of loss of reality, of vital enthusiasm, and of sincerity. Life is real, not artificial. Man's mind is the resultant of his deep, age-old inheritance of instinct and the will-to-live, molded by the matrix of beliefs and customs into which he is born. He comes to consciousness of himself as an individual because of this social environment; he is "social-copy." It is as impossible for a man to escape the development of a "soul" or "mind" made up of desires, habits, and beliefs drawn from his social mothering as it is for him to escape the large heritage of instinct won for him by the successful battle for life in the dark deeps of time. That religion should persist is natural: that the gods should grow, change, and die is necessary from this point of view. God, as the personalized embodiment of the practical meaning and value of the environing cosmic forces, must vary with the corresponding social milieu. The history of the gods of the world is the fascinating commentary.

Religion remains. The gods disappear. The modern world has witnessed the slow passing of the autocratic, transcendent deity of the Doctors of Catholic Christendom. Robed in his splendid garment of attributes—aseity, infinity, simplicity, immutability, perfection, omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience—he was really a royal ruler of the universe. It is unnecessary to say that he was never the God cherished by the great heart of the folk. Their God was far more human and humble. It is needless to point out that the God of the Doctors also had a history reaching back to the rude tribal life of a nomad race in which he shared. The main point is that the streams of vital influence which flowed into the social current of mediaeval Christendom carried the religion of the people away from the God of the Doctors. The social mind was changed. Enthroned in the other world, God was long reached by the bridges of church, of scripture, of reason. The story of their destruction and of the realization of the futility of all the proofs of the existence of God is a well-known, tragic chapter in Christian thought. At length science and democracy added their increment to the social stream, and God as Creator, Providence, Judge, and transcendent King found no response in the social mind. In modern life three currents of thought became evident: First, the philosophy of science, become over-confident and dogmatic, undertook to remove God and the spiritual life and to reduce the world-process to mechanism. Second, in opposition to naturalism, idealistic philosophy put the emphasis on spirit and wrapped the whole world of existence in the strong, encircling arms of the Absolute which they called "God." Third, there was an attempt to relieve some of the ethical and logical difficulties of orthodox theism by the argument for a finite God. This is evident in Hume, John Stuart Mill, and Renouvier. In so far as it has religious motive at all, it is in connection and contrast with these three movements that the pluralism of the pragmatists plays its part.

I. THE FINITE GOD OF JAMES AND SCHILLER

The God-hypothesis of James and of Schiller is the postulate of a finite, good, personal God. They recognize that religion does exist as a fact of human experience and that man needs and

therefore postulates a cosmic companion and helper in his struggle for complete life. Naturalism and absolutism refuse to recognize the reality of human need. The one denies human values and hopes; the other reduces them to illusion. Both are ultimately godless and deterministic, which, in combination, spells despair for man. The god of orthodox theism seemed to James no more than a "metaphysical monster." God as infinite and omniscient, Renouvier had shown to be logically impossible. It was not, however, the head but the heart that made protest in James and Schiller. In a world of suffering and evil such as ours, an all-powerful, infinite, and *good* God was unthinkable. To accept a finite god does away with the logical and ethical difficulties. Moreover, it is not impossible in an evolving and pluralistic cosmos that there should be other conscious centers of personal life great enough to be called God. Such a striving, purposive being would be a personality as the old God of immutability and omniscience never could, since teleological development and purposive, growing life are the very essence of personality. He could really be thought of as developing in character and in ideal. God, then, may be battling against the wild, wicked forces of the world and may need our help. We have in that case no absolute guaranty of victory, but if our help is denied the hope of success is still less. And then, God may be very strong, not too finite, and able to carry the battle through to triumph if we are loyal to our individual tasks. There is nothing irrational in the existence of such a God. The mystic experience gives evidence of some contact with real powers by which real effects are produced in our factual world. The channel of the subconscious is open. It may be that we are in direct contact with the God who is the Captain of our human hopes. So James presented his vision. Schiller keeps the same general attitude, though he does not depend upon mysticism or extraordinary experiences or the subconscious. For both the belief in God is a venture, a postulate in the line of our needs and legitimate because of its proved, supreme value for life. "Who says hypothesis," James grants, "gives up all claim to be dogmatic in his conclusions." For those who have grown up in the religious traditions of the past, for those who feel the need of moral reinforcement from superhuman

powers, for those who are stimulated by the daring thought that the cosmic drama is a battle of God for life and salvation in which we share, for those who have been mentally perplexed by the difficulties into which the old theology has fallen, for those who are unable to reconcile the goodness of God with such tragedies as world-war or world-epidemics of disease, it may well be that the hypothesis of a personal, finite, struggling, suffering God, who is good and sympathetic to the ideals for which man cares, may be the one most attractive modern religious idea. The old idea of God as infinite and omnipotent, as well as the concept of the Absolute of the idealists, falls short of the demands of the human spirit. The Absolute in the Bradleyan sense spurns the mundane meanness of being the God of religion. The Absolute in the Roycean sense is logically possible, as Lovejoy pointed out and as Royce admitted,¹ only if an affirmative answer can be given to the three questions: (1) Is the compounding, without loss or alteration, of many individuated or personal experiences having "centers" of their own into a single, comprehensive, personal experience, conceivable? (2) Is the literal inclusion of a genuine, temporal succession in a non-successive total conceivable without contradiction? (3) Is an actually realized or presented infinite aggregate conceivable without contradiction? It was not the logical difficulty that weighed upon the religious consciousness, however, but the ethical, practical, and religious difficulties involved. Ethically, divine omnipotence raised the dread possibility that God was indifferent to human values, or even evil and malicious. Practically, it made the struggle against evil meaningless and left nothing for man but resignation and quiescence. Religiously, there could be no stimulus or help in the hope of fellowship with a timeless Absolute or with an immutable, omniscient, and omnipotent God. The only possible cry of the human in such a situation would be the cry of Islam—Kismet! Out of a great human sympathy, a realization of the reality of the struggles and sufferings of men, came the stern, passionate pronouncement of Schiller and of James that the only God worthy of worship *must* be finite. Such a being, limited in power and in knowledge, is logically as well as cosmically possible.

¹ See *Phil. Rev.*, XIII, 140-41.

We may believe that he is good in such a case. The presence of evil then is no longer a problem but a challenge to which all brave spirits will eagerly respond—a call of God for help. So called to the standard of God to battle against the world's wrong, man finds in God a companion in struggle, a heroic leader to follow, a wise guide to obey, a splendid and sympathetic friend to reverence and to love. It may indeed be that the postulate of such a superhuman God may fill the religious needs of the awakened will to suffer and to battle for human values, characteristic of our modern age.

II. THE GOD-IDEA OF THE FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGISTS

The need of understanding what we mean by "God" becomes important when functional psychology unfolds the natural history of religion. In the writings of Professors Ames and King the sheer individualism of James and Schiller is replaced by the social elements in the religious development. Mysticism and the subconscious are explained and robbed of metaphysical meaning. The genesis, growth, moralization, and disintegration of gods are displayed as one phase of the development of the human social consciousness. The Christian God is like all others. He came to be in tribal desert life. He grew and grew moral as his people advanced. His life-story is to us more conspicuous than that of other gods, but not different in kind. All the supreme values of our social life find synthesis now in him, and these values, of which he is the symbol, are human and ethical. Man projects his ideals into an invisible Socius which, as God, helps him in their realization. There is no cosmic sweep here. This God is not interested in the eternities of stellar grandeur or the splendor of the "swing of Pleiades." He is the symbol of our highest human values, and "cosmic emotion" is not religion in this social sense. Religion becomes enthusiasm for social ideals.

There is much driving power in this understanding of God and of religion, provided that it be frankly and honestly presented for what it is. The human "soul" itself is the creation of these social factors, and the values of social life are objectively real. Judgments of value are real, even more real, since logically prior, than judgments of fact. They shape conduct and transform the actual world.

While social values are human, they are also superhuman in the sense that they are not the creation of individuals, that they shape and coerce the individual, that they act as judge and conscience for the individual and by the normal social being are not to be neglected or denied. They are purposive in the sense that they are never static but by growth and interaction move on to ever larger meaning and gain broader human scope. In this sense the "Common Will"¹ of men, as they are woven together in the vast, far-reaching web of experience, bears in it a high, ideal purpose of increasing beauty, mutuality, and love which is always more than the actual but always being actualized. This Common Will claims our loyalty as commandingly as any God, for we are one with it; and to repudiate it or go counter to its high mandate is to repudiate the divine in us.

This view eliminates definitively the old God of theism. The supernatural entirely disappears. God has been drawn not only within the world-process but within the human social process. We may still say "God exists," but we must mean by "God" and by "exist" something entirely different from that which the words have meant in the religious philosophy of the past. God, in the old sense, is dead, and only the clinging reverence for the past, the sense of loss, or the fear that the heart and moral will of man are not sufficiently strong to face the facts can make these thinkers continue to call that God which, in the sense of the Christian centuries, is not God. They who understand the situation may still use the old terms aesthetically, as wistful "make-believe" or as concession to the people, but the driving power of the functional idea of God comes only as one sees clearly that the God of eternal decrees, of loving protection and over-ruling will, the Parent God, guardian of life and giver of immortality, is no more. To say, as some still do, that after psychology has done its work and unfolded for us the idea of God—its genesis, function, meaning, and worth—there is still the possibility for metaphysics and religion to postulate a God in the old religious sense, is to give up functionalism, to vitiate the vital value of the new vision, and to leave religion with

¹ See an admirable article by H. A. Overstreet, "God as the Common Will," *Hibbert Journal*, XIII, 155 ff.

a realm more nebulous than the Unknowable of Spencer's generous gift. The God of the functional psychologists is a reality, but of an entirely different nature and demanding a quite different religious reaction from the personal, existent deity of the past. The psychologists do not even leave the bases on which James made his last stand. Yet the temptation to make the postulate or cling to the shadow of a personal, companion God is very great and bespeaks a deeply ingrained human habit. Although psychology may bring every element of human experience into clear light, there is still the tendency to seek beneath all explanation for a personal, purposive good-will; to react toward it in a mystical way and so to find comfort, strength, and hope.¹ To be sure, it may give one pause to think of purposive Will working out its world-purposes through convulsions of blood and fury, by blind blundering or by reckless sacrifice of human life, but the added postulate that God is finite, struggling and suffering with us, saves the day—and God. There can be no possible doubt that the religious man of prescientific, predemocratic and pre-war Christian tradition will resolutely cling to some such reduced and retreating theism and find in it real religious value and power of appeal.

III. THE POSITION OF THE INSTRUMENTALISTS

But the thoroughgoing instrumental pragmatist will make no such hypothesis. For the pure love of man he will remove all the old theistic props. To trust to God or Providence or to cosmic evolution under some form of immanence is to remain children or at best weaklings, making our slow way upon crutches, when the need of the age is for strong, disciplined men who will hew out of the crude, warring world of reality the Kingdom of the Ideal. What the psychologists of religion leave out is here taken up again—the life of man is rooted deep in cosmic meaning. The world is

¹ Cf., e.g., J. A. Leighton, "Personality and a Metaphysics of Value," *Int. Jour. of Ethics*, XXI, 36; H. W. Wright, *Faith Justified by Progress*; C. A. Beckwith, "Redefinition in Present-Day Theology," *Biblical World*, Vol. XLVIII; A. L. Strong, "Some Religious Aspects of Pragmatism," *Amer. Jour. Theol.*, Vol. XII; E. W. Lyman, *The Experience of God in Modern Life*, New York, 1918; L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, London, 1913; Henry Sturt, "Do We Need a Substitute for Christianity?" *Hibbert Jour.*, Vol. V; Reeman, *Do We Need a New Idea of God?* 1918.

of such a nature as to make possible and to produce man and his values, social, ethical, economic, and religious. The long sweep of the changing and destructive ages leaves him with ever-increasing power over his own life and the resources of the world. That much of confidence and of security he may at least have. The religious question is no longer, Does God exist? but, Is the world in which we live a world that bears any relation to our moral ends?¹ In the assurance that he is free, that reality is still incomplete, plastic, and dependent upon his will for shaping, man may bravely take up the task of making the good secure and of eliminating the evil. To say that man's history is a mere incident in the cosmic story is to speak the truth, but to claim on that account that actual human love and hatred, joy and sorrow, are any less real for man is far from true. Man's life and man's world are man's achievement. "Morbid and self-doubting civilizations" seek after the "sanction of an admiring cosmos,"² but no such sanction shall be given them. Neither by looking backward to the past nor upward to a higher world, but by frankly and fearlessly facing forward to carry the conquering power of science against the specific problems of life, may progress and the ideal be realized. Religion as dependence upon an external superhuman power disappears. Religion as devotion to human service, as enthusiasm for social values, and as loyal labor at the tasks involved in eradicating wrong and securing the good, remains. There is here, however, no effort to keep the God of the past in the attenuated form of a "Symbol." Theism is quietly dropped.

Many complain that this type of pragmatism is too strong, too robust; that there is no provision for "sick souls" and no guaranty of victory. The remedy applied by the instrumental pragmatist for this complaint would be heroic. He would say that his view of the universe is the only real gospel for men, the only possible way of escape from destruction. To trust the higher values of the spirit and the supreme interests of civilization to Providence or Fate, to rest in blind optimism while science steadily gains more complete control of material forces, is to make it possible for tribal

¹ J. H. Tufts, *Biblical World*, XLVI, 12.

² H. C. Brown, *Jour. Phil.*, XIII, 345.

selfishness and primitive morality to gain control of machines and technique capable of hurling the whole fabric of civilization, reared by the toil of centuries, into chaos and destruction. The way to cure sick souls is to build a society in which the souls of men are strong. The assurance of final victory is given sufficiently by the piecemeal conquest and control of the problems of life as they arise. If reality is such that man may, by his tools of science, directed by intelligence, build his ideals slowly but surely into the structure of existence, the old need of a guaranty is gone.

From another quarter comes the criticism that this pragmatism is too human, too anxious and tender concerning human values. Morris Cohen¹ finds one of the real joys of life in the thrill of being for even our brief human moment a spectator in a cosmic theater where solar systems are born and destroyed, and where the part of man is infinitesimal in significance. To the stoical Puritan Bertrand Russell² the supreme grandeur of life is in self-control and the martyr's ecstatic defiance of the cosmic powers that will ultimately hurl him and his works into the deeps of oblivion. To Cohen the pragmatic view of the world is "compensatory"; to Russell it is "narrow and petty." If this is not sophisticated disillusionment entirely beyond the reach of the great mass of modern men, it is at any rate a failure to appreciate the fact that the pragmatist also may thrill with "cosmic emotion," but while waiting for the "slow, sure doom" to fall has the courage to attempt to transform this human waiting-room into the kingdom of the heart's desire. In view of the progress of the last hundred years, one may have hopes that a wait of a few hundred thousand years will give scope for a progress splendid enough to challenge even the most stoical to loyalty and labor.

There can be no doubt that instrumental pragmatism implies an entirely new religious outlook. The traditional cult and theology become meaningless. "God" and the "Absolute" pass into the chamber of memory, glowing symbols of a past order of reality. In the ages gone by, the function of religion has been to save man from despair as he struggles for precarious existence in a ruthless world. The unnamed terrors of nature, the cruelty, injustice, and

¹ See *New Republic*, VIII, 118-19.

² *Philosophical Essays*, pp. 125-26.

greed of his fellow-men, his own ignorance and failure to control his personal capacities—all drove him to religion and to God. In the midst of a world that offered him wretchedness and woe he learned to hope for a world where his life would be kingly, triumphant, and masterful. Lacking the scientific tools to actualize his dream he postponed it to another life and waited for its miraculous advent by the power of God. Now all the functions of the ethnic gods are slowly passing into the hand of man. He no longer fears the eclipse nor cowers in dread before the evil spirits of the earth. After long ages of anguish he is learning to control drought and famine, disease and physical pain. He is mastering the oceans, the deserts, the land, and the air. Gradually the centuries of greed and tyranny and competition are giving way to the new day of mutual aid, democracy, and co-operation. The ages of savagery, both barbaric and cultured, in which poverty and degradation and cruel injustice broke the hearts of men, have reached their twilight time. The new era of democracy and science spells the doom of tyrants, political, economic, and religious. Humanity has awakened, equipped at last with weapons, to break the fetters of cruelty and oppression; to dispel the blight of slavery and the horrors of war. Man understands now that he is free; that vice and crime and ignorance and incompetence may be removed and a new social order reared upon the tortured, blood-stained earth. All the old terrors and tragedies of life which drove men through the ages to seek refuge in another world or to find comfort in a divine savior are to be driven out of the society of man. This achievement is to be man's glory. In the words of James, "Evil will be overcome not by getting it *aufgehoben* in the Absolute but by dropping it out altogether, throwing it overboard and getting beyond it, helping to make a universe that shall forget its very place and name." Religion will still persist as a powerful driving force in life, but it will be far from the awed, quiescent, resigned, appealing worship of a supernatural power. It will be rather a practical loyalty to human ideals and values. Its cult will be the web of civilization, the vast, multiform organization by which social programs may be carried through. Its dreams of future glory will keep close to the bounds of scientific prediction, yet

the wonderful growth of scientific control leaves wide windows of hope open for man. It may be that the innermost secrets of life and of death may at last unfold before his persistent inquiry and unflinching toil.

This, or something akin to this, seems to be the religious implication of instrumentalism. It is not an *apologia* for religion; but with this final surrender of the ontology of Protestant orthodoxy the basis is laid for the religion of the new age of science and democracy. When Descartes and Galileo challenged the world-view of Catholicism in the name of the new science; when Luther challenged the authority of the church in the name of individual freedom; when Cromwell challenged the divine right of kings in the name of the worth of the common man, there were, on each occasion, multitudes who thought that the most essential things were being destroyed. Yet the human spirit moved onward to ever larger liberty and light. To give up the last shadow of supernaturalism, to face frankly the facts of human experience, and to begin seriously and scientifically to construct the kingdom of human brotherhood on earth may be the way that leads to our Renaissance of religion. One might venture that it is closely akin to the practical spirit of Jesus of Nazareth. And if a seer could lay his heart to the great heart of humanity he might discover that this gospel of creative idealism, of science, and of democracy is our deepest human need.

It is merely commonplace to say that religion dies only when it is no longer needed. Only when a doctrine fails to interpret life is it in danger of dissolution. One is able to see in all the array of religions of mankind valuable instruments for the service of the life of their age and environment—only when the life-needs change are the old creeds and customs labeled “superstitions.” The period of the war revealed two modern tendencies, on the one hand a stiffening of the conservative ranks in defiant defense of the old orthodoxy, and on the other hand a serious search for a religion intimately related to modern living. We have been witnessing the attempt to write the meaning of democracy into the heart of humanity. Many stand in awe as it enters the sacred precincts of theology. If democracy is carried up to God, there can be no

blind submission of the will, no acceptance of evil as good, no special election to honor or to salvation or to service, no mystical, submissive optimism, no "feeling of absolute, unquestioning dependence." James long ago saw that if God is to be, he must be other than an autocrat. Long ago¹ Professor Moore urged as an implication of pragmatism that man must demand "a voice and a vote in the cosmic councils." President McGiffert has recently² said, "Benevolent despotism becomes God no more than man." It seems as though the main current of human thought and even of theological statement were catching up with the pioneer of pragmatism. If at last, in the development of the logic of evolution, democracy, and science, it becomes impossible to rest upon the bases which supported James in his approach to the great Cosmic Companion, and if it becomes necessary, with the instrumentalists, to face the loss of the warmth, consolation, and intimacy of the old religion, we may still remember that James said: "Whether a God exist or whether no God exist in yon blue heaven above us bent, we form at any rate an ethical republic here below. Ethics have as genuine a foothold in a universe where the highest consciousness is human as in a universe where there is a God." If religion is, as it appears to have been, a "universal function of life," those who believe in the continuity of man with the cosmic process should not fear the loss of any real values. There is urgent need, however, that the men of vision shall formulate the deep meaning of modern religion, find a language of appreciation of ultimate human values, create a new loyalty directed to human ideals, a new responsibility for the grandeur of the human task, a new earnestness in our democratic quest for human salvation. A philosophy which sees our achieved values as intrinsically rooted in the nature of the cosmos, which ventures to believe that the cosmic and human flux may be guided in the pathway of the heart's desire, which sees in the intellect a wonderful instrument for projecting ideals and controlling the environment for human service and development, which challenges the deeply intrenched forces of evil with an everlasting defiance, which refuses the absolutist anaesthetic and

¹ In *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, 1910.

² "Christianity and Democracy," *Harvard Theological Review*, XII, 49.

laughs at the club of fatalism, which dares to hope that human hands and hearts shall be able to build at last the democracy of social righteousness, which sees the possible application of the method of science in establishing an international ethic—such a philosophy ought to give light and leadership to religion in this modern age.

But the modern pragmatists maintain a mystifying silence in the matter of constructive religious thought. The world has a right to expect that the philosophy of evolution and democracy will speak in positive terms to our unusually perplexed and troubled multitudes. The feverish quest for an acceptable interpretation of God which has characterized the last decade makes it evident that the majority of contemporary religious men are unable to rest in an attitude of negation or agnosticism. Conscious that science and democracy have changed the factual world, they strive by compromise and concession to make the thought-forms of the old orthodoxy express the religious meaning of today. There is an uncomfortable break between religion and life. Many fear the uncertainty and cling more tenaciously to the dogmas of the past. Some turn from theoretical thinking to practical tasks; some make a religion of the new enthusiasm for social betterment; but the vast majority of men long for a new vision of reality which can bring again the old warmth and security to life, and until the new social democracy finds its religious interpretation we shall not rest. Men are prepared to face the loss of some of the old sanctions and securities, to give up much of the comfortable assurance of the past, but they will not rest in negations. They are too honest for "make-believe"; too serious to be satisfied with less than a religious interpretation of the universe. Rarely has an age been so deeply in earnest, so fired with idealism, so well equipped for thought and action, so conscious of social solidarity, as our age. May we not hope that the pragmatists, who are so well able to do it, will leave the beaten paths of logic and methodology and interpret for this fateful day "the positive creed of life implicit in democracy and science."

OUR SOLDIERS' DOCTRINE OF DEATH

CHARLES HENRY DICKINSON
Calhoun, Alabama

I

Our dead soldiers compel the world they saved, but have themselves lost, to seek the meaning of their death. Answers expressed in terms of their death's accomplishment or of its revelation of human worth leave us un comforted. Only if we can see in their dying an actual and permanent good for those who died will our hearts be appeased for the else unendurable glory of their sacrifice. Such an answer, if it can be won, enfolds all those at least who are of their spiritual kindred, affects all our other faiths and the whole end and art of living.

What answer have our soldiers themselves given? What did death mean to them? It is the American soldier whom Americans question, because we understand best the language of his deeds; while we recognize that whatever was great in his answer was shared by the soldiers of our allies, whom we include in one impartial sorrow, reverence, and hope.

Death did not mean to our soldiers the vastness commensurate with our pride and sorrow. They regarded dying as one incident among the incidents of war, one duty not essentially significant above other duties. This is our soldiers' doctrine of death: Death is one duty not essentially significant above other duties. Can a thought apparently so careless, of death as comparatively so slight a thing, disclose to the most deep and universal mourning of all time the assurance of an actual and permanent good for those who died that humanity might live?

The proof that this was their conviction may be gathered from their letters chosen at random, the testimonies of sympathetic observers, their general conversation and behavior; and the evidence holds good for all sorts and conditions, both officers and

men. To them death was all in the day's work. Reveille, inspection, drill, recreation, march, attack; sleet and sunshine, hunger and rations, filth and bath; shells, gas, nests of machine guns, games behind the lines; work of every kind, fighting under every test of endurance, resourcefulness, and daring; lying out wounded, going West—there appeared to them no radical distinction in any one part of their service above any other part. Officers to be obeyed, Fritzies to be beaten, nurses and Salvation Army lasses to thank God for, peasants and children to be tended; trench, open fighting, hospital, rest-camp, grave—everything was according to orders, everything was in the day's work, one indiscriminated duty in all that was to be done or endured.

It was not that they regarded death lightly: they took none of their intense experiences lightly. Least of all when they made a jest of them. Men must jest at that which cannot be borne without jesting. The faces restored to us are traced with most unyouthful lines; their eyes have seen that which no vision should be compelled to suffer. In their merging of dying with other things to be overcome there is no bravado, indifference, suppression of any essential of manhood.

When we speak of their indiscriminate regard for duty, dying or other, we are not to think of their doing what they had to do because of abstract principle. Duty was to them the present act that was due. Any consideration beyond this their directness laughed to scorn, as when the army's amateur preachers exhorted them to be mindful of principle. The deed that was then to be done they needed not to remove into any general category, from which to derive back a sense of obligation. The morality is as weak as the philosophy is shallow which separates the inspiring sanctity of any deed from the deed itself into something transcendent of the very deed, whether the transcendence be called duty, God, Christ, or whatever. If these, duty, God, Christ, are not concrete in the deed they exist not anywhere. It is in this vital sense of duty that our boys regarded death as not essentially significant above other duties.

II

Their doctrine is not ours. If it were, all our thought concerning them would have been revolutionized. Then our mourning, while it might not be less, would have a different quality. It is their death which occupies us, overwhelms us as different from all else, threatening sometimes to obliterate all else. Their attitude almost affronts our love. So irreparable a disaster to us is the loss of them that we feel they wronged us not to take the loss more heavily, as if they flung upon us the burden. Did it mean no more to them to leave us, when it cost us the light out of the sky?

When such stress of grief, wearing itself out for a while, passes into the nervous fret that our dead were not in all respects as we would have wished them to be, we are tempted to resent the absence in them of sensibilities which we had attributed to the soldier fighting and dying in a great cause. Our own sentiments are wounded by their mere tolerance of the elegiac poetry and music that bring swift tears to our civilian eyes. They preferred "Over There." We may allege their reflective poets, like Seeger. But the genius of these men won few responses from our soldiers. Such aesthetic failing is relieved by their indifference or mirth over sentimental tributes to their devotion. There was little of that romanticism which, envisaging the last great enemy in his terror and majesty, exultantly greets him as a friend. Nor did there often appear the debonair behavior in death's presence as of the young Parisian warriors of *Les Misérables*. The survivors may become gradually affected by our feelings toward the fallen, just as an audience of Grand Army veterans sometimes weeps when the orator of Memorial Day mourns unto them. But in their lodge meeting afterward they revert to their accustomed soldierly attitude, which is that of our boys who return from the front, or remain forever there.

It was not—may it be said again—that these young men were hardened against death. Their hearty comradery was not indifferent to it when their mates fell beside them. Of all men they seemed human, sanely sensitive, as they exulted over letters from home and sweethearts, fed little children, warmed the terror out of them, and taught them how to play again. They were not insensible

to the essential goodness of life, to the German bestiality they fought down, to the universe of suffering they redeemed, to the grief of home folks learning that it had been our last look of them when we saw them march away. They did not try to put out of mind the threat that ever companioned them. The arithmetically gifted calculated the chances of survival, more or less favorable according to the situation, and imparted the results of their science to those less accomplished. But every quality of theirs is so subordinate to their indiscriminating soldierly duty, which refuses to consider dying as essentially significant above other duties, that our sentiments seem alien to them, fail to get the range of them. The feelings implicit in their doctrine of death are so different from what was expected by those who never waited for the poison gas sweeping down the east wind, nor in the training-camp made body and soul athletic for hard-won victory.

Their doctrine offends our religious doctrine—rather, our religious sentiment. At most times indeed we were accustomed to put death out of mind and to attend exclusively to this world's business and pleasure, but when we had occasion to think of it we required of ourselves a fitting solemnity. But their religious advisers testify, with varied feelings, to the general absence in our soldiers of any emphasis at least upon the customary religious thoughts connected with dissolution. The Catholic soldiers accepted as a matter of course the dogmas of the church on this subject as on all others, but their wise chaplains, trained really to know real men, gave little instruction in this tenet. Of the other soldiers, mostly unchurchly, few argued that death ends all. If an exhorter should intimate the possibility of any dead comrade going to Hell, this was insult irretrievable, blasphemy that has never forgiveness. That such a thought insulted and blasphemed God was not the cause of their indignation. This is something different from a religious conception as commonly understood. Not from sources so various and vague came the power of their ultimate devotion. They did not dwell upon the celestial glory appropriate to the supreme courage and the final sacrifice.

For what is death, my friends, that I should fear it!
To die? Why, 'tis to triumph, 'tis to join—

Such lines sound incongruous applied to them. It is the lack of what seems to us the religious consciousness which perplexes us most in those whom we long to reverence according to the measure of our grateful love. We try to attribute to them our own attempts at faith, which must be, one would infer, deepened and intensified in them by the terrific facts they faced, faith in God and immortality, and all the transcendencies by which we supposed the greatest things must be won.

And yet may it not be possible that their seeming unfaith is faith different but far from inferior to that which we consider desirable? These common men, with common men's standards uncommonly disciplined and energized—have they perhaps been lifted into moral imperatives which make them our guides in the deep things of the soul? Is our soldiers' doctrine, of death conceived as one duty not essentially significant above other duties, a clearer unfolding of that which is implicit in death?

III

Our soldiers' doctrine, like every other, must be understood genetically. Its immediate origin is the military discipline of the Allied armies. For it is military discipline that makes soldiers, and these men became completely soldiers. Though the sources of this their faith are traceable to the genius of free people, consciousness of participation in the cause of world-wide liberty, indignation against crimes whose forms were learned from the crassest savagery and whose spirit is of a degeneracy unprecedented, and to reverent compassion for those whose sufferings, estimated by the moral worth of the sufferers, were from outrages unparalleled, yet all these forces were made consummately practical in the military discipline which directly formed our soldiers both in action and in conviction.

This discipline, thus realized, makes everything required of the soldier a duty absolute, a categorical imperative, from cleaning up camp to cleaning up a world, from the first "Fall in!" to the last "Let's go!" All sorts of men came into the training-camp, the clean and the polluted, the unregulated and the self-controlled, yet with a general readiness to do what might be required of them.

Military discipline laid its hand upon them all, in every moment of their service, their leaves of absence not excepted. If the soldier will give himself up to the molding of this all-pervasive law, well. If he will not, compulsion is instant and severe. But never did compulsion, even in its severest and rarest forms, in cases when our army's principle of discipline ceased to apply to the offender in order that it might apply to the rest, stop short of its purpose to make the hearts of our soldiers one with inviolable law. This discipline is very jealous of any motive not implicit in itself. Officers did not preach it: that would be to deny it. It wisely excluded from the camp all professional preachers of every creed who had not been trained in its strictness. Unwise, as the event has proved, was the admittance of amateur exhorters. "What is the sense," remonstrated a Christian officer, "of talking all sorts of Christian motives to these men to persuade them to do what military discipline requires them to do!" Here was no disparagement of Christian motives, but the recognition of them in their effective unity. He spoke the sentiment of his men. It was not that the conventional moral and religious appeals were too high for their comprehension; they went wide of our soldiers' position. It was the military discipline, with no adventitious aid, which held them and led them till a soldier's duty became incarnate in them. His duty, kneaded into him till it was he! Nothing less than that in the first eccentric wanderings of the awkward squad; nothing higher than that along blind paths of death through Argonne Forest to November 11 at Sedan.

The distinction between this principle of military discipline and that of Germany is none the less important for not being obvious. In both, the purpose of army training is "to win battles." In both, absolute and instant obedience as a second nature is demanded, with heavy penalties inflicted upon any approach to insubordination, even "to reason why." Yet there are indications, on the surface, of a fundamental difference. One of these is the initial superiority of the German army as a fighting machine. There was an automatic carrying out of orders, invaluable when it does not destroy other soldierly qualities. There was again the attitude of German officers toward their men, not different indeed

in demanding and enforcing obedience, but in the superman assumption, which excluded the mutual sense of equality of duty in him who commanded and in him who obeyed. There was also the difference which has been most remarked, the successful effort in our army for individual intelligence of response and initiative, "the instinctive calling into play of all the faculties upon command." "Superiors will direct their subordinates what to do, not how to do it." These chief differences, of free though no less obedient action as against mechanical action, of the consciousness of moral unity in officers and men as against the relation of master and slave, and of the development of the whole efficient manhood as against its suppression, point to the fundamental distinction, of free moral obedience which is duty, in the one case, and of servitude and compulsion in the other. It is a question, not of the comparative amount of courage, but of its moral quality, in which indeed practical effectiveness is at length seen to be involved. The higher soldierliness is by no means denied to all German soldiers: there are souls that keep essential moral freedom under any external servitude. But we have only to try to transfer in fancy our soldiers to the German ranks, to perceive the essential disparity between our enemies and those who, enlisting freely or as members of a nation that enlisted freely, found in the service nothing that did not lead them on to free manhood fulfilled in duty.

IV

Thus did our boys learn that duty is greater than dying, and that, if dying is required, it is the duty that gives worth to death. This recognition of what our soldiers became removes the temptation of excessive, indiscriminate, or sentimental praise. They were young men with all the frailties of ordinary young manhood, who had sinned as young men sin, many of them grossly and frequently. They were exposed in camp to contaminations which no military discipline could extirpate. They were flung into a strife whose immediate object, however holy the ultimate purpose, was to kill. Let all such allegations be admitted, even with the addition of ignorant or malicious charges unproved or even disproved; none the less there had been implanted in them by the

military discipline of the higher type the supremacy of duty as making even the suffering of death its incident, and just that duty became their directive purpose, their essential being. A recreant few were among them but not of them. The delinquents indicate by their moral separateness that the attainment of the vast majority was the free choice of self-determining man. In the almost integral ranks some gained more slowly than the rest the comprehension of the requirement. Some of these were in subsidiary work, some were conscripted late in the war, but the backward ones were on their way. Some erred more, some less, from standards to which they continually returned. Devotion to a soldier's duty, in this case man's highest obligation, affected in different degrees the speech and action, the feeling and thought, which did not belong directly to their duties as soldiers; but the permeating power of that devotion is revealed, among other instances, by their rare magnanimity to the conquered enemy and by their gentleness to those whom he had outraged. All the failings, frankly acknowledged, throw into relief the essential attainment. We rightly attribute to one making the supreme sacrifice that which he proves himself to be in the most searching test, though his essential character surges up from unsuspected depths. But in our soldiers we have more than that: not a momentary moral ecstasy, but a full-formed, abiding quality, evidenced in their entire service of living and dying.

Many of our soldiers will not continue to be in peace altogether what they were in war, unless the ethical history of mankind shall attain a new stage more suddenly than we can hope. There will be reactions, many of them temporary, some permanent, from a moral overstrain, excitements of the lower nature will often be substituted for the stress of war, and from these reactions our soldiers will be judged by critics superficial, cynical, and pharisaical. They exchange a society permeated at every moment by duty, for one which has discovered no sufficient moral discipline. Their duty had a social object, humanity, concretely served; they return to an environment where individualism is prevalent, where success is still to the multitude the outstripping of one's fellows, happiness the gratification of self-regarding desires,

industry a blind struggle toward economic democracy by undemocratic ways and motives, and religion the saving of one's own soul. In so sudden a transition character may be impaired before the adjustment is completed. Demoralizing disappointment awaits many in the closing or checking of civilian careers which had been successfully begun, in the loss of former industrial opportunities, often usurped by the less worthy. The wounded, the exhausted, the physical wrecks of men, will be tried by fearful tests of soul. The returning soldiers will feel resentments, some just, some not entirely justified, against their country's insufficient gratitude or its misdirected efforts to meet the economic difficulties involved. Sentimental laudation will be followed by neglect, excitement over their return by popular absorption in the next excitement. It will be a long and pregnant story of solicitations to an unforming of their soldierliness. Yet though in many cases the strength may be unflexed which made them truest of true soldiers, multitudes will remain in their deepest life that which they proved themselves to be, not at one moment only but through interminable endurance, not in a single act but in the consistent course of the duty that gives value to the final deed. Our hope for an environment of adequate social discipline, for a constructively revolutionized industrialism, for religion that returns at last to Jesus' sacrificial gospel, rests largely upon the inalienable quality wrought out in our soldiers. This hope is reinforced by those historic effects, clearly traceable from Marathon down, which other ennobling wars have impressed upon the soldiers engaged in them, and upon the nations into which their heroes infused the power of their own devotion.

When we ask, To what or to whom was the duty paid? we seem to encounter limitations of our praise. Duties, to cite the traditional classification, are divided into those owed to ourselves, those owed to our fellow-men, and those owed to God. Of the first and third of these compartments our soldiers had little recognition, unless indeed they force us to new meanings of both terms. In regard to the first, it is one of the most significant facts of the Great War that individual appeals fell on stony ground. Exhortations to chastity and sobriety as duties owed to self-respect were

notoriously repudiated by the cleanest-living multitude of men ever assembled. The same duties laid down by officers as necessary to army discipline and efficiency were respectfully received and loyally obeyed. The individual as such was not an object of moral interest. Even greater impatience was manifested toward self-regarding motives of conduct, such as Heaven, or the advantages and satisfactions of a righteous life. These men had been plunged into a social unity and effort where the individual is nothing, save as by losing himself he finds himself in the humanity he lives for and dies for, humanity not conceived as mass or abstraction, but as fellow-men in whom each man suffers and rejoices and overcomes. Therefore this apparent limitation in the objects of duty is the removal of a limitation. It is the formation of the social man, in whom all the universal elements of ethical personality rise into new significance and power.

Of duties owed to God they seemed to take little thought. Admonitions to "get right with God," to "give their hearts to Christ and follow Him," were for the most part met with indifference or ridicule from men whose lives were given to the supreme right, and whose faces were set steadfastly toward Calvary. Exhortations to an emotionally mystical religious experience, labeled conversion, incited rather than repressed the flagrant profanity of camp and battle. Apologies may be indulgently offered for profanity in a life of such stress and strangeness that ordinary speech is not sufficient to express it, and it is almost compelled to borrow from the highest realms of reverence and the lowest depths of infamy. War cannot be expected to refine the speech of those accustomed to curse in civil life. But apologies for what we indeed deplore become less urgent when we reflect that the God they swore by is not the Supremacy they served. The divine names connoted to them the tradition of a being who is apart from that to which they gave their lives. They never cursed in the name of flag or country or their great cause. It is a question too extensive for the limits of this discussion, whether religion must not seek God, no longer where our traditions have sought him, but where these soldiers found him—whether the all-inclusive object of their undifferentiated duty is not God as the supreme cause we

fight for, infinite and eternal, in immanent leadership, in consummate sacrifice unfolding into perfect victory.

In this socializing experience duties owed to self and duties owed to God were thus lost and found again in duties owed to one's fellow-men. This disciplinary process was as concrete as implicitly universal. They were initiated into the squad, that innermost circle of the great fraternity, that eightfold expansion and concentration of personality. The squad was in and for the company, in which the discipline of obedience was incarnated. The company was for the regiment, the preciousness of whose honor obliterated the preciousness of individual life. The regiment was for the larger unifications, of the division, of the army, of enlisted country, of the armed international alliance, of sufferers to be set at liberty, of the endangered world to be redeemed, of the great cause which is our soldier's deity, than whom there is no God higher and holier, whose outpourings of power sweep back through all those organized self-renunciations, even to the simplest and intensest of them. This process and attainment needed not to be formulated: it was felt. It needed not to be clearly felt: it was lived.

But there must be a deeper reason for what our soldiers were, beneath that of a military discipline necessarily similar to the German in form and immediate purpose, but, as we have seen, alien in fundamental principle. Though men are not to be judged in the mass, yet judgment upon men individually must be completed by estimating them in and by their organizations. This estimate applies to nations, thence to their armies, enabling us rightly to evaluate both our own soldiers and those of our allies, and their spirit of undifferentiated duty in all that they had to do.

A great Belgian author has recently emphasized the distinction between the spirit of a nation and the characters of the individual members of that nation, fraternally instancing the immaculate glory of the soul of France in distinction from whatever frailty and incompleteness are humanly inevitable to her citizens. But may it not be questioned with all deference whether this noble view does not contain an element too mystical or conceptual? Where shall the soul of France be sought except in the citizens of France, who together are France, not indeed as isolated units to be

summarized, but as interblending personalities? The French tradition and ideal have their existence in her citizens. Each soul in France forms itself from other sources of growing personality, and each imparts itself to others, toward the continuous formation of France and humanity, of France first, thence of her allies. The glorious soul of France is formed in and from concrete persons so possessed by the same moral purpose that this possession has become the essential of them, mighty to subdue the remainders of the baser nature, and they infuse this essential character into their fellows, till the nation as a spiritual completeness of united persons is permeated with it, and it becomes national that it may become universal. What is true of France is true of those nations which are, we rightly say, one with her in heart and soul.

Now in an army, national or of nations allied in a great cause, the process works most freely and completely. For an army must be made a unity by military discipline, and the quality of that discipline is determined by what the nation demands. We are therefore justified in a profound reverence for the individual soldiers generally of our army and our allies. Whatever in them remains unsubdued to the pervasive finer quality, yet that high thing has become in concrete reality their essential character.

But is there anything in their moral attainment which makes them ethical supermen? Would not men generally, if exposed to the forces which molded these soldiers, have done precisely what they did, and in their spirit? When we trace to its origin their doctrine of death as loyalty to the all-embracing duty that ennobles death as it glorifies all else they did and suffered, and find that it is the effect of a military discipline that springs from the spirit of an illumined nation, we feel ourselves in the presence of a power that is mighty to subdue all men unto itself. Our soldiers insist that there is not in any part of their service anything unexpected or exceptional, anything above the reach of other men. "Of course I done it," a soldier remonstrates against his praise; "who wouldn't 'a' done it?" Certainly that which is most deeply universal in humanity has realized itself in them. They are what all men are meant to be. They are what all men who have not sold their human birthright are implicitly. Their claim to possess and fulfil the

universal human is their right to the deepest, highest praise, which they demand in proud self-abnegation, knowing themselves wronged and humanity, which is their essential being, wronged if just this praise is denied or obscured. This universal human worth which they fulfilled brings them closest to us, as they arouse in us our lowliest, manliest response to that which is most simply human. There is nothing too great to be expected of common manhood.

Duty is often regarded as a relatively inferior moral conception, though not so regarded by plain men, to whom it connotes the highest things. But the greatness of the conception depends upon the greatness of that to which the duty responds and the spiritual wealth which the duty brings to the performance of its task. When rendered to the great cause of humanity and God it is filled with the supreme purpose, embraces all spiritual ends, and reveals itself as perfect freedom. Yet at its height of heights it is safeguarded against sentimentalism, assumption of superiority, introspective self-satisfaction. In Gethsemane, on the cross, the devotion of the holiest to the holiest is still the humble dutifulness of doing the Father's will.

V

Our soldiers' doctrine of death is that death is a duty not essentially significant above other duties. When this view has been contrasted with conventional sentiments, its genesis and development traced, its moral value estimated, and its spiritual significance recognized, then the question comes back upon us with increased intensity: Does anything in this conviction disclose to the most deep and universal mourning of all time the assurance of an actual and permanent good for those who died that humanity might live? The problem of the future life has immensity when asked concerning any man. When urged in behalf of one who is loved, its poignancy obliterates every other question. When the beloved life that has gone rejoiced with youth's vitality in the universe which the mortal senses know, there is indignant remonstrance against the whole visible and tangible universe which excludes from itself the possibility of a future life dis severed from the senses. Pile upon these heights the immeasurable gratitude for that which these deaths have

brought us, and multiply the immensity, the poignancy, the remonstrance, the baffled gratitude, by the millions upon millions of our dead, and did ever such agonizing importunity knock at the unreverberating portals of the hereafter?

What material for an answer is offered by our soldiers' doctrine of death? Their conviction that death is a duty not significant above other duties makes death incidental to life when life is the performance of duty, and nothing less than that is worthy the name of life. Thus they stand opposed to the two doctrines of death that have mainly expressed, or at least formulated, the general expectation of mankind. One of these is that death is finality. "There is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in the grave whither thou goest." The other, so far as it is a hope and not a dread, is that death is a transfer into the traditional Heaven of reward, where faith is exchanged for sight, conflict for victory, effort for rest, sacrifice for an unsacrificial blessedness eternal. Many orthodox hymns may be quoted as the statement of this doctrine. The worth of these two doctrines consists largely in the repugnance which each holds against the other, the ground of which in either case is the dim consciousness of a faith denied by each equally. Each involves failure to estimate life's supreme quality.

The chief goods of the brighter of these two expectations are not faith, conflict, effort, sacrifice, but their opposites conceived as rewards for the ennoblements of life which are at length to be laid aside. Holiness and love are indeed promised, but as gifts conferred, and thus devoid of character achieved and maintained. Though there is often mingled with this hope, consciously or unconsciously, the different conviction which makes death incidental to unconquerable life, yet the two faiths are essentially separate, and one of our most important tasks is to keep the higher uncontaminate from the lower. Also the higher faith includes participation in the divine blessedness and demands the perfecting of all things, but from a different basis of affirmation and in an opposed conception. Even when the traditional hope emphasizes the vision and worship of God, vision and worship are separated from a service whose essential is sacrifice to the uttermost—separate, that is, from the very essential of the moral and spiritual life taught by Jesus. The

religion of Jesus, in this hope, ceases at the gate of Heaven. The Crucified becomes our leader into the opposite of that which we love him for, and of that which we trust him to enable us to achieve in our innermost life, for which there would remain "no work nor device nor knowledge nor wisdom" in the Heaven whither thou goest.

This hope of Heaven is based upon our fond desires. We long for that which we never attain in this world, or attaining lose, and so we dream of fruitions of hope under fairer skies. We long for surcease of pain, sorrow, disappointment, and, having to endure them while life lasts, we are comforted by the thought that at death the burdens shall be rolled away. Above all, our weariness longs for rest. Disillusion conceiving a remoter hope belongs to a small and ignoble part of life and is alien to life's manlier joys and victories. Its foundation is as insecure as all longings for happiness prove themselves to be. Even if we base this faith upon a good God whose pity will offer us relief at last, such a faith in God, which is common, is itself founded upon the same ungratified desires. It is significant that this faith lapses easily into its apparent contradiction, the expectation of the finality of death. For we cannot really gain assurance that what we vainly long for here shall be given us elsewhere, still less that the gift can afford us satisfaction, or be therefore aught else than an eternal burden intolerable. Our expectation is beset with fears on either hand, fears that it may be false and fears lest it may be true. Therefore the hope tends to contract itself into the longing of our weariness for nothing else than rest, which any consciousness would render incomplete. To some hearers the soul-shattering pathos of the Manzoni *Requiem* sings at its "dying fall" not hope but renunciation, as its "Requies Eterna" sinks our beloved into oblivion.

The rejection of this hope on ethical and spiritual grounds is not inconsistent with sympathy for it as the dream of the oppressed, as it was the consolation of America's negro slaves, whose spiritual songs are full of it. One cannot refuse the relief of opium to intolerable pain, though the medicine has no curative value and is pernicious save for exceptional need; nor does the failure of a positive moral and spiritual worth in the traditional expectation

deny a comparative moral value. It is better to dream of such a Heaven than to sink into sensuality, the alternate recourse for a life of sordid helplessness, though frequently both reliefs are used by the same pitiful person. Yet even so, to recognize something above the sensual may be the first step toward the spiritual. This hope of Heaven is at any rate a hope, and hope is better than despair or insensibility. "And if we hope for that which we see not, then do we with patience wait for it," and patience is the inalienable virtue of the helpless. The conditions prescribed for the realization of this hope are partly ethical, though generally accompanied by the superstitions and moral deadenings imposed by an ecclesiasticism whose most potent weapon is this very hope of Heaven, with its obverse, the dread of Hell; yet the ethical conditions are impaired by the unethical aim and nature of external reward. It would be a desperate world if the great host of the very poor, the war-stricken, the outraged, were limited to this hope.

But even the halting apologies for the traditional view of the hereafter fall away whenever a man has a real life to live in the world and in the development of his own soul and the soul of humanity. Then it is no longer possible to wait for a Heaven that is to be given, in a waiting which accomplishes nothing for the improvement of the conditions of life nor for the development of life itself, one's own life in and for humanity's life. The faith based upon fond longings is recognized by soldierly men and women as hostile to progress, ineffective against evil. It is no ground of censure that popular movements for social reforms, whatever their other excellencies or defects, often repudiate this hope of Heaven and the God of this hope, as opposed to that which is right and useful in their cause; and there is no reason for censure that a religion with the same traditions found little access to our soldiers fighting and dying in a great cause, nor to men who possess their spirit. If the hope is still held traditionally, as a creed, it is yet distinct from manhood, and its falling away is so inevitable as to be often unconscious.

Our soldiers' doctrine of death may be seen to be equally opposed to the acceptance of death as a finality. Whether they expected

immortality is not the question; we have not undertaken to discover their conceptions of the hereafter. The contention is simply that the acceptance of death as a duty not essentially different from other duties will be found to be vitally opposed to the view that death ends all.

The denial of a future life has various causes. It may be the conclusion to which many intellectual men felt themselves forced—that the relation of the physical and the mental, roughly termed body and soul, is such that the dissolution of the former marks the cessation of the latter. Yet even when the case seemed most desperate for soul, the terrific facts could not quite pronounce our doom. For they encountered even then the possibility of a miracle of re-creation in a realm beyond the world of science, which excludes such possibility only from itself. But we are not now driven from the face of investigation and thought into the merely possible inconceivable. Recent closer examination of facts and deeper estimates of them leave the question open. There is no fact known to us which closes the discussion, and, as a study of our soldiers' faith will make clear, there can be none.

The denial of immortality may have grounds debased or excellent. The brute knows nothing above the brutal. And though the brute may speak with man's voice and think with man's mind, and though he imagines his brutish gratifications extended through eternity, yet his implicit consciousness is that the end of the material is the end of all. No answer is due him, whether he blazons abroad or dissembles his blasphemy of the human soul, except the opposition of men who by doing their duty even unto death have silenced such blasphemies forever.

But the denial has often nobler motives. It is frequently the rejection of an immortality founded upon mere hope and longing because these expectations have no basis of assurance, and also because they are morally unworthy and distract from or deny the ethical tasks of present living. In a justified repulsion from the traditional hope of Heaven, in the disclaiming of reward for toil and sacrifice when the reward both as reward and in its contents offers something infinitely below the intrinsic worth of toil and sacrifice, a rapidly increasing army of servants of humanity live without

hope, that they may the more earnestly live with God in the world. This denial of the traditional hope is often held not positively but agnostically, and in multitudinous instances more is the working creed of those who are absorbed in the present world of present service without concern for what may be beyond. In them is the destruction of the ancient longing for a life deprived of life's manlier elements. In them is largely the power of the affirmation wrought by our soldiers' deeds. For those who have given themselves to sacrificial service hold implicitly two great faiths in one: the first, that their life is in its nature above material things, and the second, that the ends of their toil and conflict have permanent significance.

The finality of death is the denial of all that such men hold dear, when they reach the complete estimate of achieving, self-sacrificing life. There is indeed a greatness of soul in working without hope of reward here or hereafter. But when this self-abnegation is seen to annihilate the very magnanimity that originated it—for when life is gone then its quality is gone—a personal hope appears which is directed to nothing else than the continuance of the devoted life. This moral demand grows clearer when one thinks of other men, for then any admixture of self-centered desire obscuring the sacrificial nature of the immortal life that unselfish service demands is removed. It is all but impossible to think that everything attained by our soldiers' devotion must forever be to them as if it had never been. They would indeed have advanced none the less steadily, though into nothingness, from the same motive which impelled the fulfilment of every other obligation, for they had been disciplined to do every duty without regard to consequences. And this inconsiderateness of what might be beyond death increases the difficulty of supposing that the universe is false to them, the true. And yet any one of them might say, "Let me perish if only that which I died for continues to bless other men; let me die utterly that the world may live." But those they served unto the uttermost are included in their fate. Though the redemption which our soldiers wrought should for ages bring forth and expand every mortal good even beyond the dreams of the *Prometheus Unbound*, yet these countless billions of happy men would drop into nothingness, until finally

throughout the lifeless earth and under the extinguished sky all the fruits of the ages grown upon our soldiers' graves would be as if they had never been. Whether a universe external to men's best selves, or a God separate from men's sacrificial service, would accept our remonstrance to such an annihilation of men's devotion, supposing such a universe or such a God to exist, is not at this point the question. The assertion is simply that men to whom death is one duty not essentially distinguished from other duties have that in them which denies that death is finality.

Our soldiers' formulation of the faith which was their life is of little concern. Their possession of the life to which death is but an incident reinforces, by all they were and all they did and all they gave, that vital faith in the hereafter which is alone possible to devotion becoming conscious of its own nature.

This life is rightly called the life of the spirit. The phrase suggests an infinite universe distinct in its nature, though capable of subduing to itself all that which manifests itself to sense and which mind may re-create from sense, as the immeasurable spaces and the innumerable stars and all that these contain. The spiritual universe calls us to an inexhaustible exploration of its nature and to searching distinctions of itself from all that which it is not, and to the relations by which it is to make the other its instrument. Yet it is present and possessed whenever an element of life declares itself as underived from anything in that other. Such a possession is in even the simplest duty. Whoever gains duty by unqualified obedience to it, whoever accepts the unconditioned "ought" of any demand, has entered that spiritual universe to which "the heavens are a tent to dwell in." To him who lives this life, though in the slightest and faintest beginnings, which yet impart the infinite, death is incidental. For no material process can check that which is unconditioned by it, nor affect more than the outward manifestations of that which is of a different nature. This life is eternal by its very being. Itself and its eternity cannot indeed be demonstrated by anything lower than itself, would be disproved if it could be. It therefore accepts the title of life of faith, for faith is its essential—faith in its own implicit nature, faith in the infinite and eternal immanent in it, wherein it lives and moves and has its being.

Its ONGOINGS can never forsake its inalienable elements of faith, effort, devotion, sacrifice. Denying death as finality, it equally denies that dream of the hereafter which is based upon ungratified longings and disillusioned hopes. It is this life whose appeal is reinforced by all that our soldiers were and did and gave, in their conviction that dying is one duty not essentially significant above other duties, that death is an incident in the life of duty. To our appreciation of this life they have also contributed two elements, essential but hitherto obscured.

Our soldiers have brought the life of the spirit, with eternity in its heart, within the reach of common men and common hours. This life has been too much associated with exceptional souls and exceptional experiences. It suggests vision, mysticism, ecstasy, raptures of prayer; the Buddhas attaining Nirvana; Plato "using the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts to that other beauty, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting," with which are identified the true and the good; Plotinus' ecstasy, violently grasping integration with the Infinite; raptures of the ages of faith; spiritualized romanticism piercing through the forms of things to the invisible; Paul caught up into Paradise; the five hundred brethren kneeling before the heavenly glory of their risen Master; the early church waiting for the coming of God's Son from Heaven, where their citizenship is, and their hidden life, dead to the world. Spiritual life, founded upon such models, requires temperamental gifts, allotted to the few, and obliterated, except to the elect among these few, by the incessant demands of physical existence. This spirituality is the privilege of an aristocracy. Or the spiritual may be sought in sublime heroisms, martyrdoms of every world-conquering faith, up to the prayer of Gethsemane and the triumphant agony of the cross. Opportunity for these heroic spiritualities is not granted to most men.

Our soldiers' conviction that death is a duty not essentially different from other duties emphasizes the spirituality universally attainable. For duty is, as we have reflected, one essential element at least of the spiritual universe as distinguished from the lower order, and one which is unconditioned and unchecked by that lower. They so recognized the supernal power of duty that even the utmost

heroism and devotion has its worth to them only in its identification with the commonest tasks of the soldier's life. And these tasks are one with all common tasks, for the same duty in all makes them all one. Duty was conceived by them more vitally and therefore more spiritually than by the world's great teacher Kant, evangelist of the moral law. Enfranchising it from the categorical abstractness and conceptualism by which he was limited, they made it purposeful in its attainment of supreme ends for humanity, and therefore a life of faith in God's great cause in which He energizes. They revealed its spiritual almightiness against the centralized powers of Hell. And this spirituality they made appealing to all men by its compassionate ministries to the broken-hearted and by the beauty of their devoted youth. Subordinating to duty their last full measure of devotion, they made its least instance in human life glorious with the glory of their final overcoming of the world. By making death an incident of duty's sacrificial life they have revealed to every man who does a plain man's duty the fulness of the spirit, the certainty of the eternal. For common men feel that they have not the gifts, the culture, or the opportunities for the spiritual life whose usual offer so bewilders them. The answer which every minister of the spiritual life hears repeatedly from plain men is this: "We just do the best we can," or "the best we know." How often have we seen them turning unresponsively from the message tinged with churchly mysticism and, following them to their tasks, have found our assumptions of spirituality put to shame by a plain man's duty plainly done. The completeness and the commonness of duty, which in every doing of it is not essentially different from a soldier's dying that men might live, not essentially different from Jesus' dying that men might live, this is our soldiers' evangel, this is the offer of faith, spirituality, eternity, for every task, to every man.

Here is the assurance of hope for the brotherhood of sorrow, so multiplied by terrible initiations in these incredible years. Not to sink under pain and wrong, consoling ourselves with a passive longing, but to conquer in our own souls and to do our utmost to subdue conditions to the soul's demand—this life of duty achieves duty's inalienable and immortal possession.

This soldierly evangel both criticizes and appreciates the spirituality of exceptional men and exceptional hours. Such experiences may be nothing more than hypnotisms, auto-suggestions, nervous overstrains, flights of fancy, self-delusions. Or they may be the concentration of a devoted life upon its center, its source of power. "By their fruits ye shall know them," by their reinforcements or depletions of moral strength in the daily conflict and service, where their quality is both tested and realized, whether or not they are fountainheads of power to irrigate our fields of toil. Or if the spiritual is sought in world-conquering heroism such deeds are culminations. They grow from a daily life of world-conquering spirituality. The highest of them is but one duty not essentially significant above any other duty. In the undistinguished duty are implicit the vision of God, the fellowship of the cross, the power of the life eternal.

The spiritual life to which death is but an incident incurs also the danger of an individualism which vitiates its essential nature. From the distractions of men's thronging toils and pleasures the soul that longs to know itself in its underlying life, its reality, turns to solitude; from the tumult of the crowd it is led up into the wilderness. In loneliness and quietness are unveiled its deep discoveries, are wrought its vast self-realizations. God meets his prophets in the wilderness. But there is the temptation of the wilderness, to separate the spiritual achievement from the life we live with and in and through our fellow-men. Then the spiritual is counterfeited in a deadlier egoism, and the way to the unsocial Hell diverges at the very gate of the Celestial City. The victory of spirituality against its most intimate enemy is seen in Jesus rejecting the suggested isolations of power, mastery, and dominion, that he might impart the spiritual Heaven of his divine sonship to all the family of which he is the elder brother, and add to all that God could impart to him every manifestation and presence of the divine in men and in the universal divine life which sweeps through humanity.

Our soldiers' life of duty, to which death is an incident, because death is but one duty not essentially significant above any other, was a social life. The eternity which it bears in its heart was theirs because they implicitly sought to unite with themselves every soul

for which they lived and died. They identified themselves with the interblending life of that spiritual universe which we rightly call humanity. And this they did by their sacrificial service, for souls become one eternally in the giving and receiving wrought by sacrifice.

Thus the spiritual life eternal has its clear and appealing revelation in those common men, to whom death, being one duty not essentially significant above any other duty, became an incident in the eternal spiritual life which duty demonstrated. And this undying life they cleared of the misconceptions to which it is liable and which can pervert its nature, by the realization of it as a life accessible to common experience, and as social in its essence, guided to social ends and fulfilled in sacrifice.

Death but an incident! But death is the loss of the physical universe. Death has severed them from earth and all its voices, from the stars and all their splendors, and from everything in thought, feeling, and purpose whose field and object is the world of sense. Yet before the face of duty the earth and the heaven shall flee away, and the life of duty shall feel no loss, no essential difference. Whether the spiritual life shall fling off its vesture or creatively change it for another, it has in either case the assurance of all it needs for infinite self-realization and eternal service. There shall be discoveries and experiences for which mortal speech has no language, mortal thought no conception. But these can be nothing else than unfoldings of the spiritual life which is manifest in every duty.

Death but an incident, only one duty not essentially significant above any other! Why, our hearts remonstrate, they in dying gave nothing less than youth's consciousness of limitless strength and joy, that by their death the world might live! Is there not all heroism, all devotion, all glorious sacrifice, in their dying? Yes; and the unconscious greatness of their creed announces, as with the voice of the many waters of the infinite deep, that nothing less than the supernal splendor of the death they died is in every commonest duty of their service and ours, since each duty has the essential of the spiritual life, the presence of the eternal.

TANTRISM—THE NEWEST HINDUISM

GEORGE W. GILMORE
New York City

Great religions pass through several stages of development until they reach what we may call crystallization in ritual. Frequently then there arises a revolt because of the excessive demand upon the worshiper's effort to maintain a right attitude toward deity. This may result either in the rise of a new religion, or in the revitalizing of the old by resort to the more spontaneous elements of worship, or in both. But in any of these cases there may develop anew the trend toward a fixed and burdensome ritual, possibly less irksome to the devotee, because of greater light on the character of the gods, but still with demands that that come to be felt as excessive.

India furnishes the outstanding example of this course of development. Religious history there shows the hardening of Vedism into Brahmanic crystallization—a single ceremony might theoretically last a thousand years. In protest against this and in revolt came Buddhism and Jainism, followed after a millennium by the fusion of post-Buddhistic Brahmanism into "Hinduism" with all of caste regulation and once more an insupportable ritual. Finally there developed the revolt in what is known as Tantrism, which has as its avowed object the reduction of the effort required to reach what in the Hindu system is equivalent to our "salvation" by suiting that effort to present human ability.¹

This revolt is embodied in a series of writings known as Tantras, regarded as fully inspired—being the *ipsissima verba* of deity—which specifically profess to point the way to an easy attainment of the end of being. To illustrate, the four stages of life through which man passes under the Hindu-Brahmanic system

¹Of course there have been other manifestations of revolt, as for example Sikhism and the various Samajas.

(learner, householder, "forest-dweller"—one who has retired from the duties and work of social life—and *sannyasi*—wandering meditant, done with the world) are reduced to two in Tantrism, householder and *sannyasi*.

The Tantras have as yet been little studied by foreign scholars, even by those versed in Sanskrit. Some few students¹ have spoken of this literature after what must have been the most cursory examination of a few texts, in many cases with almost complete misunderstanding of their purpose and meaning. In palliation or explanation of these facts it must be said that these scriptures exist almost entirely in manuscript. No translation was published in the West of any Tantra till 1913,² or even in India till about 1900, when an inaccurate version in English of the *Mahanirvanatantra* appeared in Calcutta. A further reason for this neglect is that in the Tantras God as Mother is the object of worship, and this was naturally seized upon as indicative of an immoral trend. That the Shivaite Tantras necessarily employ the *lingam* confirmed this conclusion. Additional suspicion was caused by the fact that portions are cryptic, mnemonic, and symbolic, and of course this was seized upon as proving that nastiness was thereby covered up. In short, most of those who came upon the Tantras at all arrived with antagonistic presuppositions so strong that they were incapable of rendering a fair and candid judgment, even if they had been able to read them.

A primary fact in studying this comparatively new movement is that it is not eclectic like some of the Samajes, not a compound of Christianity and Hinduism. It is avowedly a genuine and devoted native effort to fit the Vedic-Brahmanic faith of the first pre-Christian millennium to the needs of modern life in India.

The native description and apologetic of Tantric literature portray it variously but harmoniously: its principal characteristic is the worship of Divinity as Mother; the Tantras are the

¹ Such as W. Ward, H. H. Wilson, L. Barnett, and Monier Williams.

² *Tantra of the Great Liberation (Mahanirvanatantra). A Translation from the Sanskrit, with Introduction and Commentary by Arthur Avalon* (i.e., Justice J. G. Woodroffe, of Calcutta). London: Luzac.

result of the divine Mother's pity for man; they are the breath of Divinity (i.e., divinely revealed, therefore Scripture); they constitute encyclopedic science (i.e., just as the Bible or the Koran have been described as containing all needful knowledge); they are the most correct and practical interpretation of Vedic truth (this statement is intended to convey the idea of their continuity with Vedic, Brahmanic, etc., revelation); they are the words of Shiva (or Kali his spouse) as the Vedas are the words of Brahma; Tantrism is the Vedic religion striving "to reassert itself amidst all those new problems of religious life and discipline which later historical events and developments thrust upon it" (this expresses the idea of modernness in ferment).

The Hindu conception which in the "apologetic" accounts for the Tantras posits a great subdivision of time (*mahayuga*),¹ which is again divided into four ages (*yuga*), each of which had its appropriate Scripture. The first was the golden age of righteousness, when men were long-lived, and physically, mentally, and morally sturdy. In the second age men's righteousness, longevity, stature, and entire strength decreased by a fourth or more. The third age witnessed a further declension of one-half or over, sin and virtue having become equal in force. The present or fourth age (that of Kali—*Kaliyuga*) is characterized by "viciousness, weakness, and the general decline of all that is good." Because of man's infirmity in this age, he is unable to sustain the continued continence and the austerities which in former ages gained for him what corresponds in the Hindu system to the highest heaven of Christian hopes and expectations. A new and easier way, though one not less infallible, must be provided for his salvation. Accordingly (so runs the apologetic), in the interval of one thousand years between the third and fourth ages the Tantras were revealed.

"Revealed" is written with intent; for these writings profess to be the very words of God. They are in dialogue form, Shiva and his spouse conversing respecting the means of salvation for men. A persistent claim, however, is that the Vedas are the

¹ Diacritical and quantity marks are purposely disregarded in citation of native terms in this paper.

“root” of all the various scriptures, just as Jewish apologetic held that the Torah was the essence and root which made the entire Old Testament and even the Talmud “Mosaic.” In this way essential unity with and continuity of the religion from Vedic times is asserted. In particular, as the several parts of the entire Brahmanic-Hindu scripture prior to the Tantras were each suited to some one of the “ages,” so “for the benefit of men of (this) the Kali age—men bereft of energy and dependent for existence on the food they eat—the Kula (Tantraic) doctrine is given.”

It is necessary, however, to bear in mind that in India there are two orders of religion living side by side, mutually tolerant and neither antagonistic to the other; indeed each assumes the other to be a phase of itself. One is philosophic, the other popular. One is universalistic, based on conceptions that are cosmic, with deities (or a deity) that have the universe as their field of operations. The other is local, conceives its gods as restricted in action and confined in interest to a family, a group, or a village. This latter absorbs the common people’s active service—regular, recurrent, or occasional. But the common people tacitly recognize the philosophic doctrine with its great gods, feel themselves too insignificant to be worthy of such great beings’ attention, except on occasions of pilgrimage and great festivals. On the other hand the philosophers accept local gods as manifestations of the Supreme.

These latter, nevertheless, did not despair of indoctrinating a larger or smaller proportion of the people with the higher teachings; though in the “sectarianism” of modern India these necessarily took on a sectarian form. By this is meant that one of the deities (Shiva, or Vishnu or Kali) occupies the altar, is the focus of worship, the others being in the background since they are “the same as” the One definitely in view. The result has been the creation of a vast body of “Scriptures,” many of which have probably disappeared, while only comparatively few of those that have survived, or even their titles, have come to the knowledge of other than native devotees.

From the missionary’s standpoint, as well as from the scholar’s, these writings repay study. They represent the mind of India in

transition from devotion to a theoretical nucleus like the Vedas, tied up in a mass of philosophic, liturgic, and legal comment like the Brahmanas, Upanishads, and Puranas. The very complexity these furnish has proved a yoke which none could bear. The desire is for a simpler system which yet would attain the end sought—salvation. But the older system had not lost all its power, and the new must perforce follow the genius and renew more or less of the pattern of the old. If Christianity is to win India, it can neither neglect nor despise much of the contents of these writings. It must through its preachers and teachers recognize the excellence of many of the ethical principles they embody and the correctness of many of the religious principles.¹ Not by attempt at wholesale substitution, but by adapting on the basis of a common ethical and worshipful basis, will India be won for Christianity. It may be added here that many of the religious practices which have been employed in India, not alone by the Tantrists but by all faiths there, are justifiable on grounds of the most advanced psychology.

We cannot study these writings *en masse*; only few are accessible in any form, and only two are in English. Probably the one which is best and longest known will serve as a fair example of the whole body.

The title of this writing (*Mahanirvanatantra*, "Tantra of the Great Liberation") introduces a significant fact. "Nirvana" has come in the Western mind to stand for a purely Buddhistic conception. Really the idea was taken over by the Buddhists from contemporary thought, like many another conception, such as the "cycle of births," both of which, so far from being the sole property or invention or discovery of Buddhism, are common Indic possessions. So that "nirvana" is still in good use as expressing orthodox Hindu doctrine. It is in a way quite the equivalent of "salvation" in the Christian system, though of course its content is conceived in another fashion. It expresses what India has for millenniums held to be the best aim of mankind, the highest

¹ All the more regrettable, therefore, is the injudicious and indiscriminate condemnation of the Tantric movement and writings recently put forth under the auspices of certain missionary headquarters in this country.

good; but its significance has probably in all ages varied with the particular person or sect or religion using it.

This scripture is cast in the usual poetic form. The part published (as noted above) is but the first part of the whole Sanskrit writing, the rest being unavailable to the translator. It contains fourteen chapters, each called a "joyful message" (here one suspects an imitation of the term "gospel"). These chapters open with a question asked of her lord by the consort of Shiva, and his answers form the body of the teaching.¹ Thus the whole is "revelation" from the mouth of God.

The first two chapters are introductory. Chapter i describes the scene of the revelation—Mount Kailasa in the Himalayas, the paradise of Shiva. It opens with a highly poetic description of the paradise. There Parvati, spouse of Shiva, finds her lord, reverences him, describes the three past ages in the present world-cycle, ascribes to him revelation of the Vedic and later scriptures, reminds him of the characteristics of the present age, and beseeches him in mercy to man to give directions "how without great pains men may obtain longevity, health, energy, strength and courage, learning, intelligence, and happiness; how they may become great in strength and valor, pure of heart, obedient to parents, . . . mindful of the good of their neighbour, reverent to the Devas," etc.

In chapter ii Shiva replies that salvation is no longer obtainable through Vedas and Puranas, but by the Tantras only. These teach the proper ritual of word and deed, are the essence of all preceding revelation. Then follows:

THE TANTRIC DOCTRINE OF GOD

"O Parameshvari! should good be done to the universe, the Lord of it is pleased, since He is its soul, and it depends on Him. He is one. He is the Ever-existent. He is the Truth. He is the Supreme Unity without a second. He is Ever-full and Self-manifest. He is Eternal Intelligence and Bliss. He is without change, Self-existent, and ever the Same, Serene, above all attributes. He beholds and is the Witness of all that passes, Omnipresent,

¹ It is worth while to note that in some of the Tantras the rôles here assumed by Shiva and his spouse are reversed. In the *Kulachudamani Tantra*, for instance, Shiva as Bhairava is the questioner and Kali as Bhairavi is the teacher.

the soul of everything that is. He, the Eternal and Omnipresent, is hidden and pervades all things. Though Himself devoid of sense, He is the Illuminator of all the senses and their powers. The Cause of all the three worlds, He is yet beyond them and the mind of men. Ineffable and Omniscient, He knows the universe, yet none know Him. He sways this incomprehensible universe, and all that has movement and is motionless in the three worlds depends on Him; and lighted by His truth, the world shines as does Truth itself. We too have come from Him as our Cause. He, the one Supreme Lord, is the Cause of all beings, the Manifestation of Whose creative Energy in the three worlds is called Brahma [chap. ii, §§ 33-40].

In his worship "need there is none to trouble, to fast, to torture one's body, to follow rules and customs, to make large offerings. . . . Who will strive to seek shelter elsewhere than with Him?" (Chap. ii, §§ 53, 54.)

With the third chapter begins the exposition of worship and its method. Shiva has spoken of the Supreme and told his nature; how shall man serve him and meditate upon him, the goddess asks. Brahma is known (1) by external signs—the apparent universe; (2) in ecstasy by those free from illusion. Knowledge of the former kind comes through training and exercise (of physical and psychical powers). At once we come to the *Mantra* (approximately "invocation," but having other connotations; see below) which has a very considerable part in the Tantric system. It is a brief formula, putting the worshiper *en rapport* with the worshiped. It may be open or cryptic; may express a creedal statement or conceal it. Thus the initiatory mantra is *Om Sachchidekam Brahma*—"Om! The One only existent Intelligence (is) Brahma." Here "Om" is supposed to sum up the Hindu Trinity's three aspects of Protector, Destroyer, Creator (Vishnu, Shiva, Brahma). It is the catchword of most of India's devotion. In connection with the repetition (*japa*) of this mantra go appropriate gestures or the placing of the tips of the fingers or the palm of the hand on various parts of the body (*nyasa*). With this we may compare the making of the sign of the cross, not as an exact parallel, but as serving to explain something of the underlying meaning. All this is preliminary to meditation followed by mental worship and the five offerings (described as wine, meat, fish, grain, and woman). Then is given:

THE FIVE-JEWEL HYMN TO THE SUPREME SOUL

Om! I bow to Thee, the eternal Refuge of all:
 I bow to Thee, the pure Intelligence manifested in the universe.
 I bow to Thee who in His essence is One and Who grants liberation.
 I bow to Thee, the great, all-pervading attributeless One.
 Thou art the only Refuge and Object of adoration.
 The whole universe is the appearance of Thee Who art its Cause.
 Thou alone art Creator, Preserver, Destroyer of the world.
 Thou art the sole immutable Supreme, Who art neither this nor that;
 Dread of the dreadful, Terror of the terrible.
 Refuge of all beings, Purificator of all purificators.
 Thou alone rulest the high-placed ones,
 Supreme over the supreme, Protector of the Protectors.
 O Supreme Lord in Whom all things are, yet Unmanifest in all,
 Imperceptible by the senses, yet the very truth.
 Incomprehensible, Imperishable, All-pervading hidden Essence.
 Lord and Light of the Universe! save us from harm
 On that One alone we meditate, that One alone we in mind worship,
 To that One alone the Witness of the Universe we bow.
 Refuge we seek with the One Who is our sole Eternal Support,
 The Self-existent Lord, the Vessel of safety in the ocean of being [chap. iii,
 §§ 59-63].

A number of other mantras are given. Then it is stated that worship may be physical, mental, or vocal, at any place or time; the indispensable requirement is purity of heart (cf. John 4:24). Food consecrated by the recital of a mantra given here cannot be polluted (cf. Acts 10:9-16), and in eating of it distinction of caste vanishes. While ceremonial is prescribed, "for the knower of Brahman duty consists in action for the well-being of fellow-men. This is the eternal *dharmma*" (i.e., duty, religion, law).

In chapter iv the devi reminds Shiva that union with the Supreme (salvation) comes not only by worship of Brahma but of herself. How is that performed? Shiva declares her the Mother of the universe, assuming many forms—Creatrix, Protectress, Destroyer. Hence worship of her is as effective as worship of Brahma. The characteristics of the Kali age are once more enumerated, though truth, self-conquest, openness, compassion, and attachment to Tantric doctrine bring freedom from evil and conquest of the good.

How to form many mantras (out of the Sanskrit alphabet), mainly condensed mnemonics or symbols, is told in chapter v. Also here is described the ritual of the placing of the jar which assumes importance throughout the ritual. One may think of this as roughly paralleled in intent and significance by the setting up of the family or congregational altar. Indeed in some of these ritualistic exercises there are numerous reminders of such acts as the counting of the rosary and the making of the cross, etc. The worshiper is instructed also how to image the form of the Mother, how to offer mental and material sacrifice.

Chapter vi describes the five elements of worship (wine, meat, etc.); vii teaches a hymn of praise to Kali, her hundred names all beginning with the letter Ka, and a protective mantra. In this is discovered one of the few magical tendencies of this Tantra.

Chapter viii instructs in the general duty of the castes in two (not four) stages of life, householder and mendicant. The householder's *dharmma* is nobly set forth, and forms one bright jewel in the circlet of jewels concerning man's duty which encircles the conception throughout the ages, beginning perhaps with the Egyptian confession or assertion of rectitude in the Book of the Dead. Here too is described the formation of the Hindu congregation ("circle" of worshipers). In this is the great departure from the Brahmanic system. If Buddhism formed the first "church" of India, Tantrism founded the congregation, where caste is laid aside during worship, and the worshipers meet as brethren. Here also is pictured the life of the ascetic, permissible to a man only when he has performed to the uttermost duties to all dependent upon him.

THE HOUSEHOLDER

The wise householder's speech should be truthful, mild, agreeable, and salutary, yet pleasing, avoiding both self-praise and the disparagement of others. The man who has dedicated tanks, planted trees, built resthouses on the roadside, or bridges, has conquered the three worlds. That man is the happiness of his mother and father, to whom his friends are devoted, and whose fame is sung by men, he is the conqueror of the three worlds. He whose aim is truth, whose charity is ever for the poor, who has mastered

lust and anger, by him are the three worlds conquered. He who covets not others' wives or goods, who is free of deceit and envy, by him the three worlds are conquered. He who is not afraid in battle nor to go to war when there is need, and who dies in battle undertaken for a sacred cause, by him the three worlds are conquered. He whose soul is free from doubts, who is devoted to and a faithful follower of the ordinances of Shiva, and remains under My control, by him the three worlds are conquered. The wise man who in this conduct with his fellow-men looks with an equal eye upon friend and foe, by him are the three worlds conquered [chap. viii, §§ 62-69].

Here are praised and implicitly inculcated the virtues of truthfulness, gentleness, politeness, modesty, charity, fidelity, self-control, freedom from covetousness and from envy, courage, faith, piety, and impartiality. This sets a high norm of conduct.

Chapter ix is important for the conception of the sacredness of life in all its crises and episodes, which is implicit throughout. It describes the purificatory and consecrative rites at these crises—impregnation, conception, pregnancy, birth, naming, and so on through life, ten of these critical periods for the twice-born and nine for Sudras. The methods of various sacrifices and worships which are preliminary and fundamental are given in their due place. In chapter x is given direction for various festivals—worship of ancestors, etc., also for the ceremonial at funerals. Chapter xi defines various crimes and their punishments. Chapter xii has to do with relationships, inheritance, gifts, property, trading. In both these chapters the effort for ethical and just ends is convincing. To be sure the difference between East and West is in evidence. Age-long custom has left its indelible mark. But the protection of religion is extended over person and property. Similarly over works that are of utility to mankind—bridges parks, gardens, etc.—the blessing of religion is pronounced. But worship itself done with the hope of reward for the action or for the sake of reward makes a gain “as destructible as a kingdom in a dream” (chap. xiii, § 41).

Chapter xii is on images which “are formed to meet the needs of worshippers” (cf. Matt. 19:8a, which is often reflected in this writing). The entire chapter is a fine example of detailed religious symbolism carried to an extreme that an occidental could never

appreciate, still less carry out. There is found here also instruction as to the worship of various powers, and as to the order of rites.

The first part of chapter xiv deals with the erection of the *lingam*, the symbol of Shiva. It must be remarked for the benefit of those who are likely at once to leap to a conclusion with the thought—Ah, I thought that would be coming—there is in all that deals with this not a symbol of lewdness. It is an accepted symbol which awakes (apparently) in the worshiper's mind no suggestion such as occurs to the mind of the prurient occidental. The remainder of the chapter treats of the four classes of religions who have attained union with the Supreme or are firmly set on the way. It ends with a eulogy of this whole first part of the Tantra.

The foregoing exceedingly condensed analysis of a work which in translation (with notes) takes up 359 large octavo pages may serve to give a clue to the contents. It may perhaps afford an index to the character of the religion it aims to teach.

The obvious remark after a study of the devious, detailed, multifarious, and involved ceremonial directed in this Tantra is that if it is regarded and put forward as a simple way to salvation, that which it is intended to supersede must have been insupportable in its complexity—as indeed it was. But of this later.

The theology is orthodox Hindu, with the usual triad (or trinity, if you please) in the foreground. One might from reflection upon isolated parts conclude from it either pantheism or an implicit monotheism as the philosophic subsumption of the system. But Brahma is clearly the major term to which the other members of the trinity are always reducible. And so it is with the whole pantheon and all other objects of worship, which to him who has insight are but forms of The One or symbols of him. In addition, Kali, spouse of Shiva, is presented as an object of devotion, by whose "power we [the trinity] are powerful in the acts of creation, preservation, and destruction" (p. 60); who is "the Image and Embodiment of all the . . . Devas." She is multiform, worshipable in each, "Mother of all."

In this theology two conceptions of note are present. The first is that for the absence of which Christianity has sometimes been criticized by other religionists, viz., the mother-element in the Godhead. (It will be recalled that some of the early Gnostic and heretical sects attempted to supply this by speaking of the Holy Spirit as feminine, even as Mother. Compare also the Hebrew conception of wisdom. One may also take into account that peculiar article in the Apostles' Creed, "Conceived by the Holy Ghost." There is a temptation to see in this an unconscious attempt to supply a missing element.) There are many direct evidences that just this mother-idea has been a great comfort to many women in India.¹ It is to be remarked that in this Tantra there is not a suggestion of engagement in sensual worship such as is often reported to be inextricably associated with worship of the feminine. On the contrary, wherever the relations of the sexes are dealt with, decorum, restraint, and chastity are explicit. The sexual relation as treated in this Tantra is one of modesty and sacredness in which is no hint of abandon or of improper rites in worship or elsewhere. Judging by this example of these writings wherever breaches of decorum exist in practice, they are excrescences upon rather than inherent in the Tantric system. And so with the few other Tantras to which the writer has access.

The second element prominent here is the idea of Deity as Destroyer. One of the constant questionings among Christians, especially in days like those of Armageddon, through which we have recently passed, is destruction and God's relation to it. How can an omniscient and omnipotent yet all-loving Father, such as we conceive God to be, permit in his scheme of things the disrupting and destroying agencies which at times seem demonic and so alien to his beneficence? "Oh where is God?" cried one during the days of slaughter, "and why does He not stop it?"² But to the Tantrist, as indeed to every Hindu,

¹ One would like here to give at length the instance cited by Professor Pratt in his *India and Its Faiths*, p. 14, in which Sister Nivedita consoled an Indian mother who held her dead child in her arms: "Hush, mother! Your child is with the Great Mother. She is with Kali."

² *My Man*, by C. E. L., New York, 1916.

destruction is but one part of the all-controlling scheme of The One. The Hindu's outlook takes in vast stretches of time beyond anything conceived by an occidental (unless that occidental be a geologist or an astronomer). He takes cognizance of enormously prolonged ages, which in turn are but terms in a vaster cycle, and cycles follow each other in endless succession. Dissolution is a legitimate part of divine action in these vast stretches of time, and in the Hindu theodicy the assumption is that divine omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness govern in this as in the creative and protective processes. So that we are almost challenged to ask whether this will not at some time have to be taken into account in Christian theology as an element needed logically to complete it.

Another characteristic of the Tantra is the attention to ceremonial. Rite appears so to be heaped upon rite as to leave little opportunity for the performance of life's ordinary duty. On the other hand, and in apparent contradiction to this, it is frequently asserted of one or another of the performances that this leads to achievement of the four aims of being—*dharmma* (piety, morality, etc.), *kama* (achievement of legitimate desires), *artha* (wealth in its widest and most religious sense), and *moksha* (liberation, another Hindu equivalent of the Christian term "salvation"). How explain this apparent contradiction? Evidently there was none in the writer's mind. There may be two explanations: here is both choice of rite for the moderate worshiper and opportunity for the devotee, the religious enthusiast. The one impression that is strongest after mature study of this feature is that in the scheme of life every act and every thing is consecrate. All in the sacred assembly, all food, all acts, become holy by intention in using this, that, or the other rite (e.g., chap. iii, §§ 118, 119). Thus: "At the commencement of all rites let him say *Tat sat* (The One Who IS); and before eating or drinking aught let him say, 'I dedicate this to Brahman'" (chap. iii, § 103).

The comprehensiveness of this scheme of sanctity through pious intention is noteworthy. However, one aim in the performance of ritual is to rise superior to it, even to the need for it:

"Without knowledge of the Brahman and the abandonment of all ritual worship, man cannot attain emancipation" (chap. viii, § 288).

The emphasis upon intention is insistent, all-pervading. Mental, i.e., silent, worship is everywhere stressed. And over and over we read that the thing pleasing to God "consists in action for the well-being of men."

Mention has been made of the "congregation." This explicitly involves union in worship by the several castes. During the ceremonial all thought of pre-eminence in social position is to be laid aside: "O Great Queen, there is no distinction of caste in the Brahma circle, nor rule as to place or cup. The ignorant who . . . make distinctions of birth or caste go upon the downward path" (chap. viii, §§ 218, 219).

Outside the circle (congregation, "out of church, in the world," as we would say) "each should follow his own calling according to his caste and stage of life, and should discharge his duty as a man of the world" (chap. viii, § 198).

Here is a sort of "liberal conservatism," an axe for the demolition of the institution of caste, sheathed, it is true; but it may escape and at any time hew caste into pieces. The obliteration of caste during worship may lead in time to its abolition in ordinary life.

The object of worship, of ceremonial, is that which has engaged the mystic of all times and religions—union with the Divine. This the *guru* or teacher is so to instil in the pupil's mind that it becomes to him second nature. By contemplation, by ceremonial, by good action, Brahma is met face to face. And so comes severance of bonds with the earthy, the evanescent, the changing.

One of the means to the attainment of this end is the knowledge and use of the mantras, the doctrine and symbolism of which is highly developed in this literature. The theory of the mantra is of high importance for the comprehension of Tantric ritual and worship. It is exceedingly complex, and to the Western mind difficult to comprehend. Originally, as a synonym of

rik, it seems to have been equivalent to "hymn." But through the combination, perhaps, of inherent tendencies to brevity, to mystery, and to the play of symbolism the mantra became a short form of words, often essentially meaningless except as arbitrary symbolism, yet often expressive of adoration of a particular deity. It then served as a bond uniting the worshipers in any cult. In this sense one may well compare the sign of the fish, then the word *ichthus*, then the complete formula the initial letters of which form the word for fish, employed by the early Christians, the ultimate form of which reduced to a rude drawing the article of faith expressed in the words "Jesus Christ, Son of God, Savior."

But there is a reverse tendency manifested in certain religions in certain stages. These tend to become magical in their use. We know from Acts and from early Christian and late Jewish history, as well as from Gnostic remains, how from the names of Christ and God spells and conjuring formulas were composed. So the mantra often became a spell and its use magic. The Tantras differ among themselves very materially as to their employment of the mantra and other means for this purpose. The Tantra before us is almost free from any suggestion of this character, though that among the ignorant it became an instrument is certain. On the other hand, the *Kulachudamani Tantra* has two out of seven chapters devoted to the means of acquiring supernatural abilities.

The mantra has also the use of "invocation," conceived both subjectively and objectively: its effect both brought the worshiper into the spirit of worship and induced the presence of the deity. One may compare the effects of the ringing of the bell before a Shinto shrine. A further service of the mantra is that of consecrating to the deity every act which it initiates.

The whole idea of the mantra as employed in the Tantric system goes back to the conception of sound as an essential eternity, a component, so to speak, of the Supreme Himself. Here we have an idea that is remotely approached by the Greek idea of "the music of the spheres"—something appropriately inherent in the nature of things. So that recitation sets up "vibrations"

which beat with universal harmony and (in certain systems) are believed to affect favorably the "various sheaths of the soul," even of the dead. Finally and naturally there arose the notion (akin to a conception entertained by some of the rabbis) that the letters of the Sanskrit alphabet as expressing sound possess a certain sacredness and therefore supernatural values and potencies. The problem was to combine these so as to bring those potencies to actuality. For just as one cannot press at random the keys of a piano and produce harmony, so random combination of the letters does not produce a mantra. Hence system is introduced, and a series of signs that to the uninitiated are nonsense come to have (quite arbitrarily, it seems) a sense and a meaning. But even then the whole is not told. We set our hymns to tunes, we do not intone them without ordered notation. So with the mantra, its effect is not wrought unless the tone is correct; so that to the secrets of symbolism and the reasons therefor plus the construction of the mantras there must be added right intonation. Hence a prelude to worship may well be the intonation of a mantra, producing in the congregation the attitude of reverence.

It has not been specifically stated that the mantras are sometimes to be repeated many times. One purpose of this is what is so often the object of the mystic—"the practice of the Presence"; viz., that unity of human and Divine which has been an objective in all ages by the mystically inclined. Almost a complete analogy is our own practice where the singing of hymns, the ejaculation of Amen, and the like—once so common but now almost fallen into disuse—put the emotional worshiper into a more or less advanced stage of ecstasy; similarly the repetition of the mantra tends to induce the ecstasy which is held to be the union of devotee and Divinity.

Traditionally the mantras are seventy millions. Given an elaborate alphabet like the Sanskrit plus a system of symbolism developed through millenniums, and the permutations and combinations become almost infinite. How the mantra appeals to the untutored and the method of its operation can be explained by the known laws of the mind. And that its use should degenerate in the method already described is just as clear to the psychologist.

The "word of power" is a fact well known as a common religious phenomenon in many religions.

In connection with the mantras should be mentioned the *Yantra*—diagrams usually symbolic of some deity, constructed in various ways, often containing mantras, and believed to have magic potency. One may recall and parallel here the well-known Gnostic, Jewish, and perhaps early Christian figures used in conjuration and magic. *Yantra* and *Mantra* make a powerful combination indeed.

The cover of "Avalon's" work shows a silver *Yantra*, which he explains. "This *Yantra* is a diagram engraved or drawn on metal, paper or other substances which is worshipped in the same manner as an image. The *Yantras* are therefore of different designs, according to the object of worship." The design presented by "Avalon" consists of an equilateral triangle surrounded by a circle. From the parts of the circle opposite the angles of the triangle arise low ovoid arcs which together have the appearance of crescents enclosing the circle. This is surrounded by a band of two concentric circles. From this circular band arise eight lotus petals. These are again enclosed by another band of two concentric circles and the entire design is shut in by a square, maze-like pattern of triple lines. In the centre triangle are engraved in the middle the words "*Shri Shri Gayatri sva-prasada siddhing kuru*" (Shri Shri Gayatri Devi, Grant me success), and at each corner is the *vija* (mantra) "*Hring*" and "*Hrah*." In the spaces formed by the intersections of the outer ovoid circles is the *vija* "*Hring*." The outside circular band contains *vija* "*Tha*" which indicates *svaha*, commonly employed to terminate the feminine *mantra* or *vidya*. The eight lotus petals which spring from the band are inscribed with the *vija* "*Hring, Ing, Hrah*." The outermost band contains all the *matrika*, or letters of the alphabet, from *akara* to *laksha*. The whole is enclosed in the way common to all *yantra* by a *bhupura* (border), by which, as it were, the *yantra* is enclosed from the outer world. The *yantra* when inscribed with *mantra* serves (so far as these are concerned) the purpose of a mnemonic chart of the *mantra* appropriate to the particular *devata* (object of worship) whose presence is to be invoked into the *yantra*. The worshipper first meditates upon the *devata*, and then arouses him or her in himself.

He then communicates the divine presence thus aroused to the *yantra*. When the *devata* has by the appropriate *mantra* been invoked into the *yantra*, the vital airs of the *devata* are infused therein by the *prana pratishtha* ceremony, *mantra* and *mudra* ("Pleasure-giving thing"="propitiation" [?]). The *devata* is thereby installed in the *yantra*, which is no longer mere gross matter veiling the spirit which has been always there, but instinct with its aroused presence, which the *sadhaka* (worshipper) first welcomes and then worships.

It is both significant and characteristic that there is no explicit datum for a conclusion as to the time of composition of the *Mahanirvanatantra*. From a single doubtful reference its date may be put somewhere near the middle of the nineteenth century. This reference is to suttee, which it reprehends. It is therefore possible that it was written (or perhaps revised) about that time, after the prohibition of the institution or practice by the government (1829). However, the writing may be earlier than this, and the section cited may have been inserted long subsequent to the composition of the book—though a late date is entirely reasonable.

THE LEGACY OF JESUS TO THE CHURCH

H. T. ANDREWS
New College, London, England

The fundamental problem of the New Testament is to find out the answer to the question, What was the legacy which Jesus bequeathed to the church? It is only when we have answered this question that we can face the further issue, What is the relation between later Christianity and "the faith once for all delivered to the saints"? For before we can estimate the later accretions we must discover the original deposit which formed the datum and starting-point of Christianity. The supreme issue in the modern theological debate is, What did Jesus give and what did the church add?

Now when the cry of "back to Christ" was first raised, it was felt that the course of theology had been directed into a plain and simple path where it would be scarcely possible for it to miss the way. After the wearisome intricacies of the christological debate, it seemed such a simple thing to turn to the New Testament and take a stand upon the facts of history. The abandonment of metaphysical theology seemed to promise an end of all controversy. What could possibly be clearer than the portrait of Jesus drawn by the Evangelists in the Gospels? What could be simpler than to extract from these Gospels the essential teaching of Jesus and build up the faith anew on this foundation? Yet when the experiment came to be made it was soon found that the hopes of the optimists who had promised a simple and speedy reconstruction of faith on the basis of historical fact were doomed to swift disillusionment. The controversy about the facts and their true interpretation has been quite as acute as any controversy in the past about the metaphysical explanation of the person of Christ. The quest for the historical Jesus in modern times has been quite as hard and elusive a business as the quest for the Chalcedonian formula

in the fourth century. It is only necessary to follow the record of recent investigation in such books as Weinel's *Jesus in the Nineteenth Century* or Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* to understand the nemesis which has fallen on the heads of the theologians who thought they were setting the church a schoolboy's task when they urged it to seek the solution of its problems in the historical Jesus. The gulf that separates the Christ of Arius from the Christ of Athanasius or the Christ of Luther from the Christ of Calvin is insignificant compared with the chasm which divides the Jesus of Harnack from the Jesus of Schweitzer, or still more the Jesus of Bousset from the Christ of Feine and Forsyth.

I

The answers given by modern scholars to the question, What constitutes the main element in the legacy of Jesus to his followers? are bewildering in their diversity. It is almost a case of *quot homines tot sententiae*.

1. One school of thought, of which Harnack may be taken as the typical representative, holds that the real contribution of Jesus to Christianity lies in his moral and religious teaching, and according to Harnack the gospel consists of "the knowledge and recognition of God as the Father, the certainty of redemption, humility and joy in God, energy, and brotherly love. Jesus directed men's attention to great questions. He promised them grace and mercy. He required them to decide whether they would have God or Mammon, an eternal or an earthly life, the soul or the body, humility or self-righteousness, love or selfishness." To Harnack, Jesus is *par excellence* the Teacher and Revealer of God's will and way of life.

2. Another type of thought, which has become very prominent of late, lays the chief stress on the apocalyptic side of the teaching of Jesus. The gospel consisted mainly in the proclamation of a great hope, the hope of his own speedy return to the world and the establishment of the Kingdom of God. The mind of Jesus was concerned not with the present but with the future. His teaching was merely an interim ethic intended to tide over the interval until the consummation could be realized. According to Kirsopp Lake,

for instance, the legacy of Jesus comprised three points: (a) the insistence upon the universal need of repentance; (b) the belief that he himself was the Messiah, but only in the lower connotation of the term; (c) the conviction that the Parousia would take place in the near future and be followed by the restitution of all things.

3. A third school finds the essence of the gospel in the social teaching of Jesus. "Foremost and grandest among the teachings of Christ," said Mazzini, "were these two inseparable truths: 'There is but one God and all men are the Sons of God,' 'One is your Father and all ye are brethren.'" The goal of Christianity lies in the establishment of a Christian socialism.

4. Then there is the extreme evangelical theory, according to which the significance of Jesus lies not in what he said but in what he did. It was his death upon the cross and that alone which constituted his gospel. Everything about him that matters may be summed up in the words, "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son"!

5. Others again find the secret of the gospel almost exclusively in the fact of the incarnation. They take their stand upon the statement "The word became flesh and tabernacled amongst us" and regard the rest of the New Testament as a mere commentary on this text. Their theology is summed up in the phrase of Athanasius, "God became man that man might become God."

6. Others again regard the founding of the church or the institution of the sacraments or the creation of the Apostolate as the fountainhead of the Christian ministry as the most important element in the work of Jesus.

Two general remarks may be made in criticism of these different interpretations of the legacy of Jesus. In the first place suspicion must always attach to every theory which attempts to reduce the significance of Jesus to a simple formula. It is always possible to find a formula for physical phenomena, but personality is a different matter, and the greater the personality the more impossible the task becomes. What formula for instance would suffice to describe the many-sided activities of the genius of a Gladstone? Jesus is and always will be infinitely greater than any formula that can be invented to define him.

Secondly, all these theories fall under the stricture of the old criticism: "Theologians are generally right in what they affirm and wrong in what they deny"; for what all these interpretations do is to take some aspect of the work of Christ and treat it as if it were the sum total of the whole. Their error lies not so much in what they assert as in the exclusive importance which they attach to their own particular view. They are guilty in most of the cases of the intellectual crime of taking a fraction of the truth and treating it as if it were an exhaustive statement of the whole truth.

II

As our conclusions are bound to be affected by our historical presuppositions, we must necessarily attempt to reach an understanding with regard to the value of our sources and the critical method to be adopted in making use of them, before it is possible for us to claim credence for our results.

The primary data are of course to be found in the Synoptic Gospels, and more particularly in the original sources out of which those gospels were composed. We have often been warned that the synoptic picture of Jesus is overdrawn—and that we must avoid the exaggerations of hero worship. But there is at any rate the possibility that in some particulars the picture may be underdrawn. Jesus was always "above his reporters," as Matthew Arnold so constantly insists. He was always hampered in his teaching by the prejudice and want of understanding in the minds of his hearers. He had to educate his disciples before he could impart to them his full teaching, and alas! it was not till toward the end of his career that they proved capable of understanding his greatest truths. The New Testament refuses to admit that the legacy of Christ must be restricted to the teaching of the historical Jesus. The Fourth Gospel puts into his mouth the words, "I have many things to tell you, but ye cannot bear them now." There must always be doubt whether this saying is a genuine logion of Jesus, but there can be no doubt that the early Christians believed that the last word of Christ to the church was not spoken during his earthly life.

It is at this point that the commonly accepted canons of historical criticism break down. If we were dealing with an ordinary personality, the Synoptic Gospels ought to form our chief, if not our exclusive, court of appeal in our quest for historical truth. But if Jesus was what the New Testament represents him to be, then we cannot measure the evidence by the usual standards. We have to take into consideration the possibility, which the Fourth Gospel seems to regard as a certainty, that the development from the Synoptic Gospels to Paulinism may have been made under the direct guidance and inspiration of the Spirit of Christ, though if this thesis is to be established it must be proved that the roots of the later development are to be found in the earlier teaching.

Secondly, we may supplement the evidence of the Synoptic Gospels by taking into consideration the primitive faith of the early Christian church, which in the first instance must have been derived from Jesus himself. This new set of data makes at any rate one valuable contribution to our study. It enables us to realize the significance which was attached to the resurrection. The resurrection is only the postscript to the Gospels; in the faith of the early church it is the central fact round which everything else seems to revolve. But here again there are limitations to the value of the method. Our evidence is scanty and beset with critical difficulties. The speeches in Acts are by no means free from suspicion, and the material in the Epistles of Paul is comparatively slight. Moreover we must always remember that first statements are inevitably crude and incomplete. Even the illumination which came from the resurrection did not suffice to enable the apostles to see at first the full light of the truth as it is in Jesus.

Another method of supplementing the data in the Synoptic Gospels is to take the common elements which we find in the different types of theology represented in the New Testament. We may be sure that these common elements, which belong to all the types, reach back to a very primitive period and afford us a scientific criterion for discovering the beliefs which were current in primitive Christianity and which may therefore be presumed to have come from Jesus himself. It may be regarded as perfectly

certain that these truths form the matrix out of which the later phases of Christianity were evolved, and they therefore supply us with material to remedy the deficiencies of the Synoptic Gospels.

III

So much for the method. Now let us attempt to summarize the results which may be gleaned from its use.

1. The greatest legacy which Jesus bequeathed to his followers was undoubtedly the legacy of himself. It was the transcendent personality of Christ that dominated not only his contemporaries but all the later converts in the Apostolic age. No ordinary categories were adequate to describe the effect produced by Jesus on his hearers and followers. Even the title Messiah failed to convey all that he was to the men who knew him best. It is one of the greatest miracles in the history of thought that within thirty years of the crucifixion, by a daring leap of the imagination, the apostle Paul came to regard Jesus as the source and center and goal of the cosmic universe. And yet that audacious assertion seems to have been accepted on all sides without challenge or cavil, because in the experience of the church Jesus had proved himself worthy of the highest terms that thought could find to describe him. Everything else in the New Testament derives its value from the personality of Jesus. The ethical teaching is authoritative because it is the teaching of Jesus. The cross gains all its meaning from the fact that it was Jesus who died. From the very beginning Christianity was Christ. He is something infinitely more than the founder of a religion. He himself is the center and core of that religion.

Moreover, we must always remember that the legacy which Jesus bequeathed to the church in his own personality is not limited to his historical appearance in Palestine. The modern attempt to distinguish between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith is a false antithesis utterly unknown to the New Testament. The two conceptions are linked together by the fact of the resurrection. Faith in the living and eternal Christ is the natural implicate of the resurrection. Jesus bequeathed to the church not merely

a great and holy memory but a living and abiding presence, not merely the thought of one who had "greatly lived and greatly died," but the thought of one who was alive forever more.

2. Jesus bequeathed to the church a great conception of God. It must never be forgotten that in all his teaching Jesus is always speaking against a well-defined background. His message can be understood only when it is read in the light of the context of contemporary thought. Jewish theology had made God remote and distant. If he was not the great unknowable, he was at any rate in current ritual the great unapproachable, save through the medium of intercessors and mediators. The ideas of love and fatherhood were indeed present in some degree in the current conception of God, but they were at the circumference of theology and not at its center. Jesus brought them from the circumference to the center and made them the governing ideas in his new revelation of God. Jesus transformed God from a grand Lama who could only be approached by the High Priest once a year into a loving and merciful Father who was always ready to welcome his children and denied access to none. Jesus never for a moment canceled or minimized the great attribute of holiness which is so prominent in the Old Testament conception of God. It is only the false implications which had been read into the term by Jewish priests and school men that he attacks. The comparatively slight references to the holiness of God in the Gospels must not therefore be taken to signify that Jesus made light of the idea. The holiness of God was an axiom accepted alike by Jesus and his opponents. The emphasis which is laid upon the love and fatherhood of God is largely due to the situation at the time. Under other circumstances it is not inconceivable that the stress might have been laid in a different place. The main contention of Jesus seems to be that the attribute of holiness in God does not result, as current Jewish theology supposed, in remoteness and unapproachableness, but flows out in love and mercy and salvation; and it must never be forgotten that the infinite love and boundless mercy of God are linked in the teaching of Jesus with a stern severity which does not hesitate to doom the recalcitrant sinner "to the outer darkness where there shall be the weeping and the gnashing of teeth."

3. Jesus in his teaching gave the church a supreme moral ideal. Space forbids any attempt to analyze or even indicate the scope of his ethical teaching. This teaching was of course always strictly relevant to the situation as it existed in Palestine at the time, but it embodied great principles which are of eternal value. The far-reaching and revolutionary effects of these principles have not even yet been realized to the full.

In the early church the ethical standards set up by Jesus were regarded as absolutely authoritative. When the apostle Paul for instance found that Jesus had made some pronouncement upon an issue of vital importance, e.g., the question of marriage and divorce, that pronouncement was regarded as finally settling the matter. From that court there was no appeal. And Jesus himself definitely stated in the Sermon on the Mount that his teaching was the basis of religion. A man who built upon "these sayings of mine" was building upon a rock which no storms could ever shake. A man who built upon any other foundation was building on shifting sand, and his house was doomed to collapse at the first touch of the whirlwind. The modern tendency to regard the ethical and social principles of Jesus as merely of interim and temporary value, or to look upon them as out of touch with reality, is entirely false to the spirit of the New Testament and directly opposed to the attitude which Jesus himself adopted.

One of the most interesting features in the teaching of Jesus is that religion and ethics are always identified in the closest way. Every action which a man performs is an action toward God. God is always the third party in every transaction. "In as much as ye did it to one of the least of these my little ones, ye did it unto me." By virtue of this relationship a wrong action is always something more than a crime; it becomes a sin. It has often been asserted that Jesus "did not worry much about men's sins," but as a matter of fact the real truth lies in the actual reverse of this statement. It is perfectly true that Jesus said very little about sin in the abstract, but he said a great deal about sins in the concrete. As Beyschlag puts it, "Jesus spoke little of sin in general and proposed no doctrine of it, least of all a doctrine of its origin. He presupposed it as a fact and showed its evil nature by the

penalties he attached to it." The keynote of his preaching is the word "repent." The true attitude of man to God is illustrated in the humble prayer of one who said, "God be merciful to me a sinner." The repentance of a solitary sinner brings joy to the angels of heaven. Even sins of omission are punished in the severest way. What could be more stern than the doom pronounced upon the man who hid his talent in the earth—"Cast ye out the unprofitable servant into the outer darkness"?

To attempt to separate the ethical from the religious teaching of Jesus is to rend a seamless robe. To Jesus ethic is religion (though of course not the whole of religion) and religion is ethic. To divorce the two is fatal. It is as great a mistake to base everything on the religious side of the teaching of Jesus and sit loosely to his ethic as it is to base everything on his ethic and ignore his theology.

4. The revelation of a supreme moral ideal by itself alone would have been a mere mockery of human need. The world had moral ideals in abundance—not indeed as perfect as the ideal of Jesus—but still of great beauty and power. The legacy of Jesus can never be estimated by measuring the differentia between his own moral ideal and the moral ideals of Greek philosophy. Such a differentia of course undoubtedly exists, but it does not explain Christianity. The search for the ideal is after all only one of the quests of life, and by no means the most difficult. It is one thing "to know the highest when we see it;" it is quite a different thing to be able to attain to it. Philosophy had failed in the past for lack of a sufficiently powerful moral dynamic. Like the Venus of Milo, it was beautiful to the last degree, but it had no arms and hands, and so could not reach down to save the world. Its impotence and futility found expression in the lament of Ovid, "*Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.*"

Now if we look at the matter merely from the point of view of ethic, the demand of the world was for *δύναμις*—power to attain.

Oh that a man might arise in me

That the man I am might cease to be.

But if ethic and religion are to be identified, if wrongdoing is not merely a crime against man but a sin against God (as is always

the case in the teaching of Jesus), a new problem arises which completely dwarfs the other—the problem that finds expression in the anguished cry of Job, “How can a man be just with God?”

It was the answer which Jesus gave to this problem that was felt by the apostle Paul and indeed by all the writers of the Apostolic age, to be the supreme element in his legacy to the church. And there is little doubt that if we were compelled to adopt a single formula to express the contribution which Jesus made to religion, it would have to be this: “There is no other name given under heaven among men whereby we must be saved;” For herein lies the real differentia which marks Jesus off from all others. As a teacher, the differentia between Jesus and the sages is measurable; as a Savior, it is infinite.

The objection will at once be raised, however, that the Synoptic Gospels do not supply us with sufficient evidence to bear the weight of this conclusion. It must of course be admitted that there is a startling discrepancy of emphasis upon this point between the Synoptic Gospels and the rest of the New Testament. There is not in words at any rate the same stress upon the significance of the cross in the statements of the Gospels that we find everywhere else in the New Testament. Jesus seems even to speak at times as if repentance were the only thing needed for the salvation of the soul, and it is only on two occasions that he attaches specific value to his own death as an act of redemption.

But before we draw too hasty a conclusion from these data there are certain facts which we ought to take into consideration.

a) The revelation of the meaning of the cross was the most difficult lesson which Jesus had to teach his disciples, since it seemed to be in such flat contradiction to the common hopes and aspirations of the age. It was therefore only at the end of his career, when his followers had been sufficiently educated to receive his explanation, that the revelation could be made at all.

b) It is a point in great dispute whether Jesus himself fully comprehended the necessity and significance of his death till the later stages in his ministry. There is some evidence, though it must be allowed that it is not strong enough to admit of demonstrative proof, that at first Jesus looked upon preaching as the

main mission of his life, and it was only when he realized that preaching was too weak a weapon to break down the power of sin that he came to see that something more was needed—the supreme sacrifice upon the cross.

c) There are two explicit statements which can scarcely be explained away or robbed of their meaning: "The Son of Man is come to give his life a ransom for many" and the formula at the communion service, "This cup is the new Covenant in my blood," a formula which definitely asserts that the death of Christ established a new covenant—relationship between God and man.

d) All the circumstances of the crucifixion point in the same direction. If the teaching of Jesus were the supreme element in his legacy, why did he go out of his way to bring death upon himself? Why did he set his face to go up to Jerusalem at all? The narrative seems to imply that at the end Jesus attached far more importance to his cross than to his teaching, and felt that it must not be postponed even to enable him to consolidate his work as a teacher, or to accept the inviting appeal of the Greeks to undertake a mission to them. No, even if we were tied down to the narrative in the Synoptic Gospels we should be forced to admit that there are elements in the Gospels which cannot be explained except on the lines of a doctrine of the atonement such as was afterward constructed by the theologians of the Apostolic age.

5. The question now arises, Did Jesus seek to establish a church? Was the institution of the church part of the legacy which he left to the world? Two objections to such a supposition leap into the mind at once. First, the center of interest for Jesus was the Kingdom and not the church, for the two are certainly not identical. The word church is found only twice on his lips, and there is considerable doubt about the authenticity of these utterances, since they are found only in Matthew's Gospel. And moreover, even if the utterances are genuine, it is by no means certain that the word church is used with its later technical connotation. Secondly, the undoubted belief of Jesus in the speedy occurrence of the Parousia seems to preclude the possibility that he could display any interest even in laying the foundation of the later Ecclesia.

Yet, though we are bound to admit the absence of any explicit instructions with regard to the formation of the church, the idea of the church as a Christian society seems to be implicit in his teaching. There can be little doubt that Jesus did set himself to create a fellowship of his followers. As the author of *Ecce Homo* puts it:

To organize a society and bind the members of it together by the closest ties were the business of his life. For this reason it was that he called men away from their homes, imposed upon some a wandering life, upon others the sacrifice of their property, and endeavoured by all means to divorce them from their former connections. For this reason he established a society which was through all the ages to remind Christians of their indissoluble union. Thus the resemblance between Christ and the ancient philosophers vanishes on examination. He was the founder of a society to which for a time he found it convenient to give instruction; they gave instruction to pupils who found it convenient to form themselves into a society for the sake of receiving it. Christianity abhors isolation, it gathers men into a society and binds them in the closest manner to each other and to Christ.

Surely Seeley is right. The idea of the Christian brotherhood could never have sprung into existence so early and so instinctively unless it had been the necessary implication of the teaching of Jesus. The band of disciples formed a precedent not only for the formation of the church but for the creation of the Christian ministry. When Jesus sent out the Twelve to preach in his name, he authorized by his precept and example the setting apart of men to whom the divine call has come for the preaching of the gospel and the work of the ministry. But though the formation of a church and an order of ministers seems to be implied in the teaching of Jesus, there is nothing in that teaching which ties us down to a particular type of either church or ministry. We cannot go farther than the assertion that that form of organization must inevitably be most in accordance with his teaching which gives the most adequate expression to his mind and will, and best embodies the essential principles of the gospel which he preached and lived.

6. It is possible to mention only one other point, but that certainly must not be omitted. There can be no reasonable doubt that among the legacies which Jesus bequeathed to the church are

the sacraments. The question of the sacraments raises immense critical problems into which it is not possible to enter here. It seems to be quite certain that Jesus adopted from his predecessor the sacrament of baptism as the rite and ordinance of entrance into the Kingdom. Whether he regarded it as a symbol or as something more than a symbol must always be more or less a matter of controversy in view of the scantiness of the evidence in the Synoptics. The appendix to Mark and the Fourth Gospel seem to regard baptism as a *sine qua non* for entrance into the Kingdom, but these statements may simply be the reflections of later thought. The same difficulty meets us when we come to consider the exact import which Jesus attached to the communion service. It was certainly a sacrament of remembrance, and as certainly in the time of Paul something much more than that—"the Communion of the body and blood of Christ." Some kind of transformation was bound to take place, for in all our records the communion is brought into direct association with the Parousia. Probably the original intention of the founder was stated in some such words as those which have been transmitted to us by Paul, "As often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup ye do shew the Lord's death till He come." As the promise of the Parousia faded, it was inevitable that a new set of ideas should be introduced into the Lord's Supper.

Such in general outline are the chief elements in the legacy of Jesus. There are some points which have necessarily been omitted in this brief survey, e.g., the apocalyptic hope and the eschatology, both of which would need more detailed treatment than the scope of this present article permits. But the great conclusion we have reached is this: The church of today needs the whole Christ, Christ in his fulness and entirety, and not merely a part of his message or his work. It is a fatal mistake, a mistake which has been too often made in the past, to isolate a single element in his teaching and treat it as if it represented the complete gospel.

PURITAN EFFORTS AND STRUGGLES, 1550-1603
A BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL STUDY. II

WILLIAM MUSS-ARNOLT
Boston Public Library, Boston, Massachusetts

The struggle between the two contending parties in the Church of England, the Prelatic and the Puritan, grew apace with the progress of the English Reformation. It was a struggle concerning usages rather than doctrine; for non-conformity was founded originally on disapproval of the vestments and usages prescribed by the Prayer Book rather than on dissent from the doctrine of the Church. The new revision of the Prayer Book in 1559, with its manifest return toward the first Edwardine liturgy, with changes and alterations in a Roman Catholic direction rather than a Protestant, spread dismay among the reform party. The feeling was intensified by the queen's *Injunctions*, of 1559, and the issue of the *Advertisements* of 1566, in which Archbishop Matthew Parker (1504-75) strove, among other things, to enforce the surplice in all churches, while the use of the cope was henceforth confined to cathedral and collegiate churches.¹ The enforced clerical subscription to the Prayer Book and the vestments, as also the proclamation of the Thirty-nine Articles of religion, on June 7, 1571,² and the required clerical subscription to them, aroused widespread

¹ It may be stated here that for vestments the date of the standard is 1566, the publication of the *Advertisements*; for ceremonies, 1662; and for ornaments, 1549. As a matter of history, deviations from the standard set up by the Acts of Uniformity can be shown not only to have existed, but also to have been tolerated at every period since the Act of Uniformity of 1559. Nor does it appear that any systematic attempt to enforce general conformity to the rubrics has ever been made except upon three occasions: (1) in the reign of Elizabeth, after the issue of the *Advertisements*; (2) during the primacy of Archbishop Laud (1633-45); and (3) in the period following the Restoration in 1660.

² The first set of Articles of Religion compiled by the Church of England on the principles of the Reformation were the Forty-two Articles of 1553. They differed little from the draft of forty-five articles drawn up in 1552, four articles of which on the Lord's Supper, Nos. 29-32, were in 1553 combined into one. The work was done

indignation. Shortly after the opening of Parliament, May 8, 1572, a bill was introduced to legalize the Puritan idea of worship. It was proposed to substitute a "Protestant" confession of faith for the Thirty-nine Articles, and a constitution without bishops was demanded. While Parliament was, on the whole, favorably inclined toward the requests of the Puritan party, the queen inter-

mainly by Archbishop Cranmer and Bishop Nicholas Ridley on the basis of the Augsburg Confession of 1530 through the medium of the Thirteen Articles of 1538 (D. Stone, *Holy Eucharist*, II, 115, 116). The articles were originally written in Latin, but translated into English at the same time. Both texts were published in 1553 before the death of Edward VI (July 6, 1553). In January, 1562/3, the Forty-two Articles of 1553 were considered by convocation. In revised form and reduced to thirty-eight in number they were published first in Latin by Reginald Wolfe in 1563. The revision was mainly the work of Archbishop Matthew Parker, assisted probably by his friends, Bishops Edmund Grindal, of London, Robert Horne, of Winchester, Edmund Guest, of Rochester, and Richard Cox, of Ely. He added to the articles, which originally had been mainly derived from earlier Lutheran sources, some new clauses obtained from the more recent Confession of Württemberg (1552). The 39th, 40th, and 42d articles were deleted by the two houses of convocation, the archbishop having himself previously omitted the 41st. The sanction of the queen was obtained late in 1563, whereupon Wolfe's edition appeared. The printed edition differs from the Parker manuscript in the 20th article and in the omission of the entire Article 29. From other instances it is evident that the queen looked upon her supremacy as totally independent not only of temporal but also of spiritual control. She made the change and omission last referred to and thus the articles should really be named the Thirty-eight Articles. The revised articles were translated into English and put forth through Jugge and Cawood by the queen's authority. The translation was made by members of the convocation. In 1571 the Thirty-nine Articles were put forth in Latin and in English by the authority of Parliament. They had been newly subscribed by the convocation of that year and were committed to the editorship of Bishop Jewel. The 29th article was now replaced. The editor numbered the whole series, making them, with the ratification, forty. They were not termed Thirty-nine Articles until a later period. Jewel likewise added the table to the English edition. The Latin title reads: *Articuli de quibus convenit inter Archiepiscopos et Episcopos utriusque provincie, & clerum universum in Synodo Londini. An. Dom. 1562. Secundum computationem Ecclesie Anglicane ad tollendam opinionum dissentionem, & consensum in vera religione firmandum . . . Londini. Apud Joh. Day. 1571. Black letter. Page, 4½×6½; paper, 6×7½ inches. The English title is: Articles, whereupon it was agreed by the Archbishops and Bishops of both provinces and the whole Cleargie in the Convocation holden at London in the yere of our Lorde God 1562 according to the computation of the Church of England, for the auoiding of the diuersities of opinions, and for the stablishyng of consent touching true religion. Put forth by the Queenes auctoritie. London. R. Jugge & J. Cawood. 1571. 25 pp. Sm. 4to. The Act 13 Eliz. c. 12 established the Thirty-nine Articles of 1562/3 as a standard of doctrine and required the *ex animo* and *bona fide* subscription of the clergy to them.*

posed her own prerogative as supreme in ecclesiastical matters. Unsuccessful in Parliament, the Puritans appealed to the country in their first manifesto, headed: An Admonition to the Parliament (1572; sig A two leaves, A-D in fours, E two leaves, F and G in fours, GG two leaves, Sm. 4to). The pamphlet appeared before Parliament rose, on June 30. It was the joint work of five clergymen, two of whom, John Feilde or Field (died February, 1588) and Thomas Wilcox (1549?-1608), attempted to present it to Parliament. They were immediately arrested and sent to the Newgate prison, where they were held until October, 1573. Toward the end of their imprisonment they composed an apology or defense, printed in later years on pages 528-46 of the collection of Puritan *Acts* called: *A parte of a register*, contayninge sundrie memorable matters, written by diuers godly and learned in our time, which stande for, and desire the reformation of our Church, in Discipline and Ceremonies, accordinge to the pure worde of God, and the Lawe of our Lande. [1593?] (4), 546, (2) 86, (6) pp. Sm. 4to. The tract of Feilde and Wilcox has the title: "The copie of a letter, with a confession of Faith, written by two faithfull seruants of God, vnto an Honorable, and vertuous Ladie." The lady was probably Lady Anne Bacon (1528-1610), the wife of Sir Nicholas Bacon (1509-79) lord keeper, and mother of Francis Bacon, the lord chancellor. Lady Anne was a staunch "supporter of many Puritans by her purse as well as by her influence" (A. Peel). The *Admonition* remained the talk of the day and was widely disseminated and universally read in spite of the strict censorship of the press. The first edition was soon exhausted, and a new edition followed speedily, marked by some alterations and corrections. This, in turn, was quickly reprinted and two additional documents or tracts from the pen of Thomas Cartwright were added to it.¹ The second edition collates sig. A-C in eights, D four leaves. The two tracts constituted one pamphlet, independent in form from the *Admonition*. They number twelve leaves (sig. ✕ two leaves, A and B in fours, C two leaves). The preface occupies the two initial leaves, the first tract begins on A1, and the second on B1. Sayle, *Early*

¹ Percy Dearmer, *Religious Pamphlets*, p. 85; W. Pierce, *An Historical Introduction to the Marprelate Tracts*, pp. 43-44.

English Printed Books in the University Library, Cambridge, Vol. II, p. 1308, No. 5895, suggests Wandsworth, in Surrey, the home of Feilde, as the place of the printing of the original edition of the first *Admonition*.

Toward the end of the year 1572, while Feilde and Wilcox were in prison, appeared: A Seconde Admonition to the Parliament, in which Thomas Cartwright (1535—Dec. 27, 1603), Lady Margaret professor of divinity at Cambridge and fellow of Trinity College, came to the support of his imprisoned comrades. In conjunction with the second *Admonition*, though separate from it, was printed a small tract, with the title: Certaine Articles, collected and taken (as it is thought) by the byshops out of a little boke entituled An Admonition to the Parliament, with an answer to the same. Containing a confirmation of the sayde booke in shorte notes. This tract was published about September, 1572, in answer to a now utterly lost answer to the first *Admonition*, written by Thomas Cooper (1517?–94), at that time bishop of Lincoln. The second *Admonition* and the *Certaine Articles* occupy 44 leaves (sig.✖ A–H in fours, and, again, A–B in fours). Neither of the two Admonitions has a title-page.

The *Admonition*, published anonymously, had at once “an enormous effect.” Projected into an atmosphere already explosive, it did a work for the Puritan cause which hitherto would have been inconceivable. It was read everywhere, and welcomed in spite of all attempts to suppress it. A large part of its success was due, not merely to circumstances, but to its merits, for it had many of the most telling qualities of a successful pamphlet.¹ The two Admonitions were reprinted together about 1589, and again in 1617. The first *Admonition* was reprinted also in 1644 among the Puritan literature re-issued during the struggle between King Charles and the Parliament. The text of the issues of 1617 and 1644 is that of the second edition of the first *Admonition*. Extracts from the second *Admonition* were printed by Percy Dearmer in *Religious Pamphlets* (1898), pp. 84–110. The latest critical reprint of the two Admonitions, together with other early Puritan tracts

¹ W. H. Frere, *The English Church in the Reigns of Elizabeth and James I* (1904), p. 178.

just mentioned, was published in 1907, with the title: *Puritan Manifestoes*. A study of the origin of the Puritan revolt. With a reprint of the Admonition to the Parliament and kindred documents, 1572. Edited by the Rev. W. H. Frere and the Rev. C. E. Douglas. London. Soc. for Promoting Christian Knowledge. xxxi, 155, (1) pp. Facsimiles. [The Church Historical Society Publications. lxxii.] 8vo.

At the suggestion of Archbishop Parker, John Whitgift (1530?-1604), dean of Lincoln and master of Trinity College, and Cartwright's predecessor as Lady Margaret professor of divinity, wrote an answer to the two Admonitions, assisted by the archbishop and several bishops. It was a well-printed quarto in black letter, with the title: An Answere to a certen libell intituled An Admonition to the Parliament, by John Whitgifte, D. of Divinitie. London. The first edition appeared in February, 1572/3, and in July of the same year, 1573, another "newly augmented by the authore, as by conference shall appear." Within less than four months, about May, 1573, the champion of the Puritan cause answered Whitgift with: A Replye to an answere made of M. Doctor Whitegifte, againste the Admonition to the Parliament. By T. C. (4), 224 pp. Sm. 4to. Second edition, June, 1573, with a prefatory note by the printer signed J. S. There are several later editions in existence, but all without date of publication. Frere and Douglas, *Puritan Manifestoes*, p. xxix, following Sayle, *loc. cit.*, p. 1309, No. 5899, believe that the second *Admonition* and the two editions of the *Replye* are printed in the same type and probably by John Stroud (Strowd), formerly minister at Yalding, in Kent. The tract *Certaine Articles*, etc., was printed by J. T. J. S. It is quite possible that John Stroud printed also this last-mentioned tract and prefixed to it the two other initials in order, as he states, to elude the vigilance of Day, the printer, and Toy, the bookbinder, who were zealously tracking this unauthorized press. Stroud was suspended in 1575 and died in October, 1582. See also Peel, *The Seconde Parte of a Register* (1915), Vol. I, Nos. 66 and 67, pp. 108-20.

Cartwright had become the recognized leader of the Puritan cause. In many respects he was the real father of conscious Puritanism. With him it became consciously Presbyterian. The

year 1573 saw the first presbytery in England at Wandsworth, in Surrey. "The term Puritan appears to have been first used about 1566, and was correctly applied to Nonconformists, *i.e.*, to learned clergymen of the Church of England, who found fault with the clerical vestments, etc., and yet remained in the Church. The word Dissenter appears to have had a history similar to that of the word Nonconformist, only it seems to have been first employed after 1641."¹ Puritanism was a spirit rather than a system; presbyterianism a system rather than a spirit. The *Admonition* was the manifesto in which presbyterianism sprang aggressively upon the world. According to Fuller, *Church History*, the first occurrence of the term "Puritans" is of the year 1564.

On December 11, 1573, an order was issued by the ecclesiastical commission for the apprehension of Cartwright, but he escaped from the country in time and went to the Continent. His *Repleye* remained for twenty years the textbook of the controversy. Whitgift continued the strife and in due course appeared: A Defense of the Ecclesiasticall Regiment in Englande, defaced by T. C. in his Repleye against D. Whitgyfte on Sacrificing Priestes, Apparell of Ministers, Kneeling at the Communion, Holy dayes, Women's Veyles, the Sign of the crosse, (ii, 194 pp., Sm. 8vo) and: The Defense of the Aunswere to the Admonition against the Replie of T. C. (xx, 812, xi pp. Folio). Both books were published in 1574, the latter in two editions giving also the text of the original *Admonition* and of Cartwright's *Repleye*, etc.² Cartwright answered the following year with: The second replie of Thomas Cartwright: agaynst Maister Doctor Whitgiftes second answer touching the Churche Discipline. Imprinted. M. D. LXXV. (31) D[C]LXVI, (13) pp. Sm. 4to. It was printed in the Zürich type of Whittingham's *A Brieff discours*, assumed by Sayle to be that of Christopher

¹ Champlin Burrage, *The Early English Dissenters*, Vol. I, p. 37.

² A modern reprint of Whitgift's *Defense* was edited by John Ayre for the Parker Society, 3 vols., Cambridge, 1851-53. Vol. I contains: The defence of the Answer to the Admonition against the Reply of Thomas Cartwright. Tractates I-VI; Vol. II, Tractates VII-X; Vol. III, Tractates XI-XXIII. Together with sermons, selected letters, &c. The controversy with Cartwright was the only literary production of Whitgift.

Froschauer, Jr.¹ Two years later followed: The rest of the second replie of Thomas Cartvuriht: agaynst Master Doctor Vuhitgifts second ansvuer, touching the Church discipline. Imprinted. M.D. LXXVII. (7), 265, (13) pp. Sm. 4to. This ended the controversy. The 1575 book is printed in a Gothic letter, the other in a roman type.

One of the results of the controversy between Cartwright and Whitgift was the celebrated *Book of Discipline*, written in Latin by Walter Travers (1548?-1635), with a preface by Cartwright, and published at La Rochelle in 1574 (W. H. Frere: 1573). Almost simultaneously appeared an English translation under the authority of and with an introductory epistle by Cartwright. The Latin title reads: *Ecclesiasticæ Disciplinæ et Anglicanæ Ecclesiæ ab illa aberrationis, plena è verbo Dei, & dilucida explicatio*. Rupellæ (i.e., La Rochelle). [1574]. xii, 296 pp. 12mo. The English: A full and plaine declaration of Ecclesiasticall Discipline owt off the word off God, and off the declininge off the church of England from the same. Imprinted. M.D. LXXIII. (10), 193, (1) pp. Sm. 4to. The British Museum Catalogue conjectures that it was printed at Heidelberg; the *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. LVII, p. 163, col. 2, suggests Middleburgh as the place of printing, and Sayle, *loc. cit.*, No. 6299 says: Printed in the Zürich type of Whittingham's *A Brieff discours*. The book was reprinted in 1580 (Geneva), 1584 (Cambridge), 1617 and 1644. Travers was "the neck" of the Presbyterian party, Cartwright himself the head.² The book fixed the policy of the proposed reform and became so authoritative that its adherents began to bind themselves to "the Holy Discipline" by a definite subscription. The controversy, in itself sufficiently remarkable, was rendered the more noteworthy by the fact that it was the indirect cause of the production by Richard Hooker of his *Ecclesiastical Polity*.

¹ Zürich as place of publication of Whittingham's treatise is very doubtful, as mentioned before. Rudolphi in his monograph, *Die Buchdrucker-Familie Froschauer in Zürich, 1521-95* (Zürich, 1869), mentions neither Whittingham's treatise nor any books and pamphlets by Cartwright and Travers as having been printed by the Froschauers.

² Fuller, *Church History*, ed. Brewer, IV, 468.

Soon, also, Puritan books of Common Prayer as substitutes for the existing liturgy of the Church were published and presented to Parliament; but none obtained the sanction of the law. That of 1578 is remarkable for its omissions, not only of rubrics, but of entire services, such as those for the private celebration of the sacraments, of confirmation, and the churching of women. It used uniformly the words morning, evening, and minister in the place of matins, evensong, and priest. In the book of 1589 the earlier forms are restored. In 1584 *A booke of Common Prayer* was presented to Parliament by Peter Turner, a physician, which he desired to have adopted in place of or in addition to the current liturgy of the Church. Turner was born in 1542, represented Bridport in several Parliaments of Elizabeth, and was zealously advocating the cause of the Puritans in the House of Commons. He died in 1614. It is quite possible that the book which Turner presented was the edition without date, printed by Waldegrave, with the title: *A booke of the forme of common prayers, administration of the Sacraments: &c. agreeable to Gods worde, and the vse of the reformed Churches. . . . At London: Printed by Robert Waldegrau.* 77 pp. Sm. 4to.¹ It was printed either in 1584 or the early part of 1585; for, in June of 1585, it was prohibited by order of the

¹ Robert Waldegrave, or Walgrave, was born about 1554, in Blacklay, Worcestershire, as the son of a yeoman. From the beginning of his career as a printer he attached himself to the Puritan party, in whose service he labored incessantly and suffered greatly. In 1581 he printed John Knox's *Confession of faith* and other Scottish books. In 1583 the Ecclesiastical Commission at the bidding of the Privy Council restricted the London presses, suppressed illicit ones, and issued orders to regulate printing. Further orders were issued by the Star Chamber in 1584. Waldegrave, his workmen, and his presses were seized for printing Puritan books. He was thrown into the White Lion prison, Southwark, for six weeks, and again, in 1585, for twenty weeks. Finally an order of the Privy Council in the Star Chamber, June 23, 1586, allowed presses to be in use only in London, except one at each of the universities. Every press was to be licensed and subject to inspection. The futility of this attempt to muzzle the Puritan press was very soon apparent. For Waldegrave, who in May, 1588, was the victim of this order and suffered the destruction of his presses and his work for attempting to issue Udall's *Diotrephes*, became forthwith the hero of the secret press. He succeeded in eluding capture and after many vicissitudes and narrow escapes from his "pursuivants," came finally to Edinburgh, where he was King's printer from 1590-1603. He died in 1604, shortly after his return to London. As device he used the cut of a swan standing on a wreath within an oval frame, bearing the motto "God is my helper" or "God is my defender."

Star Chamber. The book is reprinted in Peter Hall's *Fragmenta liturgica* (1848), I, 1-80.

About the same time Waldegrave also printed the book which became the groundwork and starting-point of the Marprelate controversy, viz: a Briefe and plaine declaration concerning the desires of all those faithfull Ministers that have and do seeke for the Discipline and reformation of the Church of Englande. Which may serve for a just Apologie against the false accusations and slaunders of their Aduersaries. At London. Printed by Robert Walde-grave. 1584. vi, 148 pp. Sm. 8vo. The book, published anonymously, is generally attributed to William Fulke (1538-1589), Master of Pembroke College. It is usually quoted by the running title: A Learned Discourse of Ecclesiasticall Government.

The reformed prayer book, described above, is "a brief and desultory compilation from the Genevan form of Calvin; and that probably not direct, but through one or other of the abbreviations of Knox's Book of Common Order."

At Middleburgh, in the Low Countries, resided at that time Thomas Cartwright and Dudley Fenner (1558?-87) as pastors of the colony of English Nonconformists, the Company of Merchant Adventurers, worshipping in the Gasthuis Kerk. At Middleburgh the second, third, and fourth editions of the reformed prayer book, of 1584, were published, printed by Richard Schilders, and commonly known as "The Middleburgh Prayer Book." The later editions differed to some extent from the first edition, due perhaps to the editorial supervision of Fenner who wielded a capable pen and possessed a resolute spirit. A copy of the second or 1586 edition in the J. P. Morgan library collates A-E8, in eights. A1, obv., title; rev., Contents; text A2, obv., -E8. No pagination. Size of paper, $4\frac{1}{8} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches. A copy of the third edition, 1587, is in the library of the Antiquarian Society, Worcester (Massachusetts). The fourth edition, 1602, collates A-F8, in eights. Compare the further description in *Transactions of the Bibliographical Society*, London, Vol. XI (1912), pp. 93, 95, 105, Nos. 7, 12, and 34. The edition of 1586, with the variants of 1602, is reprinted by Peter Hall, *Reliquiæ Liturgicæ*, Vol. I (139 pp.), Bath, 1847.

The book of 1586 was presented to the speaker of the House of Commons on February 27, 1586/7, by Sir Anthony Cope, together with a bill which apparently went farther than its predecessors, since it declared void all existing laws about ecclesiastical government.¹ Cope was born about 1545 and died in 1614. He was several times high sheriff of Oxfordshire and represented Banbury in six parliaments, from 1586 to 1604. Cope and three other members who were responsible for the bill and the book, presented in 1586/7, were committed to the Tower from February 27 to March 23, but were soon released.

With the elevation of Whitgift, bishop of Worcester, to the primacy of the Church of England, September 23, 1583, a strong and firm hand took hold of ecclesiastical affairs. Of all contemporary prelates he was the man best fitted to carry out the ecclesiastical policy of the queen. Like his opponents, a convinced and thoroughgoing Calvinist in doctrinal matters, he was at the same time a firm believer in and staunch defender of episcopacy as a matter of principle rather than of policy. He took prompt and determined measures against his powerful opponents and issued within a few days after his elevation and with the queen's consent: Articles (eleven in number) for the regulation of the Clergie, and for the better obseruation of the lawes and usages of the Church Established. . . .² Of the three special articles "to whiche very one who shall be allowed to preach must subscribe," viz., the acknowledgment of the royal supremacy, the authority of the Book of Common Prayer and of the Pontifical, and the acceptance of the Thirty-nine Articles, the second article was especially heartily disliked by the Puritan element, from whom numerous protests began to pour in immediately. A few of these, conveniently collected in *A parte of a register*, will serve to illustrate their tenor. Thus: The copie of a Letter [printed Letrer] written by a Gentleman in the Countrey, vnto a Londoner, touching an answere to the Archb. articles, on pp. 132-200. Then, in accordance with the

¹ See also A. Peel, *The Seconde Parte of a Register* (1915), Vol. II, Nos. 231, 232, pp. 212-18.

² E. Cardwell, *Documentary Annals of the Reformed Church of England* (1844), I, 459-64; H. Gee and W. J. Hardy, *Documents Illustrative of English Church History* (1896), pp. 481-85.

table of contents should have followed immediately, on p. 201: A briefe aunswere to the principall pointes in the Archbishops Articles. Also certayne reasons against subscription to the booke of common prayers, and the booke of articles, as followeth. Written about añ. 1583. 6 pp. The brief answer was written by Dudley Fenner, but, of course, published anonymously. When *A parte of a register* was paged up, the pressman must have overlooked these six pages and probably did not discover the omission until the whole volume was made up. He thereupon simply added the six pages without giving them either signature or pagination. Page 200 ends signature Bb, and page 201 begins sig. Cc. Pp. 280-303 contain: The vnlawfull Practises of Prelates, against godly Ministers, the maintainers of the discipline of God. This is without name of author or date of original publication, but printed separately about 1584 or 1585, and reprinted in 1588.

The archbishop's articles gave rise to the final distinction between Conformists and Nonconformists. The Puritans, though highly organized and possessing for a long time, not merely the sympathy, but the active support of many that were high in Elizabeth's counsel, found in Whitgift a worthy opponent. On the main points he had the constant approval and vigorous support of the queen, who soon granted his request for the legal establishment of the new High Commission, created by the queen in 1559, for Causes ecclesiastical,¹ to enable the archbishop to search more effectively for unlawful books and to deal summarily with "disordered persons commonly called Puritans."

Of the flood of Puritan literature which swept over the whole country during the first decade of Whitgift's primacy the publications of Fenner and Udall, and the Marprelate tracts are the most interesting and important.

Dudley Fenner began to write in defense of Puritan principles when scarce twenty-one years of age. In 1583 or early in 1584 appeared anonymously: An Abstracte of Certaine Acts of parlement

¹ On the High Commission see, e.g., John Southerden Burn, *The Star Chamber. Notices of the court and its proceedings; with notes on the High Commission*, London, 1870. VIII, 199 pp. R. G. Usher in *Dictionary of English Church History* (1912), pp. 275-78; and the same author's *The Rise and Fall of the High Commission*, Oxford, 1913.

. . . . , a collection of canons and statutes claimed to support the presbyterian system of government as a protest against the policy of the archbishop. An answer was published by Dr. Richard Cosin (1549?-97), the ecclesiastical lawyer and dean of Arches. Fenner came to the rescue of the *Abstracte* in: *A Covnter-Poyson, Modestlie written for the Time, to make an answer to the obiections and reproches, wherewith the answerer to the Abstract, would disgrace the holy Discipline of Christ.* 1584. The tract was printed by R. Waldegrave and was reprinted in *A parte of a register*, pp. 412-505. The *Covnter-Poyson* was in turn assailed in a Latin sermon preached by Dr. John Copcot (died 1590) at Pauls Cross. Two years later Fenner (?) replied in: *A defence of the Reasons of the Covnter-poyson, for maintenance of the Eldershippe, against an aunswere made to them by Doctor Copequot, in a publike Sermon at Paules Crosse, vpon Psalm. 84.* 1584. Wherein also according to his demaund is prooued syllogistically for the learned, and plainelie for all men, the perpetuitie of the Elders office in the Church. [1586.] Published in *A parte of a register*, pp. 506-27. Pp. 507 and 508 contain "That part of his (Copcot's) Sermon which concerned Discipline." The *Defence* was published anonymously in 1586. Lambeth MS. 874, f. 115, gives Copcot's sermon, and also: An answer to the defence of the reasons of the Counter-poyson . . . (A Peel). The article on Dudley Fenner in *Dictionary of National Biography*, XVIII, 318, denies Fenner's authorship of the *Defence* and maintains that the prefixed note "To the Christian Reader" makes it clear that the tract is not by the author of the *Covnter-poyson*. But under the conditions prevailing when the tract was written it was quite likely that the author, if it was Fenner, should hide his identity and lead the "pursuivants" astray.

During Whitsuntide, 1585, John Bridges, dean of Salisbury,¹ preached at Pauls Cross a sermon against William Fulke's *Briefe and plaine Declaration*, popularly known from its running headline as "A Learned Discourse" Out of this sermon grew a portentous quarto volume, with the title: *A Defence of the*

¹ Bridges became bishop of Oxford in 1603/4, and died in 1618 at a very advanced age.

Gouernment established in the Chvrch of Englande for Ecclesiasticall matters At London, Printed by Iohn VVindet, for Thomas Chard, 1587. viii, 1402 pp. Black letter. Folio. Next to his reply to Fulke's work the dean undertook to answer Theodore Beza's: The iudgment of a most reuerend and learned man from beyond sees concerning a threefold order of Bishops which had been published in 1580 (Sayle, 1585 ?) in an English translation by John Feilde. The chief interest in Bridges' publication lies in the fact that it was the immediate cause of the Marprelate controversy. The dean's arguments were at once answered by Dudley Fenner in: A Defence Of the godlie Ministers, against the slaunders of D. Bridges, contayned in his ansvvere to the Preface before the Discourse of Ecclesiasticall gouernement, with a Declaration of the Bishops proceeding against them, [Middleburgh. Schilders.]¹ 1587. iv, (48), 49-150, (1) pp. Sm. 4to. Sig A two leaves, B-V in four. A1, rev., and V4, rev., blank. Pagination begins on Sig. H1, p. 49. This work appeared anonymously; but when a portion of it was reprinted in *A parte of a register*, pp. 387-93, it was called: Master Dudley Fenners defence written a month before his death. Anno. 1587.

The year following, a second reply appeared attributed to Walter Travers² and printed probably at Middleburgh, bearing the title: A Defence of the Ecclesiastical Discipline ordayned of God to be vsed in his Church. Against a Replie of Maister Bridges to a brieft and plaine Declaration of it which was printed An. 1584. Which replie he termeth, A Defence of the gouernement established in the Church of Englande, for Ecclesiasticall matters 1588. 128 pp.³ Sm. 4to; without divisions, chapters, or marginal analysis. It is a strong and well-written presentation of the simple and democratic order which went under the title of the Discipline.

John Udall (Uvedall) was born about 1560 and died in 1592. He was a Puritan divine holding for a time a living at Kingston-on-Thames. He enjoyed the favor and protection of Ambrose Dudley,

¹ *Transactions of the Bibliographical Society* (London), Vol. XI (1912), pp. 95-96, No. 15.

² Attributed to John Penry by Pierce, *The Marprelate Tracts* (1911), p. 402, n. 2.

³ *Transactions of the Bibliographical Society*, loc. cit., p. 97, No. 20, Sig. A-Cc4. Folio 221 printed for 121, 223 for 123, 225 for 125, and 228 for 128.

earl of Warwick, the well-known friend of many Puritan ministers. In April, 1588, Udall induced Waldegrave, through his friend John Penry, to print at his office in London an anonymous tract in which he trenchantly denounced the policy of the Church Established from the extreme Puritan point of view. The tract is entitled: *The state of the Church of Englande, laide open in a conference betweene Diotrephes a Byshopp, Tertullus a Papiste, Demetrius an vsurer, Pandoch(e)us an Inne-keeper and Paule a preacher of the worde of God.* It was reprinted a few years later in *A parte of a register*, pp. 333-65, and again in 1637 when the storm began which for many years swept away monarchy and established church. The latest reprint is that edited by Professor Arber in *An English Scholar's Library of Old and Modern Works*, No. 5 (1879), xiv, 34 pp. Sm. 8vo.

After Waldegrave had fled from London he set up about September 29, 1588, another secret press at East Molesey (Moulsey) near Kingston-on-Thames, and printed a second anonymous polemic of Udall, called: *A demonstration of the trueth of that Discipline which Christ hath prescribed in his worde for the gouernment of his Church, in all times and places, vntill the end of the world.* 86 pp. Sm. 4to. Sig. A-L in fours. No special title-page. It has been reprinted by Arber in *An English Scholar's Library of Old and Modern Works*, No. 9 (1880) xii, 84 pp. Sm. 8vo. The tract was secretly distributed in November at the time when, through Penry's agency, the first of the famous seven Martin Mar-Prelate tracts, also printed by Waldegrave, appeared.

Deprived of his living at Kingston, in July, 1588, Udall accepted an appointment at Newcastle-on-Tyne, December, 1588, and labored there successfully for about a year. Late in 1589 he was arrested at his new home and appeared on January 9, 1590, in London as "a suspected person." In spite of the extraordinary efforts made on his behalf, Udall lingered in the Marshalsea prison until he died in 1592.

The prime mover in the publication of the Martin Mar-Prelate (Marprelate) tracts, director of the secret press which printed them and corrector of proofs, was John Penry (1559-93), a Welshman and graduate of Oxford. He became soon an out-and-out

Puritan and was very much in earnest about the reformation of the Church along presbyterian lines, independent of state control, and also desirous to promote the general welfare of his beloved home country, Wales. In behalf of the latter he published three tracts in 1587 and 1588, viz.: (1) A treatise containing the Aequity of an Humble Supplication in the behalfe of the Countrey of Wales. Oxford, J. Barnes, 1587, commonly quoted as *The humble supplication on behalfe of Wales*; (2) An exhortation unto the gouvernours, and people of hir Maiesties countrie of Wales, to labour earnestly, to haue the preaching of the Gospell planted among them (1588), known as *Exhortation unto Wales*;² and (3) A view of some part of such publike wants and disorders as are in the seruice of God, within her Maiesties countrie of Wales, together with an humble Petition for their speedy redresse (1588/9) quoted as *A supplication* (unto the High Court of Parliament), or as *View of publike wants within Wales*.³

On some words on page 40 of the first-named tract is founded in Professor Arber's opinion the Marprelate controversy.⁴ In them Penry insinuated that the queen and the bishops care nothing for religion in Wales, while verbally asserting that they do. Udall has never been considered as author of any of the Marprelate tracts and Penry only on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Both, however, had a part in organizing the campaign and arranging for the tracts; and Penry was the "soul" of these attacks on the bishops and the episcopal government.⁴

² See J. D. Wilson, "A New Tract from the Mar Prelate Press," *Library*, new ser., Vol. X (1909), pp. 225-40. The first edition of the *Exhortation unto Wales*, numbered (2), 110 pp., the second, of the same year, 65 pages, these corresponding to pages 1-65 of the first issue. Compare also G. Bonnard, *La controverse de Martin Marprelate*, p. 157.

³ F. Madan, *Oxford Books*, Vol. I, p. 23, No. 5; Vol. II, p. 26, No. 91. Bonnard, *loc. cit.*, p. 171.

⁴ *Introductory Sketch to the Martin Marprelate Controversy*, pp. 55-67.

⁴ On the history of the Marprelate controversy the following books are important: William Maskell, *A History of the Martin Marprelate Controversy in the Reign of Queen Elisabeth*, London, 1845. viii, 224 pp. Edward Arber, *An Introductory Sketch to the Martin Marprelate Controversy, 1588-90*, London, 1879. 200 pp. = *The English Scholar's Library of Old and Modern Works*, No. 8. It contains an excellent collection of materials, drawn from sources contemporary with the issue of the tracts. *The Complete*

Pierce's edition of the Marprelate tracts, 1911, has made them quite accessible to the general reader. They were all issued without name of author or editor or printer, without indication of place, and mostly without date of printing.

1. The first tract is usually known as *The Epistle*.¹ It was a preliminary attack on Dean Bridges' *Defence of the Government*, Book one. It is a small quarto of (1), 54 pages, blackletter, printed by Waldegrave, October 15, 1588, at East Molesey, in the country house

Works of John Lyly, now for the first time collected and edited from the earliest quartos, with life, bibliography, essays, notes, and index, by R. W. Bond; 3 vols., Oxford, 1902, and here, especially Volume III. William Pierce, *An Historical Introduction to the Marprelate Tracts*. A chapter in the evolution of religious and civil liberty in England, London, 1908. xix, 350 pp. Portrait of Sir Richard Knightley, 1534-1615. The book contains, on pp. 322-32, a select bibliography of the Marprelate controversy. Three years later the same scholar published an edition of *The Marprelate Tracts, 1588, 1589*, edited with notes historical and explanatory. London, xxviii, 431 pp. Portrait of Archbishop Whitgift and facsimile reproduction of the title-pages of the tracts. C. Burrage, *The Early Dissenters*, Vol. I, p. x, states that Pierce's edition . . . is a "painstaking and thorough work in which, however, the text has been unfortunately modernized." J. Dover Wilson, "The Marprelate Controversy," in *Cambridge History of English Literature*, Vol. III (1909), chapter xvii, pp. 425-52, 606-16; and the same scholar's *Martin Marprelate and Shakespeare's Fluellen*, London, 1912, 74 pp; a reprint of two articles, published in the *Library*, Ser. 3, Vol. III, pp. 113-51, 244-76, London, 1912. See W. Pierce and R. B. McKerrow, *ibid.*, pp. 345-74, and Wilson, Vol. IV (1913), pp. 92-104.—*The Works of Thomas Nashe*, edited from the original texts by R. B. McKerrow; 5 vols., London, 1904-10. R. W. Dale, *History of English Congregationalism*, London, 1907, pp. 160-62. H. M. Dexter, *Congregationalism . . . as Seen in Its Literature*, New York, 1880, pp. 129-200. G. Bonnard, *La controverse de Martin Marprelate, 1588-1590*. Episode de l'histoire littéraire du puritanisme sous Elizabeth. Genève, 1916, xv, 237, (1) pp. Contains on pp. 219-28, Bibliographie chronologique des pamphlets de la controverse; and on pp. 229-37, Bibliographie des ouvrages cités.

¹ The complete title of tract 1 reads: Oh read ouer D. John Bridges, for it is a worthy worke: | Or an epitome of the | fyrste Booke, of that right worshipfull volume, written against the Puritanes, in the defence of | the noble cleargie, by as worshipfull a prieste, John Bridges, | Presbyter, Priest or elder, doctor of Diuillitie, and Deane of | Sarum. Wherein the arguments of the puritans are | wisely prevented, that when they come to an-|swere M. Doctor, they must needes | say something that hath | bene spoken.|| Compiled for the behoofe and overthrow of | the Parsous[sic], Fyckers, and Currats, that have lernt | their Catechismes, and are past grace: By the reverend | and worthie Martin Marprelate gentleman, and | dedicated to the Confo-cationhouse.|| The Epitome is not yet published, but it shall be when | the Bishops are at convenient leysure to view the same.| In the meane time, let them be content with | this learned Epistle.|| Printed oversea, in Europe, within two fur-|longs of a Bouncing Priest, at the cost and charges | of M. Marprelate, gentleman.

of Mistress Elizabeth Crane, widow of a Puritan minister who had died in prison. It was almost immediately followed by

2. *The Epitome*, printed toward the end of November, 1588, by Waldegrave, at Fawsley, Northamptonshire, in a house belonging to Sir Richard Knightley (1534-1615); 42 unnumbered pages; Sig. A-GI, in fours, small 4to, blackletter. It contained the critical summary of the first of the sixteen books of Dean Bridges' *Defence*, as promised in tract 1, and an attack on Bishop John Aylmer's: An Harborovve For Faithful and Trevve subiectes agaynst the late blowne Blaste . . . Anno MDLIX. At Strasborowe the 26. of Aprill. Aylmer's book was intended as a refutation of: First Blast of the Trumpet against the monstruous regiment of women (Geneva?), 1558, by John Knox.

The first line of the title of both of these initial Marprelate tracts reads: Oh read ouer D. John Bridges, for it is a (caret tract 2) worthy worke. The two tracts were reprinted by Petheram in 1842 (iv, 76 pp.) and 1843 (vi, (1), 64 pp.) respectively; in the series *Puritan Discipline Tracts* (2d ed., 1860). No. 1 also by Arber in *An English Scholar's Library*. . . . No. 11, 1880. xiv, 50 pp. (2d ed. 1895.) Pierce, *Marprelate Tracts*, pp. 1-101, 103-171. About one-fifth of tract 1 is reproduced by Dearmer, *Religious Pamphlets* (1898), pp. 114-41. Copies of the original issues of tracts 1 and 2 are in the Congregational Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

The suggestion of J. Dover Wilson that notes left by the Puritan propagandist *par excellence*, John Feilde, who died in February (or March?), 1588, formed the material for the first two tracts is quite plausible unless Mr. Pierce can prove (1) that the testimony of Henry Sharpe, minister at Fawsley, contained in Thomas Baker's transcript (Henry Sharpe sworn and examined, . . . ye 15th day of October 1589, Harleian ms. 7042, p. 94; see Arber, *Introduction*, pp. 94-104, 194), to the effect that Feilde had expressed a desire that his notes should be burnt after his death (*Library*, Series 3, Vol. III, p. 350), is credible, and (2) that they were actually destroyed.¹

¹ On Feilde's close connection with the whole scheme of the Marprelate tracts, and especially with tract 1, see also A. Peel, *The Seconde Parte of a Register*, Vol. I, pp. 16-18. "It would seem probable that the Puritans had a kind of publication department, with John Field as head or editor-in-chief, until the time of his death (Mar., 1588?)," p. 18.

The *Epitome* printed in November was not issued until February 2, 1589. Advance copies must have, in some way, reached the bishops, for it is mentioned in the preface of the answer issued by them in: *An Admonition to the people of England: VVherein are ansvvered, not only the slaunderous vntruethes, reprochfully vttered by Martin the Libeller, but also many other Crimes by some of his broode, obiected generally against all Bishops and the chiefe of the Cleargie, purposely to deface and discredite the present state of the Church London 1589.* The book appeared after the second Marprelate tract had been printed. It was the joint work of Archbishop Whitgift and Bishops Thomas Cooper, then of Winchester, John Aylmer (1521-94), of London, William Wickham (1539-95), Lincoln, and John Young (Yonge, died 1605), of Rochester. The preface is signed T. C., Cooper acting as editor of the book. It has always been regarded as the official answer to this opening Martinist attack and is a reply of great gravity. It is a quarto and was printed the same year in three editions. The original edition collates A-I in fours, K and L in eights (L8 wanting), M-Y & Aa-Kk in fours, Ll two leaves. The presence of two sheets of eight leaves each in a quarto is very suspicious, and, when upon examining the pagination we find that in these two signatures (folios 65 ff.) the leaves alone are numbered, except L7, which is numbered on both sides, whereas the rest of the book is numbered by pages, an evident device to make the pagination run on consecutively, it becomes clear that the two sheets are a cancel, and a hasty cancel, if we may infer from the fact that pages 68 and 69 are both numbered 69, and 70 and 71 both 71. The interesting point is that we are able to infer from this that the reply to the Martinists which the book contained was not part of the work as originally planned and printed, but was added at the last moment. L8 was a blank and was thus cut out. The omission of a signature Z is of no significance in books of that period.² The original edition, numbered on the last page 252, thus actually had 266 pages. Two other corrected editions were put out the same year, the one numbering 245 (+ one blank) pages, the other 244. The second edition

² *Transactions of the Bibliographical Society* (London), Vol. XII, pp. 264, 298-99; Pierce, *Introduction*, pp. 172, 324.

was reprinted by Petheram in *Puritan Discipline Tracts*, xii, 203 pp. 1847; 2d ed., 1860); and by Arber in *An English Scholar's Library*. . . . No. 15, 1882, xii, 182 pp. (2d ed., 1895).

The Martinists set to work at once to answer the *Admonition*. From Bridges they turned with fierce joy to Cooper. While busy on a more detailed answer they hastened to entertain their admiring friends with a veritable broadside, headed:

3. Certaine Minerall and Metaphisicall Schoolpoints, to be defended by the reuerende Bishops, and the rest of my cleargie masters of the conuocation house against both the vniuersities and al the reformed Churches in Christendome The sheet is briefly referred to by contemporaries as *Mineralls*. Blackletter, page of type measuring 9 $\frac{3}{8}$ by 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches, printed February 20, 1589, by Waldegrave at the White Friars, the residence of John Hales, Esq., at Coventry. Reprinted in Pierce, *Marprelate Tracts*, pp. 173-96.

While Waldegrave's one press, used for blackletter printing, was busy on the next Martinist tract, he printed on his second press, in roman type, John Penry's *View of some part of such publike wants*. It was issued about March 9, 1588/9.¹ Two weeks later, March 22; appeared from the Waldegrave press at Coventry the main work of the Martinists, the reply to Cooper's *Admonition*:

4. Hay any worke for Cooper² Black letter.³ (10), 47, (1) pp. Sig. A-H1 in fours, Sm. 4to. It was the last tract printed by Waldegrave, who went to Devonshire toward the end of March

¹ See also Arber, *Introduction*, p. 198.

² Hay any worke for Cooper: | Or a briefe Pistle directed by waye of an | hublication to the reuerende Byshopps, counselling | them, if they will needs be barrellled vp, for feare of smelling | in the nostrels of her Maiestie to the State, that they would | vse the aduise of reuerend Martin, for the prouiding of their | Cooper. Because the reuerend T. C. (by which misticall | letters, is vnderstood, eyther the bounsing Par- | son of Eastmeane, or Tom Coakes his | Chaplaine) to bee an vnskil- | full and a beceytfull | tubtrimmer.|| Wherein worthy Martin quits himselfe like a man | I warrant you, in the modest defence of his selfe and his | learned Pistles, and makes the Coopers hoopes | to flye off, and the Bishops Tubs to | leake out of all crye.|| Penned and compiled by Martin the Metropolitane.|| Printed in Europe, not farre from some of the Bounsing Priestes.

³ J. D. Wilson, *Library*, new ser., Vol. VIII (1907), p. 351. Waldegrave apparently never again used this fine blackletter type after printing the fourth tract.

and from there to Rochelle where he continued printing for Penry and others. The title of the Cooper tract was very catchy. "Ha'ye any work for John Cooper?" was at the time one of the cries of London. Two reprints were issued at the beginning of the Commonwealth, the one in 1641, with a title differing from the original,¹ the other an exact reprint. Petheram put out a reprint in 1845, 2d ed., 1860; and Pierce on pp. 197-284 of his edition of the tracts.

The Martinists, deprived of Waldegrave's help, employed another zealous Puritan, John Hodgkins, an expert printer, but dubbed, for policy's sake, a "saltpeterman." He printed on Waldegrave's second press and with the roman type which the latter had left behind, the next two tracts, viz.:

5. Theses Martinianae, known from its reputed author as "Martin Junior," printed July 22, 1589, at the Priory, the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Roger Wigston, at Wolston, near Coventry (31) pp., Sig. A-D in fours, Sm. 4to. Reprinted in Pierce, *loc. cit.*, pp. 285-334.

6. The iust censure and reproofe of Martin Iunior, known from its pretended author as Martin Senior, July 29, 1589; same printer and place; (32) pp., Sig. A-D in fours, Sm. 4to. Reprinted in Pierce, *loc. cit.*, 335-81.

Safety now demanded a further removal of press and pressmen. Hodgkins with his two assistants, Valentine Symmes (Simms) and Arthur Tomlyn (Thomlyn), journeyed toward Manchester and began setting up, at Newton Lane, near Manchester, the tract "More worke for the Cooper," when on August 14 they were apprehended, together with the copy they had in hand and the printed sheets. The tract, of course, never appeared in print.

The last effort of the now discouraged Martinists was printed toward the end of September, or at least before the middle of October, 1589. It is known as:

7. The Protestatyon of Martin Marprelat Published by the worthe gentleman D. martin marprelate D. in all the faculties primat and metropolitan; 32 pp. (last page numbered 23 by mistake); roman type, small 8vo. Reprinted in Pierce, *loc. cit.*, pp. 385-417.

¹ See Pierce, *Introduction*, p. 325, for the complete titles of the two reprints.

According to J. D. Wilson following Sayle, *Early English Printed Books* . . . , No. 7325, the tract was printed at Haseley Manor, in Job Throckmorton's house, by Waldegrave, while on his way from Rochelle to Scotland. Pierce, *Library*, new ser., Vol. III, pp. 303-4, believes that it was printed at Wolston, and that Waldegrave was not the printer.

This ended the Martinist tracts. And who was or were the author or authors? Only conjectures can be made. The *Catalogus Bibliothecæ Bodleianæ*, Vol. II (1843), p. 667, states that "the libels written under the name of M. M. are ascribed to four persons, namely Penry, Throgmorton, Udal, and Fenner; but most frequently to Penry." Thus also the British Museum Catalogue, s.v. "Marprelate (Martin), pseud," and Sayle, *Early English Printed Books*, etc., Nos. 1915, 1916, 7325, 7779(?). These assumptions are undoubtedly based upon the depositions of Henry Sharpe, the bookbinder, and Humphrey Newman, the cobbler.

A most ingenious theory as to the authorship of the tracts is that of J. Dover Wilson in his *Martin Marprelate and Shakespeare's Fluellen*, in which he brings forward Sir Roger Williams, Welsh adventurer and Elizabethan soldier, not only as the original of Shakespeare's Captain Fluellen, but also as Martin Marprelate the Great, who, in conjunction with Penry and Throckmorton, was responsible for the tracts as follows: Tracts 1, 2, 4, and the body of "More Worke for the Cooper," by Sir Roger alone; 3, the joint work of Sir Roger, Throckmorton, and perhaps Penry; 5, the Theses, 110 in number, by Sir Roger, the prologue and epilogue by Penry; 6, by Throckmorton; and 7, pp. 1-14, by Penry, pp. 15-32 by Throckmorton, who is also the writer of the epistle to "More Worke for the Cooper." Dr. McKerrow (*Library*, Ser. 3, Vol. III, pp. 364-74) hesitates and Mr. Pierce (*ibid.*, pp. 345-64) absolutely refuses to entertain the theory of Sir Roger's authorship. The latter also disbelieves the joint authorship of tract 7 (*ibid.*, p. 363).

G. Bonnard, *loc. cit.*, pp. 207-14, believes that Job Throckmorton was the author of all the Marprelate tracts. Throckmorton (1545-1601) was the eldest son of Clement Throckmorton, a sympathizer of the "seekers after reformation," and nephew of Sir

Nicholas Throckmorton. He was a graduate of the University of Oxford and a zealous, even reckless, advocate of Puritan views. After his father's death, in 1573, Job became master of Haseley Manor, near Warwick. He was of great assistance to Penry and other Puritan writers. When Penry escaped to Edinburgh in 1590, Throckmorton seems to have supplied him with funds. When Penry was arrested and put on his trial in 1593, Throckmorton swore that he himself "was not Martin and knew not Martin [Marprelate]." In 1592 Matthew Sutcliffe (1550?-1629), dean of Exeter, issued a vehement attack, asserting, despite the absence of legal proof, that Throckmorton was guilty of complicity both with Penry and William Hackett (executed in 1591) and the little band of religious fanatics who were convicted of treason in 1591. Throckmorton replied in 1594 with a pamphlet: *The Defence Of Iob Throckmorton against the slaunders of Maister Sutcliffe, taken out of a Copey of his owne hande as it was written to an honorable Personage* (1594. 4to). To this Sutcliffe published an answer in 1595. On the basis of Sutcliffe's statements and the general tenor of the Marprelate tracts, Bonnard assumes Throckmorton as the author of them.

As to the name Martin Marprelate, Sir Sidney Lee in *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. XLIV, p. 347, col. 1, believes that the name Martin was suggested to Penry and his associates by Luther's Christian name. From our twentieth-century viewpoint the tracts show a coarse wit and invective. They are a humorous, though ribald, attack upon the bishops for withstanding and preventing the true reformation along presbyterian lines. Martin would put a young Martin "in euerie parish" and "euerie one of them able to *mar a prelate*." The tracts were the climax of the first Puritan assault upon the Church of England in favor of the Book of Discipline.

At Rochelle Waldegrave printed Penry's: *Th' Appellation of John Penri unto the Highe court of Parliament, from the bad and injurious dealing of th' Archb. of Canterb. other his colleagues of the high commission: Wherein the complainant craveth release from trouble or just tryall* The author had finished the pamphlet at Coventry on March 7, 1589. Its

title was chosen probably in imitation of the *Appellation* of John Knox.¹ At Rochelle Waldegrave is reported to have printed in the summer of 1589 also: A Dialogue wherein is laid open the tyrannicall dealing of L. Bishoppes against Gods children: with certaine points of doctrine vvherein they approue themselues (according to D. Bridges his iudgement) to be truely the Bishops of the Diuell. A-D in fours, Sm. 4to, without date, place, or printer's name. It was reprinted in 1640 as: A Dialogue, wherin is plainly laide open (A-C in fours, D two leaves),² and in 1643 under the title: The Character of a Puritan. According to *Dictionary of National Biography* and Sayle, *loc. cit.*, No. 1917, the tract was written "under Penry's auspices."

One more tract belongs here which, from its contents, is considered by J. D. Wilson a veritable Marprelate tract. Robert Some (1542-1609), master of Peterhouse College, Cambridge, attempted to interpose as mediator in the Marprelate controversy. With this in view he published in May, 1588, a tract headed: A Godly Treatise concerning and deciding certaine questions, moued of late in London and other places, touching the Ministerie, Sacraments, and Church Imprinted at London by G. B. Deputie to Christopher Barker 1588. The preface is dated May 6, 1588, which in accordance with the usage of the sixteenth century indicates the day on which the book was printed, not the date of composition by the author. Penry made answer to it in two of his tracts being printed just then by Waldegrave. Some issued a second edition of his treatise September 19, 1588, replying at some length to both tracts of Penry. To this Penry addressed himself once more and penned a "Reply." But the manuscript was seized when the "pursuivants" raided the house of Henry Godley, Penry's father-in-law, on January 29, 1588/9. It was this unfortunate occurrence which induced an anonymous friend to

¹ Arber, *Introduction*, p. 68; Arber, *ibid.*, pp. 68, 179-81, and the *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. XLIX, p. 21, col. 1, have the book "printed at Rochelle in March 1590." See also J. D. Wilson's article, "A Date in the Marprelate Controversy," *Library*, new ser., Vol. VIII (1907), pp. 337-59: On John Penry's *Appellation*, a petition to Parliament, printed in 1589, and on Waldegrave's movements in 1589.

² Copy in the Congregational Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

produce the work of an alleged anonymous author replying to Dr. Some. Its title runs: M. Some laid open in his coulers: Wherein The Indifferent Reader may easily see, hovve vvretchedly and loosely he hath handeled the cause against M. Penri. Done by an Oxford man, to his friende in Cambridge. 124 pp. Sm. 4to; roman type, without place, date, name of author or printer, apart from the terminal initials I. G. on the last page. Sayle, *loc. cit.*, No. 1918, follows Dexter in assuming John Greenwood, the separatist colleague of Henry Barrowe, as its author. Arber, *Introduction*, p. 179, and Pierce, *Introduction*, pp. 210, 233/34, assign the whole tract to Job Throckmorton, "an Oxford man," as had been done long ago by Matthew Sutcliffe (Bonnard, *La controverse de Martin Marprelate*, pp. 196-97). J. D. Wilson maintains that the preface is the work of his resurrected friend, Sir Roger Williams, the body of the tract that of Throckmorton, and that it was printed by Waldegrave at Rochelle in the summer of 1589.¹ As a matter of fact, Throckmorton never denied the authorship of the pamphlet.

The bishops acquired valiant defenders in Thomas Nashe (1569-1601), one of England's greatest satirists and a hater of puritanism; in John Lyly (1554-1606), the dramatist, Robert Greene (1560-92), and others that were presumably secretly commissioned to answer the Martinists. Nashe, especially, entered with zest into the controversy and under his *nom de guerre* "Pasquill" wrote some of the most telling and sarcastic answers. Anno Dom. 1589, August 6, appeared: A Countercuffe giuen to Martin Iunior: by the venturous, hardie, and renowned Pasquill of England, Caualliero. | Not of olde Martins making, which newlie knighted the Saints in Heauen, with rise up Sir Peter and Sir Paule: but lately dubd for his seruice at home in the defence of his Countrey, and for the cleane breaking of his staffe vppon Martins face. | Printed Betweene the skye and the ground. VVithin a myle of an Oake, and not many fieldes of, from the vnpruiledged Presse of the Ass-ignes of Martin Junior. (8) pp. 4to. The pamphlet was set up in duplicate at the same time, the one being printed August 6, the other, differing in minor typographical matters, on August 8 (McKerrow, ed. Nashe, Vol. I, pp. 52-55). Next followed John Lyly's: Pappe

¹ In his *Martin Marprelate and Shakespeare's Fluellen*.

with an hatchet. Alias, A figge for my Godsonne. Or Cracke me this nut. Or A Countrie cuffe, that is, a sound boxe of the eare, for the idiot Martin to hold his peace, seeing the patch will take no warning. | VVritten by one that dares call a dog, a dog, and made to preuent Martins dog daies. | Imprinted by John Anoke and John Astile, for the Bayliue of Withernam, cum priuilegio perennitatis, and are to bee sold at the signe of the crab tree cudgell in twack-coate lane. | A sentence. Martin hangs fit for my mowing. (28) pp. Sig. A-D₃ in fours. Sm. 4to. There were three issues, put out at the same time and, like Nashe's pamphlet, differing only in minor typographical matters. Nashe's: *The Returne of the renowned Caualliero Pasquill of England, from the other side the Seas . . .* is dated October 20, 1589,¹ and close upon this appeared: *An Almond for a Parrat, Or Cutbert Curry-knaues Almes. . .* (Bonnard, *loc. cit.*, p. 199), denouncing Penry by name as the protagonist of the controversy. *The First Parte of Pasquils Apologie . . .*, an answer to John Penry's treatise in favor of reformation, brought the whole controversy to an end in 1590. Nashe's unbridled pen had led chiefly to the discomfiture of the Martinists.

In September, 1592, Penry returned from Edinburgh to London, was arrested in March, 1593, charged with inciting to rebellion and insurrection, and was hanged in May, 1593. On his last days and trial, see C. Burrage, *John Penry, the So-Called Martyr of Congregationalism*, as revealed in the original record of his trial and in documents related thereto. Oxford, 1913. 43 pp.

In 1593, according to most authorities, appeared: *A parte of a register . . .* The book is without name of editor, date, place, or publisher. According to Pierce, *Marprelate tracts*, p. 21, note, the book was printed by Waldegrave at Rochelle. J. D. Wilson, *Transactions of the Bibliographical Society* (London), Vol. XI (1912), pp. 86-87, maintains that Schilders at Middleburgh was the printer of the book. See *ibid.*, pp. 98-99, No. 22. On page 84 of the same article it is said that Schilders "was playing second string to Waldegrave throughout the whole business of the Marprelate tracts." Dickson and Edmond, *Annals of Scottish Printing*, pp. 468-70, and

¹ R. B. McKerrow, "A Note on Variations in Certain Copies of the Returne of Pasquill," *Library*, new ser., Vol. IV (1903), pp. 384-91.

H. G. Aldis, *List of Books Printed in Scotland before 1700*, p. 8, No. 243, appear to have shown that its compiler was Dudley Fenner,¹ and that it was printed by Waldegrave at Edinburgh, in 1593. Toward the end of his short life Fenner must have collected scattered tracts, published or in manuscript, by other Puritan writers representing the same views for which he labored, suffered, and died, intending to publish the collection in an account of Puritan sufferings and woes. Death overtook him before publication. The material probably passed into the hands of Feilde, and after Feilde's death into those of Udall, who added some of his own tracts. Possibly the printer received the material ready for publication from among the manuscripts left by Udall at his death, or, more likely, obtained it from Udall through Penry when the latter escaped to Scotland. R. G. Usher, *The Reconstruction of the English Church*, Vol. II, p. 396, and others argue for the year 1590 as date of publication of these Puritan *Acta*. This date, of course, would simplify matters considerably. Bancroft, *Dangerous positions*, Book II, chap. 3, states that the book was printed in Scotland, sent to London by ship, and that most of the issue was destroyed there by order of the authorities.

Champlin Burrage, *The Early Dissenters*, 1912, Vol. I, p. 24, note 9, stated that "Dr. Williams's library, London, contains the thick folio, of about 570 leaves, in manuscript, entitled, 'The seconde parte of a Register.'" Pierce quotes from it repeatedly. Daniel Williams (1643?-1716) was one of the best-known non-conformist divines and founder of a well-known library of Puritan literature.² After years of waiting, a calendar of the manuscripts was printed in 1915, with the title: *The Seconde Parte of a Register*. Being a Calendar of Manuscript under that title intended for publication by the Puritans about 1593, and now in Dr. Williams's Library, London. Edited by Albert Peel. With a preface by C. H. Firth, Cambridge at the University Press, 1915, 2 vols. 8vo. Volume I, numbers xviii, (2), 311 pages; Volume II (6), 328 pp.

¹ See also *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. XVIII, p. 318.

² Robert Travers Herford and Stephen K. Jones, *A Short Account of the Charity and Library Established under the Will of the Late Rev. Daniel Williams, D.D.* London, 1917. vi (2), 147 pp. Portrait. Plates. Facsimile 8vo.

"A calendar of these Mss. was the best way of making them accessible to students, for the cost of printing them all *in extenso* would have been prohibitive, and many of them are not of sufficient value to deserve reproduction at length" (Vol. I, prefacé, p. vi). The collection was brought together by the Rev. Roger Morrice, born in 1628 and died January 17, 1701-2. *The Seconde Parte of a Register* is a collection of manuscripts, some of them originals, but the majority copies made toward the end of Elizabeth's reign, ranging in date from 1547 to 1590. The manuscript consists really of two parts, the one being numbered by pages (632), the other by leaves only (245). There exists also a later transcript volume, a copy from the original *Seconde Parte*. The transcripts and copies were made late in the seventeenth century, probably by Roger Morrice's amanuensis. The destruction of almost the whole issue of *A parte of a register* upon their arrival in London from Scotland in 1593 deterred the Puritan ministers from printing other volumes ready in manuscript. Neal (1732) and Brook (1873) made use of the later transcript, and very poor use at that, as Peel shows on pages 20-24 of Volume I of his edition. In addition to the contents of the copy of the original manuscript of *The Seconde Parte of a Register*, the transcript volume contains also as part 2: Mss. Some Papers, viz. Old ones, with pages marked at bottom, and New ones, or several of the old "Transcribed Fair" but not bound, numbering 227 pages. All of these have been made use of by Dr. Peel in his calendar edition of *The Seconde Parte of a Register*.

Archbishop Whitgift's policy in ecclesiastical matters received most vigorous support from Richard Bancroft (1544-1610), later his immediate successor as primate of England (1604-10). The Sunday after the opening of Elizabeth's seventh Parliament, February 4, 1589, he preached at Pauls Cross a notable sermon on "The Trying of Spirits," in which he denounced "Martin and all schismatics." Four years later he came forward with two volumes by which he materially helped to clear the situation and to check the rapid growth of Puritan presbyterianism. The first was: A survey of the Pretended Holy Discipline. Contayning the beginnings, successes, parts, proceedings, authority, and doctrine of

it: with some of the manifold, and materiall repugnances, varieties and vncertainties, in that behalfe. Faithfully gathered, by way of historicall narration, out of the bookes and writings, of principall favourers of that platforme. Anno 1593. viii, 466 pp. 4to. The other, published presumably some months later: Davngerovs Positions and Proceedings, published and practised within this iland of Brytaine, vnder pretence of Reformation, and for the Presbiteriall Discipline. London. Imprinted by I. Wolfe, 1593. viii, 184 pp. 4to.

The Act 35 Eliz. c.1 (1593) marked the culmination of the measures taken by Elizabeth to repress puritanism. Her legislation, it will be remembered, began with the Supremacy Act, restoring ancient jurisdiction (1559), and was continued by the Uniformity Act (1559), and the proclamation of 1573 addressed to the bishops appointing a special commission of *Oyer* and *Terminer*. Account must also be taken of the proceedings of the Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission. The Act of 1593 was continued by 3 Car. I, c. 4, saving certain clauses repealed by 3 (Jac.) I, c. 4, and was further continued by 16 Car. I, c. 4. The Toleration Act, 1 William and Mary, c. 18 (1689), may be considered to have finally abrogated the Act of Elizabeth, 1593.¹

With the death of Elizabeth in 1603 and the accession of James I, born and brought up under the influence of Scottish puritanism, the hopes of the English Puritans rose high again. Petitions for reformation of Church, clergy, and liturgy began to pour in from city and country, clergy and laity. But James would not harken unto them. The Hampton Court Conference with its resultant meager revision of the liturgy of the Church, and the production in 1604 of the ecclesiastical code which has governed the Church of England to the present day, spread dismay among Puritan clergy and laity. The reconstruction of the Church along strictly episcopal lines begun by Archbishop Bancroft and completed by William Laud (1573-1645), Archbishop of Canterbury (1633-45), resulted in even greater repression of English puritanism. Yet the latter could not and would not be utterly crushed and exterminated.

¹ H. Gee and W. J. Hardy, *Documents Illustrative of English Church History* (1896), pp. 492-98, 654-64.

The fire of rebellion against the continuous harsh treatment kept smoldering beneath the ashes of discontent and discouragement until the ill-fated Scottish Service-book of 1637, the Laudian policy, and the new canons of 1640 roused Scotland and Puritan England to such a storm of indignation and resentment that it fanned the smoldering fire into a gigantic blaze destroying monarchy and episcopacy for years to come. And when in 1660 Charles II and episcopacy returned to England and the final settlement of the Church as by law established took place in 1661 and 1662, the ecclesiastical authorities had to recognize the power and influence of puritanism in many ways and numerous concessions. The Puritans now decided to leave the established church entirely and become independent, a step which after further years of efforts and struggles finally brought about mutual brotherly recognition and friendly interrelations.

THE LISBON EARTHQUAKE: A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS VALUATION

EDGAR S. BRIGHTMAN
Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts

If religion be what Höffding holds it to be, a belief in the conservation of values, then every instance of apparent destruction of values is for philosophy of religion a peculiarly poignant problem. At the present time we are looking back with horror on the destruction of values by the hand of man in the world-war and by the hand of Nature in the dread scourge of the Spanish influenza. Analogous instances abound in human history.

On November 1, 1755, there occurred one such event, known to history as the Lisbon earthquake. An event appalling in the suddenness and extent of the devastation which it wrought, it raised again for all thoughtful minds the problem of religion in acute empirical form: If values are thus destroyed, how can religion be true? To survey the intellectual reactions called forth in great minds by this event may help us both to understand the thought of the enlightenment, and, more important, to glean some suggestions for the philosophical interpretation of the religious valuation of experience.

I

The Lisbon earthquake came to a Europe enlightened, rationalistic, optimistic. The optimistic phase of eighteenth-century thought was most seriously disturbed by the catastrophe. Optimism had received its classical expression at the hands of Leibnitz and Pope. In order to understand the "apperceptive mass" with which Europe envisaged the event at Lisbon, it is therefore desirable to survey the relevant ideas of the two writers just mentioned.

Leibnitz expressed his optimistic ideas in the *Théodicée*, published in 1710 in answer to Pierre Bayle's *Réponse à un provincial*, in which Bayle had held that the moral and physical ills of life were

such that one might well assume two ultimate principles, one good and one evil. Leibnitz wrote the *Théodicée* to prove that this world is good, indeed the best of possible worlds, chosen by an all-wise, all-good Creator.¹ It is not necessary to repeat here all the arguments of that remarkable product of philosophical theology. It will suffice to call attention to a few of its outstanding ideas. Leibnitz writes from the point of view of faith in the Christian religion, and undertakes to show that such faith is in harmony with reason. For this faith, the participation of God in the existence of evil is the crucial instance. "Supreme wisdom, united with a goodness no less infinite, could not fail to choose the best"; if God is to be what revelation proclaims and faith accepts, the actual universe must be the best among all possible worlds. This can be true only if details are judged from the point of view of the whole, for nothing exists or has significance by itself, "tout est lié dans la nature"—in Nature everything is connected. There are, it is true, apparent evils here below. God sends us unhappiness, as a result of original sin our vices surpass our virtues, and "a single Caligula, a Nero has done more [evil] than an earthquake." But whatever the sorrows or the sins of humanity, the optimistic faith remains unaffected, for "it is sufficient in relation to God that there is incomparably more good than evil in the universe." For finite minds, evil must be, as a consequence of finiteness; a defect, something negative which vanishes when the whole is known. For these and other familiar reasons, Leibnitz regards theistic optimism as rationally justified.

Pope is to be set alongside of Leibnitz as the second great prophet of optimism for the enlightenment. The *Essay on Man*, published 1732-34, Pope's poetical version of Bolingbroke's moral philosophy, was said by Voltaire to be "the most beautiful, the most awful, the most sublime didactic poem that has ever been written in any language."² In 1738 Voltaire paid Pope the

¹ All citations are from the edition of his *Opera* published in Berlin, 1840. Sections 1, 8, 119, 259, 262, and 378 are referred to in the text above. The translations from this and other works in foreign languages are made by the present writer.

² *Pope's Complete Poetical Works*, Cambridge edition, Boston and New York, 1903. For the foregoing quotation see p. 15. The *Essay on Man* is to be found on pp. 137 ff.

sincere flattery of imitation in his *Discours en vers sur l'homme*. That the optimism of the admired *Essay* was essentially the same as the Leibnitzian, a few citations will suffice to show.

Of systems possible, if 'tis confest
That wisdom infinite must form the best,
Where all must fall or not coherent be,
And all that rises rise in due degree;
Then in the scale of reas'ning life 'tis plain
There must be, somewhere, such a rank as Man.
Respecting Man, whatever wrong we call,
May, must be right, as relative to all.

Pope's God is one

Who sees with equal eye, as God of all,
A hero perish or a sparrow fall.

Should wretched humanity object, and "cry, if man's unhappy, God's unjust," Pope answers, "In pride, in reas'ning pride, our error lies."

Leibnitz had specifically brushed earthquakes aside as relatively justifiable in comparison with Nero or Caligula. So Pope:

But errs not Nature from this gracious end
When earthquakes swallow, or when tempests sweep
Towns to one grave, whole nations to the deep?
"No," 'tis replied, "the first Almighty Cause
Acts not by partial but by general laws."
If plagues or earthquakes break not Heav'n's design
Why then a Borgia or a Catiline?

The scriptures of optimism thus expressly insure against loss by earthquake:

And spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite,
One truth is clear, *Whatever is, is right*.

This familiar optimism of Leibnitz and Pope is characterized by one outstanding trait: that of regarding the universe as a whole (not unlike Bosanquet, for all the differences) as ultimately the only object of value. The universal welfare or fitness is the only standard of worth; so far as particulars and individuals are concerned value-distinctions literally have no real meaning. "God loves," says Pope, "from whole to parts"; yet not the parts, not

man, but "the universal cause," "that chain which links th' immense design," "whatever is," "tout," is the truly valuable. Kant in his *Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus* (1759) puts the Leibnitzian view in a nutshell when he says, "Dass das Ganze das beste sei, und alles um des Ganzen willen gut sei." In the first epistle of the *Essay* Pope exclaims,

All this dread order break—for whom? for thee?
Vile worm! O madness! pride! impiety!

Human beings have, then, no rights which reality ought to respect. Individuals are vile worms; only the dread order is worthful. The process of valuation for Pope and Leibnitz consists in setting vile worms in their place in the dread order; that is, in relating the part to the whole. This is the triumph of optimistic rationalism.

In the year of the Lisbon earthquake, A. F. Reinhard's prize essay for the Berlin Academy of Sciences was entitled "Le Système de Pope sur la perfection du monde comparé avec celui de M. de Leibnitz, avec un examen de l'Optimisme." The very word optimism was coined during this period. Morize¹ finds the first occurrence of the word in Castel's review of the Chevalier de Jancourt's translation of the *Théodicée*, in the year 1737.

II

To a Europe taught thus to be smugly content with everything in spite of anything, there came tidings of a fact that forced its way through the artificial defenses of theories and formulae, and challenged the easy-going optimism of the century.

November 1, 1755, All Saints' Day, the churches of Lisbon, Portugal, were crowded, the city was in festal array. Suddenly at 9:00 A.M. came an earthquake shock, quickly followed by two others. Churches crashed to the ground, worshipers were buried beneath ruins. About one-quarter of the houses in the city were destroyed. A stone quay on which 3,000 had taken refuge was engulfed by the Tagus, after which a huge tidal wave swept away all within its reach. Fires broke out in many parts of the city.

¹ Andre Morize, *Voltaire, Candide ou l'Optimisme*. Paris, 1913. Hereafter referred to as Morize.

Looting flourished. Estimates of the dead varied from 30,000 to 100,000. The vibrations of this earthquake made themselves felt practically all over Europe. And what was true in the physical world was, if possible, even more true in the intellectual realm. Scarcely any single natural phenomenon of modern times has aroused so much philosophical debate.

III

If any one individual was the eighteenth century in epitome it was Voltaire. His evaluation of the Lisbon earthquake would naturally be our first object of investigation.

Prior to 1755 Voltaire was an admirer and imitator of Pope. His mistress, Emilie de Breteuil, was a Leibnitzian. Voltaire therefore is commonly regarded as a typical eighteenth-century optimist, shocked by the earthquake into cynical pessimism. Morize seems to have proved that this is not true; that the influence of Pope held Voltaire only for the decade of the thirties. Leibnitz, at any rate, he rejected in the early forties. Voltaire's writings on Lisbon, therefore, had for their background, not his own optimism rudely overthrown, but rather the optimistic fashion of the day, which he himself had already for more than a decade rejected.¹

The period immediately preceding the earthquake found Voltaire under the shadow of the death of his mistress (1749). His letters reveal doubts of freedom, the soul, of all metaphysics, and of optimism; Morize finds a more discouraged pessimism in Voltaire's letters of 1754 than, say, in the conclusion of *Candide*. On receiving news of the disaster at Lisbon, he writes twenty letters which, according to Morize, reveal a triumphant pessimist. It may be that Morize overestimates the consistency of Voltaire's pessimism in this period, for as late as 1752 he could still say, "There is more good than evil on earth," and in the *Poème sur la loi naturelle*, directed to Frederick the Great, he could still praise Pope, and could devote the entire second part of the poem to

¹ Otto Lemp, *Das Problem der Theodicee in der Philosophie und Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts bis auf Kant und Schiller*. Leipzig, 1910. This work, not available in connection with the present study, may be consulted for the optimism of the period.

"Answers to Objections against the Principles of a Moral Universe" and "Proof of This Truth." It may well be that Lisbon found Voltaire not so clearly a triumphant pessimist as rather a divided self, shifting from one mood to the other, not satisfied with any conclusion.

On December 16, 1755, Voltaire published the *Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne en 1755, ou examen de cet axiome: Tout est bien*, which appeared in a new edition, with notes, in March of the following year. In the preface Voltaire pays his respects to Pope, "the illustrious Pope," who "enveloped in his immortal verse the systems of Leibnitz, of Lord Shaftesbury, and of Lord Bolingbroke," and informs the reader that he is not attacking Pope, but is only warning against an abuse of Pope's maxim, "Whatever is, is right," "taken in an absolute sense and without hope of a future." For that abuse he has no mercy. For if philosophers had said to those escaped from Lisbon, "Whatever is, is right; the heirs of the dead will increase their fortunes; the masons will earn money by rebuilding houses; the beasts will derive nourishment from the corpses buried in the ruins: it is the necessary result of necessary causes; your particular evil is nothing, you contribute to the general good," "such a discourse had certainly been as cruel as the earthquake was tragical." Only revelation and "the hope of a development of our being in a new order of things . . . can console us," and "the goodness of Providence is the only asylum to which man can have recourse in the darkness of his reason."

These same ideas are more vividly developed in the poem itself. The poet summons all men, and especially "deceived philosophers, who cry, *Tout est bien*," to behold the fate of Lisbon. He declares that no principles of eternal and necessary law nor of moral retribution justify the destruction of Lisbon, a city scarcely worse than London or Paris. "*Lisbonne est abîmée, et l'on danse à Paris.*" He resents the suggestion of Pope that such thoughts arise from pride. Would the universe really have been worse had Lisbon not been engulfed? If so, so much the worse for natural law! Passionately asserting his belief in a just and beneficent God, and at the same time in the rights of humanity, he asks the ancient question, Why must I suffer? "I live, I feel, my oppressed

heart begs succor of the God who formed it." He refuses the optimistic reply that "this misfortune is the good of another being," on the ground that other beings, including the lower animals, are subject to the same pains. One can only regard the "tout est bien" as an illusion, and hope that "one day all will be well." He closes with the thought of submission to Providence and hope of a future life.

Such was Voltaire's first reaction to the earthquake. His fundamental judgment is clearly that the earthquake has no value, but only disvalue. There seem to be two reasons in his mind for this judgment. It has no value, first, because it produces pain, and secondly, because it finds no rational justification from the point of view of the victims themselves. To them, the universe is irrelevant. They perish. Here Voltaire pays tribute to the worth of individual human personality. If there is value anywhere, we find him presupposing that it has its seat in the individual consciousness. What Pope had condemned as pride Voltaire takes to be the basis of all value. What Pope had regarded as the basis of all value Voltaire scorns as cruel and misleading.

Three years after the second edition of the *Poème*, Voltaire returns to the theme of Lisbon in one of his most brilliant skits, *Candide ou l'Optimisme, traduit de l'allemand par Mr. le docteur Ralph*. The popular impression made by this book may be judged from the fact that Morize lists 43 editions as having appeared up to 1789.

Candide is obviously written to ridicule the theories of Leibnitz, Wolff, and Pope. A brief summary of the plot will set the main ideas before the reader. The scene is laid in the home of a Westphalian baron, where we meet Candide, said to be the baron's sister's illegitimate son, the baron's daughter Cunégonde, and Pangloss, family tutor and instructor in metaphysico-theologico-cosmolo-nigology, i.e., Wolff's Leibnitzianism. Pangloss is an invincible optimist, who sees that noses are providentially made for glasses, stones for chateaux, and legs for trousers; and who condemns "Tout est bien" as stupid; we should say rather, "Tout est au mieux." But the best of possible chateaux has its faults; and Candide, too intimate with Cunégonde, flees the country.

Here begins a series of adventures in which optimism is to be put to a thorough test. Candide suffers the horrors of war among the Bulgarians, and then, arrived in Holland, meets Pangloss, now a diseased beggar, who reports the chateau destroyed, and the baron, the baroness, and Cunégonde killed. Candide already exclaims, "Cunégonde dead! Oh, best of worlds, where art thou?" But Pangloss is still optimistic; even the venereal disease from which he now suffers, and which, according to Voltaire, afflicts 20,000 out of every army of 30,000, is "an indispensable thing in the best of worlds, a necessary ingredient." "The more particular evils there are, the more everything is good."

Meanwhile the pair take ship for Lisbon, just in time to experience tempest, tidal wave, shipwreck, earthquake, and fire, all of which are vividly described. In it all Pangloss remains calm, pointing out that there is nothing new at Lisbon, "same causes, same effects," and "whatever is, is right." Following the earthquake, an *auto da fé* is carried out by the wise men of the country to prevent the earth from quaking again. On this occasion Pangloss is hung, several others burned, and Candide beaten to the accompaniment of music. He is led to inquire, "If this is the best of possible worlds, what are the others?"

Plague, war, cruelty, vice, and suffering cram the pages of the story as it progresses. The concluding scenes take place in Constantinople. Pangloss, recovered from the hanging at Lisbon, reappears as a galley-slave, still optimistic, although in despair at not teaching in a German university. Candide finds and marries his Cunégonde, who has become most unattractive, albeit restored to life. The group form the project of farming. Pangloss goes off in a discourse on the great ones of earth from Eglon of Moab to Henry IV, when Candide interrupts, "I know also that it is necessary to cultivate our garden." Pangloss agrees, because man was put into Eden *ut operaretur eum*, and even Candide's pessimistic traveling companion, Martin, can chime in on the theory of "work without reasoning—it is the only way to render life endurable." All unite. The farm flourishes. Even the ugly Cunégonde becomes an excellent pastry cook. Pangloss bursts with the confidence that this outcome proves ours to be the

best of possible worlds. Candide retorts, "Well said, but it is necessary to cultivate our garden."

If the final note of the *Poème* is hope, the outcome of *Candide* is work. Each faces the black facts of life with a frankness often enough cynical—grimacing, says Flaubert; yet neither reveals Voltaire becoming a pessimist. Rather, each shows him struggling away from pessimism, toward what we should call a meliorism based either upon religious faith or on activity (romanticism or activism). That the conclusion of *Candide* is Voltaire's sincere opinion at this time, Morize shows by numerous citations from his correspondence of the period 1756-59.

IV

From Voltaire we turn to his even more baffling contemporary Jean Jacques Rousseau, in whose mind the Lisbon earthquake aroused feelings very different from Voltaire's.

In 1755 Rousseau was living with his mistress, Thérèse le Vasseur. In 1756 he withdrew to the Hermitage at Montmorency, assigning as a reason for his leaving Geneva the presence of Voltaire near that city. It was also in that year that Rousseau sent his famous letter to Voltaire criticizing the *Poème*. During the next ten years there was a bitter feud between the two men, in which Voltaire went beyond all bounds in assailing Rousseau.

Rousseau's letter to Voltaire concerning the earthquake is dated August 18, 1756. Rousseau himself gives us an account of his motive in writing it. Says he, in his *Confessions*, "Struck by seeing this poor man [Voltaire] overwhelmed, if I may so speak, with prosperity and honor, bitterly exclaiming against the miseries of this life, and finding everything wrong, I formed the mad project of making him turn his attention to himself, and of proving that everything was right." This implies that Rousseau's prime interest was in the tragedy of the existence of Voltaire rather than in the tragedy of Lisbon; but this subjective bias did not exclude important ideas of wider significance from the letter.

The famous letter¹ begins with praise of the charms of Voltaire's poetry, asserting that he had read, "loving you as my brother,

¹ *Oeuvres complètes de J. - J. Rousseau* (Paris, 1883), IV, 238-46.

honoring you as my master." But Rousseau turns at once to a penetrating criticism of the *Poème sur le désastre*, the chief points of which we may summarize as follows:

1. Voltaire makes things worse than they were before he wrote. "Pope's poem," says Rousseau, "helps me to patience; yours reduces me to despair." Optimism has at least the merit of consoling! Rousseau here overlooks Voltaire's "hope" at the close of the poem.

2. If evil drives Voltaire to the dilemma of choosing between the omnipotence and the goodness of God, "why do you wish to justify his power at the expense of his goodness?" That is, why argue that an omnipotent God must relieve suffering, instead of arguing that a good God who permits suffering evidently cannot help it. In choosing "between two errors," Rousseau, with Mill, James, Wells, Rashdall, and Schiller, prefers what we should call a finite God to Voltaire's omnipotent riddle.

3. Most of the evils at Lisbon are the result, not of the work of Nature, but of man, such as "the 20,000 five- or six-story houses built so close together."

4. There must be earthquakes "unless the order of the world is to change according to our caprice." So Rousseau; so also Pope and Leibnitz would have spoken. Voltaire had rebelled against the idea of law in his *Poème*.

5. Sudden death, as at Lisbon, is not "always a real evil." In the ordinary course of things the victims might have suffered much more.

6. "If to be is better for us than not to be, it would be enough to justify our existence, even if we should have no compensation to look for from the evils that we have to suffer." Here Rousseau faces a fundamental issue. Voltaire, he implies, is using an abstract and absolute standard of value, such as perfect, painless pleasure, and, finding that life does not conform to that standard, argues that life has no value. Rousseau meets this by making value relative to the actual experience of the worth of human life, measured by the conscious preferences of men. Anything which is preferred by a conscious being to non-existence is of value.

7. Rousseau agrees with Voltaire's estimate of the value of the individual to such a degree that he can say, "Doubtless this material universe ought not to be dearer to its author than a single thinking and feeling being; but the system of this universe, which produces, conserves, and perpetuates all thinking and feeling beings ought to be dearer than a single one of those beings; he can, then, despite his goodness, sacrifice something of the happiness of the individual to the conservation of the whole." Here we find Rousseau attempting to solve the problem of "the world and the individual" by a road that, with Pope, recognizes the rights of the system, and also, with Voltaire, recognizes the ultimate value of the individual. Of the two factors, it is clear which is prior in Rousseau's thought. The system acquires value through its relation to personalities. "Things," as he strikingly expressed it, "ought to be considered relatively in the physical order and absolutely in the moral order." This personalistic theory of value underlies the Kantian doctrine of the dignity of the moral person. But the consistency of Rousseau's personalism in this field is marred by a concession to the rationalistic-absolutistic standpoint of Pope. "It is to be believed that particular events are nothing in the eyes of the Master of the Universe; that his Providence is solely universal; that he is satisfied with preserving genera and species and with presiding over the whole, without being disturbed at the manner in which each individual passes this short life." If indeed the system of Nature derives its value from its relation to "thinking and feeling beings," and the idea of God is to be used to ground value in the universe, it is most difficult to see how Rousseau could logically justify this last statement.

8. The value of a human life cannot be judged in the light of the mere present, or of "each particular instant of its duration," but rather with reference to "its total duration." The question of the value of an event like the Lisbon earthquake, he implies, is therefore inseparable from the question of "the immortality of the soul, which I have the happiness to believe." Thus he adds "the weight of hope to the equilibrium of reason." The pathetic contrast between the wealthy, famous Voltaire and the poor, obscure Rousseau—"you enjoy, but I hope"—closes the letter.

In this hope, as Höffding remarks, Rousseau agrees with Voltaire without noticing it.

V

The tragic event at Lisbon had its effect also on the philosopher of Königsberg. Kant's first and chief interest in the disaster is that of the natural scientist, concerned, not with the values involved, but with causal explanation. His writings on the subject were all published early in 1756 in the form of articles in the local weekly paper of Königsberg. The first article is entitled, "Von den Ursachen der Erderschütterungen bei Gelegenheit des Unglücks, welches die westliche Länder von Europa gegen das Ende des vorigen Jahres betroffen hat."¹ The article defends the view that the movement of earthquakes follows parallel to the course of rivers. There is no reference to the problems in which the present investigation is concerned.

Kant's second article was entitled, "Geschichts- und Naturbeschreibung der merkwürdigsten Vorfälle des Erdbebens, welches an dem Ende des 1755ten Jahres einen grossen Teil der Erde erschüttert hat." While still remaining in the realm of descriptive science, this title implies that Kant sees in the earthquake a wider significance than before, inasmuch as he describes it as extending to "a great part of the earth." And the article itself is less rigorously descriptive than the previous one. The opening paragraph departs from the tone of science, and hints at the meaning and value of the event. "Even the fearful instruments of the devastation of the human race, earthquakes, the raging of the sea stirred to its depths, mountains giving forth fire, challenge man to contemplation, and are no less implanted by God in Nature as a just consequence of constant laws than other more familiar causes of inconvenience, which are generally regarded as more natural merely because we are better acquainted with them. . . . Man perhaps learns in this fashion to see that this battleground of his desires should not rightly contain the goal of all his purposes." One may inquire as to whether Kant is here foreshadowing his critical theories regarding the transcendental element in morality,

¹ For Kant's writings on Lisbon see his *Werke*, edited by the Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1902-), I, 417-72.

or whether he alludes merely to the belief in immortality (so more probably). The only other reference to the valuation of the event is found in one of the final sections, entitled "On the Use of Earthquakes." The chief point, and no very profound one, of Kant's remarks here is that the same conditions that produce earthquakes also produce hot springs and metals in mountains, and improve atmospheric conditions. As a theodicy these ideas are worthy of Pangloss. In his concluding remarks he says that we should not regard earthquakes as penalties for sin, but should be aroused by them to a greater love of humanity; and further, we should look on ourselves as part, not as the whole, of Nature (quite in the mood of Pope and Leibnitz). His concluding thought recurs to the theme of immortality. "Man is not born to build eternal dwellings in this scene of vanity. . . . His whole life has a much higher purpose. . . . The goods of earth can afford no satisfaction to our desire for happiness."

Kant's third and last article on Lisbon was published in April, 1756, and was entitled, "Fortgesetzte Betrachtungen der seit einiger Zeit wahrgenommenen Erderschütterungen." The article is entirely natural-scientific, and inconsequential.

This exhausts the lists of Kant's writings that bear directly on the earthquake. It does not fall within the limits of the present investigation to show the logical relation of Kant's later writings to the religious evaluation of events in Nature. It is, however, of interest to mention the essay of 1791, "Ueber das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee,"¹ which rejects all optimism of the Leibnitzian stamp. The reason, Kant here argues, is incapable of understanding the relation of the world to the Highest Wisdom, and the practical reason is unable to answer the questions of the speculative. Nevertheless in the practical reason "God himself becomes interpreter of his will proclaimed through the creation; and this interpretation we may name an *authentic theodicy*." There is then no "doctrinal theodicy" (no speculative proof), but there is an "authentic theodicy," which finds in the practical reason "the immediate declaration and voice of God whereby he gives a meaning to the letter of his creation." In the

¹ *Op. cit.*, VIII, 253-71.

experience of the worth of the personal life, and not in abstract theory, is found the key to the meaning and value of the whole of Nature. Thus Kantian criticism carries out the suggestions of Rousseau.

VI

A survey of the value-judgments passed on the disaster at Lisbon should not omit a reference to the opinions of George Whitefield and John Wesley, who embody the evangelical mind of the eighteenth century.

On March 16, 1754, Whitefield was in Lisbon for about a month, en route to America. The religious life of the city inspired his *Letters on the Popery of Lisbon*,¹ which describe and denounce the lack of civil and religious liberty, and "Good Friday's tragic-comical superstitious, idolatrous farce." Afterward, on receiving news of the earthquake of 1755, he commented, "O that all who were lately destroyed in Portugal had known the divine redeemer! Then the earthquake would have been only a rumbling chariot to bring them to God. Poor Lisbon! How soon are all thy riches and superstitious pageantry swallowed up." This utterance displays commendable restraint. It implies that immortality is for him the only solution of the tragedies of this life.

In John Wesley's journal, under the date December 26, 1755, is found the entry, "Being much importuned thereto, I wrote 'Serious Thoughts on the Earthquake at Lisbon'; directed, not as I designed at first, to the small vulgar, but to the great; to the learned, rich, and honourable Heathens, commonly called Christians." This essay² was printed before the end of the year 1755 under the title, "Serious Thoughts Occasioned by the Late Earthquake at Lisbon." He opens with the view that God may be making "inquisition for blood"; "if so, it is not surprising, he should begin there, where so much blood has been poured on the ground like water." He would clearly adjudge the catastrophe as good and right because it is an expression of divine judgment

¹ For the letters see Tyerman, *The Life of the Rev. George Whitefield, B.A., of Pembroke College, Oxford*. London, 1877.

² *The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M.*, 3d American complete and standard edition (New York, no date), VI, 238-47.

on sin. He also regards a recent similar event in England, "the affair of Whitson cliffs," in the same light, as a mark of God's displeasure. This phenomenon is, he asserts, inexplicable by natural causes, such as fire, water, or air; therefore, he infers, only God can be its cause, thus fulfilling the Scripture, "There shall be σεισμοί (not only earthquakes, but various concussions or shakings) in divers places." Man, he continues, tries to screen himself from this conclusion by the view that "all these things are purely natural and accidental; the result of natural causes. But there are two objections to this answer: first, it is untrue; secondly, it is uncomfortable." It is untrue "because God works in or by natural causes." The logic of this argument is difficult to reconcile with the context. If these events are not the result of natural causes, as Wesley believes, what relevancy does it have to assert that God works in such causes? Or if he took seriously the view that God so works, why was he concerned to prove that the events did not have natural causes? He was evidently confusedly struggling away from the transcendent God of deism to the immanent God of theism. Man's appeal to natural causes he found uncomfortable, because the naturalistic view leaves us no hope; one may not "intreat the famine or the pestilence to show mercy."

Wesley closes with an appeal to take the hope of immortality seriously. He reminds his readers that Halley's comet, due in 1758, may perhaps "set the earth on fire and burn it to a coal." He apparently assumes that any experience is of value if it, or reflection on it, leads humanity to prepare for immortality; and that no experience is of value if it have not this effect. The Christian "groans (but they are pleasing groans) to have mortality swallowed up of life." Without the hope of immortality we should have to be pessimists (he does not use the word), even supposing "you have utterly driven away storms, lightnings, earthquakes, comets." For death "spoils all your mirth, diversions, pleasures! It turns all into the silence of a tomb, into rottenness and dust." If hope be a dream, "it is a pleasing dream. *Maneat mentis gratissimum error.*" In other words, he relies on the pragmatic proof of immortality as the basis for all our valuations of life.

VII

Our last witness to the value of the Lisbon earthquake is a child, six years of age, little Johann Wolfgang Goethe, born in 1749. His testimony is recorded in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, where he tells us, "By an extraordinary world-event, the calm of the boy's spirit was moved to its depths for the first time." After a description of the earthquake, he comments, "God, the creator of heaven and earth, whom the explanation of the first article of faith represented to him as so wise and merciful, had proved himself to be in no wise fatherly in giving over righteous and unrighteous to destruction. In vain the young spirit sought to overcome these impressions, which was the less possible, as the wise men and the biblical scholars were not able to unite on a way of looking at such a phenomenon." In other words, the boy tested the value of the event by its consistency with the most universal and unifying idea that he possessed. Finding the result unsatisfactory, he discovered that his whole system of values was endangered.

VIII

Summarizing the chief results of the present investigation for the history of thought in the eighteenth century, we may note that the earthquake of 1755 was in some sense the occasion of the expression and perhaps to a degree of the development of the following factors:

1. The moderation of Voltaire's pessimism, with some emphasis on his hope for immortality as the only solution of life's problems; and a heightened sense of the practical value of labor as a relief from futile speculations.
2. A deepening of Rousseau's optimism, accompanied by faith in immortality and a high valuation of individual human personality (which Voltaire shared).
3. In the case of Kant, an illustration of his predominant interest in natural science in 1756, and of the immature and vague character of his religious philosophy at this time, as contrasted with the firm lines of his later essay on "The Failure of All Philosophical Attempts in Theodicy."

4. In Wesley's case, interest in immortality was fundamental; he seems also to have been experiencing a shift in philosophical basis away from the traditional idea of the exclusive transcendence of God in the direction of the divine immanence, a thought that was to dominate nineteenth-century religious philosophy.

5. In general, a tendency away from the abstract and purely rational to the concrete and empirical. In other words, signs of dissatisfaction with rationalism—the end of the reign of Pope and Leibnitz.

IX

In addition to the particular historical facts just mentioned, this investigation has suggested certain general considerations regarding the nature of value, which philosophy of religion ought to take into account. These considerations are not to be regarded as true because one stage in the history of thought implies or points to them; but they may well be treated as worthy of serious attention.

1. The first point is one which has perhaps been implied in the very nature of our method; or, even worse, may be so obvious as to be trite. It is that valuations are, in a peculiar sense, the result of a thinker's whole "apperceptive mass." Only Voltaire could have written *Candide*. Only John Wesley could have written *Serious Thoughts*. It is impossible to separate one's judgments of value from one's total system of ideas, and understand them in isolation (*pace* the new realism). Of mathematical, of scientific, of logical judgments this proposition would perhaps not be valid in the same sense. But value-judgments are functions of a whole personal life. This conclusion is in agreement with the thought of a philosopher like Bowne, who finds in the values of religion an ideal compounded of intellect, conscience, affection, and all our manifold interests and tendencies;¹ or, from a different point of view, Hocking, who regards value as a function of what he calls the "whole-idea." "The person," he says, "is *all in the pleasure*"—"any given pleasure echoes into the whole cavern of a self, and varies in quantity with the volume and resonance of that cavern."²

¹ B. P. Bowne, *Theism* (New York, 1902), pp. 22 f.

² W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* (New Haven, 1912), p. 549 and *passim*.

2. As a corollary of the preceding, and of the second historical observation above, we may say that value-judgments often tend to presuppose a high regard for the individual human personality, a regard that Pope had denounced as pride. Voltaire carries this regard for the individual to such an extreme that he even revolts against the idea of natural law, because of its indifference to the individual. The hope of immortality also embodies this valuation of the individual.

3. The investigation tends to show that extremely optimistic valuations of human life are the result of an emphasis on the system of the universe, regarded abstractly, i.e., without explicit reference to the particulars of which it is made up. This is most clear in Pope, Leibnitz, and Rousseau (in his most excessively optimistic mood); and it was this tendency against which Voltaire most emphatically revolted, and which Rousseau himself implicitly repudiated in his more moderate mood. Thoroughgoing rationalism and thoroughgoing optimism thus go hand in hand. Strangely enough, however, the comradeship is a fatal one, for the individual in such a theory ultimately has no value at all, as we have pointed out above.

4. By contrast, extreme pessimistic valuations would result from an emphasis on particular, empirical details, regarded abstractly, without reference to the system to which they belong. The idea, common to Wesley, Voltaire, and Rousseau, that pessimism is the outcome of the denial of immortality, would be one kind of illustration of the logic of this principle. It is, however, noteworthy that no great mind expressed the completely pessimistic view of the Lisbon earthquake.

5. Making explicit the principle thus suggested, we come to a formula like this: any event is to be judged as of value if it arouses states of consciousness compatible on the one hand with the dignity of human personality, and on the other hand with one's total system of ideas about reality as a whole.

6. Unless human personality is a permanent part of the system of reality (i.e., unless immortality be true) on such premises as those just mentioned it is inconsistent to ascribe value to any event which destroys human life; for whatever be one's ideas of

the rest of the universe, it cannot be valuable to destroy that which possesses dignity or intrinsic value. Hence the only bases for either optimism or meliorism are either Pope's (a disregard for the value of the individual), or Voltaire's, Rousseau's, Wesley's, and Kant's (the hope of immortality). The renewed interest in immortality resulting from the Great War indicates that this result is not local to the eighteenth century, but may be the natural and logical course of thought in the presence of the evils of life.

CRITICAL NOTES

MOSES AND MUHAMMAD

The question of method in theological study seems to be always with us. Professor Robert Dick Wilson has raised it again with reference to the Old Testament. Any utterance of so distinguished a scholar, who moreover represents one of our leading educational institutions, deserves attention,¹ especially perhaps when it appeals to the layman rather than to the specialist. The author calls upon "intelligent Christian Believers who are deemed capable of sitting on Juries in a court of common law, to assert themselves against these self-styled scholars who would wrest from them the right of private judgment." Asking myself if I might perhaps be one of those self-styled scholars, I examined myself as to my intention to wrest the right of private judgment from any intelligent Christian believer, and could not find in my conscience any trace of so unworthy a motive. And from some acquaintance with Old Testament scholars I am inclined to think that they have been too much concerned to defend their own right of private judgment to make any attempt on others' enjoyment of that right.

What Professor Wilson really means is that our private judgment is at fault in not agreeing with him that the whole Pentateuch is the work of Moses. One might suppose the authorship of an ancient document a fair subject for investigation, and in fact that investigation of it is a duty for anyone interested in the history of past times. Not so, says our professor. Any inquiry into the authorship of this document is an inquisitorial process in which the ancient author is brought before judges who have pronounced him guilty in advance, and who will not allow him the benefit of counsel. It can hardly be said, however, that Moses has been deprived of counsel. From the time of Hengstenberg down to this number of the *Princeton Review* he has had many to speak for him. Yet Professor Wilson declares:

Those who pursue the inquisitorial method accuse the authors of the Old Testament books of anachronisms, inconsistencies, frauds, forgeries, and false statements, and boldly defy anyone to disprove their accusations. . . . Moses and Isaiah and Jonah are unable to communicate with us who would

¹"Scientific Biblical Criticism," an article in the *Princeton Theological Review*, April, 1919.

defend them; and those who accuse them or their works of misstatements and falsehoods wrest their words, stigmatize their motives, assume that their own opinions are testimony and declare a verdict of guilty (p. 190).

This looks rather as if it were the critics who are under indictment before a court which is bound in advance to bring in a verdict of guilty. Before pleading to so severe an arraignment might it not be well to raise the question of motive? What gain would come to these unfortunates if they succeeded in pronouncing the Old Testament authors guilty of fraud and forgery? As a matter of fact loss rather than gain has come to some of them for advocating the opinions to which the professor objects. Perhaps they are simply misguided and deserve his pity rather than his wrath.

But let us distinguish. We will rule fraud and forgery out of court. The Book of Wisdom bears the name of Solomon; is it therefore a fraud or a forgery? Does Professor Wilson affirm that Solomon wrote the Book of Ecclesiastes? If not, is he willing to stigmatize it as a forgery? The fact is that ancient ideas of literary property were different from ours, and in questioning the Mosaic authorship of parts of the Pentateuch one may yet affirm the good faith of the writer. Professor Wilson is outraged that the statement "Yahweh spoke to Moses and Aaron" should be supposed to be anything but an exact statement of fact. Yet he is aware that the rabbis of post-biblical times thought the whole of the Mishna to be the work of Moses, and that they specifically assert certain enactments to be "Halakoth of Moses from Sinai." Shall we therefore stigmatize the Talmud as wholesale forgery; or shall we not rather admit that the ancient evaluation of tradition was different from ours? Many scholars (I do not claim the agreement of *all* scholars on anything) think few of the Psalms to have been written by David. Yet the titles of many of these poems expressly ascribe them to the Shepherd King. Is this denial another case of prejudgment without giving the accused a hearing?

Anachronisms and discrepancies are on a different footing from fraud and forgery, and I do not understand Professor Wilson to deny that they may possibly exist in the Pentateuch. Whether they exist is a question of fact to be ascertained by careful examination of the document itself, not with a desire to convict it of fraud, but in an honest search for the truth. Certainly the existence of these phenomena has been affirmed from the time of Aben Ezra, and has been reaffirmed by many students—Jews, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists—for the last three centuries. The sole motive which these men had in common was to ascertain as accurately as possible the process by

which Israel reached the religious development which has made it a factor in the world's progress. It need hardly be said that to assume the absolute integrity and faultlessness of the Pentateuch at the start would have been a *petitio principii* of the most glaring description.

But, says Professor Wilson, the alleged discrepancies are only what we find in the Koran, and this book is acknowledged on all hands to be the work of the man whose name it bears. It would be hardly fair to assume that the professor puts Moses and Muhammad in the same category. The most hardened critic would not care to do that. The single point is that discrepancies may appear in a book written by a single author, and that this is conspicuously proved by the example of the Koran. The case of the Koran is indeed quite plain, and we can account for the phenomena quite easily. Muhammad was a man without literary training, but knowing how to make use of material which came to him by oral tradition. The biblical stories which he used so freely he got from conversations with Jews and Christians. Depending on his memory, and intent upon the lesson which he desired to enforce at any particular time, he was careless of verbal accuracy. It is no wonder therefore that he varied his language from time to time. But one thing stands out very plainly: he was a compiler rather than an author in the modern sense of the word author. In fact he answers to the redactor whom the critics discover in the Pentateuch as we now have it, rather than to the divinely inspired author whom tradition affirms Moses to have been. If we had no knowledge of Hebrew and Christian literature we should be sure that Muhammad drew upon previously existing material. Had his recollection been a little less hazy we should have been able to discover what he had drawn from a Jewish informant and what from a Christian. Professor Wilson declares that in Muhammad's great work "we have the same variety in the use of the names of God, duplicates, contradictions, hapax legomena and peculiar or favorite expressions. And yet all admit the unity of authorship of the Koran." Granted; but the unity of authorship is precisely the unity which the self-styled scholars find in the Pentateuch—unity secured by selecting from a mass of previously existing material that which serves the compiler's purpose.

Let us trace the parallel a little farther. Muhammad was a lawgiver as well as a narrator, and his office came quite naturally when the belief in his inspiration was established. In an imperfectly organized society, like that at Medina, disputes were submitted for arbitration to the leading man in the community—if divinely guided so much the better. We see therefore how Muslim law had its origin. It was not in the Prophet's thought to give his people a fully rounded code. He was an opportunist, believing

that sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. Now one of the Pentateuchal sources (Professor Wilson will allow the word for the sake of the argument) indicates that Moses' function was precisely similar. He judged between man and man and made them know the decisions of God. In tribal society this is all the law that will be tolerated, and the critics see no reason to doubt that so much of legislative activity was in truth exercised by Moses. But according to the Pentateuch as we now have it Moses was not content to build up a body of case law by these decisions. He had the ambition to give his people a complete and final code, one which was adapted for a stage of civilization far in advance of that existing in the wilderness of Sinai. So zealous was he in fact that he gave them four separate *corpora juris*, each accompanied by solemn warnings against disobedience, and each apparently complete in itself. The critics can hardly be blamed if they find this a strange procedure. That they are driven to suppose that not all this legislation can have been the work of one man may show intellectual dulness, but can hardly prove that they are desperately set on convicting the biblical author of fraud and forgery.

Professor Wilson will probably take issue with the statement that the Mosaic codes are complete each in itself, and will argue that they supplement each other. Why in that case they were not combined in one whole will still remain a puzzle. But let us hear the codes themselves. At the end of the Covenant Code we find that Moses told the people *all* the words of Yahweh and *all* the ordinances; and all the people answered with one voice: "*All* the things which Yahweh has spoken will we do" (Exod. 24:3); and in the immediate sequel the covenant by which they bound themselves was solemnly ratified. But in another chapter (Exod. 34) we are told that Yahweh made a covenant with the people in the tenor, not of the Covenant Code, but of the Ten Words contained in this chapter. At the conclusion of the Holiness Code, after frightful threatenings against those who disobey, we read: "These are the statutes and ordinances which Yahweh made between Himself and the Sons of Israel at Mount Sinai by Moses." Again at the end of the Book of Numbers, apparently referring to the legislation not contained in either of the codes thus far considered, we have the subscription: "These are the commandments and ordinances which Yahweh commanded by Moses in the plains of Moab." Here, indeed, we might allow a harmonizing interpretation and say that this verse is not a subscription to what precedes, but the title of Deuteronomy, which immediately follows. The title *Deuteronomy* is in fact based on the hypothesis that Moses, having given the law at Sinai, repeated it in the plains of Moab. The trouble is that Deuteronomy is provided with an ample title and introduction—two

in fact—and that it makes no reference to the elaborate provisions of the Priestcode contained in the preceding books. Does it look as if the same man put together all these separate documents in this manner? What Moses is made to say by the Deuteronomist does not favor such a theory. What he says about the earlier legislation is that the covenant at Horeb was made on the basis of the Ten Words. He then declares: "Now *this* is the commandment, the statutes, and the ordinances which Yahweh your God commanded to teach you, that you might do them in the land which you are going over to possess." Not a word alludes to the body of statutes already set before the people. What is given seems to be a new system of legislation prepared expressly for the settlement in Canaan.

Far be it from me to frame an indictment against a man educated in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. But I would like to think that the great leader of Israel was a man of practical sense and able to give his people a single simple, consistent body of laws instead of making four or five discordant attempts. The alternative seems to be to suppose that the book we are discussing is not the work of a single man, but is a growth in which various elements have been combined. And this seems favored by the course of Israel's history. The Koran may help us again. Imperfect as was the legislation left by Muhammad, we know that it at once became the basis of Muslim law for all time. If every copy of the Koran were destroyed today we could reconstruct the whole tomorrow from the later theological, legal, and historical literature of the Arabs. The caliphs held their power because they swore to follow the Book of Allah and the Sunna of the Prophet; the parties which arose and which frequently attempted to overthrow the ruler were aroused to action by discovering that he did not obey the sacred law; when rival claimants to the throne were engaged in deadly conflict copies of the Book raised on the lances caused a cessation of the conflict, and both parties agreed to let the Book decide. In short, the whole history of Islam is permeated with the flavor of the Koran.

Can as much be said of the Pentateuch? Here we have a book which on Professor Wilson's theory was published as a complete code by the great lawgiver who stands at the beginning of Israel's history. It was a book truly divine in origin. It was promulgated with the most impressive solemnity. It was provided with supernatural sanctions. Its promises were the most attractive and its threats the most terrible that the people of that day could conceive. One would expect such a book to influence the whole history of Israel at least as much as the history of Islam has been influenced by the Koran. Is anyone bold

enough to assert that this is the case? If the Pentateuch were destroyed today could we reproduce it from Israel's later literature? Yes, if by Israel's later literature you mean the Talmud. Here indeed we find the parallel to the Koran which we seek. Post-biblical Judaism is based on the Torah. But as we go back through the centuries this becomes less and less the case. The Pharisaism of the New Testament period is incomprehensible without the Pentateuch; the Maccabean struggle presupposes it; Nehemiah's community apparently accepted it. But of earlier periods this cannot be said. Nowhere do the judges, though divinely commissioned to lead the people, pledge them to obey a ritual law. The kings of Judah betray no interest in the written constitution given their people at the beginning. Josiah is the exception which proves the rule—if in fact he be an exception. Amos is so ignorant of a ritual law that he does not believe sacrifice to have been offered in the wilderness. Jeremiah is bold enough to deny that Yahweh had commanded sacrifice and offering. Ezekiel knows of some sort of legislation given in the wilderness, but thinks it was given as a punishment rather than as a help to right living, and this not because he depreciated a ritual law, for he makes his appreciation of ritual abundantly evident by his own provisions for the sanctity of the new community. It would seem to be a work of supererogation to point out how incomprehensible all this would be if the traditional (excuse the word) view were correct.

And we have not yet done with the parallel. The Koran is a source of history, a very imperfect one to be sure. The hints which its author gives concerning his own life are meager, but they help us reconstruct his experiences. The Pentateuch on the other hand professes to give us a life of its hero, a continuous narrative from his birth to his death. If written by himself it should be at least consistent and intelligible. That it is so, few will assert. We shall be unreservedly grateful to Professor Wilson if he will give us a plain narrative of what actually took place during those momentous years between Moses' slaying of the Egyptian and his final message on Mount Pisgah. If he will make the attempt he will perhaps realize that all the critic's difficulties do not arise from an obstinate prejudice against the honesty of Moses. In truth we stand in the presence of historical problems of the first magnitude. The critic's leading motive is a desire to construct a history of Israel that shall be at least intelligible to plain common sense.

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
NEW YORK CITY

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

THE AMORITES AND THEIR EMPIRE

A generation ago a bare reference or two in the Bible was all we knew of the Hittites; Sayce gave them a history and a civilization, and only the other day we were astonished to learn that our oldest dated Indo-European documents were written by them. Today the Amorites, known from a few more Old Testament passages, are given an empire by Clay; with all due allowances for controverted questions and errors, some of the main theses will stand. But his is not a book to be briefly reviewed.¹

Clay has proved beyond a doubt that there was a country named Amurru, which included Syria and northwestern Mesopotamia; that there were Amorites who spoke a language akin to Hebrew and probably had a Nordic infusion; that they appear as early in Babylonia as the Sargonide period and furnish the conquerors of the Nisin and Babylonian dynasties; that similar names are to be found in the mysterious Cappadocian tablets; that their chief god was Amurru, feminine Martu, and that these can be traced through a series of amazingly protean forms; that certain other gods, notably Adad, Dagan, and Marduk, were brought in by the Amorites; that the Gilgamesh epic comes from the Lebanon cedars. He has traced the history of the various states which grew up in Amurru and by thus putting them side by side has given new light. He has scoured Babylonian and Egyptian records for data on the Amorites.

Had Clay paused here, his half-book would have made a far stronger case than his whole. Shumerians are quietly edged out of the way until we expect a new "Shumerian question." Even the surest of topographic canons, the relative tenacity with which sacred place-names persist, is flouted. The ten antediluvian kings, the oldest legendary kings of Shumer, such as Etana (Ethan), Adapa (Adam), Tammuz, were Amorite, we are told, though even if they were, this merely proves that they were invented or adapted after Amorite kings in Nisin or Babylon were to be flattered. Few will find, with Clay, Amorite kings in Opis, Kish, or

¹ *The Empire of the Amorites*. By Albert T. Clay. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919. 192 pages. Cf. Amurru, *The Home of the Northern Semites*, 1909.

Lagash, nor will the idea of an Amorite origin for the Shumerian code which lies behind the code of the Amorite Hammurapi find much acceptance.

The topographic suggestions of Clay are peculiarly unfortunate. Mari cannot be the same as Mar-Maradda, for that was in Babylonia, and Nin Mar is not the lady of Mari. Hallab beyond possible doubt is a suburb of Babylon,¹ and, especially when it is not spelled phonetically, the burden of proof lies heavy on those who would ever find an Aleppo in it. The old identifications of Kimashki with Damascus, Humurtu with Gomorrah, Simurru with Simyra, are revived, but Ki Mash², with suffixed sign for place, Humurtu, Urbillum (Arbela), Harshe (Tuz Khurmati), all go together, and the topographer, without any a priori wishes, must place them east of the Tigris.

The most serious objection the reviewer would raise against Clay is his identification of the original city-state of Amurru with Mari on the Euphrates. Ever since he viewed the splendid but little-visited ruins at 'Amrit fifteen years ago, the reviewer has been convinced that here was the original Arvad, before the Phoenicians secured control of the Mediterranean. To the topographer it is mathematically proved that here is the Amurru of Ashur-našir-apal. So obvious is this that H. Rawlinson saw it long ago, though he misread the name. Amurru first appears in Assyrian records when the men of Arvad, across from Amurru, gave Tiglath Pileser his ride on the great sea of Amurru. Still earlier, Thothmes the Third lists a Mari whose accompanying names prove beyond cavil that it was on the Syrian coast and not on the Euphrates.³ Here Alexander found Marathus, a city great and flourishing,⁴ a city not obscure,⁴ where especially grew the styrax.⁵ It was always at enmity with the men of Arvad in the Hellenistic period⁶ and in the Roman period it was called an ancient city of the Phoenicians, now pulled down, which the men of Arvad had parceled out as settlers.⁷ It is far more centrally located than Mari on the Euphrates; the cedar forests lead to the hills behind it. Mari on the Euphrates is mentioned earlier in the Babylonian records; doubtless this is the main reason Clay changed his opinion, but

¹ Weissbach, *Bab. Miscel.*, No. 15; cf. *AJSL*, XXXV, 94.

² Cf. Sayce, *PSBA*, XXXVIII, 201.

³ Arrian *Anab.* ii. 13. 6; Curt. iv. 6. 1.

⁴ Plin. xii. 124; cf. v. 78.

⁵ Mela i. 67.

⁶ Diod. xxxiii. 34; Polyb. v. 68. 7.

⁷ Strab. xvi. 2. 12; cf. Ptol. v. 14. 12; the river Marathias, Eustathias, *Ad Dionys.* 914; Olmstead, *JAOS*, XXXVIII, 249.

the prehistoric ateliers along the North Syrian coast testify to an antiquity far earlier than anything from Mesopotamia or Babylonia, and it is here we may look for the oldest ancestors of the Amorites.

A. T. OLMSTEAD

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
URBANA, ILLINOIS

THE BOOK OF JUDGES:

The present volume is considerably more than a commentary; and as it belongs to no series, its aims, scope, and method invite more attention. As the author observes, "The book might well be termed a collection of materials for the early history of Israel's residence in Canaan."

The work is also not merely "another commentary" made to stand alongside such works even as Moore's *Judges*. The author aims, as all good commentators should, to advance the knowledge of the subject, and proceeds to his task with a scientific grasp of the problems involved that is stimulating to follow. As a first-hand student of Babylonian culture he admits that his efforts in this direction have revolutionized his conception of Old Testament studies; and this can well be believed from the book as a whole.

The introduction is noteworthy for 67 pages devoted to "External Information Bearing on the Period of the Judges." In this section the writer surveys, in admirable fashion for such brief space, Babylonian and Eastern Mediterranean civilization from the appearance of the Semites in Babylonia to the period of the Judges of Israel. The author has formed his own synthesis on most of the topics discussed, but on disputed points wisely gives in copious footnotes the opinions of scholars who differ from him. This section will prove a most valuable chart of outside events bearing on early Israel, for all Old Testament students and particularly for those who have not a thorough grasp of Babylonian and Egyptian development.

The book is closely packed with information; one might almost say too closely packed. That is the writer follows the custom of giving the biblical text in large type and the comments below in finer print. This works well in smaller volumes where the notes are not too numerous; but in so exhaustive a work as the present it fills the page largely with fine print that is wearisome to the eye. One could wish the writer had either

* *The Book of Judges, with Introduction and Notes*. By C. F. Burney. London: Rivingtons, 1918. cxxviii+528 pages. 21s.

placed the biblical text in finer type or omitted it altogether in order that the more important notes might have been placed in larger type.

The author follows the usual critical analysis of the sources of Judges, but not without variations. He is definitely of the opinion that the J and E documents extend through Joshua and Judges as far as I Sam., chap. 12. His most noteworthy departure from accepted opinion on the sources is in his conception of the growth of Judges. He finds no Deuteronomic Book of Judges. The main editing of the older sources is all pre-Deuteronomic and the editor is regarded as of the Elohist school and designated in the notes, accordingly, as R². This change is not so considerable as might at first appear; and the conclusion is quite in line with what might be expected from a closer scrutiny of the materials.

In addition to the main commentary, under the title of "Additional Notes," a valuable discussion is given of over a dozen topics that are important for a knowledge of the period, e.g., "Yahweh or Yahu. Originally an Early Amorite Deity"; "Early Identification of Yahweh with the Moon God." Under the latter topic the discussion of the name "Abraham" might have been carried one step farther by consulting H. F. Lutz's *Early Babylonian Letters from Larsa*.

The criticism may be offered that the author seems inclined to give undue weight, at times, to the early traditions of Israel, in their present form; and is over-ready to place them on a par with history while a more searching criticism of the processes of these traditions would have simplified, considerably, a number of the historical problems involved.

The book is provided with double indexes and a series of maps most excellently done. All earnest students of the early life of Israel will be very grateful for this new work, which clearly puts the problems of Israel's origins and settlement in relation to its world-setting and historical sequence.

LERoy WATERMAN

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
ANN ARBOR, MICH.

ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENT IN CANAAN¹

The British Academy did well to keep up the Schweich Lectures throughout the period of the war. The loss to scholarship due to the war is in any case terrific and irremediable, and we welcome every fresh

¹ *Israel's Settlement in Canaan. The Biblical Tradition and Its Historical Background.* [The Schweich Lectures at the British Academy, 1917.] By C. F. Burney. London: Oxford University Press, 1918. xi+104 pages+vi maps. 3s. 6d.

bit of evidence that interest in scientific pursuits has not perished from the earth, but that scholarly tradition has remained alive and vigorous during the all-absorbing struggle. Dr. Burney is successor to the late Professor Cheyne as Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture in the University of Oxford. He is well known to scholars through his *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Kings* (1903) and, more recently, by his admirable commentary, *The Book of Judges with Introduction and Notes* (1918).

Indeed, the contents of the present course of lectures are largely dependent upon the latter book and the studies involved in its preparation. These lectures maintain the high standard of excellence established by Dr. Burney's previous work.

It is of interest to find that though Dr. Burney's methods are thoroughly and consistently historical and critical, his conclusions to a considerable extent reinforce the credibility of the biblical record. He identifies Ramses II and Merneptah respectively as the Pharaohs of the Oppression and the Exodus. He shows that only a portion of Israel was in bondage in Egypt, and that other Israelitish clans were in Canaan continuously from a much earlier period. He treats the patriarchal legends as fairly reliable accounts of tribal movements rather than as individual and personal biographies. The westward expedition of Abraham is a movement of Aramaean groups in the Hammurabi period. These are followed by another Aramaean group represented by Rebekah, which by uniting with the Abrahamic group through "Isaac" produces the two groups "Jacob" and "Esau." "Jacob" is later driven eastward across the Jordan by "Esau," whence he returns reinforced by fresh Aramaean groups (Jacob's wives) and now known, not as Jacob, but as "Israel." The Joseph group entered Egypt after the Hyksos period, during the Eighteenth Dynasty and from the reign of Thutmoses III onward. The story of Abraham's trip to Egypt in Gen. 12:10-20 may be a reflection of the presence of some Hebrews in Egypt in the Hyksos period. The Habiru movement was that of a floating semi-nomadic Aramaean population and corresponds more nearly to patriarchal conditions than to the entry of the Joseph-tribes under Joshua, which was "a definitely organized campaign of conquest."

Dr. Burney is, on the whole, inclined to connect the 'Apurin of the Egyptian records with the Hebrews. As a matter of fact, the fact that *p* occurs instead of *b* in the Egyptian word should not be taken too seriously. Many Egyptian words are written in Babylonian and Assyrian sometimes with *p* and sometimes with *b*—*Kūpu*, a gold vessel for

holding wine, is in Egyptian *Kb*; the Egyptian *wpwt*, a legate, appears in Assyrian as *uputi* or *ubuti*. In the Tell-el-Amarna letters, according to Böhl, *Sprache der Tell-Amarna Briefe*, section 9b, *pa* often stands where *ba* is called for etymologically. It is not likely that the Egyptians were more accurate in the pronunciation of Semitic loan-words than the Semites were themselves. On page 32, line 3 from the bottom, read *are* for *as*; on page 34, line 1, read *of* for *to*; and on page 47, line 18, read *for* for *from*. The argument for the identification of the name Moses with the Egyptian *mš* (page 47) may be strengthened now by reference to my note on the use of the sibilant in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, XXXV, 110 ff.

J. M. POWIS SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A POPULAR STUDY OF OLD TESTAMENT RELIGION¹

The author makes clear at the outset, in his brief Preface, the purpose and method of procedure in this volume. He has "adopted the topical method as best calculated to meet the needs of the preacher and general Bible student." As this method presupposes some acquaintance with the religious history of Israel as a whole, the first chapter, of 30 pages, "is consequently devoted to a brief outline of the development of Old Testament religion and literature," closing with a handy chronology of the writings.

This task out of the way, the author proceeds with his topical arrangement. The Preface goes on to say that "the aim of the book is to give an account of the origin and development of the leading religious ideas of the Old Testament," and by his method the writer well nigh admits that "ideas" are of more importance in the history of religion than "development." The reviewer must say, however, that a serious and on the whole a very fair attempt is made to deal with genesis and development.

Any method adopted in such a complex field would subject the author to the necessity of some repetitions, and for finished and concise treatment the topical method has some advantages. Possibly we have become so used to viewing Old Testament religion from the developmental angle, as a result of the published works of the leading scholars in this field during the last generation and more, that even a topical

¹ *The Religious Teaching of the Old Testament*. By Albert C. Knudson. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1918. 416 pages.

arrangement, with all its high-sounding "attributes" and theological captions, cannot throw us off guard. At any rate, in this instance the author has so carefully chosen titles that have red-blood vitality in them that we are scarcely conscious of any offence against our sense of "historicity"; this is especially true in the second half of the volume, where the seven chapters have the following headings: "The Nature of Man"; "The Doctrine of Sin"; "The Problem of Suffering"; "Forgiveness and Atonement"; "Nationalism and Individualism"; "The Messianic Hope"; and "The Future Life."

The first half of the book is a systematic theology; in seven chapters the author deals with as many "attributes" of God, in the following order: personality, unity, spirituality, power, holiness, righteousness, and love. Chapter ix is a rather full treatment of "Angels and Other Divine Beings," in which a more prominent development of angelology in pre-exilic times than is now commonly admitted is contended for. Indeed, the pre-exilic, even pre-prophetic, period was a very important one for "the higher faith of Israel" in the mind of the author, and in nearly every chapter he shows his willingness to champion this view. This may best be set forth in his own words in his Preface.

Scholars are generally agreed on the history of religious thought in Israel after the time of Jeremiah and Ezekiel. But with reference to earlier times, especially the pre-prophetic period, considerable difference of opinion still prevails. It is the contention of this book that the literary prophets were not, in the proper sense of the term, the "creators of ethical monotheism." The higher faith of Israel may be traced back into the pre-prophetic period. Indeed the germ is to be found in the teaching of Moses.

This whole question is most fully treated in his chapter on "The Righteousness of God," where the rise of ethical monotheism is discussed, with the result that "the new and profound sense of gratitude and loyalty called forth by the marvelous deliverance of the Israelites," "in itself a profoundly ethical act," involving "such a surrender of the human to the divine will and such an outflow of joyful gratitude to God that the prophets centuries later looked back upon it as the ideal expression of the nation's religious life"—this was the origin of ethical monotheism.

In his chapter on "Nationalism and Individualism" a strong and convincing plea is made in behalf of a larger place for the individual in this same early period. The same may be said for the Messianic idea.

The writer has done good work in calling the attention of the modern school to the danger of large and sweeping generalizations. He has not

trodden controverted ground to any great extent, having preferred to keep on the safe side, but he has produced a very readable book, full of information for the general reader, scholarly, modern, constructive, practical—in fact, a manual for “the preacher and general Bible student.”

D. E. THOMAS

EDMONTON, CANADA

THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS¹

The general character of this monumental work is so well established by the volumes that have already appeared that a review of the latest publication can do little more than to reiterate what has already been said. The undertaking is so stupendous that the matter of selecting topics and discovering the proper writers requires almost superhuman powers. Moreover, while the time is ripe for such a work as this, which should represent a historical as contrasted with a dogmatic way of discussing religion, comparatively few scholars in the field of the Christian religion are able to think of their own religion in historical terms. The reader who consults the encyclopedia will often be struck by the contrast between articles dealing with non-Christian religions and those dealing with Christian beliefs or customs. Thus in the midst of a series of historical articles setting forth the ideas and the customs of prayer in various religions there is a theological discussion distinctly apologetic in content, dealing with Christian prayer.

In connection with several articles, e.g., Possession, Prayer, and Purification, there is an introductory section, setting forth the important data found in connection with the subject under discussion in every religion. Such a general orientation is an admirable preparation for the study of the detailed accounts of the various religions which constitute the bulk of the longer articles. It could have been employed more frequently with advantage. The article on Psychology is purely technical and the reader is left to formulate his own conception of the bearings of it on either religion or ethics. An article on Psychology of Religion would have been more to the point; but no such article appears. The bulk of the encyclopedia is already so great that it seems a pity to give space to an article which might just as well have found a place in a purely non-religious work. The article on Prophecy is unfortunately

¹ *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. Vol. X, *Picts—Sacraments*. Edited by James Hastings, with the assistance of John A. Selbie and Louis H. Gray. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919. xx+915 pages. \$7.00.

restricted in scope. Are we to understand that prophecy is a phenomenon only of American Indian, Hebrew, and Christian religions? Among the articles which the reviewer has found especially satisfactory are those on Pluralism, Possession, Reformation, Righteousness, and Ritschlianism. Especial mention should be made of Stanley A. Cook's conscientious and comprehensive article on Religion. He has, in suggestive fashion, given an excellent objective presentation of the important aspects of religion, but has constantly called attention to the fact that a religious belief or rite *means* something to a religious person which no mere description can reproduce. Thus while the discussions in the article are marked by careful scientific restraint, and give us admittedly only an account of religion as a function of human life, yet the way is left open in cordial fashion for a positive significance to be attached to the mythologies, theologies, and philosophies which play so large a part in the actual practice of religion.

GERALD BIRNEY SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A TRANSLATION OF WUNDT'S *FOLK PSYCHOLOGY*

"The direct approach to a philosophy of history which aims, not to acquire a knowledge of reality from a priori concepts, but conversely, to derive ideas from reality, is a *psychological account of the development of mankind*" (p. 532). This is what Wundt has undertaken in his *Elements of Folk Psychology*. He assumes a development through four stages, denominated: Primitive Man; the Totemic Age; the Age of Heroes and Gods; the Development of Humanity. Humanity is thus represented as the final stage, and not only this but also as the goal toward which development advances. "Humanity, when predicated of an individual, means that he transcends the limits of all more restricted associations, such as family, tribe, or state, and possesses an appreciation of human personality as such; in its application to human society, it represents a demand for an ideal condition in which this appreciation of human worth shall have become a universal norm" (p. 472). Now this is a goal for human development which is not reached as the result of the psychological study of man and his evolution. It is gained from the appreciation of cultural values, and the assumption that this is the natural goal of human development has no better foundation than

¹ *Elements of Folk Psychology. Outlines of a Psychological History of the Development of Mankind.* By Wilhelm Wundt. Authorized Translation by Edward Leroy Schaub. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xxiii+532 pages. \$3.75.

Hegel's doctrine, which Wundt criticizes. It is necessary to preface this to distinguish between Wundt's psychological study and his philosophy of history, which has no essential relation to his psychological undertaking, though his own statement implies that this theory of human evolution in society is the result of a psychological analysis.

The first three parts of the work are in part psychological and in part anthropological description. Primitive man is presented as belonging to loose groups living in monogamous families. His most important mechanical achievements were the making of fire and the invention of the bow. For both of these the author presents explanations which have varying degrees of probability but which cannot be regarded as in any sense assured. The reader is struck with the assurance with which Wundt offers them as final solutions. The same assurance goes with his account of the origin of exogamy, a subject that is still dark, though the matter of a vast and vivid controversy. The explanation that a group growing beyond its food supply would naturally divide first into two groups still loosely connected but seeking different habitats is probable enough, and this is a process that can well enough have continued till the varied clans found in the larger tribes are readily accounted for. The question that remains unanswered is why marriage must take place between members of different clans, and Wundt has no answer for this except the statement that men will naturally seek their wives among those with whom they are less familiar. It is the very fact that it is sought to explain. With a like assurance Wundt derives the beginnings of forms of decorations from the rhythmic repetition of geometric forms, which are later identified with animal and vegetable forms, an explanation of the beginnings of plastic art that is by no means generally accepted, nor does the author give convincing grounds for its acceptance. Again one finds that, though in his account of primitive man he is largely dependent upon the Vedda's, Wundt is not familiar with some of the important authorities upon these people. The book cannot then be accepted as authoritative in the field of anthropology, and its interest lies rather in the psychological study given to the phenomena of mind as they appear in totemism, the ideas of the soul, the life beyond death, the appearance of a full conception of personality and its reflection in the hero and the god.

For Wundt the soul had its origin in the fear of the corpse. This fear he regards as instinctive. There is something attached to the corpse that is dangerous, that may leave it and attack or injure anyone in its neighborhood. Such a body-soul leaves the body in the form of the

"soul animals": the snake—more or less loosely identified with the worm—the bird, or the mouse. It is their swift movements and their association with corpses which led primitive man to identify them as soul animals. Wundt calls attention to the frequency of these among totem animals, and assumes that totem belief originates with these animal forms and is only later transferred to other animals, plants, and even inanimate things, through men's attention being for various reasons centered upon these. From the supposed departure of the soul from the body with the breath comes the belief in the breath-soul, animism. The development of the idea is readily understandable. As the author points out, the two souls were accepted by primitive man without sense of contradiction. They grew out of two different emotional situations, and primitive man was without interest in logical consistency. What one fails to find in his account of this beginning of soul ideas is an analysis of what is involved in the appearance of the self in human experience, and its relation to the soul, especially the dependence of the self as an object in experience upon the social organization out of which it arises. This is indeed implied in the author's third part, that dealing with the age of heroes and gods. It is only here, the author assumes, that such full consciousness of personality is present, that the full human individual appears. Wundt recognizes that this appearance is dependent on the more highly organized form of society, which gives rise to the state, but the psychological explanation of this is insecure and inadequate. The derivation of the god from the hero is convincingly presented, but here again the psychological analysis is scant.

Of particular interest are the chapters on Deity Cults, the Forms of Cult Practices, and on World Religions. Wundt fully accepts the prevalent view of the dominance of primitive magic in primitive times, and the many survivals of this in later cults reaching down to our own times. This belief in magic again is carried back to fear and its creation of more or less invisible objects and powers arising from what inspires fear, especially that which instinctively inspires fear. It develops especially about the soul ideas, in accounting for sickness and death, in the evolution of the Medicine Man, and the magician as priest. Here we find nothing that can reasonably be called religion. This according to the author can only appear when divine beings have been conceived as personalities and are able therefore to enter into personal relations with men, in assistance, retribution, and later into communion. In this process the ecstatic cults played a critical part, for they were always motivated by the possession of the initiated by the god, and lead

naturally to the higher forms of religious experience. These cults begin, in Wundt's opinion, with the vegetation cults, their seasons of exhilaration and their effort to stimulate fertility by sympathetic magic. The discussion of prayer, passing from its earliest form of conjuration through petition, thanksgiving, praise, penitence, and of sacrifice from the original magical meal through the different forms of offerings—peace and sin offerings, votive and consecration gifts—and of sanctification ceremonies, is one of the best and clearest descriptions that can be found. Again, the description and analysis of redemption cults in the development of the universal religions are admirable. But the reader is aware of absence of recognition of the experience of community values, and the emotional life connected with these, as forming an essential part in the development of religion. When Wundt has once started the cult on its road of evolution from the original magic ceremony he loses the connection between it and the social life which it has mediated. The study of religion in this profounder sense, a study which is in the greatest need of psychology, is lost in the study of the cult and the god.

But with all its shortcomings the treatise leaves the reader with a sense of human development as more comprehensively and simply presented from the standpoint of psychology than from any other point of view.

GEO. H. MEAD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHRISTIANITY IN HISTORY¹

The treatment of the entire course of church history as a whole has distinct advantages. By it the reader obtains a picture of the whole process of development. As the vast panorama enrols before him he unconsciously makes comparisons and draws inductions. But unless the work is on a vast scale it can hardly be little more than a dry record of innumerable facts, detail piled on detail, or windy generalizations inspiring little confidence. The work before us escapes these defects to no small extent. It is in substance the picture of the Christian church in its long life, and yet it is far from being a mass of detail. It presupposes an acquaintance with the history of the church. In fact it would mean little, at least in many parts, to one who did not have the history of the church at his fingers' tips. It is a series of studies aiming to show the religious life of the church, to determine the spiritual forces that

¹ *Christianity in History. A Study in Religious Development.* By J. Vernon Bartlet and A. J. Carlyle. London: Macmillan, 1917. xx+613 pages. \$4.00.

molded it, the extent to which fundamental principles were carried to their legitimate conclusions or retarded and perverted by the exigencies of the church's life.

The authors of *Christianity in History* are favorably known to the theological world. Dr. Bartlet's work on the Apostolic Age introduced him to many American readers; and of Dr. Carlyle's work on political theory in the Middle Ages enough has appeared to make its completion eagerly awaited. The present book makes perhaps a wider appeal. It should be found useful by those who would study again the course of church history, or by the more advanced students of theology who would study the doctrinal teaching of the church in its broadest historical setting. Here is the greatest merit of the book. The doctrine of the church everywhere is presented as the outcome and culmination of the historical process. But that process is not treated as taking in a vacuum, or as the result of a dialectical evolution. It is the outcome of the rich and varied life of the church, in which piety, moral life, worship, all have their determining part, quite as much as has logic, perhaps a larger part. The great theological statements are traced to their roots in Christian experience and the contrasting theologies exhibited as the result of correspondingly contrasting types of religious life.

For the early church, to which somewhat more than half of the volume is devoted, the book is very suggestive. The passage in the Christological Controversies, for example, brief as it is, throws a flood of light on what commonly appears as an unedifying dispute. So far as actual theological learning goes, it cannot be said that there is much that is novel in the discussion, but all is well and convincingly stated. The treatment, however, becomes less convincing and more sketchy as the Middle Ages are approached. One is not by any means satisfied with the authors' excuse for the rapid pace for the later periods and the disproportionate treatment. It is well enough to show how the environment of Christianity in its first appearance and spread influenced its development. There remains a question which escapes the authors and should be answered in any discussion of Christianity in history: Why has Christianity in its historical form come to occupy in modern times a place in life quite different from that it held in the Middle Ages? The relations of Christianity to the political and social life of today are an even more fruitful topic of discussion than those relations in the second and third centuries. One cannot help wishing that the authors had done more to present Christianity as it is undergoing a process of transformation under the influence of modern economic and political ideas,

as it is being modified by the piety and religious feeling of the present. It is in this direction that the book fails to satisfy to anything like the degree to which it does in the early period.

J. CULLEN AYER, JR.

DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH
PHILADELPHIA, PA.

THE NATURE AND THE SANCTIONS OF MORALITY¹

Professor Everett has given us an admirable introduction to the study of ethics. His discussion is exceptionally well organized, his literary style is clear and graceful, his temper is scientific and sympathetic; and the resultant book is delightful and stimulating to the reader.

Ethics he defines as a "science of values in their relation to the conduct of life as a whole" (p. 7). Just why human beings place valuations on their experiences is a question to which no answer can be given other than to cite the fact of emotional and volitional activities inherent in life itself. The problem of ethics, then, is not to seek metaphysical explanations, but rather to interpret accurately the valuations which experience actually affirms.

The first portion of the book consists in a discussion of the important theories of ethics which have been set forth. Formalism, hedonism, and perfectionism are shown to be legitimate interpretations of aspects of experience. But none of them can stand as the sole explanation of morality. Loyalty to a cause, happiness as a consequence of action, and self-development are all real values. But when any one of them is abstracted from the total complex of life and made the sole criterion of morals, a distortion of values is sure to result.

The constructive portion of the book sets forth the important values which we find emphasized in the actual experience of men. Eight types of value are differentiated. The problem of ethics is to show how these values may be so understood in their mutual relations that the richest possible life may be achieved. Such tests as the following are suggested: "The less inclusive must always be subordinated to the more inclusive interest." "Values chiefly instrumental must be subordinated to those which are chiefly intrinsic." Permanent values are to be preferred to transient. Productive values (i. e., those which breed other values) are to be preferred to unproductive. Ethics is thus the critical study of the art of rational living.

¹ *Moral Values*. By Walter Goodnow Everett. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1918. xiii+439 pages.

The readers of the *American Journal of Theology* will be interested to know what becomes of certain aspects of ethical theory on which religious teaching has laid much stress. What about the authority of conscience? What about the sovereignty of the moral law? What about the religious sanctions of morality? Professor Everett has furnished a frank and illuminating discussion of these points. The fundamental fact is that values are always derived from human experience, and that any given value is therefore relative. There are no "absolutes." This seems at first blush to be eliminating the "authority" of moral precepts. But when we consider the admittedly imperfect character of the moral life of humanity up to date, it becomes more important to plan for steady progress in morals than to canonize any particular phase of moral history. "The belief that the standard of morality is progressive is far more precious than the belief that it is universal in the form of its requirements." A forward-looking, evolutionary conception of ethics discovers a reverence for the achievements of the past and an interest in the possible growth of morality both in the individual and in society, which furnishes quite as potent an enthusiasm for the good as did the older metaphysical sanctions.

The concluding chapter on the relation between morality and religion is a suggestive empirical study. Religion is concerned with "the cosmic fortune of values." The development of religious beliefs has been in the direction of affirming that our human values are protected and furthered by the Power in control of the universe as the supreme end. Professor Everett, while recognizing the intense longing of man that this should be so, nevertheless finds the reality of physical evil so inescapable as to make it impossible for a truthful soul to declare that this is the best of all possible worlds. He finds unsatisfactory the now somewhat popular conception of a finite God, thoroughly human in sympathies and purpose, but unable to eliminate the destructive forces which prey upon human values. Even less satisfactory, however, is the optimistic type of monism which affirms the complete goodness of the Absolute by declaring God's goodness to be different in quality from human values. Professor Everett holds that we must come to the conclusion that while human values are real ends, yet they are not the only ends in the universe. "In God's empire are many kingdoms. The life of humanity constitutes one of these kingdoms." To be loyal to the highest human values so as to make our kingdom as strong as possible is our way of securing the best interests of the larger empire. The other kingdoms are interrelated parts of a larger whole.

To survey the field of human values in such a way as to compel exact scientific observation and at the same time to disclose the immanent power of those values to stimulate loyalty, self-control, reverence, and a mystic faith, is a worthy achievement. In these days when theology is endeavoring to work out its problems in a scientific spirit, such a study of the spiritual life of man is of value, not only to students of ethics, but also to students of religion.

GERALD BIRNEY SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

FELIX ADLER'S *PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE*

Dr. Adler's rare personality, his many-sided activities and intimate contacts with all phases of human experience, gave pledge in advance that an ethical philosophy at his hands would be of unusual interest and profit. This pledge is fully redeemed in the present work.

Not the least interest of the book is found in its frankly personal note. Book I is devoted to an autobiographical Introduction. This record of personal development is so objective and illuminating that it offers the best possible propaedeutic to the author's moral theory. Here the reader follows Dr. Adler through his student days, and notes the influence of his teachers, his rejection of the traditional theism in which he was reared, his study of Kant, and his interest in social questions aroused by the writings of Lange. Then follow accounts of his gradual separation from the Hebrew faith and of his fresh study of the teachings of the gospel, to which he expresses a deep obligation, though compelled to reject the view that they attain ethical finality. The chapter on "Social Reform" may be especially commended to all social workers. The radical defect of programs of social reform lies in their failure to present an ethical end to which all improvements in material conditions must be instrumental. Dr. Adler is not indifferent, as all know who have followed his career, to the betterment of material conditions. But he well insists that, without a clear perception of the spiritual goal, desires for wealth are kindled which lead only to a vicious spiral of worldly ambition.

Book II, on "Philosophical Theory," contains an elaborate critique of Kant, and presents the author's own conception of an "infinite spiritual universe," an "infinite community of spiritual beings." The unity of "this infinite assemblage" consists in this—"that the unique difference of

* *An Ethical Philosophy of Life*. By Felix Adler. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1918. viii+380 pages. \$3.00.

each shall be such as to render possible the correlated unique differences of all the rest." Man has "worth" only "as a member of the infinite ethical manifold"; his task is to achieve uniqueness and to elicit it in others. Further, the conception of the "infinite spiritual universe," and the place of the individual in it, is not, according to the author, based upon empirical evidence derived from the existing moral order. It is rather a product of the "reality-producing function" of the mind, by the use of the principles of unity and manifoldness, which, to avoid the misleading implications of the term *a priori*, are called "functional finalities."

Thinkers will here raise significant questions. Granted a spiritual community of moral personalities, are we justified in identifying it at once with "reality," with the "infinite universe"? Or is its reality to be found within the universe, in the experience of the ethical beings who think and feel and will it? Again, is the conception reached by an immediate act of the mind, using the principles of "functional finality"? Or is it won by a creative process out of the experiences of the moral life, its defeats and successes, its frustrations and achievements? And still again, is not mere uniqueness, as such, and apart from the content of the moral life which is to be uniquely expressed by the individual, inadequate as a principle of worth? These are points, I think, at which Dr. Adler's theory challenges debate.

Books III and IV contain applications of the theory, and do not readily lend themselves to a brief summary. They present, however, many valuable discussions which, in not a few cases, bear directly upon vital issues of the present day. The ethical basis of property is found in "the control of external things for the maintenance and development of personality." No individual has an ethical right to "the great fortunes accumulated under the modern system of industry." Wages must be adjusted "with reference to the end to be served." "Adequate nourishment as to quantity and quality, suitable dwellings, educational opportunities, etc., are all indispensable to the rendering of service even by common laborers." This teleological method must be taken rather than that of attempting to determine, on genetic lines, a fair wage, for it is impossible to "construct an equation between labor and reward."

It is interesting to note that Dr. Adler favors vocational instead of geographical representation in the legislative body of the state. As for improvement in international relations, this will not come automatically by the growth of friendly intercourse, trade, and science. Only as the more advanced nations are awakened to the task of liberating the

potential spiritual life of the less advanced will they themselves find increased life. Until this ideal is accepted the "strong peoples will never cease to harm the weak, and in so doing to harm themselves."

This brief review can give only a suggestion here and there of the thought-provoking contents of Dr. Adler's work, and will best serve its purpose if it guides the reader to the book itself.

WALTER GOODNOW EVERETT

BROWN UNIVERSITY

WAR-TIME PREACHING¹

This book is the work of both a preacher and a teacher. Dr. Davis has young men before him preparing for the ministry, and the chapters are full of materials and suggestion for the preacher; but he looks beyond his classes to the people of the churches, perplexed, disturbed, suffering, needing an interpreter of Christianity in the face of a world-war. The students and the churches would both be helped by these discussions.

There are men who speak with an aloofness from life. They are intent on their biblical or philosophical conceptions and are not disturbed even by the sounds of war. Sermons have been published in this year of grace without the grace of timeliness. They lack that touch of humanness, that sympathy and knowledge that make the message a living word. And there are men who only speak a passing word, whose sermons and addresses always tingle with present sensation, who rarely go back of phenomena to eternal truths. One can see the value of current opinion in such a mirror of the past as the *Education of Henry Adams*. Mr. Richard Whiting, the English novelist, has wittily said: "We turn to the editorials of our great dailies for guides of conduct, we go to Westminster Abbey for the latest news." Happy the preacher who unites the two great principles of religion in the light of present experience. The Bible is the book of life: it interprets life. But to understand its truth and spirit needs something of the fulness of life. The book of Dr. Davis is a good example of the gospel in life. It is just what the title indicates, "The Gospel in the Light of the Great War."

It has special value because it is more than one man's interpretation. The field is too big for one man's experience to understand. Nothing is more marked than the individual reflections from this great experience

¹ *The Gospel in the Light of the Great War*. By Ozora S. Davis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919. vii+219 pages. \$1.25.

of our time. Here we have the word of poet and philosopher, of preacher and statesman and soldier. It is a generalization from many sources. It shows what a live man will do to understand his own age. Its value is in the wide study of the literature of the war.

The material is classified under significant topics, such as "New Conditions of the Preacher's Task," "The Moral Aims of the New Era," "Patriotism," "The Worth of Humanity," "The Reality of Religion," "The Fatherhood of God and the Mastership of Christ," "Forgiveness," "Immortality," and what Dean Brown of the Yale School of Religion calls the most important fact of our time, "The International Conscience, or The League of Nations." It would be still more valuable if a new era had not been taken for granted. Too many deny a new birth of time. They think it the same old world of struggle for the survival of the fittest. The indications of a new world are bright enough to the open eye, but they need interpretation for the mass of men.

The book has much practical suggestion as to the variety of materials for the sermon and where and how to find them. The pulpit may have the most interesting and vital message that the age bears.

The impression of the book is sometimes "scrappy," from its very method. And the least valuable parts are the texts and plans for sermons, crutches to most men. Men need to be trained how to see. The most effective message is the discovery of the man himself—the man speaking in his own way what God has given.

ARTHUR S. HOYT

AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

BRIEF MENTION

BIBLICAL AND EXEGETICAL

LEWIS, FRANK G. *How the Bible Grew*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919. xi+223 pages. \$1.50.

There are few among recent books on the Bible which compare in interest and suggestiveness with the little volume entitled *How the Bible Grew*, by Professor Frank Grant Lewis. It is one of the excellent "Handbooks of Ethics and Religion," published by the University of Chicago Press, intended for college classes and adult study groups; and it is clearly one of the best in the series.

The purpose of the book is to tell the story of the Bible "as told by the book and its keepers." In other words, the author seeks to determine the origin and growth of the Bible from information furnished by the book itself and by the men who had an important share in the transmission of the book. Certain outstanding characteristics of the volume which give it a unique value may be noted: (1) Its simplicity and

readableness. Even a novice can follow the discussion without difficulty and without fear of confusion. (2) Its direct dependence on the Bible itself. Wherever possible the author's statements are supported by biblical material, which means that the inductive method is used consistently.

A valuable feature is the chronology of the Bible writings and of the Bible versions given toward the close of the discussion.

The reviewer knows of no other work which serves the same purpose; and he heartily recommends it to all who desire to know the story of the Bible from its smallest beginnings to the completion of the American Revised Version in 1901.

F. C. E.

BOSWORTH, EDWARD I. *Commentary on the Epistle of Paul to the Romans.* (The Bible for Home and School.) New York: Macmillan, 1919. 281 pages. \$1.10.

The excellent series to which this brief commentary belongs has already made available for the English reader the adequate critical understanding of such outstanding New Testament epistles as Galatians (Bacon) and Hebrews (Goodspeed). Now Dean Bosworth, of the Oberlin Graduate School of Theology, does a similar service for Romans. As in the series generally, all critical processes and all controversy with differing views of other exegetes are happily omitted, and we have a simple, intelligible comment on the letter's phraseology, by the aid of which any reader may follow its meaning without difficulty. The English Revised Version of 1881 is taken as a basis, with no citation of the Greek or discussion of textual problems. Of course any reader of Romans must make certain notable presuppositions, and these are taken for granted here without investigation, which would quickly outrun the limits set for the book. The Introduction, of 80 pages, is followed by an excellent bibliography. Dr. Bosworth holds that the letter was sent to Rome from Corinth between the years 54 and 58, as "a document intended to provide a unification platform for Jewish and Gentile Christianity" (p. 57), chapter 16 being an integral part of it. Paul, it is held, had all his life been deeply concerned for the coming of the Messiah, and had opposed the movement of Jesus as tending to delay that consummation. As a Christian, he sought to convert the gentile world as quickly as possible, believing that thereupon the Jewish world would relent and accept the gospel, and all parties unite on a common Christian hope and faith. Since his projected mission in Spain is to be the last stage in the gentile propaganda, the end is glimpsed, and in this Roman letter the apostle lays down the outlines of the common faith with which the united church is to greet its Master's advent.

From this point of view the letter is explained, each section of comment being preceded by an illuminating and carefully worded paraphrase, which almost makes comment unnecessary. In the exegesis itself few novelties will be noticed, but there is always independence of judgment, based on sound learning and admirable good sense (which has not always been the distinguishing mark of commentators). Samples of the book's excellence may be seen in the comments on the *crux* of 9:5, on 3:25, on 10:14, and on 12:6-8.

C. R. B.

CHURCH HISTORY

ROCKWELL, WM. WALKER (editor). *Papers of the American Society of Church History*. Second Series, Vol. V. New York: Putnam, 1917. lrv+147 pages. \$3.00.

Six valuable papers are included in the volume. The easy orators who eulogize the Protestant Reformers as champions of religious liberty will be sobered by reading the first of these contributions, in which Professor J. A. Faulkner, dealing with "The Reformers and Toleration," exhibits the views of Melancthon and Zwingli, views wholly opposed to freedom of conscience in religion and indicating a constitutional inability to distinguish between error of opinion and depravity of heart. The principle of freedom belonged, however, to the logic of their situation. The second paper in the volume, by Arthur Charles Howland, enables the reader to view the intolerant Reformers as an improvement, on a more cruel past. His "Criminal Procedure in the Church Courts of the Fifteenth Century as Illustrated by the Trial of Gilles de Rais" by the painful detail of a shocking episode reveals this still darker background of oppression, and apart from this relation is of value as a concrete presentation of a mediaeval situation.

All who share the growing modern interest in the Anabaptists will prize two more papers. Professor H. E. Dosker discusses the contents of the ten volumes of the *Bibliotheca Reformatoria Neerlandica* with reference to the Anabaptist movement, and from the same rich source Professor A. H. Newman presents a valuable study of "Adam Pastor, Antitrinitarian Antipaedobaptist."

In lighter vein Frederick John Foakes Jackson, now of Union Seminary, narrates the career of "English Church Historians." He deals with Lightfoot, Stubbs, Creighton, Acton, Maitland, Hodgkin, Overton, and Gwatkin. This entertaining paper is also profitable for the bibliographical data by which Dr. Jackson registers the scholarly production of these authors.

The final paper is by Professor Jesse Johnson on "Early Theological Education West of the Alleghanies." Dealing with the period before 1835, this record of pioneer schools is limited chiefly to Presbyterian institutions.

It is to be regretted that the financial resources of the American Society of Church History do not allow more ample publication. A publication fund would be a benefaction to American Scholarship.

F. A. C.

BREHAUT, ERNEST (translator). *History of the Franks by Gregory Bishop of Tours*. (Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1916. xxv+284 pages. \$2.50.

LOOMIS, LOUISE ROPES. *The Book of the Popes, I. To the Pontificate of Gregory I*. (Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1916. xxii+169 pages. \$2.00.

Within the past ten or fifteen years the apparatus of teaching mediaeval history has been greatly enlarged by the publication of numerous "source books." But convenient and even valuable as many of these are, all of them have had the defect of presenting merely translated excerpts, with the result that the student who might be sent to them for reading got no impression of historical continuity and could do little intensive study because of the "scrappiness" of the material.

This defect is now beginning to be remedied. Professor Robinson, of Harvard, has recently published complete translations of the life of St. Severinus and of St. Boniface. The Princeton University Press has issued a translation of the whole of the Jordanes Gothic chronicle. And now we have before us an English version of the first great mediaeval chronicle, the *Historia regum Francorum* of Gregory of Tours, and another of the *Liber Pontificalis*, the earliest history of the popes. Both volumes pertain to the new Columbia historical series known as Records of Civilization.

While in each of these volumes some portions of the original have been omitted, yet so large a part has been translated that the student, unless he be meticulously inclined, will hardly be aware of the omissions. Here are two very valuable sources in which the historical student may do a sustained and continuous piece of investigation. Enough historical notes have been added by the translators to make the text intelligible without burdening the page with erudition. It is earnestly to be hoped that present historical conditions will not interrupt or arrest future publications of this kind in this valuable series, which so admirably elucidates the history of the past.

J. W. T.

NAU, F. *Méthodius Clement—Andronicus*. Reprint from *Journal Asiatique*, May-June, 1917. Paris: Aug. Picard, 1917. 59 pages. 3 francs.

With his usual care F. Nau has here published the text in Syriac and Greek, a translation, and excellent notes of three little fragments. The first two are pseudonymous and belong to mediaeval apocalyptic. The last, by a Greek author, thus far known only through the Syriac, is an interesting contribution to the world-view of Justinian's time. The only slip noticed by the reviewer occurs in the last line of the translation on page 55 (467), where the French has "Nord," the Syriac on page 51 reading *West*; the misprint is probably to be sought in the Syriac. Note 1, page 26, will scarcely bear in its entirety the scrutiny of calmer times.

M. S.

COHU, J. R. *The Evolution of the Christian Ministry*. London: John Murray, 1918. x+128 pages. 3s. 6d.

The book is addressed primarily to the "educated laymen and laywomen" of the churches of England. It attempts to cover the main outlines of the history of the organization of the Christian church from the beginning down to the present. Under the circumstances, as the writer himself admits, less is said of events and developments than of results and principles. No effort is made to enter into an independent discussion of critical problems. The work presents a résumé of the conclusions of experts, illustrated by citations from the sources and supported by quotations from modern authorities, that appear on almost every page. The treatment is eminently fair and, except for the program for church union in England suggested in the concluding chapter, succeeds admirably in transcending denominational bias. The value of the book to a beginner in the subject is enhanced by concise explanations, generally in footnotes, of such terms as catholicism, sacramentarianism, sacerdotalism, gnosticism, monasticism, etc.

The general conclusion is that historical investigation shows that no one form of organization is to be regarded as forever binding on the Christian church. A truly living church must obey the fundamental law that life is adaptation to environment and in each age work out that form of organization which best fits environment.

The concluding program of church union is thoroughly Anglican. It proposes the adoption of one of the proposals of a commission "for uniting His Majesty's Protestant subjects," appointed in 1689, namely, that Nonconformist ministers should submit to episcopal laying on of hands, not as reordination but in order to give them *legal* status and authority.

D. C. H.

ZEILLER, JACQUES. *Les Origines chrétiennes dans les provinces danubiennes de l'empire romain.* (*Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome.* Fascicule No. 112.) Paris: E. De Boccard, 1918. iv+667 pages.

Weighty as this volume is, it yet makes one feel light of heart. For it is good to know that, even during the din of arms and the passion of clashing foes which have vexed the world for four years past, the sense of historical scholarship and the solitude of the student have not been wholly destroyed. The quiet calm that has ever invested the precincts of the École Française de Rome has evidently not been invaded. Hence this book. Few more difficult or more thorny subjects than this were possible to conceive. Government, institutions, law, ethnography, doctrine, perplex the student on every side who would trace the history of the origins of Christianity in the Danubian provinces of the Roman Empire; for then, as now, these regions were a melting-pot of diverse things. The work is dedicated to Monseigneur Duchesne, which is proof positive of the erudition and quality of scholarship which pervades these pages. Having cleared the ground in a brief introduction, M. Zeiller in Part I devotes nearly two hundred pages to the history of the origin and spread of the church down to the time of Constantine. Part II (pp. 205-406) is an elaborate and detailed study of the interior history of the Illyrian churches in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries. Part III (pp. 407-596) is the latest and completest word which we have upon the conversion of the Goths. The author's mastery of the sources, both monumental and literary, is complete, and there are few, if any, works of importance omitted from the extended bibliography. An index of persons and places and a map complete the work.

J. W. T.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

QUAYLE, WILLIAM A. *The Dynamite of God.* New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1918. 330 pages. \$1.50.

Twenty sermons and addresses by Bishop Quayle are here printed under the title of the first discourse, the text of which is "Christ the Dynamite of God." This is typical of the entire volume, full of novel, vivid, suggestive, and not always accurate statements of essential Christian truth. Perhaps "accurate" is a strong word to describe the general method which is seen in the translation of *δυναμις* as "dynamite." While this fairly expresses one aspect of the character and ministry of Jesus, it is a quite inadequate and therefore inaccurate figure. Then one turns to this treatment of a text, "'Demas hath forsaken me!' A hot heart, aching out loud. That's the text. Listen to it, will you?" One cannot forget, after this. Then hear him describe a summer night, "where stars walk out and lean over and peek at you." On page 156 he describes how "the woman takes the hat pins out of her hat, six to ten of them, and puts them in her mouth for a minute, and takes her hat off and lays it down in

her lap and jabs the hat pins in and sighs a long sigh that is like regal comfort." How can one write a criticism of that? Might as well criticize the way a mother cuddles a baby. These sermons are just versatile, big-hearted, audacious Bishop Quayle in his characteristic vein.

O. S. D.

FISKE, CHARLES. *The Experiment of Faith*. New York: Revell, 1918. 180 pages. \$1.00.

It is a fascinating task to present the fundamentals of Christian faith to thoughtful young men and women of college age. Not many men can do it well. The Bishop Coadjutor of Central New York knows how. He discusses fifteen subjects, using such interesting titles as "Letting Oneself Go," "The Joyous Yea," and "Where the Sky Begins." Bishop Fiske is frank and fair, positive and sympathetic. A young man who has been trained in modern science will understand what the author is driving at. The great truths are not whittled down or presented with shamefaced apology. This book ought to help young people who are trying to think through their religious problems. The author has rendered a positive service to the younger generation in this book.

O. S. D.

PAUL, JOHN. *The Way of Power*. New York: Revell, 1918. 190 pages. \$1.00.

The author is vice-president of Asbury College, Kentucky, and the lectures stenographically reported in this volume were delivered before the Japan Convention for Deepening the Spiritual Life. They set forth, with strong claims for scripture warrant, the idea of holiness, or perfection in love, maintained by John Wesley. The fundamental doctrine requisite to this idea is original sin. "A man must stand four square on the subject of sin and the fall of man, or that man is a dead letter, so far as promoting the Gospel is concerned," says the lecturer. Just what it means to stand "four square" on these subjects is not explicitly stated; it seems to mean "the sin which extends to the entire race and has reference to the fall of man." The style is graphic and realistic; for example, concerning the discovery of the expansive power of steam, the writer says, "This mystic giant which had been stalking through the earth ever since Adam and Eve cooked their first breakfast in the garden of Eden, was hitched to our freight wagons and began to shake the continents with its power." The lecturer lays needed stress upon the reality of spiritual experience and defines the way of attaining an altitude of love and peace which many Christians certainly have attained, and which many more ought to reach. This is an excellent restatement of Wesley's teachings.

O. S. D.

JOSEPH, OSCAR L. *Essentials of Evangelism*. New York: Doran, 1918. 167 pages. \$1.25.

The author writes in the conviction that a new era in thought and practice is upon us, and that only those institutions and programs which actually fit the modern situation will persist. The church must measure up to the new demands. Especially important is the message of the church and the method by which it is spoken home to the heart of the generation. There are thirteen chapters in the book. The discussion begins with a clear definition of the message and closes with an excellent section

entitled "Thinking Through." Evangelism is broadly conceived as the entire reproductive process of the Christian organism. Therefore it is varied and vital and a constant accompaniment of the living church. The author's practical suggestions seem to have come from a real experience with practical church work. He is thoroughly acquainted with the literature of the subject. The greater part of the material is well known, but it is clearly presented and well arranged. The average layman would be stimulated to keener interest in church work by this book.

O. S. D.

ROBERTSON, A. T. *Making Good in the Ministry*. New York: Revell, 1918. 174 pages. \$1.00.

Taking the scant material in the New Testament which refers to John Mark, Professor Robertson sketches the characteristics of a worthy Christian minister. The volume is interesting from the standpoint of New Testament criticism or of pastoral theology (if a post-war curriculum is to endure such a term). John Mark (Acts 12:12) is Peter's son and interpreter (I Pet. 5:13) and the author of the Second Gospel, in which he "used his recollections of Peter's preaching as the chief basis of the book." He used other sources, however. He finally won Paul's praise and affection. On the background of this history Professor Robertson presents an attractive sketch of what the true Christian minister must be. It is a high ideal and worthy of the most earnest endeavor of the modern man.

O. S. D.

STEVEN, GEORGE. *The Warp and the Woof*. New York: Doran, 1918. xvi+289 pages. \$1.50.

In twenty-two chapters the author describes the development of a Christian soul, following the three divisions of intellect, feelings, and will. The author attempts to handle the matter according to the actual situations in which living Christian men and women find themselves. In the chapter "A Religion of the Will" we have a clear statement of the place of positive, courageous action in the Christian life. The experiences of the war and the life of Jesus are used to illustrate this aspect of the Christian religion. The study is happy and healthy throughout. Dr. Steven finds that life binds the normal soul to God rather than separating it from him. For a book that escapes the subtleties of rapt mysticism on the one hand and the dreary intricacies of laboratory psychology on the other, this is commendable. Especially valuable is the chapter entitled "Christianity a Religion of Joy."

O. S. D.

COFFIN, HENRY SLOANE. *In a Day of Social Rebuilding*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918. 212 pages. \$1.00.

A wise selection was made when Rev. Henry Sloane Coffin, minister in the Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church and associate professor in the Union Theological Seminary, was chosen to give the forty-fourth series of the Lyman Beecher Lectureship on Preaching in Yale University. The lectures are now published under this interesting title. They are eight in number. The first is a frank discussion of the function of the church in modern life; the second, of the essential ministry of reconciliation; the third, of the task of evangelism; the fourth, of worship; the fifth, of teaching; the sixth, of

organization; the seventh, of friendship; the last, of ministers for the day. One is aware that the lecturer is a preacher; the sermon form appears throughout in the presentation of the material. The note of real experience with the problems discussed sounds consistently. Dr. Coffin faces the living issues of the day fearlessly. The chapter on evangelism is especially clear. Note this: "An evangelism which occasionally imports a spiritual expert to win people from a dead world to a scarcely living church adds little to the Kingdom of God." Dr. Coffin insists that the whole task of the church is clearly defined; it is to make men followers of Jesus Christ. The range of discipleship must embrace the whole of life. These lectures contain the finest ideals of the modern ministry, expressed in clear and beautiful style, with the urgency of deep passion behind them and the temper of the true prophet charging them from first to last.

O. S. D.

MURRAY, J. LOVELL. *The Call of a World Task in War Time*. New York: Student Volunteer Movement, 1918. 214 pages. \$0.60.

This book is a brief outline of the missionary tasks and problems of the Christian church as they have been affected by the war. It was obviously written before the end of the war was anywhere in sight and finds its relation to the great conflict more in immediate illustrations of missionary needs and opportunities and in appeals for religious devotion and sacrifice that shall match those of patriotism than in a more fundamental study of the deeper causes of the war and the relation of the missionary enterprise to their removal or of its peculiar possibilities in the years after the war. The Preface states frankly that the book was prepared within a month to meet the urgent need of a textbook for a mission-study campaign in the colleges. Within the limitations of material and method inevitable under such conditions of hasty preparation, the book marshals facts and arguments that have played no small part in bringing about the recent missionary advances in all the churches. The fact that its appeal is very definitely to those who are already interested in missions, or who at least realize that they ought to be interested, makes one hope that we may some day have a more thoroughgoing interpretation of the intimate connection between the missionary enterprise and the international ideals for which America entered the war—a book that shall win new converts for the missionary cause among those who still think they "do not believe in foreign missions."

C. W. G.

SPEER, ROBERT E. *The Christian Man, the Church, and the War*. New York: Macmillan, 1918. 105 pages. \$0.60.

Few of our American religious leaders have learned more from the war than Dr. Robert E. Speer, or will have such a hearing for the new emphases which it has brought into their message. In the three chapters of this little book Dr. Speer gathers up his convictions on some of the moot points which the war has raised for Christian men. The first justifies America's participation in the war as against the extreme pacifist position, in a way that must have brought help to many honestly perplexed Christians. The second examines the true and permanent functions of the church in human society, as the war has made them plain. The third drives home the indispensable part of

Christianity in the solution of the present world-problem. Like all of Dr. Speer's more recent writings and utterances this volume shows that the war has carried him, not like some other popular devotional writers, toward a more rigid literalism, but rather toward a more social and contemporary interpretation and application of Christianity, not only without the slightest loss of spiritual authority and power, but with evident gain in both.

C. W. G.

FAUNCE, WILLIAM HERBERT PERRY. *The New Horizon of State and Church*. New York: Macmillan, 1918. 96 pages. \$0.60.

This little volume contains the four Bedell lectures given by President Faunce, of Brown University, at Kenyon College in 1918. They are an inspiring exposition of the wider international outlook which he calls "the return of America to the founders," and no less "the return of Christianity to Christ," which it is the "function of the Christian patriot" to cultivate and disseminate in the face of existing "obstacles to the international mind." He deals freshly and clearly with the question of national relationships, on which the war has focused the attention of all thoughtful Americans and Christians alike, and shows how valuably the highest patriotism and the truest Christianity can work together for its solution.

C. W. G.

ANTHONY, ALFRED WILLIAMS. *The Conscience and Concessions*. New York: Revell, 1918. 270 pages. \$1.50.

The author is executive secretary of the Home Missions Council. At the time he was no small factor in bringing together two wings of the denomination with which he was connected. In addressing the general theme of co-operation he writes out of his experience rather than from the academic viewpoint. Under the title of *The Conscience and Concessions* he gathers several brands of thought which have served as lecture-courses in the United States and Canada and as magazine articles. How the individual may preserve his personality and at the same time play his part in the remaking of society is another statement of the problem under discussion.

Four chapters, or about one-third of the book, give the two sides of the present situation under the headings "The Historic Movement toward Unity" and "The Unifying Tendencies of War" on the one hand, and "The Protests of Individualism" and "The Dead Hand of Organization" on the other.

Chapters v-ix introduce the Christian factor into the discussion in respect both to theory and to present-day experimentation. The concluding chapter is entitled "A Practical Program of Valid Concessions." This is not so much a program as it is a statement of the attitudes of mind which the individual must entertain in order to be a helpful factor in the work to be done. A recognition of the rights of others, patience, open-mindedness, intelligent benevolence, and the adoption of an ideal are the essential things.

As intimated above, the book is rather a statement of the author's observations and convictions in his secretarial capacity than the conclusions of exhaustive investigation. While not always convincing to the critical mind, the writer has a heartening message for those who are working alongside of him.

F. G. W.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

WALLIS, W. D. *Messiahs: Christian and Pagan*. Boston: Gorham Press, 1918. 276 pages. \$2.00.

This is a very timely book in the present state of thought among a great number of people. The difficulty is that the people who need this book most are least likely to read it. There is today a great increase of premillennial propaganda in the church, and upon relatively untrained minds it makes a profound impression. This book, with its full story of the rise and fall of similar systems of thought throughout all ages and among all nations, is calculated to give pause to any who have entertained hopes of a speedy return of Jesus in personal form for the inauguration of the promised messianic millennium.

The book is the result of an appalling amount of reading. It traces the movements of messianism among the Jews, Mohammedans, Buddhists, Negroes, American Indians, and Christians. The closing three chapters are concerned with "Messiahs and Miracles," "The Messiah and Politics," and "An Interpretation of Messianic Movements."

The book is not easy reading, for it is very largely a mass of quotations from many and widely variant sources. Full citations of literature enable the student to check up on the author's information at his will. The exposition of the various messianic beliefs is brief but on the whole fair and clear. An occasional inaccuracy is not surprising in so great a mass of material. For example, what can be meant (p. 54) by the statement "only in the Greek language does the name Christ signify the Anointed One . . . the Messiah"? Again, on page 37, we fail to see how the author knows that only the upper classes of the Jews were carried into captivity if, as he says, the Old Testament leads us to "suppose that all of the Jews were carried away by Assyria" (*sic*!). A little more care likewise would have greatly improved the proof-reading. But the main merit of the book lies in the fact that it shows clearly that the messianic conception is one that belongs exclusively to no one section of the human race but is a common possession of all.

J. M. P. S.

JOSEPH, ISYA. *Devil Worship, The Sacred Books and Traditions of the Yezidis*. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1919. 222 pages. \$2.50.

On the reviewer's desk lies a book whose lurid red covers and no less lurid title are designed to attract attention. Though dealing with a minor sect, Dr. Isya Joseph's essay on the devil worship of the Yezidis, or rather on the devil-worshipping Yezidis, is intended to fill no small place in the "World Worship Series."

The main thesis of the book is fairly well set forth and deserves the attention of everyone seriously interested in the history of religion. It rests upon a statement in the celebrated *Book of Religions and Religious Sects* of the well-known Arabic author Shahrastani. In a nutshell the thesis is this, that the name Yezidis is to be traced not to the Ummayyad Caliph Yezid I, but to Yezid ibn Unaisa, one of a great number of founders of Kharigite sects. Beside this main thesis the volume offers not a little interesting and important information about the development and the modern aspects of this curious religious body.

Unfortunately the book is marred by not a little dogmatism and scientific vanity and immaturity. One example of many will suffice in illustration: Note 1 on chap. vii,

page 210, is simply mystification to the ordinary reader and is, moreover, about as incorrect as it can well be. Further the English reader not conversant with Arabic, Persian, Kurdish, Turkish, etc., for whom the book is intended, will be still more bewildered by the extraordinary number of misprints, inaccuracies, and inconsistencies, in transliteration of foreign words, proper names, etc. To mention only a few glaring examples, why head the book and every other page with the impossible and mystifying form *Yezidiz*, when the final *z* is simply the English plural ending *s*? The unfortunate reader who looks elsewhere in encyclopedias or histories for '*Abd Mousa al-Ak-Aree*, *Am ibn-al 'As*, *Ashahr-Astani*, page 121, will be sorely disappointed. *Alton Salhani*, *K. F. Harper*, *Schwolsohn*: *Dies Sabien*, *gutterals*, are no better.

The copy which is now in the hands of the reviewer (June 1, 1919) contains no mention of the fact that a large part of the book is substantially a reprint of the author's dissertation for the doctorate, published in *AJSL*, XXV (1908/9), 111-56 and 218-54. The proofreading of these articles, done under the watchful eye of George F. Moore, is as good as that of the book is bad. The general reader who is interested in the book's essential contribution to knowledge will find these articles a safer guide than the book.

M. S.

Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei. Classe di Science Morali, Storiche e Filologiche. Serie Quinta, Vol. XXVI, Fasc. 7°-10°. Rome, 1917.

An interesting contribution to Lucretia literature with side lights on the papacy in the fifteenth century by Pier Desiderio Pasolini (pp. 645-98); a book of Abyssinian legends and traditions in a French translation published by Carlo Conti Rossini (699-718); two Syriac tractates on palmomantics (divinatory interpretation of spasms and spasmodic jerkings of various parts of the body), published with a retranslation into the original Greek of the first by Guiseppe Furlani (719-32); notes on excavations in Italy during 1917 (733-37); and a list of books presented to the Academy (738-54) constitute the interesting and not unimportant, if somewhat heterogeneous, contents of this number of the *Rendiconti*.

M. S.

DOCTRINAL

WARFIELD, BENJAMIN B. *Counterfeit Miracles*. New York: Scribner, 1918. 327 pages. \$2.00.

For several reasons this is an interesting book. It defends the thesis that with the apostolic church miracles ceased. It collates an astonishingly long list of patristic, mediaeval, and Roman Catholic "miracles." It rehearses the recent claims of the Irvingite gifts, faith healing and mind cure, with a discussion of Christian Science. Nearly a hundred closing pages are devoted to illustrative notes. The material was delivered as lectures at the Columbia Theological Seminary, South Carolina. The most arresting feature of this fluent presentation is a single slight omission which seems to have escaped the attention of the lecturer and possibly that of the hearers, but which the careful reader will not overlook; no definition is offered as to what constitutes a miracle, and hence no test is provided by which to distinguish "real" from "counterfeit" miracles, or even to identify any miracle as "real," even those of the New Testament. The work represents a type of thought and method of inquiry, as well

as presuppositions, which are out of touch with the modern mind. It will be welcomed by those whose mental outlook is bounded by the horizon of two generations ago.

C. A. B.

SINCLAIR, MAY. *A Defense of Idealism: Some Questions and Conclusions.*

New York: Macmillan, 1917. xvii+355 pages. \$2.00.

This is a sparkling piece of writing in defense of the absolute, that unity or reality which is all and in all and plays the game of the universe with, by, and for itself. The author thinks the deepest word in regard to it is "Spirit," but the term must be left "infinitely comprehensive" and "elastic," with a "wide margin for the Unknown," and should be understood to include "Life-force" and "Matter" and "Individual Self" and "Substance" and "Thing-in-itself" and the "Unknown" and "Unknowable" and "Soul" and "Consciousness" and "Thought" and "Will" and "Love." One would think that anything with such a tremendous "swallow" should be more than the vague, indifferent absolute of the old idealism. Miss Sinclair calls her absolute "rich and concrete" and finds it by jumping out of the frying-pan of epistemology into spiritualism, but her ultimate is still the same old shadowy absolute—absolute because the relativity of the world needs it; unity because the multiplicity of the world cries aloud for it. One can cover up a great deal of vagueness, however, with a blanket term like "Spirit." But, of course, the absolute cannot approve of Miss Sinclair's brilliant defense, for how must it feel to have its "appearance" in Miss Sinclair administering a "horrible mauling" to its "appearances" in the pragmatists and delivering "kicks in the ribs" to its "appearances" in pacific realists like Mr. Russell. Still there is no doubt that the manifestation of the absolute in Miss Sinclair has a tremendously good time and dances ecstatically among the struggling philosophies like the fabled Irishman at the fair, looking for heads to hit. It is enjoyable reading. Miss Sinclair thrusts brilliantly, parries prettily, but her blade does not go home. Her defense of idealism will not make converts, and to some idealists her reckless concessions to the neo-realism will seem like throwing down the walls.

Our author hates pragmatism. It is "unsterilized." She is relieved to know that "to treat Pragmatism and Humanism faithfully would be to slay the slain." Pragmatism has "no philosophical method. It has no logic: it is spineless." "If it were carried to its logical conclusions the eternal ideas of Truth, Goodness and Beauty would lose their meaning and we our belief in them." And so, relieved from the study of pragmatism, Miss Sinclair caricatures it. The scientific-critical school of America is ignored; the great work of James is not understood, and an early speculation of Schiller's regarding God and matter is presented as pragmatism. The pragmatists will be genuinely surprised to know what they stand for. One wonders how the absolute can tolerate such ridiculous "appearances."

Miss Sinclair recognizes that the new idealism has problems. Does the absolute spirit exist? It is a hypothesis which best meets the facts. No pragmatist will object to that. But why should an absolute spirit "appear" in its desire to "know itself"? "Why not?" says Miss Sinclair. That seems to be final. But when one thinks of evils which appear in that appearing—evils like war—is it enough to be told that "evil is illusion"; that "we are not *compelled* to attribute reality to badness"; that "in the Absolute, goodness and badness are no longer relative to each other"? This is maddening, and all the glittering generalities of Miss Sinclair's persuasive pen will not make the modern world take that ancient anaesthetic any more.

A. E. H.

HUIZINGA, A. V. C. P. *Theological Essays*. Boston: Gorham Press, 1918. 130 pages. \$1.25.

The subjects of the five papers are "The Hedonistic and Christian Paradox," "Discussions on Damnation," "Is 'Proverbs' Utilitarian?" "Anent Might and Right," and "Social or Individual Regeneration." Two of these have appeared in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. The book is dedicated to that bulwark of Calvinistic orthodoxy in Holland, Dr. Abraham Kuyper. The author names Princeton Seminary as almost the sole advocate in America of Reformation principles and expresses the pious wish that it may become more and more the rallying-point for all who would preserve the faith once delivered to the saints. Those who substitute external authority for the light of reason and discard the present emphasis on the social aspect of religion may find comfort here, but the student whose spirit and method of inquiry are modern must look elsewhere for the truth he seeks.

C. A. B.

WARING, HENRY F. *Christianity's Unifying Fundamental*. New York: Doran, 1919. 175 pages. \$1.25.

This book, which is popular in style, is written "to direct attention to the biggest, deepest and most unifying thought in Christianity," and this with a view to promoting that co-operation between liberals and conservatives which, as the author reasonably maintains, can be best secured through this emphasis upon what is really fundamental in religious belief. "Fellowship with Christlike Deity, that makes for Christlike humanity—this is Christianity's Unifying Fundamental." It emphasizes that which underlies all the differences between the churches, since it is what all Christians must hold in common. Moreover, it does not call for any unnatural union, but permits great diversity in unity.

D. C. M.

SNOWDEN, JAMES H. *The Coming of the Lord: Will It Be Premillennial?* New York: Macmillan, 1919. xxi+288 pages. \$1.75.

Books on the subject of the millennial hope may be either historical, expository, or controversial. Dr. Snowden's book is distinctly in the controversial class. It is based on the fact (for it is not a mere assumption) that there is a question which divides Christian students of the Scriptures into two warring camps. The question is stated in the very title of the book, "Will the coming of the Lord be premillennial?" Dr. Snowden is aware that for a long time past those who have published their answers to the question have taken the affirmative side in the debate. It was about time for those who cannot accept this answer to register their dissent. Dr. Snowden comes forward and not only distinctly and emphatically registers his dissent and that of many others, but gives many good reasons why premillennialism should be regarded as an error and a serious departure from the sound and scientific interpretation of the Christian system. In support of his thesis he marshals an array of considerations which his opponents will find it hard to meet and refute. It will be unnecessary to attempt even a rough sketch of the argument. Suffice it to say that for clearness of statement, directness of attack, and absence of bitterness in polemic Dr. Snowden has given a shining example for writers in this subject to imitate, whether they agree with him or differ from him.

A. C. Z.

CAMPBELL, JAMES M. *The Second Coming of Christ: A Message for the Times.* New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1919. 136 pages. \$0.60.

The only source of knowledge on the subject of Christ's second coming is the New Testament. To the New Testament, therefore, Mr. Campbell resorts in his desire to answer the questions of when and how the second coming is to take place. His search of his source is open-minded and careful. His exegesis is free from vagaries and fanciful literalisms. He comes to the conclusion that the second coming foreshadowed in the New Testament is not to be identified with the coming of the Holy Spirit. But he declines to interpret the words of the New Testament as predicting an individual bodily re-entrance of Jesus into the world. The second coming therefore means the reincarnation of Christ in the whole body of humanity. The incarnation is bodily, but not fleshly and individual. The style is expository throughout. The controversial element is totally absent. As a study of a living question from a unique point of view the little book is worthy of all consideration.

A. C. Z.

MISCELLANEOUS

The Record of a Quaker Conscience: Cyrus Pringle's Diary. With an introduction by Rufus M. Jones. New York: Macmillan, 1918. 93 pages. \$0.60.

Cyrus Pringle was an uncompromising Quaker, who was drafted for military service July 13, 1863. This diary records the experiences and meditations of this conscientious objector during nearly five months of steady refusal to give any active service, either direct or indirect, in obedience to military orders. While he complains very little, the strain of constant passive resistance completely broke his health. He was ultimately paroled by President Lincoln. Professor Jones, in his introduction, gives a sympathetic interpretation of the Quaker's ideal of maintaining the inner integrity of his personality. The diary reveals the pathetic dilemma of an unalterable alien in war time, no less pathetic when the alienation is religious rather than political.

G. B. S.

NOIRÉ, LUDWIG. *The Origin and Philosophy of Language*, 2d ed., revised and enlarged. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1917. 159 pages. \$1.00.

This is one of the curious books published by the Open Court, i.e., by the energetic and always selfless and truth-seeking genius of the late, lamented Paul Carus. It can hardly be described as one of the Open Court's notable contributions, of which there are more than is generally known. Perhaps the reason for the choice of Noiré lay in the fact that he was a monist. The reviewer cannot but wish that a translation of Wundt's material on the same subject might have been offered instead.

M. S.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

- Böhl, F. M. Th. *Bijbelsch-Kerkelijk Woordenboek. Onder Redactie van Prof. Dr. A. Van Veldhuizen. I. Het Oude Testament.* Groningen: Wolters, 1919. vii+332 pages. 7.25 fr.
- Genung, John Franklin. *A Guidebook to the Biblical Literature.* Boston: Ginn & Co., 1919. xv+686 pages. \$2.50.
- Jastrow, Morris, Jr. *A Gentle Cynic.* Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1919. 255 pages. \$2.00.
- Penniman, Josiah H. *A Book about the English Bible.* New York: Macmillan, 1919. ix+444 pages. \$2.25.

NEW TESTAMENT

- Bosworth, Edward Increase. *Commentary on the Epistle of Paul to the Romans (Bible for Home and School).* New York: Macmillan, 1919. 281 pages. \$1.10.
- Cadbury, Henry J. *The Style and Literary Method of Luke. Part I. The Diction of Luke and Acts.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919. 72 pages. \$1.25.
- Hastings, James (editor). *Dictionary of the Apostolic Church. Vol. II.* New York: Scribner, 1918. xii+724 pages. \$6.00.
- Streatfield, Frank. *Preparing the Way.* New York: Macmillan, 1918. xix+205 pages. \$1.25.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Aalders, W. J. *Bijbelsch-Kerkelijk Woordenboek. Onder Redactie van Prof. Dr. A. Van Veldhuizen. III. De Kerk.* Groningen: Wolters, 1919. 332 pages. 7.25 fr.
- Alfaric, Prosper. *Les écritures manichéennes.* Paris: Emile Nourry, 1918. Two vols. iii+154 and 240 pages.
- Alfaric, Prosper. *L'évolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin. I: Du Manichéisme au Néoplatonisme.* Paris: Emile Nourry, 1918. ix+556 pages.

- Köhler, W. *Martin Luther und die deutsche Reformation.* Berlin: B. C. Teubner, 1916. v+135 pages.
- Manning, Bernard Lord. *The People's Faith in the Time of Wyclif.* Cambridge: University Press, 1919. xvi+196 pages.
- Moore, Edward Caldwell. *The Spread of Christianity in the Modern World (Handbooks of Ethics and Religion).* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919. xi+352 pages. \$2.00.

DOCTRINAL

- Demeuran, J. Louis. *L'église.* Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1914. xxviii+347 pages. 4 fr.
- Huby, Joseph. *La conversion.* Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1919. 119 pages. 1.75 fr.
- Marshall, Henry Rutgers. *Mind and Conduct.* New York: Scribner, 1919. ix+236 pages. \$1.75.
- Schleiter, Frederick. *Religion and Culture.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1919. x+206 pages. \$2.00.
- Sorley, W. R. *Moral Values and the Idea of God.* New York: Putnam, 1919. xix+534 pages. \$5.00.
- Youtz, Herbert Alden. *Democratizing Theology. A Call to Educated Religious Leadership.* Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1919. 39 pages. \$0.25.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Anthony, Alfred Williams. *The Conscience and Concessions.* New York: Revell, 1918. 270 pages. \$1.50.
- Davis, Ozora S. *The Gospel in the Light of the Great War.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919. vii+219 pages. \$1.25.
- Hunter, Robert. *Why We Fail as Christians.* New York: Macmillan, 1919. xiii+180 pages. \$1.60.
- Kelman, John. *The War and Preaching.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919. 216 pages. \$1.25.

- Kirk, Harris Elliott. *The Consuming Fire*. New York: Macmillan, 1919. xiii+183 pages. \$1.50.
- Mitchell, C. A. *The Model Prayer and Other New Testament Studies*. Boston: Badger, 1918. 154 pages. \$1.25.
- Second Report of the Joint Commission on the Book of Common Prayer. New York: Macmillan, 1919. xx+301 pages. \$1.50.
- Versteeg, John M. *The Modern Meaning of Church Membership*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1919. 160 pages. \$0.75.
- Castillon, Pierre. *Trois problemes moraux: Autour du mariage*. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1918. 93 pages. 2 fr.
- Duggan, Stephen Pierce (editor). *The League of Nations; The Principle and the Practice*. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1919. xvii+357 pages. \$2.50.
- From French "Mascots" to Their American "Godfathers." Paris: American Red Cross in France, 1919. 62 pages. 1 fr.
- Inge, William Ralph. *The Philosophy of Plotinus*. Two vols. New York: Longmans, 1918. xvi+270 and xii+253 pages. \$9.00.
- Jaarboek voor het Protestantisch Theologisch Onderwijs. Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1919. 104 pages. 1.25 fr.
- The Korean Situation. Authentic Accounts of Recent Events by Eye Witnesses. New York: Federal Council, 1919. 125 pages. \$0.25.
- Ladd, George Trumbull. *Knowledge, Life, and Reality*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918. 549 pages.
- Lewis, Frank G. *How the Bible Grew*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919. xi+223 pages. \$1.50.
- Mackenna, Robert W. *The Adventure of Life*. New York: Macmillan, 1919. xii+233 pages. \$1.25.
- Palmer, George Herbert. *Altruism, Its Nature and Varieties*. New York: Scribner, 1919. x+138 pages. \$1.25.
- Purcell, Richard J. *Connecticut in Transition, 1775-1818*. Washington: American Historical Association, 1918. x+471 pages.
- Scott, James Armstrong. *The Christian Nations and the Hague*. (Hattie Elizabeth Lewis Memorial Essays in Applied Christianity.) Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 1918. 48 pages.
- Sorley, W. R. *Spinoza (from the "Proceedings of the British Academy," Vol. VIII)*. London: Oxford University Press, 1918. 20 pages. 1s. 6d.
- Swift, Morrison I. *Can Mankind Survive?* Boston: Marshall Jones, 1919. 201 pages. \$1.50.
- Trask, Katrina. *Without the Walls*. New York: Macmillan, 1919. 196 pages. \$1.40.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

- Gilmore, George William. *Animism, or Thought Currents of Primitive Peoples*. Boston: Marshall Jones, 1919. xiii+250 pages. \$1.75.
- Hastings, James. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. Vol. X, "Picts—Sacraments." New York: Scribner, 1919. xx+915 pages. \$7.00.
- Joseph, Isya. *Devil Worship*. Boston: Badger, 1919. 222 pages. \$2.50.
- Keith, A. Berriedale. *The Sāmkhya System*. (Heritage of India Series.) London: Oxford University Press, 1918. 109 pages. 1s. 6d.
- MacPhail, J.M. *Asoka*. (Heritage of India Series.) New York: Oxford University Press, 1918. iii+88 pages. \$0.60.
- Moore, Clifford Herschel. *Pagan Ideas of Immortality During the Early Roman Empire*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918. 64 pages. \$0.85.
- Moore, George Foot. *History of Religions. Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism*. New York: Scribner, 1919. xvi+552 pages. \$3.00.
- Wallis, Wilson D. *Messiahs: Christian and Pagan*. Boston: Badger, 1918. 276 pages. \$2.00.

MISCELLANEOUS

- Best, Harry. *The Blind: Their Condition and the Work Being Done for Them in the United States*. New York: Macmillan, 1919. xxviii+763 pages. \$4.00.

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
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